✦ High Court of India

Criminal Petition No. 6709 of 2024 · The High Court

Case Details

1 Reserved on : 10.01.2025 Pronounced on : 22.01.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.6709 OF 2024 BETWEEN: MR.RAHUL PANDYA S/O SRI BHASKER BHANUPRASAD PANDYA, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS RESIDING AT FLAT NO. D303, CITILIGHTS, RUSTIQUE, ECC ROAD, WHITEFIELD, BENGALURU – 560 066. (BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI RAVI C.S., ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA BY WHITEFIELD CEN POLICE STATION I FLOOR, WHITEFIELD MAIN ROAD, BESIDE PRESTIGE WHITE MEADOWS, SATHYA SAI LAYOUT, WHITEFIELD, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA – 560 066. REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... PETITIONER 2 HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA. 2 . SAMSUNG R AND D INSTITUTE INDIA BANGALORE PRIVATE LTD., A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956 HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO. 2870, PHOENIX BUILDING BAGMANE CONSTELLATION BUSINESS PARK OUTER RING ROAD, DODDANEKUNDI CIRCLE MARATHALLI, BENGALURU – 560 037. REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE MS. SOPHIA DAS HEAD HR-SSIR DIVISION. (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1; SRI RAGHAVENDRA K., ADVOCATE FOR R-2) ... RESPONDENTS THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO 1. SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 07-06-2024 PASSED BY THE HONOURABLE 45TH ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, BANGALORE IN CRIME NO.1145 OF 2020 REJECTING THE ‘B’ REPORT, TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE OFFENCES UNDER SECTIONS 66, 66(C), 72(A) OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000 AND SECTION 420 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE AND DIRECTING THE COMPLAINANT TO LEAD EVIDENCE ON 20-07-2024 AT DOCUMENT NO.1 AND ETC., 3 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 10.01.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CAV ORDER The petitioner/accused is knocking at the doors of this Court in the subject petition calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.1145 of 2020 for offences punishable under Sections 419 and 420 of the IPC and Sections 66C, 66D and 72A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (‘the Act’ for short).

Legal Reasoning

2. Heard Sri C.S.Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri K. Raghavendra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:- The 2nd respondent/Samsung R & D Institute India-Bangalore Private Limited (‘the Company’ for short) is the complainant. The 4 petitioner on completion of his Master’s in Engineering from Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur and securing first rank accepts offer of employment offered by the 2nd respondent/Company after an interview. He joins the Company as an Associate Director in the Commercial Modem Software Development Team. The petitioner works for about a year and on 27-04-2020 tendered his resignation. After his resignation he sent documents from his official email id for reviewing his assigned responsibilities as an employee. When no response was received even on the last date of the notice period on 29-05-2020, he leaves the Company. After exit of the petitioner from the Company comes the impugned crime registered on 24-09-2020 which becomes a crime in Crime No.1145 of 2020 for the afore-quoted offences. The police conduct investigation and file a ‘B’ report before the concerned Court. The complainant files a protest petition. The ‘B’ report is rejected and cognizance is taken for the afore-quoted offences. Taking of cognizance on rejection of ‘B’ report is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 5 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner in the capacity of him being the Associate Director and in terms of employment agreement had access to confidentiality or confidential information. He is now alleged that he has sent confidential organizational information via 24 emails to his personal id in violation of the security policy of the complainant and the petitioner admits that he has sent all those mails. He voluntarily surrenders his laptop, and mobile phone prior to his last date of working in terms of the notice period. The learned counsel submits that the petitioner has never indulged in data thieving as is alleged and the issue which is purely a commercial dispute between the parties is sought to be dressed with a colour of crime. Therefore, the Police had rightly filed a ‘B’ report, as the issue being a dispute with regard to employment and the Court has erroneously taken cognizance of the offence. He would seek quashment of entire proceedings pending before the concerned Court. 5. Per-contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/Company would contend that the Police did not conduct 6 a proper investigation. On a shoddy investigation, they filed a ‘B’ report. The Court has rightly rejected the ‘B’ report on filing of protest petition and taken cognizance of the offence. The civil suit is instituted by the complainant to restrain the petitioner/accused from divulging any confidential information. Injunction is granted against the petitioner/accused. The petitioner also filed a counter claim which is rejected by the concerned Court. He would submit that in a given case both civil and criminal law can go hand in hand. He seeks dismissal of the petition. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The employment of the petitioner with the 2nd respondent/Company is a matter of record. An employment agreement is entered into between the two and conditions of employment that are necessary to be noticed read as follows: “…… ….. ….. 7 2. (a) (b) (c) STANDARD CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT In addition to the terms of this Agreement, You shall be subject to the standard terms of employment of the Company as stated in the Employee Handbook and any other policies or procedures communicated to You by the Company either orally or in writing (“Standard Employment Terms”). The Standard Employment Terms will be communicated to you from time to time or be accessible by you on the Company’s Intranet. The Standard Employment Terms will relate to various matters relating to your working with the Company, including hours of work, holidays, leave, code of conduct, confidentiality policy, dress code, etc. including The Standard Employment Terms are deemed to include other policies of the Company that may be created for prevention of the policy harassment at the workplace, internet and network use policy, intellectual property policy, etc. The Standard Employment Terms may be changed by the Company from time to time at the sole discretion of the Company and such changed Standard Conditions of Employment shall become applicable to You forthwith, upon receipt of notice of the same. It is clarified that uploading of updated Standard Employment Terms in the Company’s intranet is deemed as notice of such changed Standard Conditions of Employment.” The petitioner, after a year, tenders his resignation and after the resignation at the end of notice period on communicates the following mail: “Rahul Bhasker<[email protected]> 8 To: Sophia Das <[email protected]> Cc: Balajee Sowrirajan<[email protected]>, [email protected], Haesong Jung <[email protected]>, Kiran Nadagoudar<[email protected]>, Madhu Mohan Mulbagal Rathnaiah <[email protected]>, [email protected] Hi Sophia and all, First of all, my sincere apologies for this behavior. I have committed a mistake and I am very sorry for the same. I admit that I have behaved irresponsibly. Prior to receiving this mail, I have voluntarily handed over my phone, my personal laptop and my gmail password to SSIR security for any further investigation. I am fully cooperating in any kind of investigation from your side. I do not wish to access this gmail account till the investigation is over. However, if you want I can delete all 24 mails myself immediately upon confirmation form your side. I also declare that this information is not forwarded or sent to anyone else. And I will never do the same. Once again my sincere apologies to all of you. Best Regards Rahul Pandya [Quoted text hidden]” On 02-06-2020 he communicates the following further mail: “Hi Sophia, I am waiting for further update from your side. 9 Since my phone, personal laptop and gmail password are in SSIR possession since 29th May, I would also like to know when will I get back my personal belongings. As my kids school online classes started, it is of great inconvenience to not have my laptop with me. I am sure that my personal information will not be misused in any manner since all my personal sensitive information is stored in my phone and laptop. Best Regards Rahul Pandya [Quoted text hidden]” Long thereafter, a complaint comes to be registered by the respondent/Company on 24-09-2020. Certain paragraphs of the complaint are germane to be noticed. They read as follows: “…. …. …. 5. 6. his official During the internal investigations, as is highlighted in the KPMG Report, it was found out that even earlier, i.e. on 19 May 2020 Rahul Pandya sent 1 (one) email ID from [email protected] to a Gmail ID bearing [email protected], which contained details of modem project/group, which is confidential and commercially sensitive information belonging to SRI-B as it contained information about ongoing commercial projects and future roadmap. Samsung e-mail It was also confirmed by KPMG that on 28 May 2020, one day prior to his resignation, Rahul Pandya had indeed sent 24 (Twenty four) Emails from his official Samsung E-mail ID [email protected] to a Gmail ID [email protected], as was also 10 found by Company’s internal IT team earlier. In the said batch of emails sent out on 28 May 2020, 10 e- mails were confidential in nature and 12 emails contained proprietary information of SRI-B.” …. …. …. 10. Sir, the from Moreover, the aforesaid actions were very obviously committed with an evil intent and criminal mind to make an unlawful enrichment and deliberately causing unlawful loss to the Company, both monetarily and facts and otherwise. circumstances deciphered by both SRI-B internal team and third party independent investigator KPMG, and the duration and repetitive nature of his malafide actions, it is crystal clear that the Ruhul Pandya was not just cheating the Company on almost a daily basis but possibly also had fraudulent intentions to steal valuable confidential Data/proprietary information of the Company from day one and possibly, even before joining the Company, and prima facie appears that he joined the Company only with the sole motive to commit the aforesaid offences of Criminal Breach of trust and cheating, in addition to offences committed under the Information Technology Act, 2000.” The Police conduct investigation and file a ‘B’ report. The reason for filing ‘B’ report can be gathered in the following paragraphs: “.... .... .... PÉÆ£ÉAiÀÄ ¢£ÀªÁVzÀÄÝ, ¢£ÁAPÀ:25/02/2023 gÀAzÀÄ vÀ¤SÁ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è DgÉÆÃ¦UÉ £ÉÆÃn¸ï eÁj ªÀiÁrzÀ ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ ¥Éưøï oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è ºÁdgÁVgÀÄvÁÛ£É. DvÀÀ£À£ÀÄß «ZÁgÀuÉ ªÀiÁr ºÉýPÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß zÁR®Ä ªÀiÁrPÉÆArzÀÄÝ, ¢£ÁAPÀ: 29/05/2020 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄ PÉ®¸ÀPÉÌ ¢£ÁAPÀ: PÉ®¸ÀzÀ Lr vÀ£Àß C£ÀÄPÀÆ®ªÁUÀ§ºÀÄzÉAzÀÄ [email protected] Lr [email protected] UÉ vÀgÀ¨ÉÃwUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ zÀvÁÛA±ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀUÁðªÀuÉ ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛ£É. ¢£ÁAPÀ: 29/05/2020 gÀAzÀÄ ¦üAiÀiÁð¢/ºÉZïDgï gÀªÀgÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£ÀzÀ ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄ ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀ ¯Áå¥ïmÁ¥ï, PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄ ¯Áå¥ïmÁ¥ï, ªÉƨÉʯï 28/05/2020 PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄ gÀAzÀÄ ªÉÄÃ¯ï ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀ DgÉÆÃ¦ ªÉÄÃ¯ï ¤AzÀ 11 ¥sÉÆÃ£ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DvÀ£À fªÉÄïï DPÉì¸ïUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀA¥À¤UÉ PÉÆlÄÖ, PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄÄ £ÀqɹzÀ DAvÀjPÀ vÀ¤SÉUÉ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛ£É. vÀzÀ£ÀAvÀgÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 08/06/2020 gÀAzÀÄ ¸ÁåªÀÄìAUï PÀA¥À¤AiÀĪÀgÀÄ DgÉÆ¦AiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀA¥À¤UÉ §gÀªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ, J®ègÀ ¸ÀªÀÄPÀëªÀÄ ªÀUÁðªÀuÉ ªÀiÁrPÉÆArzÀÝ J¯Áè zÀvÁÛA±ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß r°Ãmï ªÀiÁr ¯Áå¥ï mÁ¥ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÉƨÉʯïUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÁ¥À¸ÀÄì PÉÆnÖgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀ:09/06/2020 gÀAzÀÄ PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄ M¦àUÉAiÀÄ ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ DgÉÆÃ¦ vÀ£Àß fªÉÄïï LrUÉ ¥Á¸ïªÀqïð C£ÀÄß §zÀ¯ÁªÀuÉ ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛ£É. DzÀgÉ PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄÄ DgÉÆÃ¦UÉ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà QèÃAiÀÄgÉ£ïì ¤ÃqÀzÉ EzÀÝ PÁgÀt, DvÀ£ÀÄ ¥ÀzÉà ¥ÀzÉà ªÉÄÃ¯ï ªÀiÁrzÀ ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 18/06/2020 gÀAzÀÄ PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄ ªÀÄzsÀÄ ªÉÆÃºÀ£ï JA§ÄªÀgÀÄ E£ÀÆß vÀ¤SÉ £ÀqÉAiÀÄÄwÛzÀÄÝ, ¥ÀÆtðUÉÆAqÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ ªÀiÁ»w ¤ÃqÀĪÀÅzÁV DgÉÆÃ¦UÉ ªÉÄÃ¯ï ªÀiÁrzÀÄÝ, CzÀgÀ°è DgÉÆÃ¦ zÀvÁÛA±ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ AiÀÄjUÁzÀgÀÆ ±ÉÃgï ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ ¥Àj²Ã®£É ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ PÀA¥À¤AiÀİè C¸ÉÆÃ¹AiÉÄÃmï qÉÊgÉPÀÖgï DVzÀÄÝ, ªÀUÁðªÀuÉ ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀĪÀ J¯Áè zÀvÁÛA±ÀUÀ¼À DPÉì¸ï DvÀ¤VgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. CªÀÅUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀUÁðªÀuÉ ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà DyðPÀ ¯Á¨sÀ ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀĪÀÅ¢®è, PÀA¥À¤UÉ DyðPÀ £ÀµÀÖ GAlÄ ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ GzÉÝñÀ CxÀªÁ PÀA¥À¤UÉ ªÉÆÃ¸À ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ GzÉÝñÀ EgÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ vÀ£Àß ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgÉzÀ ºÉýPÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛ£É. DvÀ£À ªÉÄÃ¯ï ¸ÀAªÀºÀ£À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀ¸ÀÄÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀA¥À¤UÉ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀÅzÀPÉÌ ºÁUÀÆ ¹«¯ï zÁªÉUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀ®A.65(©) ¥ÀæªÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæzÉÆA¢UÉ ºÁdgÀÄ¥Àr¹gÀÄvÁÛ£É.” On the ‘B’ report comes the protest petition by the complainant. The crux of the protest petition was misuse of data. On the protest petition comes the impugned order which rejects ‘B’ report and taking of cognizance. The order insofar as it is germane reads as follows: “…. …. …. 17. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for accused, the breach of contract would amount to offence of cheating only if the intention to cheat was existing at the very inception. The investigation officer has stated in his report that, there is no evidence to show that, the accused was having such an intention since from joining the complainant company. Whereas, the complainant has clearly stated in paragraph No.10 of the first information statement that, the act of transferring the data pertaining to the 12 company from official e-mail ID of the company to his personal e-mail ID were obviously committed with an evil intent and criminal mind to make an unlawful enrichment and deliberately causing unlawful loss to the company, both monetarily and otherwise. Further it is alleged that, moreover from the facts and circumstances deciphered by both SRI-B internal team and their party independent investigator KPMG and the duration and repetitive nature of his malafide actions, it is crystal clear that the accused was not just cheating the company on almost a daily basis, but possibly also had fraudulent intentions to steal valuable confidential data/proprietary information of the company from day one and possibly even before joining the company and prima-facie appears that he joined the company with a sole motive to commit the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating and offences under Information Technology Act, 2000. Further, the complainant in the protest petition has asserted that, the complainant company is ready to provide evidence and produce necessary digital and documentary evidence to prove that the accused has committed the alleged offences. 18. Admittedly, the investigation officer has not submitted the seized laptop and mobile phone for forensic examination and obtained expert report with regard to whether the alleged data of the company was transferred and deleted from the said devices. Further, the investigation officer has not collected necessary documents with regard to appointment and agreement entered by the accused with the complainant company in order to ascertain whether there is any violation of terms of the employment agreement and confidentiality agreement committed by the accused. On meticulously going through the contents of 'B' report filed by the investigation officer, it reveals that, the main ground or reason for filing 'B' report is that, there is lack of evidence to show that the accused has misused the stolen data or the accused has stolen the said data with an intention to cheat the complainant company or he has caused any financial loss to company. The said grounds are not sustainable, as it is not necessary for the complainant to prove that, the accused has stolen the said data with an intention to cheat the complainant company or he has caused any financial loss to company. Mere transferring the confidential data of another 13 person or company without their permission, itself amounts to an offence under Information Technology Act, 2000. Hence, this Count is of the opinion that, at this stage there is a prima - facie material on record to take cognizance of offences punishable Sec.66, 66(C), 72(A) of Information Technology Act, 2000 and Sec.420 of I.P.C. The ratio laid down and the observations, made in the above cited decisions is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Further, the protest petition filed by the complainant contains all the necessary ingredients of a complaint and it is signed by the authorised person of the complainant company. In such circumstances, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the material placed on record by complainant, this Court is of the opinion that, an opportunity is to be given to complainant company to prove its case by examining its witnesses with all relevant documents with regard to violation of terms of the employment agreement and confidentiality agreement by the accused and commission of alleged offence under Sec.66, 66(C), 72(A) of Information Technology Act, 2000 and Sec.420 of I.P.C. Accordingly, holding that the complainant has made our reasonable grounds to reject the 'B’ report filed by the investigation officer and to take cognizance of alleged offences, I answer Point No. 1 in affirmative. 19. Point No.2: In view of above conclusion arrived on Point No.1, I proceed to pass the following:

Decision

ORDER The ‘B’ report filed by investigation officer is hereby rejected. Cognizance of offences punishable under Sec.66, 66(C), 72(A) of Information Technology act, 2000 and Sec.420 of I.P.C., is taken against the accused. For sworn statement of complainant, call on 20-07- 2024.” 14 The concerned Court observes that as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the accused, a breach of contract would not amount to an offence of cheating. But, then goes on to hold that it was not a breach of contract, but it was a transfer of data unauthorizedly. 8. The issue now would be, “whether further proceedings before the concerned Court should be permitted to be continued or otherwise?” 9. In the considered view of this Court, the proceedings cannot be permitted to be continued, for the simple reason that the 2nd respondent/complainant has already filed a civil suit in O.S.No.5190 of 2020 to restrain the petitioner/accused from circulating any proprietary information. There is an order of injunction operating against the petitioner. A perusal at the contents of the complaint quoted hereinabove would indicate that for the same cause of action of preventing the petitioner from circulating confidential proprietary information suit is filed. Therefore, the ground on which the civil suit is preferred is the 15 alleged breach of confidentiality clause in the agreement. The reason for registering the crime is again breach of confidentiality clause in the agreement. Therefore, it is a breach of agreement. Whether on such breach of agreement the proceedings before the concerned Court should be permitted to be continued or otherwise need not detain this Court for long and delve deep into the matter. 10. The Apex Court in the case of DELHI RACE CLUB (1940) LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH1, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence. 42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in respect of which 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2248 16 the offence of breach of trust has been committed must be either the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be of some other person. The accused must hold that property on trust of such other person. Although the offence, i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept. 43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or misleading representation i.e., since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.” the offender (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that in the case of cheating the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution, unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction. The beginning of the transaction between the two in the case at hand is an agreement. Therefore, no cheating arises in 17 the case at hand, as ingredients of Section 415 of the IPC are hardly met as elucidated by the Apex Court in DELHI RACE CLUB’s case. 11. The Apex Court, a little earlier, in the case of SARABJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB2, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. From the facts available on record, it is evident that Respondent 2 had improved his case ever since the first complaint was filed in which there were no allegations against the appellant rather it was only against the property dealers which was in subsequent complaints that the name of the appellant was mentioned. On the first complaint, the only request was for return of the amount paid by Respondent 2. When the offence was made out on the basis of the first complaint, the second complaint was filed with improved version making allegations against the appellant as well which was not there in the earlier complaint. The entire idea seems to be to convert a civil dispute into criminal and put pressure on the appellant for return of the amount allegedly paid. The criminal courts are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. Wherever ingredients of criminal offences are made out, criminal courts have to take cognizance. The complaint in question on the basis of which FIR was registered was filed nearly three years after the last date fixed for registration of the sale deed. Allowing the 2 (2023) 5 SCC 360 18 proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the court.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution. A civil dispute cannot be permitted to be continued as a crime. The criminal justice system must not be permitted to be misused to settle civil disputes. The dispute in the case at hand is civil in nature, which cannot be in dispute, as the complainant itself has filed the civil suit and it is pending consideration. In such circumstances, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is also elucidated by the Apex Court in NARESH KUMAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA3, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that this is a case where the inherent powers should have been exercised by the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. 6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal 3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268 19 Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This is what was held: its “12. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied) the decision 7. Relying upon in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2023 relying OnLine upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” SCC 90, SC (Emphasis supplied) If the facts obtaining in the case at hand are pitted to the law elucidated by the Apex Court, the unmistakable inference would be 20 quashment of the entire proceedings. The Police had rightly filed a ‘B’ report. The concerned Court has erred in rejecting the ‘B’ report and taking cognizance of the offence. 12. The other offences are under Section 66 of the Act. The common ingredient between the offence of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC and Section 66 of the Act is dishonest or fraudulent intention. Therefore, the reasons rendered to hold Section 420 of the IPC as loosely laid, against the petitioner, would become applicable to Section 66 of the Act. The offence alleged under Section 66C which deals with dishonestly making use of electronic signature is not even the allegation in the case at hand. The allegation is sending emails from his official mail id to his personal mail id. The other offence is under Section 72A of the Act. The ingredients of the complaint would not become an offence under Section 72A even, as the petitioner has not accessed to anybody else’s personal information or disclosed the information for wrongful gain. Therefore, none of the ingredients find place in the offences laid. Hence, permitting further proceedings before the concerned 21 Court would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R (i) Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) FIR in Crime No.1145 of 2020 registered by Whitefield CEN Crime Police Station, Bangalore and pending before 45th Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed. (iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings pending before any other fora. Sd/- ______________________ JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA Bkp CT:MJ

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