SRI G. SHIVAKUMAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

ORDER The captioned petition is filed assailing the order dated

10.12.2015 passed by the respondent No.2 vide Annexure-A and the consequent memo issued on a representation submitted by the petitioner herein as per Annexure-B. The petitioner is seeking a mandamus against respondent No.2 to consider the representation dated 08.04.2019 and sanction backwages and salary due to the petitioner during his period of suspension.

2. The facts leading to the case are as under: The petitioner was appointed by respondent No.2 to the post of watchman at High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 3 account of registration of crime in Crime No.324/2010 for the offences punishable under Sections 9, 39, 40, 44 and 51 of the Wild Life (Prevention) Act, 1972 read with Section 379 of IPC. In the said complaint, it was alleged against the petitioner that he has stolen 10 live turtles from the forest and had illegally kept them at High Court quarters without any licence, permit and pass. Based on the said compliant, investigation was conducted and charge sheet was laid against the present petitioner and other accused.

3. The petitioner made a representation on

08.08.2013 and brought to the notice of respondent No.2 about his acquittal of all the charges in C.C.No.2820/2011 and therefore, a request was made to revoke his suspension. The grievance of the petitioner is that though respondent No.2 taking cognizance of acquittal has revoked his suspension with immediate effect, however, declined to grant monetary benefits. Petitioner, therefore, submitted a representation on

08.04.2019 thereby requesting to grant full salary for the 4 period he was placed under suspension. The respondent No.2 as per Annexure-B declined to grant monetary benefits on the ground that acquittal was by giving benefit of doubt. The second reason for denying salary for the suspension period was on the ground that petitioner has not discharged official duty during the period of suspension and has reported for duty only on 11.12.2015.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterating the grounds urged in the petition has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1) Union of India and Ors. vs. Kameshwar Prasad – (1997) 11 SCC 650; 2) Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation vs. M.Prabhakar Rao – (2011) 8 SCC 155; 3) Krishnakant R.Bibhavnekar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. – (1997) 3 SCC 636; 4) C.R.Radhakrishnan vs. State of Kerala and Ors. – (2017) 13 SCC 365; 5) P.Ramaswamy vs. General Manager, Canara Bank and Anr. – (1998) 3 LLN 686; 5 6) Anish Gupta vs. Union of India and Anr. – 2019 SCC Online Del 7383; 7) Union of India and Ors. vs. K.V.Jankiraman and Ors. – (1991) 4 SCC 109; 8) Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh – (2013) 7 SCC 685; 9) Union of India vs. Methu Meda – (2022) 1 SCC 1; 10) Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. - (2024) 1 SCC 175; 11) State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. Debashish Mukherjee and Ors. – (2011) 14 SCC 187.

5. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered in P.Ramaswamy vs. General Manager, Canara Bank (supra) and in the case of Anish Gupta vs. Union of India (supra), he would vehemently argue and contend that where disciplinary proceedings post acquittal in criminal proceedings are not conducted, full consequential monetary benefits are required to be accorded to the concerned personnel. Reliance is also placed on the judgments rendered in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi vs. Mehar Singh, Union of India vs. Methu Meda and Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (supra). 6 Referring to these judgments, he would contend that ‘Honourable acquittal’ and such other concepts are only relevant vis-à-vis departmental proceedings. On account of acquittal in a fully contested criminal proceedings, he would point out that the petitioner is entitled to seek monetary benefits during the suspension period. He would also place reliance on the judgment rendered in Union of India vs. K.V.Jankiraman (supra) to substantiate that principle of ‘no work, no pay’ has no application to the present set of facts and therefore, he would request this Court to quash the impugned endorsement issued by the respondent No.2 as per Annexure-B.

6. Referring to these judgments, he would point out that respondent No.2 has not initiated any departmental enquiry and the fact that petitioner was acquitted by the competent court, petitioner has to be deemed to have been on duty for the period of suspension and therefore, is entitled for full pay and allowances. While taking 7 this Court through the reasons assigned in the memo dated

12.09.2019 as per Annexure-B, he would point out that no reasons are forthcoming to deny full salary during the period of suspension.

7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would point out that the criminal proceedings in C.C.No.2820/2011 ended in acquittal as two prime witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the gravity of charges levelled against the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents would point out that petitioner being watchman in a higher judiciary, the conduct alleged is relevant and a foundation for prosecution and dehors acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence which has culminated into an acquittal, though entitled for reinstatement, cannot seek full salary. Reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation vs. M.Prabhakar Rao1. 1 (2011) 8 SCC 155 8

8. Referring to the conduct of petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents would point out that the petitioner’s suspension was revoked on 10.12.2015 and the representation seeking full salary is submitted only on

08.04.2019. Therefore, he would contend that there is complete laxness on the part of petitioner and only on account of inordinate delay, the petitioner is liable to be dismissed.

9. Referring to Rule 14 and Rule 20 of the High Court of Karnataka Services (Conditions of Services and Recruitment) Rules, 1973 (for short ‘Rules, 1973’), he would contend that Hon’ble Chief Justice is the controlling and disciplinary authority and the services of the High Court employees shall be subject to superintendence and control of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The memo dated 12.09.2019 as per Annexure-B is passed by the Chief Justice after considering various factors by exercising power under Rule 20 and therefore, no judicial review is warranted in the present case on hand. 9

10. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents.

11. Petitioner who was appointed as a watchman was prosecuted for the offence punishable under Sections 9, 39, 40, 44 and 51 of the Wild Life (Prevention) Act, 1972 read with Section 379 of IPC. The allegations are that the present petitioner along with other accused have stolen 10 live turtles from the forest and they were illegally kept in High Court quarters. Though the Investigating Officer has laid a charge sheet, on account of prime witnesses having turned hostile, the Court on account of witnesses to seizure mahazar having given adverse statement was of the view that seizure mahazar is not proved beyond doubt. The Court also found that there is some discrepancies in the colours of the turtles and the same was no indicated in the mahazar.

12. The petitioner was charge sheeted for the offence punishable under Sections 9, 39, 40, 44 and 51 of the Wild 10 Life (Prevention) Act, 1972 read with Section 379 of IPC and the Investigating Officer has laid a charge sheet. The very cause for suspension of petitioner was on account of grave offences indicated while registering crime and also while laying charge sheet. Therefore, bearing in mind the conduct alleged against the petitioner by the prosecution, though has ended in acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence, the question that emerges for consideration before this Court is, as to whether petitioner though is reinstated by taking a lenient view is entitled to seek full salary for the period of suspension. If respondent No.2, taking note of acquittal of the charges in criminal trial, for lack of evidence, has formed its opinion that petitioner is not entitled to seek monetary benefits for the period of suspension, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order passed by respondent No.2 as per Annexure-B. Having regard to the gravity of allegations, respondent No.2 was justified in treating suspension period as a period of not on duty and I do not find any error in declining either payment 11 of suspension allowances or full salary as claimed by the petitioner.

13. The conduct of employees of a higher judiciary has to be put on a higher pedestal. Though legal evidence may be insufficient to bring home the guilt of the petitioner, the act of reinstatement itself would send a wrong signal to the society as well as to the employees of the judiciary. Merely because respondent No.2 has taken a lenient view and ordered for reinstatement, that will not in itself constitute a ground for petitioner to seek full salary for the period of suspension.

14. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioner’s action seeking full salary lacks bonafides. Petitioner’s suspension was revoked on

10.12.2015 and his claim for full salary in the representation dated 08.08.2013 was rightly declined by respondent No.2. The petitioner has submitted one more representation on

08.04.2019. There is a delay of more than three years in 12 seeking sanction of backwages due to the petitioner during his period of suspension.

15. It is a trite law that Doctrine of laches in Court of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical Doctrine, where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy as the petitioner’s conduct in the present case on hand is found to be grossly unfair and has to be regarded as equivalent to a waiver. The lapse of time and delay are most material. Court while examining such stale case have to be cautious and have to take cognizance of the long delay and the nature of acts done by a litigant during the interval. Court has to be also cautious and examine as to whether any relief, if granted, which might affect either party and gives a balance of justice or injustice. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by respondent No.2 as per Annexure-A and the consequent memo issued by respondent No.2 vide Annexure-B. 13

16. For the reasons stated supra, I pass the following: ORDER Writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly, stands dismissed. CA Sd/- JUDGE