TEJA G. E. @ TEJU v. STATE BY HASSAN RURAL POLICE & Ors.

10. Based on the aforesaid facts, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated 31.08.2024 came to be registered against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC at City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar City.

11. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an anticipatory bail application bearing Criminal Bail Application No. 1841 of 2024 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad (hereinafter referred to as “Trial Court”). The Trial Court, by order dated 19.09.2024, allowed the application and enlarged the appellant on anticipatory bail. During the course of the investigation, both respondent No. 2 and her mother, in their statements, supported the prosecution’s version of events. Subsequently, on completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet bearing No. 143 of 2024 dated 25.10.2024 came to be filed against the appellant under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.

12. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an application bearing Criminal Application No. 601 of 2025 before the Bombay High Court at Aurangabad under Section 528 of the BNSS, seeking quashing of FIR No. 294 of 2024. 13. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant in FIR No. 294 of 2024 on the ground that a chargesheet had already been filed and the matter was ready for trial; the appellant could not sufficiently prove that the instant case was a clearly case of consensual relationship; that the relationship between the appellant and - 8 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR respondent No.2 could be termed as a fiduciary relationship inasmuch as the appellant was discussing the maintenance case of respondent No.2 with her; and that in view of the aforesaid, the facts of the present case warranted the conduct of a trial to test the veracity of the allegations made by respondent No.2 and to ascertain whether the acts alleged to have occurred between the appellant and respondent No.2 were against her will or otherwise.

14. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent-State and learned Amicus on behalf of respondent No.2.

15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant has been falsely implicated as there is no evidence against him with respect to the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.

16. It is further submitted that the respondent No.2 is a well- educated lady who is married and has a minor daughter. It was contended that there is no divorce decree passed between respondent No.2 and her husband. Therefore, during the subsistence of her marriage, respondent no.2 consequently entered into a relationship with the appellant for a period of three years. Further, during the subsistence of relationship, no complaint whatsoever was ever lodged by respondent No.2 against the appellant. It was only in August 2024 after the appellant refused to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- demanded by - 9 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR respondent No.2, that in a fit of anger, she lodged the present criminal case against him.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, on the other hand, supported the impugned order and submitted that the allegations made by respondent No.2 discloses commission of a cognizable offence and warrants no interference at the threshold. It is submitted that the veracity of the defence taken by the appellant is a matter for trial and not for adjudication under the limited jurisdiction of a petition for quashing.

18. Learned Amicus also supported the respondent- State by contending that there is no merit in this appeal.

19. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having perused the material on record, the only question that needs to be addressed is whether FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated 31.08.2024, along with Chargesheet No.143 of 2024 filed on 25.10.2024 against the appellant herein, should be quashed

20. In the instant case the allegations in the FIR are under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC. An offence of rape, if established in terms of Section 375 of the IPC, is punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. In the present case, the second description of Section 376 is relevant which is set out below: “376. Punishment for rape. – (1). Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub- section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less - 10 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

2. Whoever, - Xxx (n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,— (a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces constituted under any law for the time being in force, including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces that are under the control of the Central Government or the State Government; (b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and the precincts of any includes reception during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation; institution persons treatment (c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as assigned to the expression “police” under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861); (d) “women's or children's institution” means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widow's home or an institution called by any other name, which established and maintained for the reception and care of women or children.”

21. Section 376(2)(n) of IPC provides enhanced punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision is to - 11 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim. Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a single transaction.

22. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation.

23. In the present case, a bare perusal of the FIR and the statement on record reveals that respondent No.2 met the appellant, who is a practicing advocate, for the first time in reference to a case which was instituted by respondent No.2 against her husband. Thereafter, they exchanged numbers and regularly kept in touch. Over a passage of time, respondent No.2 and the appellant developed a close relationship and started meeting each other frequently. During this time, they established sexual relations multiple times between 12.03.2022 to 20.05.2024. The appellant contends that during the course of their relationship, not once did respondent No.2 file a complaint regarding the alleged non-consensual sexual relations, and - 12 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR inconceivable that the appellant would force himself upon her for so many years without there being any protest or complaint from the side of respondent No.2. Notably, it was only in August of 2024 when the appellant refused to fulfil respondent No.2’s demand of payment of Rs.1,50,000/- that the instant criminal case came to be instituted against the appellant.

24. Another question which arises for consideration is whether the appellant engaged in physical relationship with respondent No.2 based on a deception or a false promise to marry.

25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on respondent No.2’s claim that appellant established physical relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the appellant that respondent No.2 opposed the idea of marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No.2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married.

26. The FIR in the present case also states that in September 2022, when respondent No.2 found out that she was pregnant with the appellant’s child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and I will live my life”. At that time, the appellant again assured her that they would get married and asked for some time from respondent No.2, to - 13 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR which she refused. However, despite her refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet him at Hotel Citizen and engaged in physical relations with him.

27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein the following observations were made: “27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.

28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.” (underlining by us)

28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the - 14 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage.

29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation.

30. In Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the crucial the charge-sheet as ingredients under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the they stand, offence - 15 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing prosecution.” (underlining by us)

31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases - 16 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture.

32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case, we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious.

33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever raised by respondent No.2 regarding the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the appellant’s refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between

12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy.

34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No.2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her - 17 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.

35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under: “33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship. - 18 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced relationship between complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception. together,

35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.

39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” (underlining by us)

36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya - 19 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.

37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No.2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasized in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned.

38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid - 20 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in which it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of to show that at - 21 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (underlining by us)

39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may be appropriate: “102. xxx (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of - 22 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. xxx”

40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In our opinion, the High Court’s refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery.

41. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated

06.03.2025 in application under Section 528 BNSS bearing Criminal Application No. 601 of 2025. The said application accordingly stands allowed. Consequently, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated 31.08.2024, registered with City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar City under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of IPC and Chargesheet No. 143 of 2024 dated 25.10.2024, filed in the Court of the 3rd Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aurangabad, accordingly stands quashed. - 23 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

42. We express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered by Ms. Radhika Gowtam, learned Advocate-on-Record who had been appointed as Amicus Curiae in the matter. Registry of this Court is directed to pay honorarium of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) to the learned Amicus Curiae.

6. So also, this Court in the case of XXX Vs. The State of Karnataka and Anr., stated (supra) held as under: “Criminal Petition No.1225 of 2025 is filed by accused No.1 and the companion petition in Criminal Petition No.2826 of 2025 is filed by accused Nos. 2 and 3. These petitioners challenge a common crime in Crime No.789 of 2024. The complainant is common. Therefore, these petitions are taken up together and considered by this common order.

2. For the sake of convenience, obtaining in Criminal Petition No.1225 of 2025 would be narrated. In this order, accused No.1 would be referred as the petitioner, for easy reference.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

3.1. The petitioner is said to be in relationship with the complainant. Accused 2 and 3 in the companion petition are the relatives of accused No.1. It is the 2nd averment petition - 24 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR respondent/complainant is a resident of Anjananagara for the last 4 to 5 years and her marriage had taken place 10 years ago with a particular person and the complainant has a child born from the said wedlock. In the year 2014, the averment in the petition is that the complainant again married one Yathish Kumar T.R. and the said marriage got dissolved in the year 2020 and from the said wedlock she has a child of 4 years now. In the year 2020, it appears that she gets acquainted with the present petitioner, a practicing Advocate in a case pertaining to Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant alleges that during the conversation with the petitioner, he took the telephone number of the complainant and began conversation. The conversation turned into personal and the petitioner thereafter in the year 2022 sent a friend request on Instagram of the complainant and also made phone call to the complainant requesting her to accept his request. Accordingly, friendship between the complainant and the petitioner developed and the friendship further blossomed into having physical relationship as well.

3.2. The petition further narrates that in the month of July 2023 the petitioner came to the house of the complainant and expressed that he is willing to marry her and on the pretext of marriage has had physical relationship which continued thereafter and on the breach of said promise of marriage, the complainant registers a complaint before the jurisdictional Police on 09-12-2024 not only against the petitioner but also against relatives of the - 25 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR petitioner. Registration of crime has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petitions.

4. Heard Sri Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused No.1, Sri Punith C, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/accused 2 and 3; Ms. Asma Kouser, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 in both the petitions and Sri Akshay R. Huddar, learned counsel appearing respondent No.2/complainant in both the petitions. SUBMISSIONS: PETITIONER’S:

5. The learned counsel appearing petitioners would vehemently contend that there is no physical relationship between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent/complainant at all. It is all concocted story which the complainant is used to. He would contend that the complainant is already married not once but twice, and a person who is already married cannot project physical relationship on the promise of marriage. He would submit that the complainant is in the habit of indulging in such acts of trapping every man and registering crimes against them. He would submit that if further proceedings are permitted to be continued, it would become an abuse of the process of law. To buttress his submissions, he takes this Court through the documents appended the petition demonstrate marriage of the complainant with one Yathish Kumar T. R. and proceedings of annulment of marriage - 26 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR with Yathish Kumar T. R. and a crime being registered for offences punishable under Section 363 of the IPC when the child that the complainant had from the first marriage who was by then 13 years old goes missing, only to contend that the complainant who was married not once but twice, is wanting to project that the petitioner has had physical relationship with the complainant on the promise of marriage. He would submit that there is neither physical relationship nor promise of marriage. COMPLAINANT AND STATE:

6. Contrariwise, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/complainant would vehemently refute the submissions in contending that the crime is registered only on 09-12-2024. The investigation should be permitted to continue. It is only then the truth will come out. The petitioner has had relationship with the complainant as an Advocate and a client for the last 3 years prior to registration of crime. The physical relationship have happened between the two on the pretext of promise of marriage. The complainant, though is married, came in contact with the petitioner on divorce. In the light of her being single, all possibilities of physical relationship on the pretext of marriage can spring. It cannot be said that the crime should be nipped in the bud.

7. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor Ms. Asma Kouser would toe the lines of the learned counsel for the complainant in contending that the - 27 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR crime must not be obliterated and at the outset investigation should be permitted in the case at hand.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would now join issue to contend that divorce between Yatish Kumar.T.R. and the complainant though has happened in the year 2020, they are still living together. He would take this Court through the documents and the photographs to demonstrate that they are living together. Therefore, he would submit that all the narration of physical relationship on pretext of marriage is a figment of imagination of the complainant.

9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. CONSIDERATION:

10. The relationship of the parties to the lis are as narrated hereinabove covering both these petitions. The facts, dates and link in the chain of events are again not in dispute. It would suffice if the narration would commence from the complainant getting married to one Yathish Kumar T. R. The marriage between the complainant and Yathish Kumar T. R. happens on 30-05-2014. The certificate of marriage is appended to the petition. It appears that the complainant’s relationship with the said Yathish Kumar T. R. flounders and floundering of the relationship leads the complainant seeking annulment of marriage M.C.No.3017 of 2015. The said matrimonial case is - 28 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR disposed of on account of settlement and the marriage got dissolved on 22-10-2016. The petitioner was nowhere in the picture till the said date. According to the complainant after the grant of decree of divorce, a child is born from the wedlock in the year 2020. In the year 2023, for legal assistance in a case concerning Negotiable Instruments Act, the petitioner and the complainant come to know each other. It is here, the petitioner comes into the picture. Two years pass by. The complainant then seeks to register a complaint before the jurisdictional Police on 09-12-2024. Since the subject issue is triggered from the registration of complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows: “ರವ(cid:4)(cid:5)ೆ, (cid:8)ೕ(cid:10)ೕ(cid:11) ಇ(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:15)ೆಕ(cid:17)(cid:18). (cid:19)ಾ(cid:21)ಡರಹ(cid:24)(cid:25) (cid:8)ೕ(cid:10)ೕ(cid:11) (cid:26)ಾ(cid:27)ೆ, (cid:19)ೆಂಗಳ(cid:31)ರು ನಗರ. ಇಂದ. #ಾಗರತ% ಎ(cid:13) ’(cid:13) #ಾಗ(ಾಜು, 29ವಷ+ ,ಾಸ ನಂ.ಇಲ/, ಬ(cid:24)(cid:25) ’(cid:10)1ಂ2, 34ೕ5#ಾಯಕ 7ಾ8ೆಯ ರ9ೆ:, ಅಂಜನನಗರ <ಾಗ= ರ9ೆ:, (cid:19)ೆಂಗಳ(cid:31)ರು-560091. >ಾ?: ಒಕA(cid:10)ಗ, B(cid:19)ೈD ಸಂEೆ(cid:21):9686382940 Email Id: nagarathana75@gmail.com <ಾನ(cid:21)(ೇ. 5ಷಯ:- XXXX, <ಾಲ ಮತು: ಮೂ?+ರವರ 5ರುದI Jಾನೂನು ಕ4ಮ ಜರುKಸಲು Jೋ(cid:4) ದೂರು. --**-- ಈ MೕಲAಂಡ ತಮQ(cid:10)/ 5ಷಯJೆA JೋರುವRSೇ#ೆಂದ(ೆ, #ಾನು ಸು<ಾರು 4-5 ವಷ+Tಂದ ಅಂಜನನಗರದ(cid:10)/ ಸಂಬಂNOದಂPೆ - 29 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR ,ಾಸ,ಾKರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. #ಾನು ಸು<ಾರು 10 ವಷ+ದ UಂSೆ ಒಬVರನು% ಮದು,ೆWಾKರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. 2020 ರ(cid:10)/ Jಾನೂನು ಅ=ಯ(cid:10)/ 5XೆYೕದನ ಪ[ೆTರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ನನ(cid:5)ೆ 4 ವಷ+ದ ಮಗು5ದುI, ಅದನು% #ಾ#ೇ #ೋ=Jೊಳ\(cid:25)?:ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. UೕKರು,ಾಗ ನನ% ಒಂದು ಚ^ (cid:19)ೌ(cid:13)(cid:14) Jೇ(cid:11) (Jೇ(cid:11) ನಂ.0000403/2022) 5Xಾರ(cid:27)ೆ(cid:5)ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಪಟ(cid:17)ಂPೆ XXXX (ವcೕಲರು) ಇವರ ಹ?:ರ ಸದ(cid:4) Jೇ(cid:11) 5Xಾರ,ಾK <ಾತ#ಾಡು,ಾಗ O5D Jೋd+ ಬ(cid:24) ನಮQ ದೂರ,ಾe ಸಂEೆ(cid:21)ಯನು% ಸfತಃ ಅವ(ೇ Pೆ(cid:5)ೆದುJೊಂ=ರುPಾ:(ೆ. Uೕ(cid:5)ೆ 3-4 ?ಂಗಳ\ಗಳ Jಾಲ ಅವ(ೊಂT(cid:5)ೆ Jೇ(cid:11) 5Xಾರ Jೇಳಲು M9ೇhಗಳನು% <ಾ=ರುPೆ:ೕ,ೆ. UೕKರು,ಾಗ ಅವರು Jೇ(cid:11) 5Xಾರದ >ೊPೆ(cid:5)ೆ ನನ% ,ೈಯc:ಕ 5Xಾರಗಳನು% Jೇಳಲು ಆರಂjO, ನನ% ಸಂ9ಾರದ 5ಷಯಗಳನು% ?(cid:24)ದುJೊಂ=ರುPಾ:(ೆ. UೕKರು,ಾಗ ನಮQ ಪk5+ಕ(cid:4)(cid:5)ೆ ಸಂಬಂNOದ ಒಂದು >ಾಗದ ಬ(cid:5)ೆl ಅವ(ೊಂT(cid:5)ೆ ಚm+OರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ಆ >ಾಗದ Sಾಖ8ೆಗಳನು% Pೆ(cid:5)ೆO ಅವ(ೆ ಆ Jೇಸನು% #ೋ=Jೊಳ\(cid:25)ವRSಾK oೇ(cid:24), Jೋd+ ನ(cid:10)/ Jೇ(cid:11) (0000025/2024) oಾcರುPಾ:(ೆ. ನಂತರ pೆಬ4ವ(cid:4) 2022 ರಂದು XXXXX ರವರು ನನ% ಇ(cid:13)(cid:14) 9ಾ(cid:17) (cid:5)ಾ4ಂ ಐ=(cid:5)ೆ pೆ4ಂr (cid:4)Jೆf(cid:11)(cid:17) ಕಳ\UOರುPಾ:(ೆ. oಾಗೂ ನನ% ದೂರ,ಾe(cid:5)ೆ ಕ(ೆ <ಾ= (cid:4)Jೆf(cid:11)(cid:17) ಅJೆ(cid:14)s(cid:17) <ಾಡಲು ಸೂmOರುPಾ:(ೆ. Uೕ(cid:5)ೆ ನಮQ ನಡು5ನ 9ೆ%ೕಹ ಸಂಬಂಧವR TನTಂದ TನJೆA oೆXಾtಗುPಾ: oೋKರುತ:Sೆ. XXXXX ರವರು <ಾತ#ಾ=ಸ8ೆಂದು TನJೆA ಹಲ,ಾರು (cid:19)ಾ(cid:4) ಕ(ೆ <ಾಡು?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ. ಒಂದು ,ೇuೆ #ಾವR ದೂರ,ಾeಯನು% Pೆ(cid:5)ೆಯTದI(cid:10)/ ಹಲ,ಾರು M9ೆh ಗಳನು% ಕಳ\Uಸು?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ >ೊPೆ(cid:5)ೆ 5=vೕ JಾD ಸಹ <ಾಡು?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ. ನನ(cid:5)ೆ ಇಷ(cid:17)5ಲ/TದIರು ಪ4?Tನ 5=vೕ JಾD ನ(cid:10)/ ಗಂwೆಗಟ(cid:17)8ೆ <ಾತ#ಾ=ಸುPಾ:, ನನ% 9ೌಂದಯ+ವನು% ವe+ಸು?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ. Uೕ(cid:5)ೆ ಒಂದು Tನ T#ಾಂಕ :07/06/2023 ರಂದು ಅವರ ಹುಟು(cid:17)ಹಬV ಇTIದI(cid:4)ಂದ ಅವ(cid:4)(cid:5)ೆ ಹುಟು(cid:17)ಹಬVದ ಶುyಾಶಯವನು% ?(cid:24)ಸಲು ಕ(ೆ <ಾ=ರು,ಾಗ, ನನ%ನು% ಹುಟು(cid:17)ಹಬVದ ಸಲು,ಾK oೊರಗ[ೆ ಊಟJೆA ಬರುವಂPೆ ಒPಾ:ಯ ಪkವ+ಕ,ಾK ಬಂSೆ ಬರ(cid:19)ೇJೆಂದು oೇ(cid:24)ರುPಾ:(ೆ. T#ಾಂಕ :07/07/2023 ರಂದು ಓ(cid:4)ಯ(cid:13) <ಾD ನ(cid:10)/ ಪರಸ|ರ (cid:19)ೇ}WಾಗುPೆ:ೕ,ೆ. XXXX ರವರು ಅ(cid:10)/~ೕ ಇದI ಒಂದು (ೆ9ೊ(cid:17)ೕ(ೆಂd(cid:5)ೆ ನನ%ನು% ಊಟ <ಾಡಲು ಕ(ೆದುJೊಂಡು oೋKರುPಾ:(ೆ. ಅ(cid:10)/~ೕ ಅವರು ನನ%ನು% ಬಹಳ ಇಷ(cid:17)ಪಡು?:SೆIೕ#ೆ ಎಂದು oಾಗೂ ನನ%ನು% ಮದು,ೆ <ಾ=Jೊಳ\(cid:25)ವRSಾK Jೇ(cid:24)Jೊಂ=ರುPಾ:(ೆ. #ಾನು ನನ(cid:5)ೆ 5Xೆtೕದನ,ಾKರುವ ಬ(cid:5)ೆl ಮತು: ನನ(cid:5)ೆ ಒಂದು ಮಗು ಇರುವRದನು% ಸಹ ಅವ(cid:4)(cid:5)ೆ ಮPೊ:MQ ಮನವ(cid:4)Jೆ <ಾ=ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ಆದರೂ ಕೂಡ ಅವರು ನನ%ನು% (cid:19)ೇ(ೆಯವರ ಉSಾಹರ(cid:27)ೆ Jೊಟು(cid:17) ನನ% ಮನoೊ(cid:10)ಸಲು ಪ4ಯ?%OರುPಾ:(ೆ. #ಾನು ಈ 5Xಾರದ ಬ(cid:5)ೆl vೕmO ನನ% (cid:128)(cid:129)ಾ+ರ - 30 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR ?(cid:24)ಸುವRSಾK oೇ(cid:24) oೊರ}ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ಆ Tನ #ಾನು ಮ#ೆ(cid:5)ೆ oೋಗು?:ದIಂPೆ ಸು<ಾರು ಸಮಯ 10.00 (ಾ?4 ಸಮಯದ(cid:10)/ 5ೕ=vೕ JಾD <ಾ= (cid:128)ಮQ ಕುಟುಂಬದವರನು% #ಾ#ೇ ಒ(cid:130)|O ಮದು,ೆ <ಾ=Jೊಳ\(cid:25)Pೆ:ೕ#ೆ ಎಂದು oೇ(cid:24)ರುPಾ:(ೆ. #ಾನು ಅವರ <ಾತನು% ನಂ’ ಅವರನು% ಮದು,ೆWಾಗಲು ಒ(cid:130)|Jೊಂ=ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. XXXX ರವರು ಇSೇ #ೆಪ ಇಟು(cid:17)Jೊಂಡು 2023 ಜು8ೈ 7 ರಂದು (ಾ?4 11.00 ಗಂwೆ(cid:5)ೆ ನಮQ ಮ#ೆಯ(cid:10)/ Wಾರು ಇರುವRTಲ/,ೆಂಬ 5ಷಯ ?(cid:24)ದುJೊಂಡು ನಮQ ಮ#ೆ(cid:5)ೆ ಬಂದು, #ಾನು (cid:128)ನ%ನು% ತುಂ(cid:19)ಾ (cid:130)4ೕ? <ಾಡು?:SೆIೕ#ೆ. ಮುಂSೆ #ಾನು (cid:128)ನ%ನು% ಮದು,ೆWಾಗುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ ಎಂದು oೇ(cid:24) #ಾನು (cid:19)ೇಡ ಎಂದು oೇ(cid:24)ದರು ಸಹ JೇಳSೆ ನ(cid:13)ನ >ೊPೆ ಬಲವಂತ,ಾK 8ೈKಂಕ c4~ ನ[ೆOರುPಾ:(ೆ. ಇSೇ (cid:4)ೕ? XXXX ರವರು ,ಾರJೆA ಮೂರು (cid:19)ಾ(cid:4) ಮ#ೆ(cid:5)ೆ ಬಂದು ಮ#ೆಯ(cid:10)/ Wಾರು ಇಲ/ದ ಸಮಯದ(cid:10)/ ಬಂದು ಬಲವಂತ,ಾK ನ#ೊ%ಂT(cid:5)ೆ 8ೈಂKಕ c4~ ನ[ೆOರುPಾ:(ೆ. Uೕ(cid:5)ೆ ಹಲ,ಾರು (cid:19)ಾ(cid:4) ನನ%ನು% ನಂ’ಸುPಾ: #ೈd ಔd, 7ಾ(cid:130)ಂ2, <ಾD, }4s ಮತು: (ೆ9ಾD(cid:17) ಗ(cid:24)(cid:5)ೆ ಕ(ೆದುJೊಂಡು oೋಗು?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ. ಇSಾದ ಬ(cid:24)ಕ ಜನವ(cid:4) 2024 oಾಗೂ ಆಗ(cid:11)(cid:17) 2024 ರ(cid:10)/ #ಾನು ಗj+eWಾKದುI, #ಾನು XXXX ರವ(cid:4)(cid:5)ೆ oೇ(cid:24)ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ಅವರು ಸಧ(cid:21)JೆA ನಮ(cid:5)ೆ ಮಗು (cid:19)ೇಡ, #ಾವR ಮದು,ೆWಾದ ನಂತರ ಮಗು <ಾ=Jೊuೆ(cid:31)(cid:25)ೕಣ ಎಂದು oೇ(cid:24) ನನ%ನು% ನಂ’ಸುPಾ: #ಾನು (cid:19)ೇಡ ಎಂದರು ಸಹ ಬಲವಂತ<ಾ=, oೆದ(cid:4)O, ಗಭ+(cid:15)ಾತ,ಾಗುವ <ಾPೆ4ಗಳನು% ತಂದುJೊಟು(cid:17) ನುಂKOದನು, ಇದ(cid:4)ಂದ ಗಭ+(cid:15)ಾತ,ಾKರುತ:Sೆ. ಇSೇ (cid:4)ೕ? ಎರಡು yಾ(cid:4) ಗಭ+(cid:15)ಾತ <ಾ=Oದ. ಇದ(cid:4)ಂದ ನನ% ಅ(ೋಗ(cid:21) ಹದ(cid:5)ೆಟು(cid:17) ,ೈದ(cid:21)cೕಯ mcPೆ(cid:14)ಯನು% ಪ[ೆಯು?:SೆIೕ#ೆ. ಇದರ ಖಚು+ oಾಗೂ ಮ#ೆಯ ಎ8ಾ/ ಖಚು+ಗಳನು% XXXXX ರವ(ೇ #ೋ=Jೊಳ\(cid:25)?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ. oಾಗೂ #ಾನು ಸಹ ಅವರು ಒPಾ:UOದಂPೆ 25UÁæA (cid:5)ೋD1 Xೈ(cid:13), 6UÁæA ಉಂಗುರವನು% ಮದು,ೆWಾಗುವ ಉSೆIೕಶTಂದ ವರದ(cid:134)(cid:27)ೆ ಎಂದು ಅವರು Jೇ(cid:24)ದಂPೆ Jೊ}(cid:17)ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. Uೕ(cid:5)ೆ ನನ%ನು% ನಂ’O Sೊ4ೕಹ <ಾ=ರುPಾ:(ೆ. UೕKರು,ಾಗ #ಾನು XXXX ರವ(cid:4)(cid:5)ೆ ಹಲವR (cid:19)ಾ(cid:4) ನನ%ನು% ಮದು,ೆWಾಗಲು Jೇ(cid:24)Jೊಳ\(cid:25)?:ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ಆದI(cid:4)ಂದ ಅವರ ವತ+#ೆ T(cid:135)ೕ(cid:18) ಬದ8ಾK ನನ%ನು% ಮತು: ನನ% ದೂರ,ಾe ಕ(ೆಗಳನು% (cid:128)ಲ+(cid:136)ಸು?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ. ನನ% >ೊPೆ <ಾತ#ಾಡSೆ ಅವರ ಮ#ೆಯ(cid:10)/ ಮದು,ೆ(cid:5)ೆ oೆಣು(cid:137) ಹುಡುಕು?:SಾI(ೆ. ನಮQ ಕುಟುಂಬದವರು ನಮQ ಮದು,ೆ(cid:5)ೆ ಒಪR|ವRTಲ/ ಎಂದು Jಾರಣಗಳನು% oೇಳ\?:ರುPಾ:(ೆ. #ಾನು ಅವರ ಮ#ೆಯವರ >ೊPೆ ಅಂದ(ೆ ಅವರ ಅಕAನವ(ಾದ <ಾ8ಾ ಮತು: ಅವರ 9ೋದರ <ಾವ ಮೂ?+ಯವರ >ೊPೆ <ಾತ#ಾ=ರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ಅವರು ನನ(cid:5)ೆ (cid:19)ೆದ(cid:4)Jೆ oಾcರುPಾ:(ೆ. oಾಗೂ ಈ 5Xಾರವನು% Wಾ(ೊಂT(cid:5)ಾದರು ಹಂmJೊಂಡರು - 31 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR oಾಗೂ (cid:8)(cid:10)ೕ(cid:11) (cid:26)ಾ(cid:27)ೆಯ(cid:10)/ ದೂರನು% Sಾಖ(cid:10)Oದರು ನನ%ನು% Jೊಲು/ವRSಾK (cid:19)ೆದ(cid:4)OರುPಾ:(ೆ. 9ಾf(cid:139), ನನ%ನು% ಮದು,ೆWಾಗುವRSಾK ನಂ’O ಬಲವಂತTಂದ ನನ%ನು% ಹಲವR (cid:19)ಾ(cid:4) ಬಲPಾAರ <ಾ= ಮದು,ೆ <ಾ=Jೊಳ(cid:25)Sೇ oೆದ(cid:4)O <ಾPೆ4ಗಳನು% (cid:128)ೕ=, ಗಭ+(cid:15)ಾತ <ಾ= Jೊ8ೆ (cid:19)ೆದ(cid:4)Jೆ oಾcರುವ XXXXX ಎಂಬುವವರ Mೕ8ೆ ದೂರು Sಾಖ(cid:10)O, ನನ(cid:5)ೆ (cid:15)ಾ4ಣ ರ(cid:134)(cid:27)ೆ (cid:128)ೕ=, ನನ(cid:5)ೆ #ಾ(cid:21)ಯ ಒದKಸ(cid:19)ೇJೆಂದು (cid:15)ಾ4(cid:140)+OJೊಳ\(cid:25)Pೆ:ೕ#ೆ. T#ಾಂಕ.09-12-2024. ಸ(cid:141)ಳ: (cid:19)ೆಂಗಳ(cid:31)ರು ನಗರ. ತಮQ 57ಾfO. Sd/- Nagarathna N.” The narration in the complaint is with regard to certain sexual escapades of the petitioner with complainant. At penultimate paragraph, complainant narrates that the attitude of the petitioner suddenly changed and began to ignore the calls of the complainant. Later it is the narration that she comes to know that the parents of the petitioner are searching for a girl to get accused No.1 married. Therefore, the complaint comes to be registered as the petitioner has, on several occasions committed the offence of rape for two years, on the pretext of marriage, but he is wanting to get married with someone else. She further narrates that due to the acts of the petitioner in the year 2024 she had even become pregnant and the petitioner told the complainant to the pregnancy terminated. Immediately after registration of the complaint, these petitions are preferred. - 32 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

11. A perusal at the complaint would indicate that even if it is taken on its face value, they were consensual acts for two years whether on the pretext of marriage or otherwise. Jurisprudence is replete with the judgments rendered by the Apex Court from time to time, which has intertwined the concept of rape and consensual sex and how consensual sex on the promise of marriage cannot amount to rape. I deem it appropriate to notice the said judgments. JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:

12.1. The Apex Court the case of DR. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA - (2019) 18 SCC 191 has held as follows: “…. …. …. Karnataka v. M. 11. In State Devendrappa [State Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as under : (SCC p. 94, para 6) “6. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of - 33 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” … … …

23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. intention and acknowledged consensual

24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get is a married man and - 34 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR together. We used their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that “as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we to reside started residing sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home”. Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they had living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.” It (Emphasis supplied)

12.2. Later, the Apex Court the case of SHAMBHU KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH- (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1032 has held as follows: “…. …. ….

9. In Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of - 35 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] a two-Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State of U.P., that: (Pramod (2021) 18 SCC 517] observed SuryabhanPawar case [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC pp. 616- 18 & 620, paras 12, 14, 16 & 18) “12. This Court has repeatedly held that to Section 375IPC respect consent with involves an active understanding of circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. … ***

14. … Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. … *** 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to is a relations, engage in sexual “misconception of fact” woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. … fact” where that vitiates ***

18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must - 36 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR propositions must involve an active and reasoned deliberation the proposed act. To establish towards whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus engage in the sexual act.” the woman's decision (emphasis supplied) … … …

11. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in the charge- sheet, the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 376IPC. The crucial issue which is to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that the appellant had given a promise to the second respondent to marry which at the inception was false and on the basis of which the second respondent was induced into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 375IPC are absent. The relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above, was in existence prior to the marriage of the second respondent and continued to subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent.

12. The High Court, in the course of its judgment, has merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which cannot be in an application under Section considered 482CrPC. As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand, which are not in dispute, would indicate that the ingredients of the offence under Section 376IPC were not established. The High Court has, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application under Section 482CrPC on a completely misconceived basis.” (Emphasis supplied) - 37 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

12.3. In XXXX v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH - (2024) 3 SCC 496, the Apex Court holds as follows: “…. …. ….

9. While getting her statement recorded under Section 164CrPC, she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017. On account of dispute with her husband, she was living with her parents. As she got acquainted with the appellant, they fell in love. In 2018, the appellant went to Maharashtra for job. However, he used to visit her home and take care of the complainant as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant assured the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes divorce from her husband who used to harass and beat her. For this reason, she divorced her husband and solemnised marriage with the appellant in a temple in January 2019. Thereafter, they started living together with her daughter born from the previous marriage. Despite assurance, appellant did not solemnise court marriage. After marriage was solemnised in temple, treating the appellant as her husband, they both started leading a married January 2019 till June 2020. The appellant treated the complainant as his wife. Thereafter, appellant refused to respond to her calls and even marry her. … life having physical relations … …

11. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she got divorce from her earlier husband on 10-12-2018. In the statement under Section 164CrPC, she stated that marriage between the appellant and the complainant was solemnised in a temple in January 2019. However, the date of divorce as claimed by the complainant is belied from the copy of the decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where divorce by mutual consent was granted to the complainant and her husband vide judgment dated 13-1-2021. The aforesaid fact could not be disputed. Meaning thereby, the complainant besides the facts in the FIR and also in the statement under Section - 38 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR 164CrPC regarding her divorce from the earlier marriage, sought to claim that she had remarried with the appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage. recorded by the statement got the dates when

12. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis of which FIR was got registered complainant, it is evident that there was no promise to marry initially when the relations between the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on complainant alleges the parties had physical relations, she was already married. She falsely claimed that divorce from her earlier marriage took place on 10-12-2018. However, the fact remains that decree of divorce was passed only on 13-1-2021. It is not a case where the complainant was of an immature age who could not foresee her welfare and take right decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years elder to the appellant. She was matured consequences of the moral and immoral acts for which she consented during subsistence of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of betraying her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix that even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for his job, he used to come and stay with the family and they were living as husband and wife. It was also the stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan of Rs 1,00,000 to the prosecutrix through banking channel which was not returned back.” intelligent enough to understand (Emphasis supplied)

12.4. In JASPAL SINGH KAURAL v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI - (2025) 5 SCC 756, the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. - 39 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR allegedly,

13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] whereby this Hon'ble Court had decided a similar matter, wherein prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship with the appellant-accused, upon an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three children, had continued to have such relationship with the appellant-accused, at least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had observed as under : (SCC pp. 398- 99, paras 21-22) respondents “21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. In

22. prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false instant case, - 40 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was mature and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. from her She even obtained divorce husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given - 41 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375IPC.” (emphasis supplied)

14. The decision in Naim Ahamed [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] is squarely applicable to the conspectus of present case. It has been time and again settled by this Hon'ble Court, that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual [Mahesh DamuKhare v. State of relations. Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471]

15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the facts are clearly following charge-sheet, established:

15.1. The physical relationship between the appellant and Respondent 2 was consensual from the very beginning and cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted, there is no material on record to show that there was any dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the appellant.”

15.2. There is also no material on record, to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506IPC against the appellant. In fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the appellant, that he was acting in furtherance of the promise to marry. It is the own observation of the High Court, that the - 42 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR appellant had made a promise to marry Respondent 2 and was acting accordingly. The mangalsutra being prepared with the initials of the name of Respondent 2 complainant does reflect his intention and promise to marry. However, in the eventuality of a fall out or split between the parties, it cannot be said that the promise to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct dishonest. relationship

15.3. There is also no element of criminality that can be accrued to the appellant, insofar as it is the own case of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship with the appellant, while being in a subsisting marriage. It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have for a sustained a physical prolonged period of five years [Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 5 SCC 764] , while in a subsisting marriage, and even subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the relationship. The prolonged period of relationship, during which the sexual relations continued between the parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an element of force or deceit in the relationship. [Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471] The prosecutrix was thus, conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her actions, and had given her consent after an active and reasoned deliberation. [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903]” (Emphasis supplied)

12.5. In SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528, the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. ….

28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. - 43 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. has,

29. This Court numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls condemnation. NCT

30. In Prashant v. State Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. taking stand, In our view, allegations in the FIR and the charge- sheet as crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face the outset of - 44 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR in a the appellant. The value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of relationship between a consenting a couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us)

31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and facts, and not on concrete unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. the IPC be reduced - 45 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR … …. …

33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore, the to have occurred alleged between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy. incidents are stated

34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.

35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under: “33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. - 46 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship. intention of that the

34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception. together, that she was

35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.

39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain relations. The Court has also sexual - 47 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” (underlining by us) the appellant that although

36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed it was contended on behalf of relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred. Singh v. State of Ganga in question

37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. in the

38. At this stage, it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of - 48 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. understanding nature

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the - 49 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR various accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the unavoidable victim circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, really intended to marry her.” the accused had never (underlining by us)” (Emphasis supplied)

12.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG v. STATE OF TELANGANA - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1258, the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. ….

25. In the chats which have been placed on record along with the additional documents, the de- facto complainant, who is referred to by the name ‘Muffin’, has admitted that she was manipulative and was trying to “get a green card holder”. At one point of time, she also stated that it would not be difficult for her to trap the next one. In the very same breath, she mentions that she would not waste time with the accused appellant and needs to “invest on the next victim”. She also mentions that she would irritate her victims to the extent that they dump her, and she could happily start with the next one. She also stated that she was using the accused appellant.

26. These chats depict the stark reality the de- the behavioral pattern of facto complainant who appears to be having manipulative and vindictive tendency. - 50 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

27. Thus, in our opinion, the accused appellant was absolutely justified in panicking and backing out from the proposed marriage upon the aggressive sexual coming behaviour and the obsessive nature of the de- facto complainant. to know of in sexual

28. Hence, even assuming accused appellant retracted from his promise to marry the complainant, it cannot be said that he indulged the de- false promise of facto complainant under a marriage or that the offence was committed by him with the de-facto complainant on the ground Scheduled belonged Castes/Scheduled Tribes community. intercourse with

29. It is also relevant to mention here that in FIR No. 751 of 2021, the de-facto complainant has the accused not even made a whisper about appellant dumping her on the ground of her caste. Thus, apparently this allegation which has been set out in the subsequent FIR No. 103 of 2022 lodged almost after seven months is nothing but a sheer exaggeration which must be discarded. to continue

30. Having considered the entirety of facts and circumstances as available on record, we are of the firm opinion that allowing prosecution of the accused appellant impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 would be nothing short of a travesty of justice in addition to being a gross abuse of the process of Court. The impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 is nothing but a bundle of lies full of fabricated and malicious unsubstantiated allegations complainant. The facts on record clearly establish the vindictive and manipulative tendencies of the complainant and these aspects have a great bearing on the controversy.” levelled by (Emphasis supplied) - 51 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

12.7. Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230, the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. ….

8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully considering the material on record, the following attributes come to the fore: The consent Appellant (a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from the record Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her will and merely on an assurance to marry. Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they interacted frequently and fell in love. The Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct. consent (b) The Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise. Investigation has the Khulanama, was executed Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained from her ex-husband. During this time, the

29.12.2022 which revealed - 52 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR parties were already in a relationship and the alleged incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable the Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant. It injury section 506 IPC. (c) There is no evidence of coercion threat Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an offence improbable that there was any threat caused to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the Appellant when all along the relationship was cordial, and it was only when the Appellant graduated and left for his hometown to Ahmednagar, the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated. We also cannot ignore the conduct of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the native village of the Appellant without any intimation, which is also unacceptable and reflects the agitated and unnerved state of mind of Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same reason, the criminal prosecution against the is probably with an Appellant herein underlying motive and disgruntled state of mind. (d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being married before and having a child of four years, would continue to be deceived by the Appellant or maintain a prolonged physical relationship with an individual who has sexually assaulted and exploited her. association

9. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to consensual to begin with. A - 53 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR turning relationship sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied)

13.1. The Apex Court, the case of Dr. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR supra, draws with unmistakable clarity, the doctrinal line that separates rape from consensual intimacy, where two adults of their own volition, engage in consensual sexual relation over a sustained period, the subsequent refusal of the man to marry the woman, howsoever regrettable, does not, ipso facto, transmute such intimacy into the offence of rape as punishable under Section 376 of the IPC.

13.2. The principle is reaffirmed in SHAMBHU KHARWAR supra where the Apex Court interdicted the criminal process at the threshold holding that the relationship between the parties was purely consensual and accordingly quashed the crime as well as the charge sheet.

13.3. Likewise, in NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) [(2023) 15 SCC 385], the Apex Court addressed an identical factual complexion, where the - 54 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR complainant had even become pregnant on account of the relationship, and yet held that such circumstance, by itself cannot clothe the relationship with criminality, for pregnancy arising out of consensual intimacy.

13.4. In SAMADHAN supra the Apex Court sounded a note of stern caution against the disquieting tendency of coloring failed relationships, with the hue of heinous crimes. The Apex Court holds that mere breakdown of a relationship between the consenting adults, cannot constitute rape nor can the criminal law be set into motion as a retaliatory instrument, merely because the relationship did not ultimately culminate in marriage.

13.5. Further, in AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL, the Apex Court observes that where the complainant is already married, the allegation of physical intimacy induced by promise of marriage stands on infirm grounds, a promise which ex-facie unenforceable, cannot in those circumstances, be elevated into a foundation of imputing criminality.

13.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG supra the Apex Court goes even further, on a perusal of contemporaneous chats, it found that the complainant had exhibited manipulative and vindictive tendencies and held that man backing out of marriage, even assuming such promise existed, cannot automatically attract the offence of rape. Holding the - 55 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR prosecution to be malicious and fabricated, the Apex Court obliterates the proceedings against the accused.

13.7. In the light of the overwhelming majority of such decisions, the Apex Court has exercised Constitutional and inherent jurisdiction to arrest the criminal process, even at the stage of registration of the crime, where the allegation taken to their highest, disclose nothing beyond a consensual relationship subsequently turning sore. APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE:

14. In the case at hand, the relationship between the complainant and the petitioner, at its inception, was plainly that of a client and a counsel. Yet to determine whether the complaint is a bonafide invocation of criminal law or an endeavour covered by manipulation and vendetta, it becomes necessary to notice certain antecedent facts, which emerge not from conjecture, but from documents placed on record. Manipulation and Malafides of the complainant: A brief chronology bears mention:

14.2. The complainant is said to have married one Yathish Kumar T. R. in the year 2014. The said marriage, by an order dated 22-10-2016, was annulled. However in the year 2020, it appears that a child was born to the - 56 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR complainant, the date of birth being 21-08-2020. The birth certificate is placed on record. The birth certificate depicts the date of birth of the child born to Yathish Kumar T. R. and the complainant is as follows: The birth certificate placed on record is not without significance. It indicates two distinct and telling circumstances; first, that notwithstanding the annulment decree dated 22-10-2016 in M.C.No.3017 of 2015, a child is born on 21-08-2020 to the complainant and the very same Yathish Kumar T. R. and second, that the complainant appears to have continued association with the said Yathish Kumar T. R. even long after the severance of the marital tie. Photographs are also produced to demonstrate that the child now about - 57 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR 4 years of age, has been living with the complainant and Yathish Kumar T. R., as a family. The matter does not rest there:

14.3. The petitioner has also produced another birth certificate evidencing the birth of a child on 15-12-2008 where the father’s name is shown as Nagaraju and the mother, the complainant. The said birth certificate is as follows: The inevitable inference is that the complainant has two children, the first born on 15-12-2008 from Nagaraju and the second born on 21-08-2020 from Yathish Kumar T. - 58 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR R., long after the annulment of marriage dated 22-10-2016. These circumstances do not float in isolation. They connect with yet another material episode.

14.4. A crime comes to be registered on 28-11-2022 and on the basis of the said complainant a crime in Crime No.602 of 2022 for offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC is alleged. The gravamen of the complaint is that the child born from their earlier relationship, went missing on 25-11-2022. The child was about 13 years at that point in time. In the complaint, the complainant narrates that she is married and settled with another person. The gist of the complaint is as follows: ಸMೕತ ಕುಟುಂಬ “(cid:130)Wಾ+Tಯು (cid:26)ಾ(cid:27)ೆ(cid:5)ೆ oಾಜ(ಾK (cid:128)ೕ=ದ ದೂ(cid:4)ನ 9ಾ(ಾಂಶ,ೇ#ೆಂದ(ೆ (cid:130)Wಾ+Tಯು ಸು<ಾರು 4 ವಷ+ಗ(cid:24)ಂದ (cid:19)ಾ=(cid:5)ೆ ಮ#ೆಯ(cid:10)/ ,ಾಸ,ಾKದುIJೊಂಡು ಗೃUeWಾKರುPಾ:(ೆ, (cid:130)Wಾ+Tಯ ಮಗ ಹ(cid:143)+(cid:144) (ಾh-13ವಷ+ ಈತನು ಅಂಜ#ಾನಗರದ(cid:10)/ರುವ 34ೕ5#ಾಯಕ ಸೂAಲ%(cid:10)/ 9#ೇ ತರಗ?ಯ(cid:10)/ ,ಾ(cid:21)9ಾಂಗ <ಾಡು?:ರುPಾ:#ೆ. (cid:130)Wಾ+Tಯ ಮಗ ಈ UಂSೆ ಸು<ಾರು 2 ವಷ+ಗ(cid:24)ಂದ 4-5 (cid:19)ಾ(cid:4) ಮ#ೆ ’ಟು(cid:17) oೋK (cid:19)ೇ(ೆಯವರ ಮುEಾಂತರ (cid:8)ೕ(cid:13) <ಾ=O ,ಾಪಸು(cid:14) ಮ#ೆ(cid:5)ೆ ಬಂTರುPಾ:#ೆ. T#ಾಂಕ:25/11/2022 ರಂದು (ಾ?4: 08-00 ಗಂwೆ(cid:5)ೆ ಮ#ೆ(cid:145)ಂದ oೊರಗ[ೆ oೋದವನು ,ಾಪಸು(cid:14) ಮ#ೆ(cid:5)ೆ ಬಂTರುವRT8ಾ/, (cid:130)Wಾ+Tಯ 9ೆ%ೕUPೆ ಪke+ಮ ರವರು ಮಂಡ(cid:21)ದ(cid:10)/ ,ಾಸ,ಾKದುI, ಇವರ >ೊPೆ (cid:130)Wಾ+Tಯ ಮಗ oೆಚುt ಒಡ#ಾಟ5ಟು(cid:17)Jೊಂ=ದುI, ಪkeೕ+ಮ ರವರನು% ಕ(ೆO 5Xಾರ(cid:27)ೆ <ಾಡ(cid:19)ೇJೆಂದು JೋರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ನಂತರ (cid:130)Wಾ+Tಯು ಸಂಬಂNಕರು ಮತು: 9ೆ%ೕUತರ ಬ(cid:24) 5Xಾರ <ಾಡ8ಾK WಾವRSೇ ಉಪಯುಕ: <ಾU? Sೊ(ೆ?ರುವRT8ಾ/, ಆದI(cid:4)ಂದ Jಾ(cid:27)ೆWಾKರುವ ಹ(cid:143)+(cid:144) (ಾh-13ವಷ+ ರವರನು% ಪPೆ: <ಾ=Jೊಡ(cid:19)ೇJೆಂದು Jೊಟ(cid:17) ದೂರು ಇPಾ(cid:21)T..” - 59 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

14.5. Yet another record is placed before this Court; the complainant filed Crl.Misc.No.1467 of 2023 invoking Section 13(3) of the Karnataka Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and in the cause title therein, in the year 2023, the complainant describes herself to be the wife of Yathish Kumar. The cause title reads as follows: “IN THE COURT OF THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU Present:- Sri. SUNIL.R., B.COM., LL.B., CJM., Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru. Dated this the 20th day of January, 2024. PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: Crl. Misc. No. 1467/2023 Smt. Nagarathna, W/o. Sri. Yathish Kumar, 31 years, R/at No.458, Muddinapalya Main Road, Anjananahara, Bengaluru North, Bengaluru-560 061. (By Sri.B.L.Jayarama, Adv) - V/S - The Chief Registrar, Births and Deaths, Office of the Tahsildar, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru. (Respondent placed exparte) *************” The prayer sought therein is follows: - 60 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR “The petitioner has filed the petition under Section 13(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 seeking direction of this Court to direct the respondent to enter the date of death of Renukamma, W/o Late Nagaraja, as 19.07.2011 in the death register.” When all these facts, borne out from official records, are considered cumulatively, it becomes difficult to comprehend, far less accept, how the complainant could credibly assert that she consented to sexual relationship on a “promise of marriage”, when she appears to have been in a subsisting marital relationship or at the very least, in a continuing domestic association, and is also mother of 2 children, one about 13 years old and the other about 4 years.

14.6. What is more disturbing is the disquieting fashion in which the complainant has sought to implicate other members of the family of the petitioner. They are arraigned on a tenuous allegation that they did not cooperate or support the petitioner’s marriage with the complainant, thereby attempting to create a narrative of cheating. Criminal law cannot be permitted to be expanded by such facile insinuation.

15. The offences alleged included Section 69 of the BNS. Section 69 of BNS reads as follows: “69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.—Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse - 61 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—“deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.” Section 69 criminalizes sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means including a promise of marriage, without intention of fulfilment. The provision though newly introduced, cannot be interpreted, in a manner that allows it to become an instrument of retroactive criminalization of consensual relationships upon the mere recital of “promise”. The statute punishes deceit, disappointment; fraud, not failed affection; and exploitation, not the collapse of relationship. On the facts presented, it is difficult to discern where from the offence under Section 69 could even spring. The complainant on her own showing and on admitted records, appears to have been married/associated in other relationships, and to have children. In such circumstances, the allegation of sexual intercourse, induced solely on promise of marriage is inherently implausible and legally unsustainable, consequently, neither Section 96 BNS nor Section 64 BNS (Section 376 of the earlier regime, the IPC) can be attracted.

16. The offence under Section 89 of the BNS (Section 313 of the earlier regime) is also not made out. In view of the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in NAIM AHAMED supra, consensual sexual acts, do not by - 62 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR themselves, invite such provision, in the absence of essential legal ingredients.

17. What then remains is, Section 318(2) of the BNS (Section 420 of the earlier regime, the IPC), even that cannot be invoked merely because a relationship did not culminate in marriage. The settle position of law is that, breach of a marriage to marry, howsoever morally questionable, is not per se cheating in the criminal sense, unless dishonest intention at the inception is established, which is conspicuously absent in the case at hand.

18. The petitions are at the stage of registration of crime. The question whether this Court should interfere at the stage of registration of crime is no longer res integra. The Apex Court in MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH - 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 has held as follows: “…. …. …. this stage, we may refer

10. The entire case put up by the first informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At parameters laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . The parameters are : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) “102. … (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. - 63 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR (2) Where the allegations information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR inherently or complaint are so absurd and improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” We are of the view that the case of the present appellants falls within Parameters 1, 5 and 7, respectively, of Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426: AIR 1992 SC 604].

11. At this stage, we would like to observe important. Whenever an accused something - 64 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. 12. We say so because once complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the the purpose of FIR/complaint alone ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. the averments made

13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged. - 65 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two- Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) “5. … Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] , this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; - 66 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. is no

7. In dealing with the last category, it is in mind the distinction important to bear between a case where there evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the jurisdiction accusations. When exercising under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and take all exercising discretion and should relevant consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.” (emphasis supplied)” to an accused circumstances function of judicious (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court reiterates with crystalline clarity that where the proceedings are manifestly frivolous, vexatious, inherently improbable or maliciously instituted to wreak vengeance, the High Court should not hold itself looking into artful drafting of the complaint, but should travel to consider the antecedent circumstances registration of the crime, and obliterate the same if it finds any of the aforesaid factors. - 67 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR

19. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case at hand, the documents and events noticed hereinabove unmistakably disclose, that the complaint is not a genuine criminal grievance, but bears a strong imprint of manipulation and of an attempt to convert private discord into public prosecution. This, therefore, is a fit case where even proceedings for malicious prosecution may be warranted. However, this Court for reasons best left unstated, restrains itself and holds its hands from issuing such direction. Wherefore, this Court cannot permit the criminal process to be employed as an engine of harassment or a weapon of retaliation and become an abuse of the process of the law, eventually resulting in miscarriage of justice.

20. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R (i) Criminal Petitions are allowed. (ii) FIR in Crime No.789 of 2024 registered at Byadarahalli Police Station and pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru stands quashed.”

7. As can be seen from the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment, a mere promise to having sexual intercourse on the false promise of marriage by itself in the absence of any other material cannot be construed or treated as commission of - 68 - NC: 2026:KHC:8087 CRL.P No. 2682 of 2025 HC-KAR offences punishable either under Sections 376(2)(n) and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

8. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the continuation of the impugned proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the present petition. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER i) The petition is hereby allowed. ii) The impugned proceedings in C.C.No.6302/2023 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge and JMFC-II, Hassan, for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 420 of IPC are hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE MDS List No.: 2 Sl No.: 1