The High Court
Case Details
1 R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 03RD DAY OF MARCH 2025 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD WP No.781 OF 2025 (GM -CPC) c/w WP No.782 OF 2025 (GM -CPC) IN WP 781/2025 BETWEEN M/S ALLIANCE UNIVERSITY (A PRIVATE UNIVERSITY ESTABLISHED UNDER AN ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA NAMELY ALLIANCE UNIVERSITY ACT, 2010) HAVING OPERATIONS OFFICE AT NO.2 AND 3, 36TH MAIN DOLLARS SCHEME, BTM I STAGE BANGALORE-560068 AND HAVING ITS CAMPUS AT CHIKKAHAGADE, ANEKAL CHANDAPURA ROAD, BANGALORE BY ITS REGISTRAR. (BY SRI. SHYAMSUNDAR M.S., SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE) ...PETITIONER AND 1. MR. MADHUKAR G ANGUR AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS 2 S/O LATE SHRI GUDDAPPA ANGUR NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR BANGALORE-560 103. 2. MRS. PRIYANKA B S W/O MR MADHUKAR G ANGUR AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR BANGALORE-560 103. 3. MR SATCHIDANANDA RAO MACHINENI S/O SHRIRAO MACHINENI AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/O HOUSE NO.7.1.79 AND 80 FLAT NO.506, ANANDANILAYAM AMEERPET, HYDERABAD-560016. 4. MR RAVINDRA REDDY S/O LATE MR K YELLA REDDY AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS R/O NO.8-2-293/82/519F ROAD NO.28, BANJARA HILLS HYDERABAD-560 0034. 5. MOHAN KUMAR B.L AGED BOUT 45 YEARS R/AT NO.2A/5, 4TH CROSS MESHWARA NAGAR, JAYANAGAR 1ST BLOCK EAST BANGALORE-560011. 6. MR. RAJENDRUDU B AGED MAJOR No.72, 3RD CROSS, GAURAVNAGAR KOTHANUR ROAD 3 J P NAGAR, 7TH PHASE BANGALORE-560 078. 7. MR. K.S. VENKATESHAPPA S/O SEEMANNA AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS C/O MADHUKAR ANGUR R/AT NO.235, 5TH BLOCK JAYANAGAR, BANGALORE CITY. 8. MR. C.S. RAMESH AGED MAJOR NO. 18/13, 58TH CROSS 6TH MAIN, IV BLOCK RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560010. 9. MR SRIPAD MARKANDE AGED MAJOR 106, “VISHWAVALLABHA APARTMENTS” 4TH CROSS, NAVODAYA NAGAR JP NAGAR 7TH PHASE BANGALORE-560 078. 10. MR. B K RAVINDRA AGED MAJOR DOOR NO.2-107/1 GANDHIJI ROAD, MARY-HILL MANGALORE-575008. 11. MR. NIRANJANA K R AGED MAJOR 22, SRI RAGHAVENDRA NILAYAM 7TH MAIN, 12TH CROSS SHREYAS COLONY JP NAGAR 7TH PHASE BANGALORE-560 078. 12. MR. KIRAN HEGDE AGED MAJOR 101, ANEKAL-CHANDAPURA ROAD 4 KAVALAHOSAHALLI BANGALORE-562106. 13. SHERIN BOVAS AGED MAJOR C/O AYURVEDSALA RAMAIAH REDDY COLONY NEXT TATA SHERWOOD ADJECENT TO SAMHITA SQUARE BASAVANAGAR, BANGALORE-560037. 14. MS. DEEPA LADAWA AGED MAJOR DESHPANDE FOUNDATIONS 3RD FLOOR, AKSHAY PLAZZA AKSHAY COLONY,NEAR CHETAN COLLEGE SIRUR PARK ROAD, HUBLI-580021. 15. MR. RAHUL N BORAWANE S/O NARAYANA BORAWANE AGED MAJOR “MATRUCHAYA” NEAR AGARWAL HOSPITAL SANGHRSH CHOWK CHANDAN NAGAR, PUNE-411014. 16. MR SYED THOUSIF S/O MR BABU AHMED AGED MAJOR SIRAJ LAYOUT ROAD ROAD NO.5, OPPOSITE KIDZEE SCHOOL MARGANDANAHALLI VILLAGE HULIMANGALA POST ELECTRONIC CITY, PHASE 1 BENGALURU-560 105. 17. MR SOMANNA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS C/O MADHUKAR ANGUR R/AT NO.235, 5TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR BENGALURU CITY-560041. 5 18. MR. CHANDRASHEKAR AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS C/O MADHUKAR ANGUR R/AT NO.235, 5TH BLOCK JAYANAGAR, BENGALURU CITY-560041 (BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. H.K. SRIVASTHAVA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 & 2: SRI. V.S. SHYAM SUNDAR, ADVOCATE FOR R11) …RESPONDENTS THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE AN ORDER OR DIRECTION PROHIBITING AND ABROGATING THE JURISDICTION OF THE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL COURT BANGALORE AND PROPOSING TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 24 OF CPC NOT VESTED WITH IT BY VIRTUE OF OVERRIDING EFFECT OF PROVISIONS OF THE BANGALORE CITY CIVIL COURT ACT 1979 WHILE DEALING WITH THE MISC PETITION NO.1118/2024 FILED BY THE R1 & R2 VIDE ANNEXURE A AND ETC. ENTERTAINING ACCEPTING, IN IN WP 782/2025 BETWEEN M/S ALLIANCE BUSINESS SCHOOL (A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF INDIAN COMPANIES ACT) A SECTION 25 COMPANY (SECTION 8 UNDER THE ACT OF 2013) HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO.2 AND 3, 2ND CROSS, 36TH MAIN DOLLARS SCHEME, BTM I STAGE BANGALORE-560068 REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR ABHAY CHEBBI 6 S/O G B CHEBBI AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS (BY SRI. JAYAKUMAR S PATIL., SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. CYRIL PRASAD PAIS., ADVOCATE) ...PETITIONER AND 1. MR. MADHUKAR G ANGUR AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS S/O LATE SHRI GUDDAPPA ANGUR NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR BANGALORE-560 103. 2. MRS. PRIYANKA B S W/O MR MADHUKAR G ANGUR AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR BANGALORE-560 103. (BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. H.K. SRIVASTHAVA, ADVOCATE FOR C/RESPONDENTS) …RESPONDENTS THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE AN ORDER OR DIRECTION TO PROHIBITING AND ABROGATING THE JURISDICTION OF THE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL COURT AND BANGALORE PROPOSING TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 24 OF CPC NOT VESTED WITH IT BY VIRTUE OF OVERRIDING EFFECT OF PROVISIONS OF THE BANGALORE CITY CIVIL ENTERTAINING ACCEPTING, IN 7 COURT ACT 1979 WHILE DEALING WITH THE MISC PETITION NO.1117/2024 FILED BY THE R1 & R2 VIDE ANNEXURE A AND ETC. THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 21.02.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE COURT, MADE THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD CAV ORDER
Legal Reasoning
These writ petitions are filed by the plaintiff under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking for quashing of the proceedings in Misc.Nos. 1118/2024 and 1117/2024, respectively, which are pending before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru. 2. The petitioner herein filed two suits, seeking a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants/respondents herein, from entering upon the suit schedule premises and interfering, in any manner, either directly or indirectly in the day-today 8 administration, management and affairs of the plaintiff – University. 3. The respondents herein/defendants, after service of summons appeared through counsel and have filed Misc.Nos.1118/2024 and 1117/2024, respectively, before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, praying to transfer O.S. Nos.3932/2017 and 5148/2017, respectively, pending on the file of XLIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge (CCH-44), Bengaluru, to any other Court. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/plaintiff approached this Court, seeking for quashing of the proceedings pending in Misc.Nos.1118/2024 and 1117/2024, respectively, on the ground that Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru has no power to withdraw or transfer any suit from one court to another court. 9
Legal Reasoning
4. Sri Jayakumar S.Patil and Sri Shyamsundar M.H., learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (i) Firstly, the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru has no jurisdiction to entertain Misc. Petitions seeking transfer of case from one court to another court. (ii) Secondly, the general power of transfer and withdrawal under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’) vested in the District Court can be exercised in respect of any suit, appeal or other proceedings pending in any court subordinate to it and not in respect of the matter pending in the court of Additional District Judge, which is not a subordinate court to the District Court. (iii) Thirdly, as per Section 3 of the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1979 Act’) City Civil Court is established for the City 10 of Bangalore. As per Section 5(1) of the 1979 Act, the City Civil Judges are not subordinate or inferior to the Principal City Civil Judge, the senior-most City Civil Judge would be appointed as the Principal City Civil Judge, all of them belong to the same cadre. Therefore, the Principal City Civil Judge has no power to transfer or withdraw the suit from one court to another court. (iv) Fourthly, under Section 5(2) of the 1979 Act, the Principal City Civil Judge has only the power of distribution and arrangement of the work, that too, as per the orders of the High Court. Except that, he has no other authority to interfere in the course of work or administration of justice by other City Civil Judges. (v) Fifthly, the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore who is placed as equal as the Additional City Civil Court Judges, Bangalore is given or embedded with the power of transferring the case 11 only on the ground mentioned in Section 13 of the 1979 Act. Other than that the Principal City Civil Judge has no power to transfer the case from one civil court to the other. (vi) Sixthly, even under Section 5 of the 1979 Act and under Section 24 of CPC, the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge has no power to transfer and withdraw the case from one court to another court. In support of their contentions, they relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of M/S.VALLIAPPA SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIESL PARTK (P) LTD. Vs. C.SUNDARAM reported in AIR 2002 Kar.HCR 2720 and contended that the Additional City Civil Judges are not subordinate or inferior to the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge. They have also placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of MANCHUKONDA VENKATA JAGANNADHAM vs. 12 CHETTIPALLI BULLAMMA (CRP No.5212/2010 decided on 25.02.2011) to contend that, even under Section 24 of CPC, the Additional District Judges are not subordinate to the District Court. They have also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SHAH NEWAZ KHAN AND OTHERS vs. STATE OF NAGALAND AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2023 SC 1338 and specifically relied on paragraph 41 and contended that the court which gives transfer should be subordinate to the court which is sought to be transferred. Since the Additional City Civil Court is not subordinate to the Principal City Civil and Sessions Court, therefore, the Misc. Petitions filed before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge are not maintainable. They have also relied on the Commendatory on Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. Hence, they sought for allowing
Decision
the writ petitions. 13 5. Per contra, Sri D.R.Ravishankar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has raised the following contentions: (i) Firstly, the issue relating to the power of the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge to transfer or withdraw the case from one court to another court is no more res-integra. This issue has been already decided by this Court in the case of SATHYA SHREE vs. M.KUMRESHAN reported in 1999 (5) Kant.L.J. 540. (ii) Secondly, a similar issue has been referred to the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of TADIKONDA SURYA VENKATA SATYANARAYANA MURTHY vs. TAMMANA SEETHAMAHALAKSHMI reported in Laws (APH)- 2016-6-11, wherein it is held that, Additional and Assistant District Judges are subordinates to the Principal District Judge. Therefore, the Misc. Petitions 14 filed by the respondents herein is maintainable before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore. Hence, he sought to dismiss the writ petitions. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the writ papers. 7. The point that arises for consideration before this Court is, ‘Whether the Principal City Civil Judge can transfer the case from one City Civil Court to another City Civil Court?’ 8. To decide this point, it is relevant to extract Section 5 of the 1979 Act and also Section 24 of CPC. “Section 5 of 1979 Act Powers of Judges.- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, each of the Judges may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the City Civil Court by this Act or any other law for the time being in force. 15 (2) The Principal City Civil Judge may, subject to the General or Special Orders of the High Court, from time to time, make such arrangement as he thinks fit for the distribution of the business of the City Civil Court among the Judges thereof. ……….. Section 24 of CPC 24. General power of transfer and withdrawal (1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion, without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may, at any stage.- (a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or (b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any court subordinate to it; and (i) try or dispose of the same, or 16 (ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or (iii) re-transfer the same for trial or disposal to the court from which it was withdrawn. (2) Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred or withdrawn under sub-section (1), the court which [is thereafter to try or dispose of such suit or proceeding) may, subject to any special directions in the case of an order of transfer, either retry it or proceed from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn. [(3) For the purposes of this section, (a) courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court: (b) "proceeding" includes a proceeding for the execution of a decree or order.] 4) The court trying any suit transferred or withdrawn under this section from a court of small causes shall, for the purposes of such suit, be deemed to be a court of small causes. 17 [(5) A suit or proceeding may be transferred under this section from a court which has no jurisdiction to try it.]” 9. A plain reading of Section 5(1) of the 1979 Act would indicate that each of the Judges of the City Civil Court are conferred to exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the City Civil Court. Section 5(2) of the 1979 Act would indicate that the Principal City Civil Judge, may, subject to general and special order of the High Court, from time to time, make such arrangement, as he thinks fit, for distribution of business of the City Civil Court among the judges thereof. 10. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has considered the power and ambit of the Principal District Judge vis-à-vis Section 5 of the 1979 Act and Section 24 of CPC in the case of SATHYA SHREE (supra). Relevant paragraph 9 is extracted below: 18 “9. Whenever the expression "District Court" has been used in the Code of Civil Procedure, it means and refers to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Hierarchy of the Courts for administration of justice had been created by the Constitution of the Courts under the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, as well as by Bangalore City Civil Court Act with respect to the City of Bangalore. Karnataka State Legislature enacted Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979. Section 3 of the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979 provides for the establishment of a City Civil Court for the City of Bangalore. The City Civil Court under sub- section (3) of Section 2 of the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979, means the Court established under sub-section (1) of Section 3. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, provides that there shall be a City Civil Court for the City of Bangalore. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that the City Civil Court shall consist of a Principal City Civil Judge and such number of other City Civil Judges as the State Government may, in consultation with the High Court determine. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that "Notwithstanding 19 anything contained in any law, the City Civil Court - (a) shall be deemed to be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the City of Bangalore", it means, by this deeming clause the state of affairs as enacted has to be deemed. Even for a moment it may be said that the Principal City Civil Court may ordinarily be the City Civil Court but by legal fiction the City Civil Court has to be deemed to be the Principal City Civil Court of original jurisdiction for the City of Bangalore and there it has been provided that there shall be a Principal City Civil Judge and such number of other City Civil Judges as State Government in consultation with High Court may determine. With respect to the Bangalore District Courts, the Courts of the Civil Judges and the Munsiffs Court established under the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 21 of 1964), exercising jurisdiction only within the local limits of the City of Bangalore immediately before the appointed date shall, on and from the said date, cease to function and are hereby abolished. Section 4 provides that the City Civil Court shall be deemed to be a Court subordinate to and subject to the control and 20 superintendence of the High Court. Section 5 provides that each of the Judges may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the City Civil Court by this Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 5(2) is more important and it provides that the Principal City Civil Judge may, subject to the general or special orders of the High Court from time to time make such arrangement as he thinks fit for the distribution of the business of the City Civil Court among the Judges thereof. This power is no doubt subject to the general or special order of the High Court. Therefore the power of distribution of work among the Judges of the City Civil Court vests in the Principal City Civil Judge. The expression "distribution" includes in its allocation of work to different City Civil Judges and this power is vested in the Principal City Civil Judge. The City Civil Court has been deemed to be the Court of original jurisdiction, unless any direction to the contrary is shown, it lies within the power of Principal City Civil Judge to allocate work or to distribute work of the various Judges of the City Civil Court and this power may be said to include transferring of a 21 case from the Court of one Additional City Civil Judge to the Court of another Additional City Civil Judge. Section 24(3)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, also introduces a deeming clause that Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court/If Additional District Judges can be deemed to be subordinate to the Principal District Judge for the purpose of distribution of work and transfer of cases under Section 24 of the Code, in my opinion the same will be the position of other Judges of the City Civil Court. The Principal City Civil Judge may make such arrangement as he thinks fit for the transfer and distribution of the work of the City Civil Court among other Judges. In this view of the matter, in my opinion it cannot be said that the Principal City Civil Judge had committed any jurisdictional error or acted in excess of jurisdiction when it passed the impugned order. The Principal City Civil Judge, Bangalore, has got full power to transfer the case under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 5(2) of the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979. The order impugned in this revision petition does not 22 suffer any error or jurisdictional error. The Court below had considered the matter and applied his mind to the necessity of directing O.S. No. 4438 of 1996 pending on the file of the Additional City Civil Judge, CCH. 14 has to be withdrawn and transferred to the Court of Additional City Civil Judge, CCH. 16, where the suit O.S. No. 3221 of 1996 is pending”. 11. On a bare reading of Section 24 of CPC, two conditions are to be satisfied for exercising the power under Section 24 (1)(a) of CPC. The first is that, the court to which the case is to be transferred, should be subordinate to the court ordering the transfer. The second is that the transferee court should also be competent to try and dispose of the same. 12. A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of TADIKONDA SURYA VENKATA SATYANARAYANA MURTHY (supra) has considered the provisions of Section 24 of CPC and held that for 23 the purpose of Section 24 of CPC the Additional and Assistant District Courts are subordinates to the Principal District Judge. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “(10.) The salient features of sub-section (1) of Section 24 are as follows: 1) The general power of transfer and withdrawal vests both with the High Court as well as the District Court; 2) the power could be exercised either suo moto or on an application of any of the parties; 3) if the power is exercised suo moto, no notice is required to be served on the parties, but, if the power is sought to be exercised on the application of any of the parties, it can be done only after notice to the other party and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard; 4) the power may be exercised at any of stage of the proceeding; 5) the principal condition for the exercise of the general power of transfer and withdrawal is that the Court from whose file the suit, appeal or other proceeding is sought to be transferred, should be a Court subordinate to the Court 24 seeking to exercise the general power of transfer and withdrawal. (11.) The power conferred upon the High Court and the District Court by sub-section (1) of Section 24 is of three types. They are, - 1) the power to transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before the very Court ordering the transfer, for trial or disposal to any other court subordinate to it and which is also competent to try and dispose of the same, 2) the power to withdraw a suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to the Court ordering the transfer, for the purpose of trial and disposal by the very Court ordering the transfer; and 3) the power to withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any court subordinate to the court ordering the transfer, and to transfer the same for trial or disposal to any other court subordinate to it and which is also competent to try and dispose of the same. Deeming fictions created in section 24 (12.) Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 24 create two deeming sections. Clause (a) sub- 25 section (3) creates one deeming fiction by holding that for the purpose of Section 24, the Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court. Sub-section (4) creates another deeming fiction by providing that if a suit is transferred from a Court of Small Causes to any other Court, the transferee Court will be deemed to be a Court of Small Causes. Purport of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 24. (13.) As we have indicated above, the nature of the power conferred upon the High Court and the District Court is of three types, the first of which is found in clause (a) of sub-section (1). Interestingly, the power under Section 24 (1) (a) is akin to the power of distribution and allocation of work. Under this provision, a suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before the High Court or the District Court itself can be transferred for trial and disposal to any other Court subordinate to it, if that other Court is competent to try and dispose of the same. What is provided in Sections 6 and 11 (2) of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972, is similar to what is provided in sub-section 24 (1) (a). Therefore, the opinion expressed in Manchukonda Venkata 26 Jagannadham v. Chettipalli Bullamma that the distribution and allocation of work under Sections 6 and 11 (2) of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 is completely different from the power conferred by Section 24 of the Code, does not appear to be correct. Difference in the language employed. (14.) Another important aspect that has not been taken note of in Manchukonda Venkata Jagannadham that in the entirety of Section 24, which contains five sub-sections, there is only one part viz., clause (a) of sub-section (3), where the word Judge is used. In all other parts of Section 24, the statute uses only the expression Court and not Judge. Therefore, let us see what a District Court is. (15.) Section 2 (4) of the Code defines District to mean the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. It includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. The expression District court, though not directly defined, is indirectly defined in Section 2 (4) itself to mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction of a District. 27 (16.) Therefore, the expression District Court always denotes the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction of a District. All other civil Courts of original jurisdiction, even if presided over by officers of the very same rank and status, will not be treated as District Courts within the meaning of Section 2 (4), if they do not happen to be the Principal Civil Court of the district. (17.) The expression Judge is defined in Section 2 (8) of the Code to mean the presiding officer of a Civil Court. Therefore, to be a judge within the meaning of Section 2 (8), the person concerned need not be the presiding officer of a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. (18.) If we keep in mind the distinction between the expressions District Court and Judges, it will be clear that the general power of withdrawal and transfer conferred under Section 24 (1) is upon 2 courts namely: - (i) the High Court and (ii) the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction of a district, which satisfies the definition under Section 2 (4). 28 (19.) From this, if we go to clause (a) of sub- section (3) of Section 24, it will be clear that the deeming fiction created therein is about the Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges vis-a –vis the District Court. Once this is clear, there is no difficulty in concluding that the absence of the word district after the words additional and assistant is of no consequence. The emphasis in clause (a) of sub-section (3) is not simply on Additional Judges and Assistant Judges, but is actually on Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges vis-à-vis District Court. This important aspect has not been taken note of in Manchukonda Venkata Jagannadham. (20.) A careful look at clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 24 would show that the phrase courts of additional and assistant judges appearing therein, is ejusdem generis with what follows, namely the phrase District Court. When clause (a) speaks of the courts of Additional and Assistant Judges with specific reference to the District court, it can be construed only as a reference to the Additional and Assistant District Judges, irrespective of whether the word District is used or not in between the words Additional Judges and Assistant Judges. 29 (21) A few decisions are cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the courts are not empowered to supply words into a statutory provision. We do not think that we need to refer to any of them, as the principle of causus omissus is too well recognised. We are not, in this case, supplying the word District in clause (a) of sub- section (3), when it is conspicuous by its absence. We are just pointing out that the word already exists in the statutory provision, but it is more visible when we apply the rule of ejusdem generis. Principle of subordination. (22.) In Manchukonda, the learned Judge appears to have been perturbed by the fact that if the power to transfer a case from the file of one Additional District Judge to the file of another Additional District Judge is recognised as available to the Principal District Judge, the general principles of judicial hierarchy and subordination of courts, will suffer a severe jolt. That is why the learned Judge drew a reference to Section 3 of the Code, which speaks about subordination of Courts. 30 (23.) Section 3 of the Code reads as follows: Subordination of Courts: - For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. (24.) As per Section 3, a Civil Court will be treated as subordinate to the District Court, only if that Civil Court happens to be of a grade inferior to the District Court. Since in terms of judicial powers, all District Judges enjoy the same status, the learned Judge thought in Manchukonda that the presiding officer of an Additional District Court cannot be treated as a grade inferior to the Presiding Officer of the Principal District Court. (25.) But, insofar as this aspect is concerned, it must be pointed out that Section 3 does not speak either about the hierarchy of the Judges or about the subordination of one or more Judges to another. Section 3 speaks only about the subordination of Courts and not subordination of Judges. 31 (26.) Section 24 (1) (a) empowers the District Court to transfer a case pending before it, to any Court subordinate to it, provided such a Court has jurisdiction to try and dispose of the same. If the interpretation given in Manchukonda is correct, a Principal District Court cannot transfer any case pending on its file to the Court of an Additional District Judge, because the Additional District Judge cannot be treated as subordinate to the Principal District Judge. The Principal District Judge cannot also transfer a regular appeal pending before him to the Court of a Junior Civil Judge, since such a Judge, though subordinate to the Principal District Judge, will have no jurisdiction to try and dispose of an appeal. These consequences arising out of such an interpretation, would make the provision, a dead letter. (27.) To put it differently, two conditions are to be satisfied for the exercise of the power under Section 24 (1) (a). The first is that the Court to which the case is to be transferred should be subordinate to the Court ordering the transfer. The second is that the transferee Court should also be competent (have jurisdiction) to try and dispose of the same. 32 (28) Both the conditions laid down in Section 24 (1) (a) will stand satisfied only when the transfer is made from the Principal District Court, to any one of the Additional District Courts. Therefore, Section 24 (1) (a) itself contains a clue as to how we should resolve the problem on hand. Contention based on the distinction between administrative power and judicial power. (29.) Interestingly, the learned counsel for the respondents had no option but to agree that the Principal District Court, upon receipt of a case, would have the power to distribute, allocate or assign any suit, appeal or other proceeding to any of the Additional District Courts. But, his contention was that the distribution and allocation of work on the administrative side by a Principal District Judge stands on a different footing from the exercise of a general power of withdrawal and transfer on judicial side. In other words, his contention is that what a Principal District Judge can do in exercise of the administrative powers conferred upon him, cannot be done by him in the exercise of judicial powers, as the Courts of the Additional District 33 Judges are not subordinate to the Court of the Principal District Judge. (30.) The answer to the above contentions is two fold. The first is that it is only because the Courts of Additional District Judges are not judicially subordinate to the Court of the Principal District Judge, that a deeming fiction is created by Section 24 (1) (a). The second is that an order transferring a suit, appeal or other proceeding from one Court to another cannot be treated as a judgment. Order of transfer not a judgment. (31.) Section 2 (9) of the Code defines the word judgment to mean the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. The three segments of a judgment as propounded by the Supreme Court in Omprakash Verma v. State of Andhra Pradesh (Scale 2010 (10) 707) are: (i) facts and points in issue; (ii) reasons for decision and (iii) find order containing decision. 34 (32.) A declaration of final determination of the rights of the parties in a matter before the Court is what a judgment is. An order of transfer of a case from one Court to another does not bring to an end any dispute between the parties. The order would not also be a decision on the respective claims. (33.) The fact that the Principal District Judge cannot sit in Judgment or appeal over the judgment of an Additional District Judge, is not a ground to hold that the Principal District Judge would not even have a power to transfer a case pending on the file of one Additional Judge to another. While ordering the transfer of a case from the file of one Additional Judge to that of another, the District Court (or the Principal District Judge) neither pronounces a judgment on the merits of the case nor exercises the power of judicial review over any decision rendered by the Additional District Judge. Therefore, the expression subordinate need not be a cause for worry. (34.) In Asrumati Debi Kumar V. Rupendra Deb Raikot (AIR 1953 SC 198), the Supreme Court held that an order of transfer of a suit made 35 under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The said decision was followed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in K.V. Govindarajulu Mudaliar v. Devar and Co. (AIR 1954 Madras 248). The decision in K.V. Govindarajulu Mudaliar was rendered on 06-07- 1953. Therefore, by virtue of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in M. Subbarayudu v. the State (AIR 1955 AP 87), the decision in K.V. Govindarajulu Mudaliar is good as a binding precedent. (35.) Apart from the fact that an order of transfer is not a judgment, it must also be noted that in a petition for transfer of a case from one Court to another, no order or decision of the subordinate Court is called in question. It is only when the decision or order of a Court is called in question before another Court, the former should be subordinate to the latter, in terms of judicial hierarchy. This is why Section 3 of the Code carefully uses the expression of a grade inferior. Answer to the reference: 36 13. In respect of the very same parties, on an earlier occasion, this Court has held that the Principal City Civil Judge has the power to transfer the case from one City Civil Judge Court to another City Civil Judge Court, i.e., in the case of ALLIANCE BUSINESS SCHOOL vs. MADHUKAR G. ANGUR AND OTHERS (WP No.19160/2016 disposed of on 12.04.2016). The relevant paragraph is extracted below: “(10.) In the light of the afore stated discussion neither of the parties can be heard to contend that there is no power available to the Principal District Judge under Sec. 5(2) to withdraw a particular case from one Court and allot it or distribute it to another Additional City Civil Court. On doubts, surmises and conjectures decision making process adopted by District Judge in the instant case by impugned order cannot be looked into with coloured glasses as sought to be canvassed. As seen from the averments made in the petition, writ petitioners are only expressing that a 37 "doubtful situation" had arisen on account of sequential events that has unfolded or obtained in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the light of such apprehension, it cannot be gainsaid by petitioners that Principal District Judge erred in exercising power under Sec. 5(2) or the decision of Principal District Judge is to be faulted with. However, at this juncture itself it would be apt to state that any threat posed by litigant public to pollute the stream of justice would not be allowed and Courts are strong enough toward off such threats.” 14. As per Section 5(2) of the 1979 Act, the power of distribution of work among the Judges of the City Civil Court vested in the Principal City Civil Judge. The expression ‘distribution’ includes in its allocation of work to different City Civil Judges, as held by this Court in the case of SATHYA SHREE (supra). Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that power of the Principal City Civil Judge for distribution of the business of the 38 City Civil Court under Section 5(2) of 1979 Act, only related to Section 13 of the 1979 Act, does not hold water. 15. Relying upon the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, I am of the view that the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge has the power under Section 24 of CPC r/w. Section 5 of the 1979 Act, to withdraw a case pending on the file of one Additional City Civil Court and transfer the same to the file of another Additional City Civil Court, Bangalore. Hence, the Misc. Petitions filed by the respondents herein under Section 24 of CPC before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge are maintainable. Accordingly, the point for consideration is answered in the affirmative. 16. In respect of the judgment relied upon by the petitioners in the case of. M/S.VALLIAPPA SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIESL PARK (P) LTD. (supra), the issue in that case is regarding judicial 39 work is concerned. In the judicial work is concerned, there is no distinction between the Principal City Civil Judge and Additional City Civil Judge, all of them belongs to same cadre and enjoy the same status but the senior-most amongst them is appointed as the Principal City Civil Judge. It is not in respect of exercising the power under Section 24 of CPC. Therefore, the said judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 17. Accordingly, writ petitions are dismissed. However, the trial court is directed to dispose of Misc. Petitions filed by the respondents herein, as expeditiously as possible. JUDGE Sd/- (H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD) Cm/-