The High Court
Case Details
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 394 of 2020 The Workman namely Ram Prasad Nayak, son of Bhutka Mahto, resident of Sector 12/B, Quarter No. 3094, Bokaro Steel City, Post Office and Police Station-Bokaro Steel City, District-Bokaro, permanently residing at Village and Post Office-Karhana, police Station-Balidih, District-Bokaro. … … Respondent/Appellant Versus M/s Steel Authority of India Limited, a government Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act having one of its unit at Bokaro known as Bokaro Steel Plant, Post Office and Police Station-Bokaro Steel City, District-Bokaro, through Sri A.K. Upadhyay, son of Sri S.N. Upadhyay, presently working as Assistant General Manager (Law), Steel Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant, Resident of Plot No. 242A, Co- operative Colony, Post Office and Police Station, Bokaro Steel City, District-Bokaro. ------- … … Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHASH CHAND For the Appellant For the Respondent ------- : Mr. Ashok Kr. Sinha, Advocate : Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate Mr. Yogendra Yadav, Advocate ---------------------------- ORAL JUDGMENT 06/Dated: 28th March, 2023 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 11.11.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No.3945 of 2018, whereby and whereunder, the award dated 17.01.2018 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.I, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 32 of 2015, by which the dispute so raised by the workman-respondent, appellant herein, with regard to pre-mature retirement has been allowed with a direction for reinstatement with 50% back wages with continuity in service, has been interfered with by quashing and setting aside the award dated 17.01.2018. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which requires to be enumerated, read as under: 2 The respondent – workman, appellant herein, was appointed on 15.11.1977 to the post of Khalasi and a Personal Data Form (PD Form) was opened wherein the age, which was mentioned earlier to be 18 years as on the date of joining, was deleted and it was mentioned that on the said date of joining i.e. 15.11.1977, his age as 24 years. The new entry which was made, was duly approved by the concerned respondent- workman by putting his signature at the place where it was mentioned that his age was 24 years as on the said date of joining and as such, his date of birth was recorded as 15.11.1953 for all purposes. During the time of applying for re-validation of medical books in the years 2004 and further in the year 2009, the concerned respondent-workman had mentioned that his date of birth was 15.11.1953. However, in the year 2010, after continuous service for a period of three decades, the respondent-workman raised objection with regard to his date of birth mentioned in the PD Form and requested for correction of the same. However, the application of petitioner was rejected by the petitioner-management vide order dated 18.10.2010 on the ground that the date of birth cannot be changed at the fag end of service. Again vide letter dated 23.03.2013, the respondent-workman filed a representation for change of his date of birth, which was also negated vide letter dated 06.05.2013. After attaining age of superannuation as per PD Form, the respondent-workman superannuated from the service on 30.11.2013. However, even after his superannuation, the respondent-workman again filed a representation for recall of order of superannuation, which was also rejected vide order dated 06.06.2014. Thereafter, request was made for raising an Industrial Dispute in regard to premature retirement of the respondent-workman vide letter dated 09.02.2015 and pursuant thereto, vide order no. L-26012/20/ 2015/IR(M), Dated 15.07.2015, an Industrial Dispute was raised by making the following reference:
Legal Reasoning
“Whether the action of the management of Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL in retiring Sri Ram Prasad Nayak prematurely w.e.f. 30.11.2013 instead of 30.11.2019 is fair and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled?” 3 The petitioner-management, Steel Authority of India, filed a detailed written statement wherein plea was taken that date of birth which was mentioned on the PD Form has duly been signed by the workman without making any objection wherein the age of the respondent- workman was shown to be 24 years, meaning thereby, his date of birth was recorded as 15.11.1953 to be of 24 years and once he has accepted the said date of birth without making any objection basis upon which he has been allowed to be superannuated from service w.e.f 30.11.2013, there is no question of raising the dispute by making correction in the date of birth after the superannuation from service by making an application to that effect on 09.02.2015. The learned Tribunal has passed the award answering the reference in favour of the workman directing his reinstatement with 50% back wages with continuity in service vide award dated 17.01.2018. The Steel Authority of India, being aggrieved with the said award, preferred writ petition before this Court being W.P.(L) No. 3945 of 2018 assailing the said award on the ground that there cannot be any dispute at the fag end of service but herein, even after the retirement, the said dispute has been raised that too in a case where the respondent- workman has himself accepted his date of birth to be 15.11.1953, but, the learned Tribunal without taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, has passed the award answering the reference in favour of the workman, therefore, the said award of reinstatement in service with back wages is against the settled position of law that dispute regarding correction in the date of birth cannot be allowed to be raised at the fag end of service career but herein, the said dispute has been considered. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the
Decision
aforesaid fact, has allowed the writ petition by quashing and setting aside the award dated 17.01.2018 passed in Ref. Case No. 32 of 2015 against which the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 3. Mr. Ashok Kr. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant-workman has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact in right perspective that the moment the appellant-workman came to know 4 about the correction in his date of birth making it 15.11.1953 from 15.11.1959, an objection was raised but the same has been kept pending and he has been allowed to be superannuated from service w.e.f. 30.11.2013, thereafter, the dispute had been raised which ultimately culminated into reference vide order dated 15.07.2015. It has been contended that when the dispute was raised and the same has been kept pending, then there is no fault lying on the part of the workman but he has been allowed to be superannuated pre-maturely, i.e., 6 years before from the actual date of retirement and the Tribunal after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter has passed the reference, therefore, there was no reason to show interference by the learned Single Judge once the fact finding has been arrived at by the learned Tribunal while passing the award. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the writ court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got very limited power to interfere with the award under the scope of power of judicial review but without taking into consideration the aforesaid position of law, the award since has been interfered with, therefore, impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from patent illegality. 5. Per contra, Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted defending the order passed by the learned Single Judge raising the ground that there is no error in the impugned order since the award has been passed without taking into consideration the law laid down regarding the raising of dispute pertaining to the dispute of date of birth at the early stage of the service career and not at the fag end. Here, in the given case it is not that the dispute regarding the date of birth has been raised at the fag end of service but it has been raised after superannuation from service and hence, the very award of reinstatement in service with 50% back wages is nothing but against the settled position of law and without taking into consideration the fact that the writ petitioner was well aware about the date of birth as 15.11.1953 if 5 the personal detail form will be taken into consideration wherein the writ petitioner has put his signature acknowledging the aforesaid date of birth. The question has been raised that when the date of birth has been known to the writ petitioner to be 15.11.1953 then why such dispute was not raised at the early stage rather has been raised after his superannuation, the reason best known to the writ petitioner. It has been submitted that in that view of the matter, the dispute pertaining to the date of birth since has been raised after superannuation from service, even though the date of birth as mentioned in the PD form was known to the writ petitioner at the time of his joining since he has put his signature, there was no occasion for the learned Tribunal to answer the award in favour of the workman with a direction of reinstatement with back wages. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, submits that if in such premise, the learned Single Judge has passed such order, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. The issue which requires consideration is- (i) whether the issue of date of birth can be raised after the superannuation from service of a workman; (ii) whether issue of date of birth can be raised even though the date of birth as recorded in the service book was known to the concerned workman but not raised any objection the day when he joined the service. Both the issues are similar, as such, same are being taken up together and being answered together. 8. This Court, deems it fit and proper that before answering the issue, the settled position of law regarding the date of birth and the interference to be shown by the authority, quasi-judicial or judicial, and as to at what stage. The Hon'ble Apex Court in in State of M.P. and Ors. vs. Premlal 6 Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC 664 has held that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. Paragraph-8 of the said judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow: “8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights (see Union of India v. Harnam Singh [(1993) 2 SCC 162 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 375 : (1993) 24 ATC 92] ).” In State of Tamil Nadu vs. T.V. Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302 as also in State of Maharashtra and Anr. vs. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble and Ors., (2010) 14 SCC 423, the ratio has been laid down that at the fag end of service career the dispute pertaining to date of birth is not allowed to be agitated. Relevant paragraph of the judgment rendered in State of Tamil Nadu vs. T.V. Venugopalan (supra) is being reproduced hereinbelow: “7. …………The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register. It is common phenomenon that just before superannuation, an application would be made to the Tribunal or court just to gain time to continue in service and the Tribunal or courts are unfortunately unduly liberal in entertaining and allowing the government employees or public employees to remain in office, which is adding an impetus to resort to the fabrication of the record and place reliance thereon and seek the authority to correct it. When rejected, on grounds of technicalities, question them and remain in office till the period claimed for, gets expired. This case is one such stark instance. 7 Accordingly, in our view, the Tribunal has grossly erred in showing overindulgence in granting the reliefs even trenching beyond its powers of allowing him to remain in office for two years after his date of superannuation even as per his own case and given all conceivable directions beneficial to the employee. It is, therefore, a case of the grossest error of law committed by the Tribunal which cannot be countenanced and cannot be sustained on any ground. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs quantified as Rs 3000.” 9. It is evident from the law settled as referred hereinabove that the dispute of the date of birth can only be raised at the very threshold and not at the fag end of the service, meaning thereby, the moment any discrepancy has been found in the date of birth of the workman, the dispute must be raised immediately thereafter. If the discrepancy in the date of birth, even though acknowledged by the workman but not chosen to raise dispute at the time when such acknowledgment has been given, such dispute cannot be allowed to be raised at the fag end of service. 10. This Court is now proceeding to examine the factual aspect on such premise of the law. Here, in the given facts of the case as would appear from the material available on record that the writ petitioner/workman has joined his services on 15.11.1977 and the day when he has joined his services, he had put his signature in the personal detail form. It is evident therefrom that in the PD form, the writ petitioner’s age has been mentioned as 18 years as would appear from Annexure-1 appended to the paperbook wherein the date of birth has been referred as 24 years after making cut in the date of birth recorded as 19.09.1959 and the age as 18 years. The same is the grievance of the workman that actual date of birth is 19.09.1959 at the time when he has joined his service having the age of 18 years. But, it is on the part of the respondents that the age of the workman has been referred as 24 years basis upon which the writ petitioner has been retired pre-maturely, i.e., prior to the actual date of retirement. Dispute raised and reference has been answered in favour of the workman by directing for reinstatement in service with back wages of 50%. 8 11. The respondent has taken the plea that so far as the reference of the age of 24 years is concerned, the same has been acknowledged by the workman at the time when he joined the service, i.e., on 15.11.1977 as would appear from Annexure-2 appended to the paperbook. 12. This Court now is proceeding to examine as to whether the writ petitioner was at all aware with the age which was mentioned at the time of his joining, i.e., on 15.11.1977 to be of 24 years or not? 13. This Court on scrutiny of Annexure-2 which is PD form-I issued by the Personnel Department wherein the age of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 24 years as on 15.11.1977 and the workman, namely, Ram Prasad Nayak has put his signature. 14. The issue which has been raised before the learned writ court that it is not a case where the workman was not knowing about the age of 24 years rather it is a case where the workman was knowing about his age but no objection to that effect has ever been filed rather objection has been filed after his superannuation. 15. The said document, according to the considered view of this Court, is having force since the workman has put his signature on the personal detail form. The writ petitioner is now questioning his acknowledgment of age having 24 years when he joined the services, i.e., on 15.11.1977. 16. The position of law since is settled that if the workman is not having idea about the discrepancy, if any, in the date of birth then also such dispute is required to be raised within a reasonable time and not at the fag end of the service career. 17. The question would be that if the law is settled that if a workman is not knowing about any change in the date of birth in the service record then the dispute can be raised within the reasonable period and when such discrepancy is known to the concerned workman, wherein he has put his signature, where is the question to raise the dispute once it has been admitted by the workman itself. Herein, the dispute has been raised by the writ petitioner not while he was in service rather when he got retired. 9 The learned Tribunal without appreciated the aforesaid legal position as also not considered the personal data form, has answered the reference in favour of the writ petitioner by directing for reinstatement in service with 50% back wages. 18. The learned Single Judge after considering the settled position of law and also the fact that the writ petitioner himself has recognized his age as 24 years as on the date of appointment, has interfered with by the award passed by the learned Tribunal 19. The issue has been raised on behalf of the appellant-workman that the writ court has limited jurisdiction to exercise the power of judicial review once the award has been passed but if the award itself if perverse then certainly the power of judicial review can well be exercised by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 SC 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is 10 within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph no.21 as under: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is jurisdiction. The Court exercising special different jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) from appellate 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as under: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or 11 their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh Nathmal vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-14 as under: “14. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it 12 was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 the Hon'ble Apex Court has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 20. This Court, on the basis of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the judicial review to show interference with the award and reverting to the facts of the case, is of the view that the learned Tribunal has not taken into consideration the acknowledgment given by the writ petitioner about his age being 24 years on the date of his joining, as such, non-consideration of the aforesaid document and ignoring the same, the award passed by the learned Tribunal will be said to be based upon perversity since the settled position of law is that the award can be interfere with by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of power of judicial review if the award suffers from perversity and perversity means that the fact of the document has not properly been considered or wrongly been considered. 21. Here, in the given facts of the case the fact about acknowledgment of age of the workman to be 24 years as on 15.11.1977 as per the personal data form has not been considered by the learned Tribunal and therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, the award has been passed ignoring the said acknowledgment of the writ petitioner is nothing but based upon perversity, as such, it is a valid ground to show interference. 22. This Court, having considered the fact in entirety and coming to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, is of the view that the learned Single Judge has considered the fact in entirety regarding the settled position of law and non-consideration of that acknowledgment given by the workman 13 about his age as is available in the personal data form which led the learned Single Judge to interfere with the award. Therefore, the said interference shown by the learned Single Judge in the award cannot be said to suffer from error. 23. Accordingly, the instant appeal lacks merit, as such, is hereby dismissed. 24. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Subhash Chand, J.) Saurabh/- A.F.R.