The Director General -cum v. Ram Chand Dwivedi

1. of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.

2. Inspector General of Police, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.

3. Region, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh.

4. Chatra. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Chhotanagpur The Superintendent of Police, Chatra, P.O. & P.S. Chatra, District Versus ... ... Appellants Ram Chand Dwivedi, son of Shri Rama Kant Dwivedi, resident of Village Badruddinpur, P.O. Surajpur, P.S. Jaipur, District Ambedkar Nagar (Utter Pradesh). ... Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE ---------

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR For the Appellant 02/Dated: 09.06.2026 --------- : Mr. Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to SC-IV ---------

Heard Mr. Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, learned A.C. to SC-IV appearing for the appellant.

I.A. No.12760 of 2025 seeks condonation of the delay of 281 days in filing the accompanying Letters Patent Appeal.

The delay is sought to be explained by relying upon the averments in paragraph 3 of the interim application.

Paragraph 3 only refers to the movement of the files from one table to the other. It is stated that some time was spent in obtaining the opinion of the learned Advocate General. The reasons are vague and unverifiable.

In paragraph 4 of the interim application, it is stated that delay in the present case in filing the appeal

is due to consumption of time taken in the procedural steps/decision making process as mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present application which were -1- necessary in terms of inter departmental communications and opinion which requires to be obtained in view of established standard operating procedure among the Government functionaries and the same was not deliberate

.

Thus, paragraph 4 virtually admits that the delay was due to the routine procedural steps and the standard operating procedures. The period of limitation is well known and statutorily provided. Ordinarily, such a limitation must be respected, and the standard operating procedures should be modified so that appeals can be preferred within the prescribed limitation period. The State cannot refer to “established standard operating procedures” to defeat the statutory provisions of the Limitation Act. Based upon such averments, a delay of 281 days cannot be condoned.

In the case of Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that law of limitation binds everybody equally including Government and defence by Government of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology cannot be accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. Despite this decision, as of routine, appeals are filed after delay, and the delay is sought to be explained precisely on the ground of tardy bureaucratic procedure.

In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant -2- provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in

1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.” -3-

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.

In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed

we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, -4- who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:

We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law

.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to -5- seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

In the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown to explain the delay of 281 days in filing this appeal. Further, it is also a case where the State has not acted quite fairly. Though the respondent was directed to be reinstated by an order dated 01.10.2024, the State refused to comply with this direction to reinstate the petitioner and grant him all consequential benefits.

The appeal was filed after a delay of 281 days, and then, the pendency of the appeal was cited as a reason for non-compliance with the directions contained in the impugned order dated 01.10.2024.

The reasons cited for the delay in this matter are precisely the reasons which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held should ordinarily not be accepted as a sufficient cause. The IA is drafted quite casually and is bereft of particulars that are capable of reasonable verification. An impression is created that the State’s internal SOPs override the statutorily prescribed limitation period. This is not correct, and it is high time that such SOPs are revisited to ensure that appeals are filed within the limitation period. Only in cases where sufficient cause is shown can the belated appeals be considered after condoning the delay. No acceptable cause is shown in this matter other than relying on the movement of files from one table to the other. Administrative laxity is writ large. No indulgence can be claimed relying upon such laxity.

On cumulative consideration of the above circumstances and the law on the subject, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown condoning the delay. Accordingly, I.A. No. 12760 of 2025 is -6- liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed without any order for costs.

As a result of the dismissal of this I.A., the accompanying appeal will not survive and is dismissed.

The rest of the interlocutory applications, if any, will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.)

09.06.2026 N.A.F.R. APK/VK Uploaded on 12.06.2026 -7-