1. Manju Devi, aged about 62 years, W/o Late Haripat Saw; 2. Manoj Kumar v. 1. Central Coalfields Limited through its Chairman Cum Managing Director, office at Darbhanga House
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI (Letters Patent Appellate Jurisdiction) L.P.A. No. 403 of 2023 1. Manju Devi, aged about 62 years, W/o Late Haripat Saw; 2. Manoj Kumar, aged about 36 years, Son of Late Haripat Saw; Both resident of Saunda Central, P.O. and P.S. Saunda, District Ramgarh, Jharkhand Petitioners/Appellants … … Versus 1. Central Coalfields Limited through its Chairman Cum Managing Director, office at Darbhanga House, P.O. G.P.O. Ranchi, P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi 2. Director Personnel, Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, P.O. G.P.O. Ranchi, P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi 3. Senior Manager (P & IR), Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, P.O. G.P.O. Ranchi, P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi 4. The General Manager, IR-L/NEE/MP & R, Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, P.O. G.P.O. Ranchi, P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi District Ramgarh 5. Project Officer, Central Saunda Colliery, C.C.L., P.O. and P.S. Saunda, … Respondents/Respondents
Legal Reasoning
… --- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY For the Appellants For the Respondents --- --- : Mr. Saibal Mitra, Advocate Mr. H. N. Mahto, Advocate : Mr. Sabyasanchi, Advocate Per, Anubha Rawat Choudhary Order No. 04 Dated: 22nd November 2023 This appeal has been filed against the order dated 01.05.2023 passed in
Decision
W.P. (S) No. 2198 of 2018, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants has been dismissed. The appellant nos. 1 and 2 are mother and son respectively. The matter rerates to claim of compassionate appointment of the appellant no. 2. 2. The writ petition was filed by the appellants (hereinafter referred to as the writ petitioners) for the following reliefs: - “for issuance of appropriate Writ or Writs, direction or directions, order or orders commanding the Concern Respondents to consider the claim of petitioner No. 2 for Compassionate Appointment in place of his deceased father Haripat Saw who died in harness on 10-08-2009. AND Petitioners further pray for issuance of appropriate Writ or Writs, direction or directions, order or orders to set aside the letter No. 560 dated 20-11-2017 (Annexure-9) issued by the General Manager IR- 2 L.P.A. No. 403 of 2023 L/NEE/MP & R i.e. Respondent No. 4 by which he has rejected the claim of Petitioner No. 2 for compassionate appointment.” 3. The learned counsel for the appellants while assailing the impugned order has submitted that the authorities rejected the claim of compassionate appointment of the appellant no. 2 primarily on account of delay in filing the application for compassionate appointment. The application for compassionate appointment filed by the appellant no. 1 was entertained by the authorities and the delay was attributable to the fact that appellant no.1 had suffered from psychological disorder, which was duly intimated to the authorities upon being asked to explain the reasons for the delay. The learned writ Court has rejected the plea of the appellants on the ground that appellant no. 2 was major at the time of death of his father and he could have himself applied for compassionate appointment which he did not file within the stipulated timeframe as per National Coal Wage Agreement. The learned counsel submits that the reason for the delay was well explained but the learned writ Court failed to consider the matter in totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, while opposing the prayer has submitted that the impugned order is a well-reasoned order and there is no illegality or perversity calling for any interference by this Court. 5. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds that admittedly the father of appellant no. 2 died in harness on 10.08.2009 and the stipulated period for filing an application for compassionate appointment was one year and six months only. It is further not in dispute that appellant no. 1 had filed an application for compassionate appointment belatedly and the delay was of around four months. When an explanation for the delay was sought by the authorities from appellant no.1, she tried to explain the delay by stating that she was under the treatment of a psychiatric doctor. 6. However, from perusal of the impugned order, this Court finds that the appellant no. 2 claimed to be major at the time of death of his father i.e. on 10.08.2009. Considering this aspect of the matter, the learned writ Court has recorded that when the appellant no. 2 was himself major on the date of death of his father, there was no question of a fresh starting point of limitation on the 3 L.P.A. No. 403 of 2023 ground that the appellant no. 1, the mother of appellant no.2, was sick. The learned writ Court has recorded the findings as under: - “6. On consideration of the factual aspects of the case and the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears that though in Form PS-3, the age of the petitioner no. 2 was recorded as 8 years as on 20.09.2002, but the petitioner no. 2 has disclosed his age as 15.08.1987 and the educational certificate brought on record in this application further certifies the aforesaid claim. It would thus appear that when the father of the petitioner no. 2 had died on 10.08.2009, the petitioner no. 2 was already a major. The application of the petitioner no. 1 was basically concentrated with a request to grant compassionate appointment to the petitioner no. 2 which on being refused has been made the subject matter in W.P.(S) No. 3738 of 2016 and L.P.A. No. 260 of 2017 and consequent to the said orders, the impugned order dated 20.11.1997 as contained in Reference No. 560 was passed. Admittedly, when the petitioner no. 2 was a major at the time of the death of his father, he could have submitted a representation for grant of compassionate appointment in terms of rules and regulations prevalent at the time of death of his father, but instead the petitioner no. 1 had made an application and on being asked about the delay of such application, a plea was taken about her suffering from mental imbalance. When the petitioner no. 2 was himself a major, the question of a fresh starting point of limitation would not arise irrespective of the fact that the petitioner no. 1 was suffering from mental imbalance which according to her led to delay in submitting the application for compassionate appointment in favour of the petitioner no. 2. 7. On a perusal of the impugned order dated 20.11.2017, it appears that the reasons which have led to the rejection of such claim apart from the delay in submitting such application, which is beyond the period of 1 year 6 months, was the expiry of about 8 years since the date of the death and there has been certain discrepancy in the date of birth of petitioner no. 2 as though in Form PS – 3, the age of the petitioner no. 2 was recorded as 8 years as on 20.09.2002, whereas in his application he has disclosed his age as 15.08.1987. The impugned order has rightly come to a conclusion that there was no request for getting the name of petitioner no. 2 included in the live roster. Moreover, as per the own declaration of petitioner no. 2, he was not a minor when his father had expired. It also appears that now 13 years have passed since the father of the petitioner no. 2 had expired and accepting such belated claim would be antithesis to the basic purpose of compassionate appointment which is to help the family tide over the immediate crisis on account of the death of its earning member. 8. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, admittedly there appears to be delay in making such application claiming for compassionate appointment and on consideration of the totality of the aforesaid, I am not inclined to interfere in the impugned order as contained in Letter no. 560 dated 20.11.2017 and consequently this writ application stands dismissed” 7. In “Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana” (1994) 4 SCC 138, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: - “2……The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the 4 L.P.A. No. 403 of 2023 public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such dependant of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be remembered in this connection that as against the destitute family of the deceased there are millions of other families which are equally, if not more destitute. The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned.” 8. In “State of M.P. v. Amit Shrivas” (2020) 10 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the scheme prevalent on the date of death of the deceased employee is only to be considered and that there cannot be any inherent right to compassionate appointment and this has to be only in terms of the policy. It has been held as under: - “16. It is trite to say that there cannot be any inherent right to compassionate appointment but rather, it is a right based on certain criteria, especially to provide succour to a needy family. This has to be in terms of the applicable policy as existing on the date of demise, unless a subsequent policy is made applicable retrospectively…” 9. In a recent decision in “Seema Kausar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.” [Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.19252/2018], on 6th September 2021, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the appointment on compassionate ground is required to be made only as per the policy of the Government and only in a case where the eligibility criteria under the scheme has been satisfied. 10. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again reiterated that any appointment on compassionate ground must be made within the four corners of the scheme. In “State of M.P. v. Ashish Awasthi” (2022) 2 SCC 157, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: - “5. As per the settled proposition of law laid down by this Court for appointment on compassionate ground, the policy prevalent at the time of death of the deceased employee only is required to be considered and not the subsequent policy. 6. In Indian Bank v. Promila, it is observed and held that claim for compassionate appointment must be decided only on the basis of relevant scheme prevalent on date of demise of the employee and subsequent scheme cannot be looked into. Similar view has been 5 L.P.A. No. 403 of 2023 taken by this Court in State of M.P. v. Amit Shrivas. It is required to be noted that in Amit Shrivas the very scheme applicable in the present case was under consideration and it was held that the scheme prevalent on the date of death of the deceased employee is only to be considered. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 11. By now it is well accepted that in the matters of compassionate appointment the dependent of the deceased employee cannot claim any vested right and all that has to be seen is whether or not a fair treatment has been given by the employer to the dependent of a deceased employee. In the present case, about 15 years have passed since the father of appellant no. 2 died in harness. In our opinion, it would be improper for the Court to issue a direction to the respondents to offer compassionate appointment to the appellant no. 2. In this regard, we may reproduce the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Central Coalfields Limited v. Parden Oraon” 2021 SCC OnLine SC 299, which read as under: “8. The whole object of granting compassionate appointment is to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis which arises due to the death of the sole breadwinner. The mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that the job is offered to the eligible member of the family. It was further asseverated that compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of reasonable period as the consideration of such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in the future. It was further held that the object of compassionate appointment is to enable the family to get over the financial crisis that it faces at the time of the death of sole breadwinner, compassionate appointment cannot be claimed or offered after a significant lapse of time and after the crisis is over.” judgment the said in 12. This Court finds that the reasons assigned by the learned writ Court refusing to interfere with the rejection of claim of compassionate appointment of appellant no. 2 are sound reasons. In view of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the law is well-settled that the compassionate appointment can be granted only within the four corners of the scheme. There is no explanation from the side of the appellant no. 2 as to why he did not take any step for moving an application for compassionate appointment in spite of the fact that on the date of death of his father the appellant no. 2 was a major. Moreover, about 15 years has elapsed since the death of the father of the 6 L.P.A. No. 403 of 2023 appellant no. 2 and the sudden crisis which arose due to the death of the father of the appellant no. 2 cannot be said to continue to exist. 13. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) Mukul (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)