THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY THE POLICE INSPECTOR, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA POLICE, DAVANGERE v. SRI RAJASEKHARAIAH K H
Case at a glance
Outcome
Acquitted
The appellant/accused is acquitted of the
Provisions considered
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ss. 313, 374(2), 377
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ss. 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), 19(3), 20
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 s. 118
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 s. 114
Key paragraphs
- Para 22. Criminal Appeal No. 861/2013 preferred by the State against the very same judgment of conviction and order of sentence, seeking enhancement of the sentence, is dismissed.
- Para 55. During the trial, the prosecution relied on the testimony of PW1 (the complainant), PW2 (shadow witness), PW3 (panch witness), and police officials, along with documentary evidence and phenolphthalein tests, to establish the accused had demanded and accepted illegal gratification in his official capacity. The…
- Para 1313. Learned counsel would vehemently contend that the Trial Court erred in placing implicit reliance upon the self- serving testimony of PW-1 (complainant). The Court accepted as gospel truth the version that the complainant approached the accused and that the accused demanded Rs.2,000/- for issuing…
Judgment
conducted on his hands, which turned pink, confirming receipt of the bait money. The police seized the bait amount from the accused and recorded his written explanation. Recovery mahazar was prepared in the office of the accused, and relevant documents pertaining to the complainant were also seized. PW17 continued the investigation, obtained necessary sanction for prosecution, and filed the charge sheet before the trial Court.
#4. The accused was produced before the trial Court on
23.09.2006 along with a remand application and was subsequently released on bail. After the charge sheet was filed, copies were furnished to the accused, and the trial proceeded. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses in support of its case, marking 30 documents and producing 14 material objects. The prosecution evidence was closed on 18.2.2010, - 6 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 after which the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 11.3.2010. Thereafter, arguments were heard from the Special Public Prosecutor and the defense counsel.
#5. During the trial, the prosecution relied on the testimony of PW1 (the complainant), PW2 (shadow witness), PW3 (panch witness), and police officials, along with documentary evidence and phenolphthalein tests, to establish the accused had demanded and accepted illegal gratification in his official capacity. The trial Court noted that the evidence of PW1 to PW3 was clear and convincing, demonstrating the demand and acceptance of the bribe and corroborating the recovery of the bait amount. The defense argued that the sanction for prosecution was defective, PW1 lacked locus standi, and there were discrepancies in witness accounts regarding entrustment procedures and recovery of the bait money. However, the trial Court found these objections insufficient to discredit the prosecution’s evidence. The trial Court found that the prosecution had successfully proved the case beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, while serving as Deputy Director in the office of the Joint Director, District Industries Centre, Davanagere, had demanded and accepted Rs.2,000/- as illegal gratification for issuing the taxi rent - 7 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 cheque and had misused his official position to obtain pecuniary advantage. Accordingly, the trial Court held the accused guilty of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
#6. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the accused has preferred Criminal Appeal No.366 of 2013. Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2013 has been preferred by the State, seeking enhancement of the sentence. Arguments rendered by Appellant/Accused counsel:
#7. Learned counsel appearing appellant/accused in Crl.A. No.366 of 2013 would contend that the judgment of the trial Court is akin to an ex-parte judgment in a civil case. It is submitted that the trial Court has merely reproduced the examination-in-chief of PWs1 to 5, 7, and 9 to 11 without proper appreciation. The examination-in-chief of PW1 is reproduced at pages 10 to 13 under paragraph No.9; PW2 at pages 13 to 16 under paragraph 10; PW3 at page No. 16 under paragraph 11; PW4 at pages 16 to 19 under paragraph 12; PW5 at page 19 under paragraph 13; PW7 at pages 19 and 20 under paragraph 14; PW9 at page 20 under para 15; PW10 at page 20 under paragraph 16; and of PW11 at - 8 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 pages 20 to 22 under paragraph 17 of the impugned judgment. It is further submitted that the Trial Court has selectively extracted certain sentences from the examination-in-chief of PWs1, 2, 4 and 11, while completely ignoring the cross- examination of these witnesses. Without adverting to or appreciating the material elicited during cross-examination, the trial Court has conveniently concluded that the evidence of the said witnesses stands corroborated.
#8. Further, learned counsel would submit that the sanction has not been properly obtained. The concerned authority did not place Ex.P2 and Ex.P3 pre-trap mahazar and post-trap mahazars respectively, both drawn on 22-09-2006, before the sanctioning authority. Instead, Ex.P26, the sanction order, reveals that the Additional Inspector General of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, submitted pre-trap and post-trap mahazars dated 11-10-2006. In the body of Ex.P26, the trap mahazar date is mentioned as 22-10-2006. Both mahazars dated 11-10-2006, referred to under Item Nos. 3 and 4, do not relate to the case on hand.
#9. The prosecution has produced a corrigendum dated 13-04-2007, which states that Item 3 and 4 of the pre-trap and - 9 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 post-trap panchanama should be read as dated 22-09-2006 instead of 11-10-2006. However, the said corrigendum has not been marked in evidence. The sanctioning authority, Sri S.S. Vasan, Under Secretary to Government, examined as PW9, has not deposed anything as to the date of the pre-trap and post- trap mahazars, or as to the corrigendum.
#10. Without due application of mind, the sanctioning authority has granted sanction for prosecution, which is not sustainable in law. The sanction for prosecution is, therefore, illegal, and consequently amounts to a failure of justice.
#11. Learned counsel would vehemently contend that the trial Court has committed a serious error in not properly considering the crucial testimony of PW6–N. Hiriyannappa. It is submitted that PW6 has unequivocally admitted, both in his examination-in-chief and cross-examination, that he was working in the cash section of the office of the accused and that it was his duty to prepare the bills, forward them to the Treasury, obtain the cheque, and issue the same to the claimant. It is further contended that PW6 has specifically admitted that he prepared the bills marked as Exs.P9 and P10 relating to the complainant and that it was his responsibility to forward the same to the Treasury along with Exs.P6 to P8 for - 10 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 obtaining the cheque and delivering it to the complainant. It is also elicited in evidence that PW6 had kept the said bills pending for nearly 18 days prior to the alleged date of the trap. According to the learned counsel, this evidence clearly establishes that the duty of preparing the bills, forwarding them to the Treasury, securing the cheque, and issuing it to the complainant was not that of the accused, but of PW6–N. Hiriyannappa. The only role attributed to the accused was that of affixing his signature on the fully prepared bills after they were processed by the Deputy Director and made ready for submission to the Treasury.
#12. It is therefore contended that this vital and material piece of evidence, which goes to the root of the prosecution case, has been completely overlooked by the Trial Court. The prosecution case is that the accused demanded illegal gratification for issuing the cheque towards the bill amount. However, when the issuance of the cheque was neither the duty nor the responsibility of the accused, the very foundation of the allegation stands shaken. Despite such cogent evidence indicating that the duty of issuing the cheque was not entrusted to the accused, the Trial Court has erroneously observed that the accused did not deny, during the cross-examination of - 11 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 PW1, that he was dealing with the work relating to issuance of the cheque for the rental amount due to PW1, and that he had not adduced any defence evidence in that regard. Learned counsel submits that such an observation reflects non- application of mind and a failure to properly read and appreciate the entire evidence available on record.
#13. Learned counsel would vehemently contend that the Trial Court erred in placing implicit reliance upon the self- serving testimony of PW-1 (complainant). The Court accepted as gospel truth the version that the complainant approached the accused and that the accused demanded Rs.2,000/- for issuing rental cheque. Such acceptance was made without any independent corroboration and without any substantive basis on record. To support this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA v. CHANDRAHASA reported in 2024 SCC ONLINE SC 3469 wherein it has been held that ‘… Section 20 gets attracted when it is proved that the public servant has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification other than legal remuneration and in that case, presumption is that it is the motive or reward for any of the acts covered under Section 7, 11, or 13(1)(b) of the Act.’ The Court also held that the presumption under Section 20 of - 12 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 the PC Act is similar to the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the onus is on the accused to prove that he is not guilty of the offences charged.
#14. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the Trial Court gravely erred in relying solely upon the examination-in-chief of PW1, PW2, PW4, and PW11 in respect of the alleged entrustment, raid and incident, while completely ignoring the material contradictions inconsistencies elicited during cross-examination. The cross- examination of these witnesses exposed serious discrepancies and contradictions, thereby demolishing the prosecution case. The Trial Court failed to properly scrutinize both oral and documentary evidence before concluding that the demand and acceptance of bribe had been established. It neither considered nor discussed the contradictions affecting the credibility of key witnesses (PW1, PW2, PW4, and PW11), all of whom failed to withstand effective cross-examination.
#15. Learned counsel would contend that the Trial Court erroneously held that the entrustment and raid proceedings were proved despite the absence of cogent and corroborative evidence. The Court also erred in not accepting Exhibit P3, the - 13 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 reply by the accused appellant. The evidence of PW11, which was not proved in accordance with law and was not admitted by the accused. Learned counsel further contends that the sanction for prosecution was not properly obtained. The sanctioning authority was not furnished with the relevant mahazars and materials necessary for proper consideration. The sanction appears to have been granted mechanically and without due application of mind, rendering it invalid and unsustainable in law. It is further submitted that the accused was not a “raiding officer” and therefore, had no authority or occasion to demand any bribe. Hence, the impugned judgment of the Trial Court is arbitrary, illegal, capricious, and unsustainable in law and suffers from lack of sound reasoning, non-application of mind, material irregularities, and is therefore liable to be set aside.
#16. To substantiate his argument, learned counsel for the appellant/accused has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases: (i) NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF GUJARAT1 (ii) RAJESH BHATNAGAR v. STATE OF UTTARKHAND2 O R D E R
#1. Criminal Appeal No. 366/2013 preferred by the Appellant/accused is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
26.03.2013 passed in Special (LOK) Case No.6 of 2007 by the Principal District and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (Lokayukta), Davanagere, is set aside.
#2. Criminal Appeal No. 861/2013 preferred by the State against the very same judgment of conviction and order of sentence, seeking enhancement of the sentence, is dismissed.
#3. The appellant/accused is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 7 and - 44 - CRL.A No.861 of 2013 c/w CRL.A No.366 2013 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
#4. Fine amount, if any deposited by the accused, shall be refunded to the accused in accordance with law;
#5. The bail bond, if any, stand cancelled. Sd/- (G. BASAVARAJA) JUDGE
Questions this judgment answers
What did the Court decide in this case?
The Court recorded the following disposition: The appellant/accused is acquitted of the
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — ss. 313, 374(2), 377; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — ss. 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), 19(3), 20; Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — s. 118; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s. 114.
Which court decided this case, and when?
Karnataka High Court, on 11 Oct 2006. The bench was G BASAVARAJA.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No treatment data yet for this judgment in the Courts & Cases corpus.
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