In / v. Athar Hussain Ansari

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR For the Appellants: --------- Mr. Ashutosh Anand, Addl. A.G.-III --------- Reserved on: 22.06.2026 Pronounced on: 24/06/2026 Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.

1. Heard Mr Ashutosh Anand, learned A.A.G.-III, appearing for the appellants-State.

2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 560 days in filing the appeal against the judgment and order dated 09.05.2024 made by the learned Single Judge, disposing of W.P.(S) No. 4036 of 2012.

3. Upon a perusal of the averments in the I.A., it is manifest that no case whatsoever has been made out to explain this inordinate delay. The application does no more than advert to the routine movement Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18526-DB of files between different authorities and departments of the Government, followed by the seeking of a legal opinion and yet another round of administrative vetting and departmental approval, none of which, individually or cumulatively, constitutes a sufficient cause for the delay occasioned.

4. The learned advocate for the appellants submits that the delay has been caused by procedural formalities followed in governmental departments. It is further submitted that the delay is not willful and intentional. However, this submission is ex facie untenable, as the prolonged delay in filing the appeal is plainly indicative of a casual approach, entirely unsupported by any material demonstrating diligent steps to expedite the matter. This administrative inertia fails to explain, let alone justify, the inordinate 560-day delay.

5. In addition to the above, the learned counsel for the appellants has specifically urged that, since almost the entire government machinery was involved in conducting the Jharkhand State Assembly Elections, it was virtually impossible for the concerned government officials to manage any other workload simultaneously. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that this plea were accepted as genuine, the appellants have neither properly explained nor justified the entire remaining period of delay.

6. It is a matter of judicial notice that the 2024 Jharkhand Legislative Assembly Elections were held in two phases, i.e., on 13th and 20th November 2024, and the results were declared on 23rd November

2024. Post 23.11.2024, no impediment subsisted that could have prevented the appellants from acting proactively and pursuing this Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18526-DB litigation diligently. Notwithstanding the same, the instant L.P.A. was filed before this Court only on 22.12.2025, i.e., after 13 months.

7. Furthermore, it is noted that certain periods of delay remain wholly inadequately explained. One such instance is discernible from a combined reading of paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the I.A., wherein it is stated that despite the Executive Engineer having submitted the writ petition and the service book of the writ petitioner before the Under Secretary for further action on 07.05.2025, the deliberation with respect to the filing of an appeal or review against the impugned judgment took place only on 02.08.2025, a hiatus of nearly three months, for which no cogent explanation whatsoever has been offered.

8. It is well settled that applications filed with utmost casualness and based on routine bureaucratic delays cannot be accepted as showing any sufficient cause. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that good grounds are available in favour of the Appellants and there is every chance to succeed in the matter. However, nothing has been shown to prima facie support such a submission and, in any event, the merits of the case alone cannot justify condonation of a delay of 560 days in the absence of sufficient cause.

9. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble SC in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18526-DB movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology, particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof.

10. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble SC in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity.

11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18526-DB

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.

13. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18526-DB

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”.

16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending paraphernalia.

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18526-DB litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

18. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown and, consequently, we dismiss this I.A., which seeks condonation of the delay of 560 days in filing the accompanying appeal.

19. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not survive and are disposed of.

20. No costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 24, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Cp.2 Uploaded on 24.06.2026