Parshuram Paswan v. 1. State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Govt. of
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 5990 of 2018 --------- Parshuram Paswan ..… Petitioner Versus 1. State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, 1st Floor, H.E.C., Campus, Dhurwa, Ranchi, Jharkhand. 2.Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Range, Dumka, P.O.+P.S.+ District-Dumka, Jharkhand. 3.Superintendent of Police, Sahebganj, P.O.+P.S.+ District- Sahebganj, Jharkhand. 4.Shri Lalan Prasad, Dy. Superintendent Headquarters, P.O.+P.S.+ District-Sahebganj, Jharkhand. of Police, .... Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Petitioner For the Respondents : Mr. Dhananjay Kr. Dubey, Advocate : Mr. Nehru Mahto, A.C. to G.P.-IV --------- 15/13.05.2024 Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein for quashing of the order dated 08.02.2018 issued under memo No. 516/RaKa dated 09.02.2018, whereby the respondent no.3 has imposed major punishment of one black mark which is equivalent to forfeiture of increment for six months (Annexure-1). The petitioner has further prayed for quashing of the appellate order issued vide Memo No. 2864/GO dated 10.08.2018 (Sahebganj D.O. No. 1486/18 dated 23.08.2018) (Annexure-2) whereby his appeal has been rejected by Respondent No.2. 3.
Legal Reasoning
The brief facts which are necessary to decide the instant application is that the petitioner is a Sub-Inspector of Police in Sahebganj District. While he was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police in Sahebganj District; there is an allegation that while there has been firing between two groups of criminals, the petitioner took vehicle of one Vimal Yadav and went to Godda 1 Town on that vehicle. While the petitioner was in Godda Town, he got the information that there has been a scuffle between criminal gangs of Vimal Yadav and Munna Mandal. With regards to the incident, the Dy. S.P. (Headquarters), Sahebganj, submitted a report to the S.P. Sahebganj, alleging that the petitioner took the car of Vimal Yadav, a criminal and went to Godda by his car. Accordingly, on report of Dy. S.P. the petitioner was suspended vide Order No. 1256/17 dated 29-07- 2017 and posted in Police Lines, Sahebganj. A departmental proceeding No. 60/17 was initiated against this petitioner and it was given to Sub Divisional Police Officer, Rajmahal for conduction. In the proceeding, Dy. S.P. (Headquarters), Sahebganj and Reporting Officer was not made a witness and A.S.I. Dinesh Singh, posted in his Office, was made a witness. The specific case of the petitioner is that there are two witnesses in this proceeding i.e., A.S.I. Dinesh Singh and Sub- Inspector of Police Jairam Singh. Further, Reserve Office, Sahebganj have given their statements on 10-10-2017; however, their statements have been taken in the absence of the petitioner and he has been denied opportunity to cross examine them. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case principles of natural justice and fair play has not been complied with, inasmuch as, the conducting officer was biased against the petitioner and he has not given his independent findings. He further submits that the main witness has not been called for and the witness, who has been examined, has only proved the signature of the Inquiry officer (Dy.S.P.); whose report has been made the basis of the departmental proceedings. The Respondent No. 3 has not taken into consideration the submissions of the petitioner and he has been punished arbitrarily and in whimsical manner. Further, before 2 passing the order of major punishment, Respondent No. 3 should have called for explanation from the petitioner but it was not done. He further submits that the petitioner preferred an appeal; however, without considering the points raised by the petitioner, the Appellate authority rejected the appeal vide his order dated 09-02-2018. (Anne-II). 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the entire issue arises from the gang war between Vimal Yadav and Munna Mandal, which took place on 28.07.2017 at Saksharta More, Sahebganj. During enquiry of which, the Dy. Superintendent Police, Sahebganj (HQ) had found that on that day, the writ petitioner was informed about the said incident, but he had not taken any necessary step for the same as such the gang war between Vimal Yadav group and Munna Mandal group took place. Vimal Yadav and his men fired bullets for 10 rounds and exploded bomb on roadside which created a panic situation for everybody and two persons were brutally beaten and injured by them. He further submits that despite knowing about the criminal character of Vimal Yadav, this petitioner had asked him to make available a vehicle to go to Godda and it was made available by Vimal Yadav on the date of occurrence. The hidden
Decision
support of the writ petitioner to Vimal Yadav, led him to execute such criminal activity due to which the general people were compelled to live in a panic situation and this activity helped to lift the trust of the public from the Police Administration. As such, the Dy. S. P. (HQ), Sahbeganj had given a memo vide no. 873 dated 29.07.2017 to the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj, with a recommendation to initiate a departmental proceeding against this petitioner for his careless, arbitrary and moral-less behavior. 6. Relying on its counter-affidavit, learned counsel for the State submits that neither there is any perversity in the order 3 passed by the disciplinary authority nor there is any procedural irregularity; as such, the instant writ application may be dismissed being devoid of merit. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents available on record, it appears that the departmental proceeding was initiated on the basis of the report submitted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Head Quarter, Sahibganj on 29.07.2017; however, in the departmental proceeding he has not been made the witness to prove his report. So far as Ext. 1 is concerned; it is proved by his reader saying therein that he knows the signature of the author but the content of report has not been proved in absence of the author who was not the witness in the departmental proceeding. Therefore, in view of the settled principle, in absence of documentary evidence proved by the author, it is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Since the author of the report was not made witness, therefore, the petitioner was not afforded chance to cross-examine the author; which is against the settled principle of service jurisprudence. Reference in this regard may be made to the case of Kuldeep Singh Versus Commissioner of Police and Ors. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10. Relevant Para 32 is quoted hereinbelow:- “32. Apart from the above, Rule 16(3) has to be considered in the light of the provisions contained in Article 311(2) of the Constitution to find out whether it purports to provide reasonable opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. Reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) means "hearing" in accordance with the principles of natural justice under which one of the basic requirements is that all the witnesses in the departmental enquiry shall be examined in the presence of the delinquent who shall be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. Where a statement previously made by a witness, either during the course of preliminary enquiry or investigation, in the departmental proceedings, the law as laid down by this Court is that a copy of that statement should first be supplied to the delinquent who should thereafter be given an opportunity to cross- examine that witness.” Emphasis Supplied. is proposed to be brought on record 4 At the cost of repetition, the proceedings were initiated/proceeded pursuant to the report submitted by Deputy Superintendent of Police Headquarter, Sahebganj, however, he himself has not been examined as a witness and only his report was proved by two witnesses which certainly does not satisfy the settled principles of law. 8. Further, from perusal of the enquiry report, it is evident that the points raised in the reply filed by the petitioner were not duly considered, inasmuch as, without controverting with the grounds raised by the petitioner, it has been held by the Inquiry Officer that the charges against the petitioner is proved. As a matter of fact, the enquiry report was solely on the basis of the report submitted by the Dy.S.P. (HQr), Sahibganj, who has not been examined. The role of enquiry officer in the proceeding is of an arbitrator and he should not act as an agent of the department. In this regard, reliance can be placed to the judgment of Roop Singh Negi Versus Punjab National Bank and Ors reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570; wherein at para 14 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary the said proceeding. No witness was examined documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.” to prove 9. Even the final order of punishment dated 09.02.2018 suffers from infirmity as because the legal proposition raised by the petitioner in his reply was not properly taken into account and only on the basis of the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer, the punishment order has been passed which is also 5 bad in law and contrary to the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496 (Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Orders in which paragraph no. 47(1) has laid down the law as under: “47 (1) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretense of reasons "rubber stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process." 10. Even the Appellate Authority acted in a mechanical manner, inasmuch as, after going through the opinion sought for by the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj, he has dismissed the appeal which is also bad in law. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the instant writ application deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the impugned order of punishment and the appellate order as contained in Anexure-1 & 2 is quashed and set aside. However, the respondents would be at liberty to initiate a fresh proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law, if so advised. 12. As a result, the instant writ application is allowed. Pending I.A, if any, also stands disposed of. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Amardeep/ 6