V.S.SURESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY MAHALAKSHMIPURAM POLICE STATION

this Court in the subject petition.

#3. Heard Sri C V Nagesh, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners, Sri Harish Ganapathi, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri D R Ravishankar, 5 learned senior counsel appearing along with Sri Naveen Gudikote, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

#4. The learned senior counsel Sri C V Nagesh appearing for the petitioners would submit that the death happened on 14-04-

#2024. The husband of the complainant commits suicide. At that point in time, nothing was revealed nor the immediate investigation revealed anything. After about 40 days, claiming that the husband in his own handwriting had written the so called death note, these petitioners are drawn into the web of crime. Learned senior counsel would further submit that if the contents of the complaint are noticed, they are absolutely vague, as all the contents relate to things that have happened during the lifetime of the husband of the complainant, which the husband himself had not complained of. He would submit that none of the ingredients of the offence punishable under Sections 306, 420 or 506 of the IPC are even met in the case at hand. He would seek quashment of the entire proceedings.

#5. Per-contra, the learned senior counsel Sri D R Ravishankar representing the 2nd respondent-complainant would submit that 6 certain transactions have happened between the husband of the complainant and the petitioners. The police have seized the DVR which was installed in the residence and have also seized the mobiles, all of which would indicate that the last call before the deceased committed suicide was from the 1st petitioner who had constantly sent messages asking the deceased to call him urgently, he would therefore submit this is abetment to suicide. The learned senior counsel would also seek to place reliance upon certain bank transactions and certain agreements between the petitioners and the husband of the complainant at the time when the husband of the complainant was alive. In all, he would seek to contend that investigation, in the least, should be permitted to be completed. He would place reliance upon a document at Annexure R2 to the statement of objections, which according to him, is the reason for transfer of funds from the account of the complainant’s husband to the 1st petitioner. He would submit that this is the trigger point of abetment which led to commission of suicide. 7

#6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned senior counsel and other learned counsel and have also perused the material on record.

#7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The petitioners and the husband of the complainant being partners of M/s. Soundarya Constructions is a matter of record. The husband of the complainant dies by committing suicide on 14-04-2024. Immediately thereafter, the police enquire into the matter and register a UDR in UDR No.15 of 2024 after drawing the inquest proceedings as obtaining under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. During the course of the enquiry, prior to registration of the UDR, the complainant and their relatives were all present and were enquired into. After about 40 days of the death, a complaint comes to be registered alleging that the petitioners have abetted the death of the husband of the complainant, which is on the basis of a letter the complainant allegedly found in the wardrobe when she was cleaning her husband’s wardrobe for the purpose of performance of the ceremony of her husband. This becomes a crime in Crime No.172 of 2024. Since the entire issue has now sprung from the complaint, 8 I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The complainant is dated 22-05-2024. It reads as follows:- “gÀªÀjUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 22.05.2024 ªÀiÁ£Àå ¥ÉÆðøï C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ DgÀPÀëPÀ oÁuÉ ªÀĺÁ®Qëöä¥ÀÄgÀ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ «µÀAiÀÄ: Dgï.dUÀ¢±ï (¸ËAzÀAiÀÄð dUÀ¢Ã±ï) gÀªÀgÀ ªÀÄgÀt ¥ÀƪÀð ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß vÀªÀÄUÉ ¸À°è¹ £À£Àß UÀAqÀ£À ¸Á«UÉ PÁgÀtgÁzÀ CªÀgÀ ¥Álð£ïgïì DzÀ «.J¸ï.¸ÀÄgÉñï, J¸ï.¦.ºÉÆA§tÚ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EvÀgÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ zÀÆgÀÄ. F ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§AzsÀ¥ÀlÖAvÉ ²æêÀÄw Dgï.±À²gÉÃSÁ DzÀ £Á£ÀÄ vÀªÀÄä°è «£ÀAw¹PÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ £À£Àß AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀgÁzÀ Dgï.dUÀ¢Ã±ïgÀªÀgÀÄ (¸ËAzÀAiÀÄð dUÀ¢Ã±ï) gÀªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 14.04.2024 ¨sÁ£ÀĪÁgÀzÀAzÀÄ DvÀäºÀvÉå ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ zÉʪÁ¢Ã£ÀgÁVgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. »ÃVgÀĪÁUÉÎ 18.05.2024gÀAzÀÄ gÀÆ«Ä£À°è CªÀgÀ ªÁ¯ïqÀæ¨ï£À°è CªÀgÀ §mÉÖAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀÆeÉUÉ »qÀ®Ä vÉUÉzÀÄPÉƼÀî®Ä ºÉÆÃzÁUÀ £ÀªÀÄä AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀgÀÄ §gÉ¢gÀĪÀ CªÀgÀ §gÀªÀtÂUÉAiÀÄ°ègÀĪÀ “ªÀÄgÀt ¥ÀƪÀð ¥ÀvÀæ” (qÉvï £ÉÆÃmï) £ÀªÀÄUÉ ¹QÌgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. DzÀgÀ°è CªÀgÀÄ §gÉ¢gÀĪÀ «µÀAiÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß N¢ UÁ§j ¢UÀãçªÉÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ C£ÀĪÀiÁ£À GAmÁVzÀÄÝ K£ÉAzÀgÉ ¸ËAzÀAiÀÄð PÀ£ï¸ÀÖçPÀë£ïì£À ¸ÀºÀ¥Á®ÄzÁgÀgÀÄUÀ½AzÀ ¸ÀĪÀÄgÀÄ 60 PÉÆÃnUÀ¼À £ÀµÀÖ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÉÆøÀªÁVzÉ JA§ÄzÁV §gÉ¢zÀÄÝ F §UÉÎ £À£ÀUÉ ªÀÄÄAavÀªÁVAiÉÄ EzÀÝ C£ÀĪÀiÁ£À ¤dªÁVzÀÄÝ “¸ËAzÀAiÀÄð PÀ£ï¸ÀÖçPÀë£ï” ¥Á®ÄzÁgÀgÁzÀ «.J¸ï.¸ÀÄgÉÃ±ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ºÉÆA§tÚ J¸ï.¦ gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀgÀ ¸Á«UÉ £ÉÃgÀªÁV PÁgÀtPÀvÀðgÁVzÀÄÝ F ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼ÀÄ £À£Àß UÀAqÀ¤UÉ ¸ËAzÀAiÀÄð PÀ£ï¸ÀÖçPÀë£ï PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄ°è ºÀt ºÀÆrPÉ ªÀiÁr¹PÉÆAqÀ PÀA¥À¤ ¯Á¨sÀzÀ°èzÀÝgÀÄ £ÀµÀÖªÉAzÀÄ ¸ÀļÀÄî ºÉý £ÀªÀÄUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢¹zÀ ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀ D¹ÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¨ÁåAQ£À°è CqÀªÀiÁ£À ªÀiÁr¹ ¸ÀzÀj ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß CªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀªÁV §¼À¹PÉÆAqÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀ E®è¸À®èzÀ ¸À§Æ§Ä ºÉý £À£Àß UÀAqÀ¤AzÀ ¨ÉÃPÁzÀµÀÄÖ SÁ° ZÉPïUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ SÁ° ºÁ¼ÉUÀ¼À ªÉÄÃ¯É CªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀgÀ ¸À»UÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÀPÀ° ªÀiÁr zÀÄgÀÄ¥ÀAiÉÆÃUÀ ¥Àr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ EzÀ£ÀÄß ¥Àæ²ß¹zÀÝgÉ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼ÀÄ £À£Àß AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀjUÉ PÉÆ¯É ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉÆà «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¨ÁèPï ªÉÄÃ¯ï ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ EzÀjAzÀ £À£Àß AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀzÀÄ ªÀÄ£À£ÉÆAzÀÄ £À£Àß ºÀwÛgÀ F ºÀtzÀ ªÉÆøÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ PÀÈvÀåUÀ¼À §UÉÎ w½¹zÀÄÝ £ÀAvÀgÀ £Á£ÀÄ F §UÉÎ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÉýzÁUÀ ºÁjPÉAiÀÄ GvÀÛgÀ ¤Ãr ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ªÁ¥À¸ï PÉÆqÀĪÀÅzÁV ºÉý ªÀÄvÀÄÛ vÉÆAzÀgÉ PÉÆqÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ ºÉý ¸Àé®à ¢£À ¸ÀĪÀÄä¤zÀÄÝ £ÀAvÀgÀ CzÉà ZÁ½AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɹzÀÄÝ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À PÀgɧAzÁUÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀA¢¹ §AzÁUÀ vÀÄA¨Á ¨ÉÃeÁgÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ §AiÀÄ©ÃvÀgÁVgÀÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ EzÀ®èzÉ EwÛÃZÉUÉ £ÀªÀÄä AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀgÀÄ ¸ÁAiÀÄĪÀ ªÀÄÄAZÉ MAzÀÄ ªÁgÀ¢AzÀ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ½AzÀ ¤gÀAvÀgÀ PÀgÉUÀ¼ÀÄ §gÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ PÀgÉUÀ¼ÀÄ §AzÁUÀ ¸ÀA¥ÀÆtðªÁV dfðAvÀgÁUÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ ¸ÀA¥ÀÆtðªÁV ªÀÄ£À£ÉÆAzÀÄ CªÀgÀÄ ¸ÁAiÀÄĪÀ ¤zsÁðgÀPÉÌ §AzÀÄ ªÀÄgÀt ¥ÀƪÀð¥ÀvÀæ §gÉzÀÄ DvÀäºÀvÉå ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ½AzÀ £À£Àß UÀAqÀ¤UÉ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 60 PÉÆÃn gÀÆ.UÀ¼À ªÉÆøÀªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. 9 EzÀ®èzÉ ¸ÀÄ¢AzÀæ JA§ ªÀåQÛAiÀÄÄ ¸ËAzÀAiÀÄð PÀ£ï¸ÀÖçPÀë£ï£À°è ªÀiÁå£ÉÃdgÁV PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ EvÀ£ÀÆ PÀÆqÀ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ PÀÈvÀåzÀ°è £ÉÃgÀªÁV ¨sÁVAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÁÛ£É. DzÀÝjAzÀ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À PËæAiÀÄð, »A¸É, ¥ÀæZÉÆÃzÀ£ÉUÀ½AzÀ ªÀÄ£À£ÉÆAzÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä AiÀÄdªÀiÁ£ÀgÀÄ DvÀäºÀvÉå ªÀiÁrPÉÆArzÀÄÝ ¥Àæ¸ÀÄÛvÀ £À£ÀUÀÆ £À£Àß PÀÄlÄA§zÀªÀjUÀÆ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ½AzÀ ¥Áæt ¨ÉzÀjPÉ EzÀÄÝ ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀgÀÄUÀ¼À «gÀÄzÀÞ ¸ÀÆPÀÛ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ £ÀªÀÄUÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£Àß UÀAqÀ£À ¸Á«UÉ £ÁåAiÀÄ zÉÆgÀQ¹PÉÆqÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ PÉýPÉƼÀÄîvÉÛãÉ. F zÀÆgÀ£ÀÄß qÉvï£ÉÆÃmï zÉÆgÀQzÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À «gÀÄzÀÞ £ÀªÀÄä C£ÀĪÀiÁ£À ¤dªÁVzÀÄÝ vÀqÀªÁV §AzÀÄ F ¢£À zÀÆgÀÄ ¤ÃqÀÄwÛzÉÝãÉ. ¸À»/- EAw vÀªÀÄä «zÉÃAiÀÄ Dgï.±À²gÉÃSÁ ¸Éßûvï PÉÆÃA dUÀ¢Ã±ï.Dgï 49 ªÀAiÀĸÀì £ÀA.310, 6£Éà ªÉÄÊ£ï ªÀĺÁ®Qëöä ¯ÉÃOmï – ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ 560 086 9448485045 8970407007

#3. «.J¸ï.¸ÀÄgÉñï 9844020351 ºÉÆA§tÚ 9844059690 ¸ÀÄ¢ÃAzÀæ 6361960199 dUÀ¢Ã±ï gÀªÀgÀ DvÀäºÀvÉå §UÉÎ EzÉ oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è AiÀÄÄrDgï £ÀA.15/24gÀAvÉ zÁR¯ÁVgÀÄvÉÛ. EzÀgÀ eÉÆvÉAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄgÀt¥ÀƪÀð ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß (C¸À®Ä) ®UÀwÛ¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¸À»/- ¦.J¸ï.gÉÃSÁ” The complaint is completely vague. It narrates that the petitioners have threatened that they would kill the husband and they have forged the signatures of the complainant’s husband and have transferred several amounts. This led to the loan being taken in 10 the name of her husband, which further led to depression of her husband. Broadly based upon this comes the complaint and the crime in Crime No.172 of 2024. What is alleged against these petitioners is the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC inter alia. Section 306 of the IPC reads as follows: “306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” For an offence to become punishable under Section 306 of the IPC, the ingredients as obtaining under Section 107 of the IPC are necessarily to be present. Section 107 of the IPC reads as follows: “107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact person

1.—A who, 11 which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.” Illustration A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” The interpretation of Section 306 of the IPC and its ingredients as obtaining under Section 107 of IPC need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in plethora of judgments has considered the said issue. I deem it appropriate to notice every one of them, which are rendered for the last 3 decades.

#8. The Apex Court has, right from MAHENDRA SINGH AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH1 held as follows: “1. Criminal Appeal No. 743 of 1989 is filed by Mahendra Singh, the husband and his mother Radhabai the mother-in-law of the deceased Khema Bai. The appellant in Criminal Appeal 1 (1995) Supp (3) SCC 731 12 No. 402 of 1989 is Gayatri Bai the sister-in-law of the husband of the deceased Khemabai. These three appellants stand convicted under Section 306 I.P.C. where under they have been sentenced to three years R.I. each. In so far as the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 743 of 1989 are concerned, they have undergone the sentence imposed on them. Sentence of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 1989 stands suspended under orders of this Court after the appellant has undergone sentence barely of about ten days. The charge under Section 306 I.P.C. is basically based on the dying declaration of the deceased which when translated reads as follows: “My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning.”

#2. Learned Counsel for the appellant rightly submitted that but for the statement of the deceased there is no other pointed evidence from which it could be inferred that there was any abetment so as to bring the acts of the appellants within Section 306 I.P.C. under which the appellants have been punished. The dying declaration, per se, could not involve the appellants in offence punishable under Section 306 I.P.C., because it provides for abetment of suicide. Whoever abets the commission of suicide, and if any person commits suicide due to that reason, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Abetment has been defined in Section 107 I.P.C. to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing who firstly instigates any person to do a thing, or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing, or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Neither of the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. The conviction of the appellants under Section 306 I.P.C. 13 merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased is not sustainable. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charge.” (Emphasis supplied) In RAMESH KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH2 the Apex Court has held as follows: “9. So far as the offence under Section 306 of IPC is concerned, in our opinion, the Trial Court and the High Court have committed gross error of law in holding the accused-appellant guilty and therefore conviction under Section 306 IPC deserves to be quashed and set aside.

#10. Section 306 IPC provides that if any person commits suicide whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be liable to be punished. The ingredients of abetment are set out in Section 107 of IPC which reads as under: "107. Abetment of thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First.- Instigate any person to do that thing; or Secondly.- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing." …. …. ….

#13. The present case is not one which may fall under clauses, secondly and thirdly of Section 107 of Indian Penal Code. The case has to be decided by reference to the first clause, i.e., whether the accused-appellant abetted the suicide by instigating her to do so. 2 (2001) 9 SCC 618 14

#14. It is beyond doubt that Seema did commit a suicide. Undisputedly, such suicide has been committed within a year of the date of marriage. What happened on the date of occurrence is very material for the purpose of recording a finding on a question of abetment. Enough material is available on record by way oral and documentary evidence with which we shall now deal with. …. …. ….

#20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do `an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” In S.S.CHHEENA v. VIJAY KUMAR MAHAJAN3 the Apex Court (Emphasis supplied) has held as follows: “25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to instigate or aid 3 (2010) 12 SCC 190 15 commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.

#26. In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life. Human sensitivity of each individual differs from the other. Different people behave differently in the same situation.

#27. When we carefully scrutinize and critically examine the facts of this case in the light of the settled legal position the conclusion becomes obvious that no conviction can be legally sustained without any credible evidence or material on record against the appellant. The order of framing a charge under Section 306 IPC against the appellant is palpably erroneous and unsustainable. It would be travesty of justice to compel the appellant to face a criminal trial without any credible material whatsoever. Consequently, the order of framing charge under Section 306 IPC against the appellant is quashed and all proceedings pending against him are also set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) In the case of M. ARJUNAN v. STATE4 it is held by the Apex Court as follows: “7. The essential ingredients of the offence Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the Accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the Accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the Accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients 4 (2019) 3 SCC 315 16 of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, Accused cannot be convicted Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code.

#8. In our considered view, in the case at hand, M.O. 1- letter and the oral evidence of PW-1 to PW-5, would not be sufficient to establish that the suicide by the deceased was directly linked to the instigation or abetment by the Appellant- deceased. Having advanced the money to the deceased, the Appellant-Accused might have uttered some abusive words; but that by itself is not sufficient to constitute the offence Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code From the evidence brought on record and in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view the ingredients of Section 306 Indian Penal Code are not established and the conviction of the Appellant-Accused Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained.” (Emphasis supplied) In GURCHARAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB5 the Apex Court holds as follows: “15. As in all crimes, mens rea has to be established. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified Under Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove mens rea, there has to be something on record to establish or show that the Appellant herein had a guilty mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the deceased. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. However, what transpires in the present matter is that both the Trial Court as well as the High Court never examined whether Appellant had the mens rea for the crime, he is held to have committed. The conviction of Appellant by the Trial Court as well as the High Court on the theory that the woman with two young 5 (2020) 10 SCC 200 17 kids might have committed suicide, possibly because of the harassment faced by her in the matrimonial house, is not at all borne out by the evidence in the case. Testimonies of the PWs do not show that the wife was unhappy because of the Appellant and she was forced to take such a step on his account. …. …. ….

#20. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation in declaring that the Trial Court and the High Court erred in concluding that the deceased was driven to commit suicide, by the circumstances or atmosphere in the matrimonial home. This is nothing more than an inference, without any material support. Therefore, the same cannot be the basis for sustaining conviction of the Appellant, Under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgments, has clearly held that abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing a thing. It should be a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid commission of suicide, failing which, such cases of conviction cannot be sustained, as there should be clear mens rea on the part of the accused to drive the deceased for commission of such act.

#9. The Apex Court in the case of MAHENDRA SINGH supra was considering a case where the wife of the accused had 18 committed suicide. The allegation was that the husband was having illicit relationship with the sister-in-law and, therefore, the wife had committed suicide by burning. The Apex Court acquits the accused. In the case of RAMESH KUMAR supra, the Apex Court observes that investigation was to goad, urge forward, provoke incite or encourage to do an act. If these ingredients are not present such actions would lead to acquittal.

#10. The Apex Court, later in certain cases, while interpreting Section 306 of the IPC holds that there should be a positive act, proximate to the time or date of occurrence of the incident and that positive act should be either direct or indirect. The Apex Court in the case of AMALENDU PAL v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL6 has held as follows: “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the 6 (2010) 1 SCC 707 19 allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

#13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.

#14. The expression “abetment” has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause Firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses Secondly or Thirdly of Section 107 IPC. Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. Learned counsel for the respondent State, however, clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause Thirdly of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under Section 107 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court in the case of KANCHAN SHARMA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER7 has held as follows: “9. “Abetment” involves mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without positive act on the part of the 7 2021 SCC OnLine SC 737 20 accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, no one can be convicted for offence under Section 306IPC. To proceed against any person for the offence under Section 306IPC it requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide, seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” (Emphasis supplied) Again, the Apex Court in the case of MARIANO ANTO BRUNO AND ANOTHER v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE8 has held as follows: “42. To convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide. The prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and Appellant No. 1 abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased. In the present case, both the elements are absent. …. …. ….

#48. It is well settled that the Courts ought to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. Reference may be made to the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh9, wherein this Court set-aside the conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 306 IPC as ingredients of Section 306 IPC were not satisfactorily proved. It was observed as under:— 8 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387 21 “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. course of conduct created

#21. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal10, this Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” (Emphasis supplied) 22 The Apex Court in the case of PRABHAT KUMAR MISHRA V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH9, holds as follows: “18. The parameters required to bring an act or omission by the person charged within the purview of the offence under Section 306IPC have been elaborated by this Court time and again and a few of these judgments are quoted below for ready reference.

#19. In Netai Dutta v. State of W.B. [Netai Dutta v. State of W.B., (2005) 2 SCC 659 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 543] in almost similar circumstances, this Court quashed the proceedings sought to be taken against the petitioner under Section 306IPC. The relevant observations from the said judgment are reproduced as under : (SCC pp. 660-61, paras 4-7) “4. One Pranab Kumar Nag was an employee of M/s M.L. Dalmiya & Co. Ltd. During the course of his employment, he had been posted at various worksites of the Company and on 11-9-1999 he was transferred to the worksite of the Company's stores located at 160, B.L. Saha Road, Kolkata. It seems that pursuant to the transfer order, Pranab Kumar Nag did not join duty and after a period of about two years he sent in a letter of resignation written in his own hand wherein he expressed his grievance of stagnancy of salary and also alleged that he was a victim of unfortunate circumstances. The Company accepted his resignation with immediate effect. On 16-2-2001, a dead body was found at the railway tracks near Ballygunge Railway Station and it was revealed that it was the body of Pranab Kumar Nag. His brother went to the office where Pranab Kumar Nag had worked and made enquiries. The dead body of Pranab Kumar Nag was released to his brother after the post-mortem examination on 19-2-2001. After a period of two months, a complaint was lodged before the police post on the basis of a suicide note allegedly recovered from the dead body of Pranab Kumar Nag. Based on the complaint, a case was registered against the appellant and some others. A translated copy of the suicide note is produced before us by the appellant. We have carefully read the alleged suicide note. The substance of this suicide note is that deceased Pranab Kumar Nag alleged that appellant Netai Dutta 9 (2024)3 SCC 665 23 and one Paramesh Chatterjee engaged him in several wrongdoings (he has shown as a type of torture) and at the end of the letter, a reference is also made to Paramesh Chatterjee and Netai Dutta alleging that he reported certain incidents to them. A reading of the letter would show that deceased Pranab Kumar Nag was not very much satisfied with the working conditions in the office. In the letter he has stated that he had to be at the workplace sometimes throughout the day and night and he had to remain in the company of some drivers who had been sometimes in drunken condition at about one o'clock or two o'clock in the night. It is also alleged that the drivers who had been present at the workplace had been having non-vegetarian food. He also complained that he had to work even on Sundays. He further stated that one day he could leave the workplace at 8 o'clock in the evening and all the restaurants were closed and that he reported the matter to the present appellant.

#5. There is absolutely no averment in the alleged suicide note that the present appellant had caused any harm to him or was in any way responsible for delay in paying salary to deceased Pranab Kumar Nag. It seems that the deceased was very much dissatisfied with the working conditions at the workplace. But, it may also be noticed that the deceased after his transfer in 1999 had never joined the office at 160, B.L. Saha Road, Kolkata and had absented himself for a period of two years and that the suicide took place on 16-2-2001. It cannot be said that the present appellant had in any way instigated the deceased to commit suicide or he was responsible for the suicide of Pranab Kumar Nag. An offence under Section 306IPC would stand only if there is an abetment for the commission of the crime. The parameters of “abetment” have been stated in Section 107 of the Penal Code, 1860. Section 107 says that a person abets the doing of a thing, who instigates any person to do that thing; or engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, or the person should have intentionally aided any act or illegal omission. The Explanation to Section 107 says that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of “abetment”. 24

#6. In the suicide note, except referring to the name of the appellant at two places, there is no reference of any act or incidence whereby the appellant herein is alleged to have committed any wilful act or omission or intentionally aided or instigated the deceased Pranab Kumar Nag in committing the act of suicide. There is no case that the appellant has played any part or any role in any conspiracy, which ultimately instigated or resulted in the commission of suicide by deceased Pranab Kumar Nag.

#7. Apart from the suicide note, there is no allegation made by the complainant that the appellant herein in any way was harassing his brother, Pranab Kumar Nag. The case registered against the appellant is without any factual foundation. The contents of the alleged suicide note do not in any way make out the offence against the appellant. The prosecution initiated against the appellant would only result in sheer harassment to the appellant without any fruitful result. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge seriously erred in holding that the first information report against the appellant disclosed the elements of a cognizable offence. There was absolutely no ground to proceed against the appellant herein. We find that this is a fit case where the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be invoked. We quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant and accordingly allow the appeal.”

#20. In M. Mohan v. State [M. Mohan v. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] , this Court held as below : (SCC pp. 636-39 & 642-45, paras 36-49, 62, 65 & 68) “36. We would like to deal with the concept of “abetment”. Section 306 of the Code deals with “abetment of suicide” which reads as under: ‘306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.’

#37. The word “suicide” in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal Code, however, its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. “Sui” means “self” and “cide” means “killing”, thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, 25 irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself.

#38. In our country, while suicide itself is not an offence considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of law, attempt to suicide is an offence under Section 309IPC.

#39. “Abetment of a thing” has been defined under Section 107 of the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 107, which reads as under: ‘107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.’ Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with Section 107 reads as under: ‘Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.’

#40. The learned counsel also placed reliance on yet another judgment of this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , in which a three-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with the case of a similar nature. In a dispute between the husband and wife, the appellant husband uttered “you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever you like”. Thereafter, the wife of the appellant Ramesh Kumar committed suicide.

#41. This Court in para 20 of Ramesh Kumar [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] has examined different shades of the meaning of “instigation”. Para 20 reads as under : (SCC p. 629) ‘20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must 26 necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.’ In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record wherefrom an inference of the appellant-accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.

#42. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] , this Court has cautioned that (SCC p. 90, para 17) the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it appears to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life, quite common to the society, to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and difference were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.

#43. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word “instigation” and “goading”. The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidality pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula 27 in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.

#44. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.

#45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.

#46. In V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 361 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1290] this Court has held that when prima facie no case is made out against the accused, then the High Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC and quashed the complaint.

#47. In a recent judgment of this Court in Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1048 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 682] , this Court quashed the conviction under Section 306IPC on the ground that the allegations were irrelevant and baseless and observed that the High Court was in error in not quashing the proceedings.

#48. In the instant case, what to talk of instances of instigation, there are even no allegations against the appellants. There is also no proximate link between the incident of 14-1-2005 when the deceased was denied permission to use the Qualis car with the factum of suicide which had taken place on 18-1-2005. Undoubtedly, the deceased had died because of hanging. The deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life. In a joint family, instances of this kind are not very uncommon. Human sensitivity of each individual differs from person to person. Each individual has his own idea of self-esteem and self- respect. Different people behave differently in the same situation. It is unfortunate that such an episode of suicide had taken place in the family. But the question that remains to be 28 answered is whether the appellants can be connected with that unfortunate incident in any manner?

#49. On a careful perusal of the entire material on record and the law, which has been declared by this Court, we can safely arrive at the conclusion that the appellants are not even remotely connected with the offence under Section 306IPC. It may be relevant to mention that criminal proceedings against the husband of the deceased Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A- 3) are pending adjudication. ***

#62. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482CrPC, gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) ‘102. … (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 29 (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.’ ***

#65. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283] observed thus : (SCC p. 128, para 8) to quash any proceeding ‘8. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.’ *** 68. In the light of the settled legal position, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition filed by the appellants under Section 30 482CrPC for quashing the charges under Section 306IPC against them. The High Court ought to have quashed the proceedings so that the appellants who were not remotely connected with the offence under Section 306IPC should not have been compelled to face the rigmaroles of a criminal trial. As a result, the charges under Section 306IPC against the appellants are quashed.”

#21. It is not in dispute that the prosecution case is entirely based on the suicide note left behind by the deceased before committing suicide. On a minute perusal of the suicide note, we do not find that the contents thereof indicate any act or omission on the part of the appellant-accused which could make him responsible for abetment as defined under Section 107IPC.

#22. We have minutely perused the suicide note (reproduced supra) which clearly shows that the deceased was frustrated on account of work pressure and was apprehensive of various random factors unconnected to his official duties. He was also feeling the pressure of working in two different districts. However, such apprehensions expressed in the suicide note, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or omission constituting the elements of abetment to commit suicide. The facts of the case at hand are almost identical to Netai Dutta [Netai Dutta v. State of W.B., (2005) 2 SCC 659 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 543] . Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the necessary ingredients of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not made out from the charge-sheet, and hence allowing prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal for the offences punishable under Section 306IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act tantamounts to gross abuse of process of law.

#23. It may be noted that in the first instance, the investigating agency itself proposed a closure report in the matter after conducting thorough investigation. In this background, we are of the opinion that there does 31 not exist any justifiable ground so as to permit the prosecution of the appellant for the offences under Section 306IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.

#24. Thus, the impugned order [Prabhat Kumar Mishra v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All 1496] passed by the High Court and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant in the criminal case pending for the offences punishable under Section 306 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court, again, in the case of AMUDHA V. STATE10, has held as follows: “10. A Bench of three Hon'ble Judges in the case of Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh,1 after considering the provisions of Sections 107 and 306 of the IPC, in paragraph 43, held thus: “43. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we are required to address whether there has been abetment in committing suicide. Be it clearly stated that mere allegation of harassment without any positive action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused that led a person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. A casual remark that is likely to cause harassment in ordinary course of things will not come within the purview of instigation. A mere reprimand or a word in a fit of anger will not earn the status of abetment. There has to be positive action that creates a situation for the victim to put an end to life.” (emphasis added) In the case of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal2, in paragraph 12, this Court held thus: 10 2024 SCC OnLine SC 373 32 “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.” (emphasis added)

#11. Taking the charge sheet as correct, we find that there were no acts of incitement on the part of the appellant proximate to the date on which the deceased committed suicide. No act is attributed to the appellant proximate to the time of the suicide which was of such a nature that the deceased was left with no alternative but to take the drastic step of committing suicide. is made out against the Therefore, no offence appellant.” (Emphasis supplied)

#11. All aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court were acquitting the accused who were convicted of offences punishable under Section 306 of the IPC. In some cases the Apex Court directs High Courts to entertain such petitions in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and following the said judgments, this Court in plethora of cases has quashed proceedings in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 33

#12. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court as afore-quoted right from 1995 to 2024, what would unmistakably emerge is that, there must be mens rea and actus reus for an offence under Section 306 of IPC, as there must be a positive act to instigate in aiding suicide. Proximate to the death must be a dynamic act, be it direct or indirect. It should be proximate to the occurrence of death and it should be instigation of the kind that it drives a person to commit suicide. Thus, if these ingredients are present in a given case, exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., would not be available. Likewise, if they do not find place in a given case, this Court would step in and obliterate the proceedings. If on the afore-quoted law that is laid down, the facts obtaining in the case at hand are re-assessed, what would unmistakably emerge is, that the death of the husband of the complainant has no proximity to any of the alleged instigations of the petitioners.

#13. The sheet anchor of the submission of the learned senior counsel for the respondent is, a letter, which according to him, is 34 the reason for commission of suicide. It is appended as Annexure R2 to the objections. It reads as follows: “Tel: 23348423 23317896 23319134 SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS Promoters, Builders, Developers, Engineers & Contractors "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN" SUBJECT: ISSUE NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE We SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS is the owner of the located at No-95, 2nd Main, Link Road, property Sheshadripuram, Bangalore-560020, do hereby we declare and confirm that due to mutual understanding we have given full authorization to Mr. V.S Suresh. We (S.P HOMBANNA & R. JAGADHISH) have no objection and convey my consent to Mr. V.S Suresh for further any works he will be the responsible for the all the future liabilities and V.S Suresh will be the usages and authorization to sign all the documents related to office. On Corresponding to the details provided, the period date start from 01-06-2019. Signature of Landlord For SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS Sd/- Partner (S.P HOMBANNA) For SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS Sd/- Partner For SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS Sd/- 35 Partner (R. JAGADHISH)” (Emphasis added) The learned senior counsel would emphasize upon the fact that the signature of the husband of the complainant is forged, due to which all the funds are transferred to the account of the 1st petitioner. The said submission is, to say the least, preposterous. The said no objection certificate issued by the complainant’s husband and one S.P.Hombanna is dated 01-06-2019, suicide is on 14-04-2024 – a gap of 5 years. If this no objection certificate was forged and based upon this, transaction has happened, for 5 years it is ununderstandable as to how and why the husband of the complainant kept quiet, when transaction before his eyes was taking place. If this is the main ground projected by the learned senior counsel the 2nd respondent, permitting further proceedings would become an abuse of the process of the law.

#14. The other factors that are narrated about transactions happening between the 1st petitioner or the 2nd petitioner and the husband of the complainant are all during the lifetime of the husband of the complainant. While it is unfortunate that a life is 36 lost, but it is equally important that the accused who have nothing to do with the loss of life of the deceased should not always have the Damocles sword hanging on their head, as there is neither abetment nor goading nor proximity of any incident whatsoever in the complaint.

#15. The learned High Court Government Pleader submitted that the entire investigation was complete and what was awaiting was filing of a final report before the concerned Court. Therefore, to satisfy myself, I directed placing of the investigation papers. The entire investigation papers were also placed. Even there, not a titter of a document is found that would pin these petitioners down for any act of abetment for suicide of the husband of the complainant. As observed by the Apex Court, human mind is an enigma. What drives a person to an extreme act of commission of suicide is unfathomable, it may be due to myriad circumstances, though it result in losing of a precious life. The lives of the living, notwithstanding the fact they have nothing to do with such commission of suicide, should not be made miserable by permitting further proceedings. 37

#16. What remains is the offence under Section 420 of the IPC. Section 420 of the IPC has its ingredients in Section 415 of the IPC. If the complainant’s husband had been lured into something during his lifetime, it was open for him to complain, not the wife of the complainant after the death of her husband. The ingredients of neither Section 306 of the IPC nor Section 420 of the IPC are even found to its semblance in the case at hand. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA V. BHAJAN LAL11 wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive 11 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335 38 list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. cognizable offence but (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the 39 concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

#16. The principles laid down by this Court have consistently been followed, as well as in the recent judgment of three Judge in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra2. judgment of this Court (Emphasis supplied) In the light of the facts as narrated hereinabove and the judgments rendered by the Apex Court on the issue .

#17. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: (i) (ii) ORDER Criminal Petition is allowed. The FIR and further investigation in Crime No.172 of 2024 pending on the file of XXXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed qua the petitioners. 40 (iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioners under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not come in the way of any other proceedings pending between the parties before any other fora. Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2024 also stands disposed. Sd/- (M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ