1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department, Government v. 1. Naresh Mishra, son of Late Sablayak Mishra, resident of Bank Colony, Loh
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 With I.A. No. 2893 of 2024 ------ 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department, Government of Jharkhand, Telephone Bhawan P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi. 3. The Director, Secondary Education, Government of Jharkhand, Literacy Department, Telephone Bhawan P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi. Education School and 4. The District Education Officer, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District- Gumla. …. …. Appellants/Respondents Versus 1. Naresh Mishra, son of Late Sablayak Mishra, resident of Bank Colony, Lohardaga Road, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher Ursuline Convent Girls High School, Gumla). 2. Celina Ekka, Daughter of Late Paulus Ekka, resident of Puggu, Karam Doppa, P.O. Armai, P.S. and District Gumla Teacher, Ursuline Convent Girls High School, Gumla). Assistant (Retired 3. Mariana Kerketta, Daughter of Late Maina Kerketta, resident of Puggu, Karam Doppa, P.O. Armai, P.S. and District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher, Ursuline Convent Girls High School, Gumla). 4. Euphracia Minz, Daughter of Late Ignus Minz, resident of Deep Nagar, Sisai Road, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher, Ursuline Convent Girls High School, Gumla). 5. Celina Kindo, Daughter of Late Gabriel Kindo, resident of Deep Nagar, Sisai Road, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, Page 1 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher, Ursuline Convent Girls High School, Gumla). 6. Abha Tirkey, Daughter of Late Nelson Tirkey, resident of Loyla Nagar, Sisai Road, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher, Ursuline Convent Girls High School, Gumla). 7. Ramanuj Sharma, Son of Alate Ayodhya Sharma, resident of Chainpur, P.O. and P.S. Chainpur, District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher, Lutheran High School, Chainpur, Gumla). 8. John Ekka, Son of Late Paulus Ekka, resident of Kating, P.O. Tongo, P.S. Chainpur, District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher, St. Peter High School, Tongo, Gumla). 9. Tobias Ekka, Son of John Ekka, resident of Village Pundi, P.O. Aamgaon, P.S. Jari, District Gumla (Retired Assistant Teacher, St. Peter High School, Tongo, Gumla). 10. Smt. Shanti Devi, Wife of Late Shrikant Pandit (Assistant Teacher, Lutheran High School, Gumla) Resident of DSP Road, Jawahar Nagar, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla. 11. Churasan Maghi, Son of Shri Ladhu Maghi, resident of Village Sakhu, P.O. Jurmu, P.S. Dumri, District Gumla (Presently working as Assistant Teacher, High School, Rajawal, Gumla). 12. Jugal Kishore Sharma, Son of Late Nathuni Sharma, resident of Flat No. 501/A, Riya Plaza, Kokar Chowk, P.O. and P.S. Kokar, District Ranchi (Retired Assistant Teacher, High School, Rajawal). 13. Suman Jee, Son of Late Ram Briksha Sharma, resident of village Jairagi, P.O. and P.S. Rajawal, (Presently working as Assistant District Gumla Teacher, High School, Rajawal). …… .….. Petitioners/Respondents Page 2 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 14. The Secretary, Ursuline Convent High School, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District, Gumla. 15. The Head Master, Ursuline Convent High School, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District, Gumla. 16. The Secretary, Luthran High School, Chainpur, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla. 17. Head Master, Luthran High School, Chainpur, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla. 18. The Secretary, St. Peter High School, Tonga, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla. 19. The Head Master, St. Peter High School, Tonga, Gumla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla. 20. The Secretary, High School, Rajawal, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla. 21. The Head Master, High School, Rajawal, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla. …. ….. Respondents/ Performa Respondents --- CORAM HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
Legal Reasoning
: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI For the State : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, SC(L&C)-I : Mr. Rakesh Kumar Shahi, Adv. ------ For the Respondents : Order No.05/Dated 28th August, 2024 ------ Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.: The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 14.02.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6867 of 2017 by which the Page 3 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 writ petition has been allowed. I.A. No. 2893 of 2024 : 1. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since as per the court appeal has been filed after inordinate delay of 1391 days deems fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit. Learned counsel for the appellants- respondents has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient. 2. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned in the interlocutory application is that after the impugned order/judgment has been passed on 14.02.2018 in W.P.(S) No. 6867 of 2017 by the Hon’ble Single Bench of this High Court, relying upon the judgment rendered in the case of W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2016, thereafter, the concerned department had preferred intra Court Appeal as L.P.A. No. 35 of 2018, before the Division Bench of this Hon’ble High Court against the order passed in W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2016, which was set aside and remitted Page 4 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 back for fresh adjudication. 3. Thereafter, W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2016 had again been heard on 02.05.2023 along with several similarly situated analogous cases and the same here allowed by the Hon’ble Single Bench of this High Court. 4. Thereafter, being aggrieved by the order dated 02.05.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2016, the department had again preferred intra Court Appeal as L.P.A. No. 629 of 2023, before the Division Bench of this High Court on 02.11.2023. 5. Since, W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2016 has already been challenged before the division bench of this High Court
Decision
and W.P.(S) 6867 of 2017 which has been disposed of on the basis of W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2016 as has been found to be similarly situated, hence the department also filed the instant letters patent appeal against the order dated 14.02.2018 passed in W.P.S. 6867 of 2017, thus the delay of 1391 days in preferring the instant intra court appeal has caused. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been Page 5 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay. 7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. 8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it Page 6 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance Page 7 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that “Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the appellant.” In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Page 8 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 Living Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 27 to 29 as under: issues is not involved “27. It in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with including the prescribed the period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being limitation used and available. The undoubtedly binds everybody, the Government. including law of that 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all their agencies and the government bodies, have they unless instrumentalities reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they their duties with diligence and perform commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an government anticipated departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” benefit the for Page 9 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr. (supra,) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder: “1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020. it is stated 2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department. that 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] in Page 10 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing. 5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- for the exercise of “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a the condition precedent discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power Page 11 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 In after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. that this connection we may point out considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already learned Judicial Commissioner pointed out, rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. the Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. Page 12 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:- “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land Ltd. v. Bhutnath and Building Corpn. , Mata Din v. A. Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC Page 13 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath 535 Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .) formula it considers a distress resulting from 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve its what operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. in such a situation. its aim being to secure peace 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: in “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue Page 14 L.P.A. No. 745 of 2023 them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448] Rao v. State Ramachandra