Bachano Devi v. Union of India & Ors
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The contention of the petitioner is that her husband, namely, Lance Naik, Driver Kasturi Lal was enrolled as a Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force on 26.05.1975 and the fact that her husband was dismissed from service on the grounds of misconduct came to her knowledge only after his death.
03. It is submitted that the petitioner is an illiterate woman who had always assumed that her husband worked for the CRPF. It is only after the death of her husband,when she filed an application on May 22, 2013, before respondent No. 3 for the grant of pensionary benefits. The petitioner then approached the respondents for the grant of pensionary 2 SWP No. 876/2017 benefits and correspondence with the respondents started and she was asked to provide documents of her late husband.
04. The respondent No. 3, vide letter dated 13.08.2013, informed the petitioner that her husband was dismissed service.The petitioner,thus, approached the respondents for grant of pension and other benefits due to her.The respondents, however, on 16th May, 2014, informed the petitioner that she is not entitled to family pension because her husband was dismissed from service.
05. The petitioner wasgranted only an amount of Rs. 27,276/- as GPF final Fund and a Risk Fund of Rs. 3,172/- was deposited in the petitioner’s account on 23.12.2014.
06. The petitioner again approached the respondents, seeking a copy of the order of dismissal dated 24.11.1995 as well as the enquiry file with all documents related to it. The respondents provided her with a copy of the order of dismissal but did not provide her the enquiry details on the ground that all the relevant documents were provided to the petitioner’s husband while passing the final order.
07. The order of dismissal of her husband has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the same is illegal and is in violation of the rights of the petitioner. She, thus, seeks a direction to the respondents to quash the impugned order of dismissal of her husband dated 24.11.1995 as the same, according to her, has been passed by the incompetent authority, and she further seeks a direction to the respondents to treat her husband as being in service till the date of his due date of retirement and consequently granting of service pension in favour of the husband of the 3 SWP No. 876/2017 petitioner after his due date of retirement till date and thereafter granting family pension in favour of the petitioner along with all the arrears.
08. The respondents’ counsel has placed a preliminary objection with regard to delay and laches in filing the petition.
09. It is submitted that this writ petition suffers from delay and laches as the deceased/ Lance Naik, Driver Kasturi Lal was dismissed from service with effect from 24.11.1995 and the deceased expired on
11.04.2013 and this petition has been filed after his dismissal, as such, is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
10. This petitioner has approached this Court 22 years after the dismissal of her husband from service nearly four years after his death. Admittedly, the late husband of the petitioner, Lance Naik Driver Kasturi Lal, did not question his dismissal and accepted the same during his lifetime, thus, no right is vested in the petitioner to question the same. The ground that she acquired knowledge about dismissal of her husband after his death also does not hold any merit.
11. This apart, even if some credence is to be given to the contention of the petitioner, yet it is hopelessly barred by time.
12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in ‘Virender Chaudhary vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and others, (2009) 1 SCC 297’, held as under: “In New Delhi Minicipal Council v. Pan Singh &Ors. [(2007) 9 SCC 278], this Court held:
16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the 4 SWP No. 876/2017 reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corp. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M. R. Gupta v. Union of India”
13. Similarly, in ‘State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and others, (2015) 15 SCC 602’, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “21. In this regard reference to a passage from Karnataka Power Corp. Ltd Through its Chairman & Managing Director &Anr Vs. K. Thangappan and Anr. MANU/SC/8094/2006: (2006) 4 SCC 322 would be apposite: - “Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.” After so stating the Court after referring to the authority in State of M.P. v. Nandalal Jaiswal MANU/SC/0034/1989: (1986) 4 SCC 566 restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements, which is to the following effect: - 5 SWP No. 876/2017 “The High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
14. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the husband of the petitioner was dismissed from service on 24.11.1995 and he accepted the same for almost 18 years, therefore, there is no occasion for the petitioner to question the same. This petition suffers from inordinate delay and is required to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches also.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches. (Sindhu Sharma) Judge Jammu: 06.04.2023 Michal Sharma Whether the judgment is speaking Whether the judgment is reportable : : Yes/No Yes/No