✦ High Court of India

REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER AND CHIEF MANAGER, SRI. NATRAJ v. SRI SATHIS P.S

Case Details

- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV WRIT PETITION NO. 7045 OF 2025 (GM-DRT) BETWEEN: 1. SMT. SUKANYA M.S. AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, W/O RAMAKRISHNA, R/AT NO. 1279, 11TH MAIN, NEAR KODAVA SAMAJA, VIJAYANAGARA I STAGE, MYSURU - 570 017. 2. SRI. RAMAKRISHNA AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, S/O LATE MANJAIAH, R/AT NO. 1279, 11TH MAIN, NEAR KODAVA SAMAJA, VIJAYANAGARA I STAGE, MYSURU - 570 017. Digitally signed by VIJAYA P Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA 3. M/S. DHARMASHREE JAGGERY INDUSRTY

Legal Reasoning

PROPRIETOR SMT. SUKANYA M.S. R/AT NO. 139/1, KALLIKOPPALU VILLAGE, SRINIVAS AGRAHARA, K. SHETTIHALLI, MANDYA - 571 401 (BY SRI. C M NAGABUSHANA., ADVOCATE) … PETITIONERS - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR AND: 1. 2. M/S. BANK OF INDIA MYSORE BRANCH, ROYAL CROWN, OPP. CLOCK TOWER, ASHOKA ROAD, MYSURU - 570 001. REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER AND CHIEF MANAGER, SRI. NATRAJ. V. SRI SATHIS P.S. … PROPOSED S/O SHANKAREGOWDA RESPONDENT AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS R/O DOOR NO.345, 7TH MAIN ROAD MAHADESHWARA LAYOUT VIJAYNAGARA II STAGE MYSORE - 570 016. … RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. M MOHAMED IBRAHIM., ADVOCATE; SRI H. ABHINANDAN, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1; SRI L.M. CHIDANANDAYYA, ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED RESPONDENT) THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO DIRECT QUASHING THE ORDER DTD 31.01.2025 PASSED BY THE DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE - II AT ANNEXURE-G AND ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR ORAL ORDER Petitioners have called in question the validity of the order dated 31.01.2025 at Annexure-G which is the order passed in S.A.No.269/2024 rejecting the request to put the applicants back into possession. Petitioners have also sought for a direction for enlarging the time for compliance of conditions imposed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as per the order at Annexure-D dated 04.12.2024. Other reliefs have been sought as well. 2. Learned counsel for the respondent - Bank submits that in the interregnum property has been auctioned and rights are created in favour of a third party i.e., auction purchaser. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioners were not aware of the auction proceedings and the said proceedings are not as per the procedure. - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR 4. After hearing the matter for some time, it is noticed that if the petitioners to take appropriate action insofar as the subsequent event of action, the substantive remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act would have to be taken recourse to. 5. It is relevant to take note of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Others - (2010) 8 SCC 110 that the appropriate remedy would be to relegate the petitioner to seek for substantive remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as follows: "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 6. In light of the observations made by the Apex Court, it can be noticed that several factual contention - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR raised by the petitioners are the matters that cannot be adjudicated in the present proceedings. 7. Accordingly, the petition is disposed off relegating the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy as regards the impugned proceedings. All contentions of both the sides are kept open. 8. In light of disposal of writ petition, it would meet the ends of justice by directing the respondent- bank not to take any precipitative steps for a period of *four weeks from today. On the lapse of such time, the protection granted by this Court stands discharged. 9. The interim protection granted under this order is only to enable the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy and must not be considered to be an order passed on the basis of adjudication on merits. Upon the lapse of the time stipulated, the protection granted would cease to operate and the authorities before whom petitioners may * Corrected vide Court order dated 07.07.2025. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:20176 WP No. 7045 of 2025 HC-KAR approach are to look at the matter afresh uninfluenced by the observations made herein. 10. The auction purchaser has asserted various contentions including that his rights at this stage cannot be disturbed as per the law laid down by the Apex Court. However, since petitioner has been relegated to avail of the substantive remedy, no adjudication is required as regards the impleading application.

Decision

11. Accordingly, petition is disposed off. Sd/- (S SUNIL DUTT YADAV) JUDGE VP

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