The High Court · 2024
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 5320 of 2022 Ajay Kumar Bhandari, aged about 40 years, son of late Tarapad Bhandari, resident of Barkeari, PO-Barkeari, PS-Maheshpur, District-Pakur Versus ... … Petitioner 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Secretary, School Literacy & Education Department, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Project Building, Dhurwa, PO-Dhurwa, PS- Jagarnathpur, District-Ranchi 3. The Director, primary Education, School Literacy & Education Department, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Project Building, Dhurwa, PO-Dhurwa, PS-Jagarnathpur, District-Ranchi 4. The Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, PO-Pakur, PS-Pakur, District-Pakur 5. Regional Joint Director of Education (earlier known as Regional Deputy Director of Education), Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka, PO-Dumka, PS-Dumka, District-Dumka 6. District Education Officer, Pakur, PO-Pakur, PS-Pakur, District-Pakur 7. District Superintendent of Education cum Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Pakur, PO-Pakur, PS-Pakur, District-Pakur … ... Respondents
Legal Reasoning
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN For the Petitioner For the Respondents : Mr. Navin Kumar Singh, Advocate : Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, AAG-I -------- Order No. 14 /Dated: 3rd September 2024 The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein to quash and set aside the charge issued vide Memo No. 2129 dated 18.11.2017 (Annexure-10) by respondent no.5. He has further prayed for quashing the enquiry report dated 02.07.2022 (Annexure-15) and also the final order of punishment dated 24.12.2022; whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service. 2. At the outset, Mr. Navin Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner draws attention of this Court to the enquiry report and submits that in the concluding portion, the enquiry officer has recommended for 1 dismissal of this petitioner which is in contravention to the settled proposition of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Courts in catena of judgments. He contended that an enquiry officer is to work as an adjudicator and cannot recommend any punishment. 3. He further submits that this is a peculiar case where the enquiry officer being a District Education Officer while in charge of Regional Deputy Director of Education was also part of the Committee who passed the impugned order of termination and the law is no more res integra that an enquiry officer cannot be part of the Disciplinary Committee. 4. Relying upon the aforesaid grounds learned counsel submits that the action of the enquiry officer, who subsequently was also part of the Committee, was having bias against this petitioner and, therefore, the enquiry report and the subsequent orders be quashed and set aside. 5. Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, learned AAG-I representing the respondent-State though contended that the punishment order cannot be set-aside only on the ground that enquiry officer by virtue of being in- charge Regional Deputy Director of Education was part of the Committee; however, she could not dispute the fact that an enquiry officer cannot recommend the punishment. She further tried to defend the impugned order stating that the said officer named Rajni Devi had written letter to her superiors to exempt her from being the member of the Disciplinary Committee, however, in view of the specific order of the superiors she was forced to be part of the Disciplinary Committee. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the aforesaid facts, admittedly; from the enquiry report it appears that the enquiry officer has recommended for dismissal of this petitioner. The law is by now well settled that an enquiry officer cannot indicate the proposed punishment in his report. In a series of decisions, it has been held that it is for the disciplinary authority to impose appropriate punishment 2 and enquiry officer has no role in awarding punishment. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment rendered in the case of “State of Uttaranchal & Ors. v. Kharak Singh” reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 wherein at para 14 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “14. In regard to the question whether an enquiry officer can indicate the proposed punishment in his report, this Court, in a series of decisions has pointed out that it is for the punishing/disciplinary authority to impose appropriate punishment and enquiry officer has no role in awarding punishment. It is useful to refer to the decision of this Court in A.N. D'Silva v. Union of India [AIR 1962 SC 1130 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 968] wherein it was held: (AIR p. 1134, para 6) “6. In the communication addressed by the enquiry officer the punishment proposed to be imposed upon the appellant if he was found guilty of the charges could not properly be set out. The question of imposing punishment can only arise after enquiry is made and the report of the enquiry officer is received. It is for the punishing authority to propose the punishment and not for the enquiring authority.” 7. It further transpires from record that the said enquiry officer/in-charge Regional Deputy Director was also part and parcel of the Disciplinary Committee who took the decision of termination of this petitioner. This cannot be accepted by this Court as the same is in clear violation of basic tents of principals of natural justice; and on this score alone, without going into other merits of the case; the instant writ application, deserves to be allowed. At this stage, it is also profitable to refer the case of “A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India” reported in (1969) 2 SCC 262 wherein at para 20 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates 3 administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi- judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [ Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on15-7-1968] the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” this Court 8. Having regards to the aforesaid discussions, the instant writ application is allowed. Accordingly, the enquiry report dated 02.07.2022 and the order of dismissal dated 24.12.2022, are hereby, quashed and set- aside. The petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service forthwith; however, the respondents would be at liberty to initiate a fresh proceeding by appointing a fresh enquiry officer and proceed in accordance with law following the principles of natural justice, if so advised. 9. As a result, the instant writ application stands allowed in the manner indicated hereinabove. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Amit AFR/NAFR 4