SRI. Y. KRISHNAPPA v. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KOLAR DISTRICT

SRI.VENKATACHALAPATHY @ VENKATESHAPPA, S/O. LATE PAPAIAH, AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023

SMT.RAJAMMA, W/O. SRINIVASAPPA, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,

SRI.MUNIYAPPA, S/O. LATE PAPAIAH, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, RESPONDENTS NO.3 TO 5 ARE RESIDING AT GOLLAHALLI VILLAGE, LAKKUR HOBLI, MALUR TALUK, KOLAR-563 160.

SMT.KANTHAMMA, W/O. MUNIRAJU, AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS, R/AT CHIKKABANAHALLI VILLAGE, KADUGODI POST, HOSKOTE TALUK-562 114.

SRI.RAMESH, S/O. LATE PAPIAH, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,

SRI.SURESH, S/O. LATE PAPAIAH, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, RESPONDENTS NO.7 AND 8 ARE R/AT GOLLAHALLI VILLAGE, LAKKUR HOBLI, MALUR TALUK, KOLAR-563 160.

SMT. JAYALAKSHAMMA, D/O. LATE PAPAIAH, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, R/AT PYARAKAPALLI VILLAGE, SERUMUDUGANAHALLI POST, DENKANIKOTE TALUK, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 KRISHNAGIRI DISTRICT TAMIL NADU-635 107. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SHWETHA KRISHNAPPA, AGA FOR R1 AND R2; SRI. S.VISWESWARAIAH, ADVOCATE FOR R3, R5, R7 AND R8; R4 AND R9 ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED; VIDE ORDER DATED 27.02.2025, SERVICE OF NOTICE TO R6 IS HELD SUFFICIENT) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN LEARNED WP NO.4376/2023(SC-ST) DATED 29/05/2023, ETC. SINGLE JUDGE THE BY THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO) The report of notice on respondent No.6 states ‘refused’. Hence, notice on respondent No.6 is deemed to have been effected. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the counsel for respondents No.1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8.

The challenge in this appeal is to an order dated

29.05.2023 passed by learned Single Judge WP No.4376/2023, whereby the learned Single Judge has - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein by stating in paragraphs No.5 to 7 as under: “5. In the present case on hand, there is a delay of 34 years in initiating action. The respondent No.2 has not examined the delay and laches in moving the application. The judgments cited supra clearly indicates that on the ground of gross delay and laches, the application made by the grantee or by the legal heirs under Section 5(2) of the PTCL Act requires to be rejected. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited judgment has held that where statute does not provide limitation, authorities and State must act consciously and if the process of invoking the provisions of statute is delayed and is initiated after long lapse of time, the delay by itself would act as an impediment. Thus, without exception and coming across various rules of law, the Apex Court has categorically stated the law in respect of exercise of power/jurisdiction under statute where no limitation is stipulated. The law on the point of delay and laches to invoke the provisions of PTCL Act is well settled by catena of judgments.

6. In the present case on hand, I would find that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time. In that view of the matter, the application filed by petitioner seeking resumption and restoration of granted land on the ground that - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 the transfer is in violation of Section 4 of the PTCL Act is not at all maintainable since the same is not filed within a reasonable period. Therefore, order passed by respondent No.2 ordering restoration of petition land is contrary to principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Respondent No.1 Deputy Commissioner has rightly reversed order of respondent No.2 - Assistant Commissioner.

7. In view of discussion made supra, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER The writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly, stands dismissed.”

3. The appellant herein - the grandson of original grantee filed the writ petition feeling aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No.1-Deputy Commissioner, wherein the Deputy Commissioner has allowed the appeal filed by respondents No.3 to 9 and set aside the order dated 11.05.2016 passed by respondent No.2-Assistant Commissioner.

4. The records reveal the facts as, the Authorities have granted the petition favour of one Krishnabovi, who is the grandfather of the appellant - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 herein, by order dated 17.04.1967. The original grantee, during his lifetime, sold the land in favour of father of respondents No.3 to 8 under the registered sale deed dated 27.11.1974. The grandchild of original grantee i.e., the appellant herein moved an application under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (‘PTCL Act’ for short) in the year 2011. The respondent No.2- Assistant Commissioner ordered restoration of the petition land. The Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal filed by the purchaser on the ground of delay.

5. The submission of Sri. Abhinav.R, learned counsel for the appellant is that, the Deputy Commissioner could not have entertained an appeal after three years of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. In that sense, the appeal was barred by time. The other submission is that, the delay and laches occurred would not mean that the Authorities or the Court would not consider the case on merits. It is only that delay and - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 latches would disentitle the party to the relief. According to him, the land was granted to the predecessor of the appellant under darkasth in LND No.176/1996-1997 with a condition of non-alienation for 15 years. According to him, the sale deed having been executed within the non- transferable period of 15 years, the transaction is void and as such, the Assistant Commissioner has rightly restored the land, which order has been set aside by the Deputy Commissioner on the ground of delay. He also states, the judgment relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi -Vs.- State of Karnataka and Another [(2020) 14 SCC 232] and even the case in Chhedi Lal Yadav -Vs.- Hari Kishore Yadav [(2018) 12 SCC 527] shall not be applicable in facts of this case because of the aforesaid distinguishing factor.

6. We are unable to agree with the submission of Sri. Abhinav for the simple reason that, as a matter of fact, what was sought to be challenged by the successor of - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 the original grantee, that too in the year 2011, was the sale deed which was executed by the original grantee Krishnabovi on 27.11.1974 favour of father of respondents No.3 to 8. The application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act was only filed in the year 2011. Hence, in that regard, there is a delay of 34 years in challenging the sale deed. The learned Single Judge was right in relying upon the judgment in the cases of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) and Chhedi Lal Yadav (supra). The reliance placed by Sri. Abhinav on paragraph No.25 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. and Anr. -Vs.- M/s Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. and Anr. [Civil Appeal No.2669/2013, decided on 11.12.2023] reads as under:

25. In light of above discussion, it is clear that when a Court is seized of a situation where no limitation stands provided either by specific applicability of the Limitation Act or the special statute governing the dispute, the Court must - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 undertake a holistic assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case to examine the possibility of delay causing prejudice to a party. When no limitation stands prescribed it would be inappropriate for a Court to supplant the legislature's wisdom by its own and provide a limitation, more so in accordance with what it believes to be appropriate period. A court should, in such a situation consider in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the proceeding, the length of delay, the possibility of prejudice being caused, and the scheme of the statute in question. It may be underscored here that when a party to a dispute raises a plea of delay despite no specific period being prescribed in the statute, such a party also bears the burden of demonstrating how the delay in itself would cause the party additional prejudice or loss as opposed to, the claim subject matter of dispute, being raised at an earlier point in time.

7. Surely, the said judgment shall not help the appellant in the facts of this case, more so when the respondents No.3 to 8 got the title of the petition land and enjoying the same for a period of 34 years. For the Assistant Commissioner to hold in favour of the appellant - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:8939-DB WA No. 787 of 2023 herein was totally erroneous. The Deputy Commissioner was right in setting aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner which has been upheld by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.

8. In view of our above discussion, we do not see any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE PA List No.: 1 Sl No.: 9