SRI. VENKATESH S. ARABATTI, ADVOCATE) v. (BY SRI. HARISHA.S.S, AGA FOR R1)

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) The Karnataka Lokayukta represented by Registrar is before this Court, questioning the order dated

30.07.2019 in Application No.4287/2017 by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short “Tribunal”) by which, application of respondent No.2 is allowed quashing the Government Order dated 20.12.2016 entrusting enquiry to the petitioner as well as Articles of Charge dated 03.04.2017. - 3 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR

Heard learned counsel Sri.K.Prasanna Shetty as well as Sri. Venkatesh S Arbatti for petitioner and Sri. Harisha A.S. learned Additional Government Advocate for Respondent No.1. Perused the entire writ petition papers.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Tribunal committed an error in quashing the order of entrustment as well as Articles of Charge at the threshold and he would submit that if the enquiry as instituted was continued, truth would have come out and it is not for the Tribunal at the threshold to come to the conclusion that the petitioner as well as respondent No.1 has not considered the material on record before entrusting the enquiry as well as before framing charges. Learned counsel Sri. Prasanna Shetty would submit that the allegations relate to the year 2014 and the Tribunal taking note of the cases registered in the year 2013 has come to the conclusion that there is no misconduct on the - 4 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR part of respondent No.2 which according to him is opposed to the material on record.

The impugned order is dated 30.07.2019 whereas the present writ petition is filed on 17.06.2022 nearly after 3 years from the date of passing the impugned order in question. With regard to delay in preferring the writ petition, though there is no limitation prescribed to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ jurisdiction shall be invoked within a reasonable time.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of MRINMOY MAITY V. CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 was considering the question of delay in approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held that when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time - 5 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR same has been invoked. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 read as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such - 6 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own - 7 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: to uphold “56. We are unable contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. factors

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC - 8 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.”

It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if - 9 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:

Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might regarded as fairly be equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of remedy were afterwards - 10 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.

It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary - 11 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR likely to cause remedy because confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out invoked, that when writ unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” jurisdiction

With regard to other contentions raised by the petitioner, we have gone through the Articles of Charge dated 03.04.2017 (Annexure-A15). On going through the Articles of Charge, we are of the considered opinion that the charge is vague and it would not give required particulars. The charge would not even indicate the period of alleged misconduct and would not indicate the action that respondent No.1 ought to have taken and what action respondent No.1 failed to initiate against the illegal transportation of sand. Imputation of charges would indicate only reply submitted by respondent No.2. The petitioner-authority has failed to properly frame charge by furnishing all the details. Thus, in addition to the grounds - 12 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR on which the Tribunal rejected the application, we had one more ground of vagueness.

7. Though the writ petition was filed on

17.06.2022, after compliance of office objections the writ petition is brought before the Court by the petitioner- Institution only on 01.06.2026 and on that day looking to the delay on the part of the petitioner to file writ petition as well as delay in bringing the matter before the Court by compliance of office objections, we though it fit to direct the petitioner to deposit cost of Rs.15,000/- to consider issuance of notice to respondents. Accordingly, we directed the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards costs for consideration of issuance of notice to the respondents. However, I.A.No.1/2026 is filed to recall the said order. Along with I.A., affidavit is filed by the Registrar, Karnataka Lokayukta, paragraph 3 of the affidavit reads as follows: “3. I state that the above Writ Petition was filed on 17.06.2022 through the then learned - 13 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR Special Counsel the petitioner-Lokayukta.

Though the learned counsel had complied with most of the office objections, he failed to file the translated English copies of the Kannada Annexures produced along with the Writ Petition. Consequently, though the matter was listed before this Hon'ble "Court during the years 2023 and 2024, the same could not be taken up for admission on account of the non-filing of the translated copies of certain Annexures. As such, the matter could not be effectively processed and listed for admission. I further state that the services of then special counsel are no longer being availed by the petitioner institution. Thereafter, the matter was listed before this Hon'ble Court on 28.07.2025. On the said date, the Special counsel appeared before this Hon'ble Court and submitted that he was no longer representing the petitioner- Lokayukta. Consequently, this Hon'ble Court directed Sri Venkatesh S. Arabatti to accept notice on behalf of the petitioner institution.

Pursuant thereto, Sri Venkatesh S. Arabatti filed a Memo of Appearance in the above matter. Subsequently, the petitioner institution entrusted the present Writ Petition file to Sri K. Prasanna Shetty in view of the resignation and removal of Mr.Ashwin S Halady from the panel of special counsel and instructed the present counsel to take over the case records from - 14 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR the earlier counsel, Sri Ashwin S. Halady. A Copy of Authorisation letter dated 17.11.2025 is enclosed along with this affidavit as ANNEXURE-R1. The matter was thereafter listed on 01.06.2026. However, Sri K. Prasanna Shetty could not effectively appear in the matter, as the case continued to be reflected in the cause list under the name of Sri Venkatesh S. Arabatti. This Hon’ble Court, noticing that the Writ Petition pertains to the year 2022 and had not been effectively prosecuted, directed the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards cost for consideration of issuance of notice to the respondents.

I respectfully submit that the petitioner got a strong case on merits and that the non-listing and delay in prosecuting the matter were neither deliberate nor intentional. The same occurred due to the bona fide circumstances narrated above, including the non- filing of translated annexures by the earlier counsel and the subsequent transition of the matter between counsels. That Owing to the aforesaid bona fide circumstances, the petitioner could not take timely steps for the effective prosecution and listing of the Writ Petition for admission. The delay is thus unintentional and deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice and equity.” - 15 - NC: 2026:KHC:30815-DB WP No. 12126 of 2022 HC-KAR The affidavit would not indicate that though the writ petition was filed on 17.06.2022, what steps were taken for compliance of the office objections. Further, the affidavit would also not indicate what follow up action the petitioner-Lokayukta institution has taken once the writ petition is entrusted to its panel counsel.

The present writ petition is the best example of non-follow up after entrusting the matter to a counsel by the petitioner- Institution. The petitioner-Institution is under impression that once the matter is entrusted to a counsel, the responsibility of the petitioner-Institution ends and it is for the counsel to take further action. Though the reasons stated in the affidavit accompanying I.A.No.1/2026, in the interest of justice, we re-call order dated 01.06.2026 directing the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.15,000/- as cost to consider the issuance of notice.