Tupia Digarin, wife of Late Sukra Digar, Resident of 5 No. Dhaswara, P.O. Dhori v. 1. M/s. Central Coalfields Limited, a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, having its registered
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 4299 of 2021 ------- Tupia Digarin, wife of Late Sukra Digar, Resident of 5 No. Dhaswara, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro. ..… Petitioner Versus 1. M/s. Central Coalfields Limited, a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, having its registered Office at Darbhanga House, P.O., G.P.O, P.S. Kotwali, District- Ranchi, through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director. Chief Manager 2. (Personnel/MP), M/s Central Coalfields Limited, Dhori Area, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro. 3. Dhori Area, P.O. Dhori, P.S.Bermo, District-Bokaro. Staff Officer (P&A), M/S Central Coalfields Limited, 4. Project Officer, AA-DOCM, M/s Central Coalfields Limited, Dhori Colliery, P.O. Dhori, P.S.Bermo, District- Bokaro. Deputy Manager 5. (Personnel), M/s Central Coalfields Limited, Project Officer, AA-DOCM, Dhori Colliery, P.O. Dhori, P.S.Bermo, District-Bokaro. ..… Respondents
Legal Reasoning
Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 64 of 2018, which was preferred by the respondent-CCL observing therein that there cannot be any justification of the period of limitation of six months or one year or one and half year; claim of appointment of petitioner’s son has not been approved; instead, the petitioner has been directed to produce the papers/documents for the purpose of payment of monetary compensation. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents have violated the order passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3514 of 2008 which attains finality by order dated 20.02.2020 passed in L.P.A. No. 64 of 2018 and in spite of the same, the respondents are not granting employment to the petitioner’s elder son; which is not only illegal but also contemptuous. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents relies upon the counter-affidavit especially para 15 and 16 which is quoted hereinbelow:- 2 “15. That upon order dated 20.02.2020 passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of High Court, Jharkhand in LPA No. 64 of 2018, the respondent company has initiated process for grant of payment of monetary compensation to the petitioner Smt. Tupia Digarin and the same has been approved by the competent authority and accordingly petitioner was requested by the impugned letter (annexure 7) to submit the documents and application afresh in the prescribed format for processing the same by a letter dated 17.12.2020 (annexure 8). 16. That instead of applying afresh on the prescribed format for monetary compensation which is given in lieu of employment, the petitioner has moved this Hon’ble Court by filing the present writ petition. It would be appropriate to state here that presently the amount of monthly monetary compensation is Rs. 26,292.97/- under NCWA-X.” 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits and the averments made therein, it appears that earlier the petitioner had preferred a writ application being W.P.(S) No. 3514 of 2008 for quashing the letter dated 21.08.2003; whereby petitioner’s application for employment of her elder son has been rejected on the ground of limitation and it was also prayed in the earlier writ application for a direction upon the respondent- authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for monetary compensation. The said writ application was
Arguments
------- CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ------- : Mr. Deepak Kr. Sinha, Adv For the Petitioner For the Respondents : Mr. A. K.Mehta, Adv. ------- CAV On 01.08.2024 Pronounced on:24/09/2024 Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein for quashing and setting aside the letter No. 2682 dated 07.01.2021 (Annexure-7), issued by respondent No. 5 including the letter No. 2792 dated 17/18-12.2020 (Annexure-8), issued by respondent No.2 and also Letter No. 1922 dated 26/28-12-2020 (Annexure-9), issued by respondent No.3; whereby the 1 respondent-CCL instead of allowing the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment of her son, directed the petitioner to produce the papers/documents for the purpose of payment of monetary compensation on account of death of her husband who died while on duty. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that in spite of the order passed by this Court in the earlier writ application being W.P.(S) No. 3514 of 2008; whereby the respondents were directed to consider the case of the petitioner for monetary compensation/employment to her elder son, if he has not crossed the upper age limit for securing employment and the said order was also confirmed by the
Decision
disposed of by this Court by quashing the impugned order dated 21.08.2003 and remitting the case to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for monetary compensation/employment. 7. Relevant portion of the aforesaid order passed in W.P.(S) NO. 3514 of 2008 is extracted hereinbelow:- “8. From the pleadings available on record, it is quite apparent that the petitioner informed the respondents about the death of her husband on 03.02.2001, who died on 29.01.2001, which was duly acknowledged by the respondents. Thereafter, after lapse of about 1 and ‰ years, she represented before respondent no. 5 to 5 provide compassionate appointment of her son and till 3 he attains majority, she may be given monetary compensation. for 9. There is no doubt that the authority is required to consider the request compassionate appointment and monetary compensation in accordance with the scheme framed by it and further no discretion as such is left with any of the authority to give compassionate appointment and monetary compensation de hors the rule. The counsel for the respondents though referring to differing circulars submitted with vehemence that since the petitioner submitted application beyond the period of limitation for applying for compassionate appointment and monetary compensation, hence, the same has been rightly rejected, but, here it would be pertinent to note that in spite of such circulars being issued prescribing the time limit, the agreement as contained in sub-clause (iii) of Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A. VI never gets frustrated, as it is a settlement between the both the parties and continues to remain in force unless it is altered or modified and substituted by another settlement. There is no gainsaying of the fact that the respondents-authorities have all jurisdiction to issue such circulars prescribing period of limitation, but, such circular can never be said to be operative in exclusion to the settlement entered in between the parties and case of compassionate appointment ought to have been considered under sub-clause (iii) of clause 9.5.0 of NCWA VI. The view of this Court gets fortified by the decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coalfield Ltd & Ors as reported in (2007) 8 SCC 549 wherein 6 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that in terms of the said provision, the name of the petitioner was to be kept on a live roster till he attained the age of 18 years. 10. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement, the impugned order dated 21.08.2003 is quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the respondents-authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for monetary compensation/employment to her elder son, if he has not crossed the age of upper limit for securing employment, as fixed by the respondents.” 8. It further transpires that the aforesaid order was assailed by the respondent-CCL. However, the appellate court refused to interfere with the impugned order. Thus, the order passed by the writ court has attained finality. By going through the writ court order, it is crystal clear that there was a specific direction that the respondents should consider the case of the petitioner either for monetary compensation or employment to her elder son provided he has not crossed the upper age limit for securing 4 employment. 9. During course of argument, it could not be disputed by learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner’s son had not crossed the age of employment. In other words, he is below the age of 35 years. 10. At the cost of repetition, in the earlier writ application filed by the petitioner the writ court has quashed the order dated 21.08.2003 by remitting the case to the respondent- authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for monetary compensation or employment to her elder son. Learned counsel for the petitioner has specifically contended that the petitioner is not interested in monetary compensation; rather her elder son should be given employment; as such, now there is no scope for the respondent authorities, especially when the writ court’s order has attained finality, but to give employment to the petitioner’s son as he has not crossed the age of 35 years. 11. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, the instant writ application is allowed. The concerned respondent is directed to issue appointment letter to this petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. It goes without saying that now the respondents should not take a ground that during pendency of this writ application, the petitioner’s elder son has crossed the age of 35 years, inasmuch as, there was a specific direction by the writ court either to give monetary compensation or employment to her elder son provided he has not crossed the age of 35 years; as such the calculation of age of elder son of the petitioner will be calculated from the date of 5 disposal of the earlier writ application i.e. on 11.08.2017. 12. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A.s, if any stands closed. Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi Dated:-24/09/2024 Amardeep/ AFR/ (Deepak Roshan, J.) 6