Arup Choudhary v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.), wherein the same impugned order dated
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 4610 of 2024 1. Anil Kumar Arun, aged about 61 years, son of Late Ambika Prasad Choudhary, resident of 401, Chandra Enclave, Dutta Villa Road near Antu Chowk, Morabadi, P.O.- Morabadi, P.S.- Lalpur, District- R 2. Hifzur Rahman, aged about 62 years, son of Late Abdul Wahab, resident of 1/C, Zulekha Enclave, Qabristan Road, Parastoli, Doranda, P.O.- Doranda, P.S.- Doranda, Distrit- Ranchi. Versus …. Petitioners 1. 2. 3. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Department of School Education and Literacy, Ranchi. Director, Secondary Education, Department of School Education and Literacy (Secondary Education Directorate), Ranchi. District Education Officer, Ranchi. …. Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N. PATHAK ------ For the Petitioners For the Respondents
Legal Reasoning
submits that similar issue fell for consideration before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5198 of 2017 (Arup Choudhary Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.), wherein the same impugned order dated 30.01.2017 was challenged and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has held in paragraph nos. 7 and 8, which are quoted herein below:- “7. From the impugned order, there is nothing to suggest as to whether the case of the petitioner and his reply were considered or not. Once the show cause is issued and reply to the said show cause is filed, thereafter a decision should be taken considering the aforesaid show cause. The authority who passes an order is duty bound to consider all the grounds/defence, which have been taken by the petitioner in the said show cause. The authority should have considered the points raised by the petitioner while considering the case of the petitioner. The word ‘consider’ has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India & Others versus A. Masilamani reported in 1 (2013) 6 SCC 530. In paragraph 19 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an opinion has to be formed by the statutory authority, which should be reflected on the records itself. The order of the appellate authority should reflect the application of mind and the appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language of disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm the order. Paragraph 19 of the said judgment reads as under: - 19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide India Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar and Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat). Proposition has now been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Considering the order of the authority, I find that the same is cryptic. It does not even touch, far less deal with the points raised by the petitioner. 8. Further it is admitted fact that forfeiture of three annual increments without cumulative effect as well as censure is the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner. A punishment can only be inflicted if there is misconduct. It is well settled law that mere error and omission will not be construed as a misconduct. Some negligence may come within the purview of misconduct, but in the instant case, there is nothing to suggest as to whether the petitioner was negligent or did not perform his duly diligently. Merely the fact that the students have not passed in matriculation and intermediate examination cannot be a ground to conclude that the petitioner has not taught the students properly or has neglected his work of teaching. There is no allegation against the petitioner that he has not attended the duty or has remained absent for considerable period of time and has not taken any interest in teaching. Even if this was the allegation, the matter would have been something else. But from the show cause notice as well as from the impugned order, it is quite clear that since the students have not passed in the examination of matriculation and intermediate, this petitioner, who happens to be a teacher in the school, was punished. In absence of any specific charge of misconduct, the petitioner should not have been punished.” 3. Further, similarly situated persons have moved this Court in W.P.(S) No. 4428 of 2017 (Ramjee Prasad Singh & Ors. Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.), wherein also, this Court considering the aforesaid 2 findings, the impugned order dated 30.01.2017 was quashed and set aside. The relevant paragraph-6 is quoted herein below:- “6. Admittedly, in this case also there is no specific charge of any misconduct against the petitioners. Charge is general in nature and punishment has been imposed not particular to any petitioner. Thus, considering what has been held above, impugned order of punishment dated 30.01.2017 (Annexure 2 to this writ petition), so far as it relates to the petitioners, is set aside. The petitioners are entitled for the consequential benefits including restoration of pay scale after granting them the increments which have been forfeited by the impugned order of punishment. If this punishment has been recorded in the service book of the petitioners, the said entry be struck off from their service books.” 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has admitted the aforesaid positions and submits that the impugned order dated 30.01.2017 was already quashed and set aside, so far as the petitioners of those cases are concerned. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon going through the record, it appears that the same impugned order dated 30.01.2017 was already quashed and set aside, as far as it relates to the petitioners of those cases. Admittedly, the case of the present petitioners are similar to that of the petitioners, as there are no specific charge against the present petitioners and the charge levelled against the petitioners and others is general in nature. 6. As such, the impugned order dated 30.01.2017, so far it relates to the present petitioners, is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the petitioners are entitled for the restoration of pay scale after granting them the increments which have been stopped by the impugned order of punishment. It is made clear that if the punishment has been recorded in the service book of the petitioners, the said entry be struck off from their service books. 7. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ petition stands allowed. R.Kr./Aditi (Dr. S. N. Pathak, J.) 3
Arguments
------ : Mr. Ashok Kumar Jha, Advocate : Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. SC-II ----- 2/ 15.10.2024 The petitioners have challenged the order contained in Memo No. 194 dated 30.01.2017 issued by the Director (Secondary Education), Jharkhand, Ranchi, by which the order of withholding of three annual increment with non-cumulative effect and Censure was passed. 2. At the very outset, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners