The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No.4535 of 2024 ------ 1. Vaidnath, aged about 42 years, S/o Late Hoshiyara Balmiki, R/o near Purana Bazar, Ratanjee Road Purana Bazar, P.O., P.S. & District-Dhanbad. 2. Sikandar Alam, aged about 40 years, S/o Samshad Alam, R/o Near Railway Track, Quadri Nagar Kharikabad Bhuli Holt, Dhaljori, P.O., P.S. & District-Dhanbad. 3. Shakar Prasad Ram, aged about 33 years, S/o Sanu Ravidas, R/o Glalgarh near Shiv Mandir Tantri, P.O., P.S. & District- Dhanbad. 4. Vicky Kumar, aged about 33 years, S/o Vijendra Sharma, R/o Village New Colony Muraidih, P.O. Pochari, P.S. & District- Dhanbad. …. …. Petitioners Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, having its office at 4th floor Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. 3. The Dhanbad Municipal Corporation, through its Municipal Commissioner, having its office at Dhanbad, P.O., P.S. Dhanbad & District Dhanbad. 4. The Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, through its Chairman having its office at Namkum, P.O., P.S. Namkum & District Ranchi. 5. The Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission having its office at Namkum, P.O., P.S. Namkum & District Ranchi. .... .... Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI ------ For the Petitioners For the State : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate Mr. Chanchal Jain, Advocate : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General : Mr. Mohan Kr. Dubey, AC to AG 1 For the Resp. No.3 : Mr. Mahavir Pd. Sinha, Advocate Mr. Santosh Kr. Jha, Advocate For the Resp. No.4&5 : Mrs. Pinky Shaw, Advocate Ms. Risheeta Singh, Advocate 03/Dated: 20.08.2024 ------ Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J. Prayer 1. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs:- “(i) For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) declaring the Jharkhand Municipal Services Cadre Rules, 2014 as amended up to date contained in gazette notification no. 349 dated 28.07.2014 (Annexure 1) as unreasonable, unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India particularly the rule 2 (ङ) introduced vide amendment contained in gazette notification no. 508 dated 04.10.2021 (Annexure-9) wherein the educational qualification for appointment on the post of Sanitary Supervisor has been introduced arbitrarily & illegally having no nexus with the aim & object sought to be achieved as also because no institution in State of Jharkhand (to the best of the knowledge of the petitioners) conduct the courses as prescribed under the impugned rule 2 (ङ), which impliedly debars the local resident or domicile of the State of Jharkhand to participate in the appointment process. (ii) For a declaration that the impugned Rule as notified vide notification no. 349 dated 28.07.2014 as amended up to date suffers from procedural ultra vires as also 2 lacks competence & authority in view of the provisions of section 590 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011. (iii) For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) particularly a writ of certiorari for quashing the Clause 5 (3) of the Advertisement No. 7/2023 (Annexure 10) which prescribes the educational qualification required for appointment on the post of Sanitary Supervisor and aims at ousting the local residents or domicile of the State of Jharkhand pursuing their studies in the State as the courses being Post Graduate Diploma in Sanitary Inspector or Post Graduate Diploma in Health and Sanitation or Post Graduate Diploma in Water Sanitation and Hygiene introduced in the educational eligibility criteria for Sanitary Supervisor by the respondents is not conducted by any of the Institutes within the State of Jharkhand. (iv) For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to consider the candidature of the petitioners as they have worked on the post of Sanitary Worker/Sanitary Supervisor for more than 6 to 8 years with an unblemished record to the utmost satisfaction of their superiors and have the added advantage of experience in the same job. (v) In the interim, to stay the publication of the result or process of appointment on the post of Sanitary Supervisors in pursuance of the Advertisement No. 7/2023 and/or to allow the petitioners to continue to work on the post of Sanitary Supervisor until the final disposal
Decision
of the writ petition.” Factual Matrix of the case 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ 3 petition required to be enumerated, which reads as under:- 3. It is the case of the writ petitioners that the Dhanbad Municipal Corporation, Jharkhand floated an Advertisement No. DMC- ADVT/2015-2016/01 in a daily newspaper namely Prabhat Khabar on 26.08.2015 inviting applications from eligible applicants for appointment on various posts including Sanitary Inspectors, Sanitary Supervisors (Swacchata Paryveshak) etc. in the Dhanbad Municipal Corporation on contract basis. 4. Upon being eligible and fulfilling the requisite criteria, the petitioner no. 1 applied and was subsequently appointed on the post of Sanitary Supervisor (Swacchata Paryveshak) vide order contained in memo no. 363 dated 19.03.2016. The name of Petitioner no. 1 appears at sl. no. 15 of the memo no. 363 dated 19.03.2016. The petitioner no. 1 & other similarly situated persons were appointed on contractual basis for a period of 6 months. 5. The respondent no.3 again issued a notice for Walk-In-Interview dated 09.08.2016 for appointment on the post of Swacchata Paryveshak, i.e., Sanitary Supervisor on contractual basis for a period of 6 months. 6. After fulfilling the requisite criteria, the petitioner nos. 2 & 3 applied and were also subsequently appointed on the post of Swacchata Paryveshak, i.e., Sanitary Supervisor vide order contained in memo no. 831 dated 13.08.2016. The name of petitioner no. 2 appears at sl. no. 2 and the name of the petitioner no. 3 appears at sl. no. 8 of the memo no. 831 dated 13.08.2016. 4 7. In the year 2018, the respondent no. 3 again floated an Advertisement No. 01/DMC/2018 contained in memo no. 116 dated 20.01.2018 inviting applications from suitable applicants for appointment on the post of Swacchata Mitra i.e. Sanitary Supervisors on contractual basis for a period of 6 months. 8. Likewise, the petitioner no. 4 applied and was subsequently appointed on the post of Swacchata Mitra/Sanitary Supervisor vide office orders contained in memo no. 209 dated 12.02.2018. 9. It is the further case of the writ petitioners that the services of the petitioners which were initially undertaken on contractual basis for 6 months, have been extended till date and the petitioners as on date are working on the post of Sanitary Supervisor/Swacchata Paryveshak/Swacchata Mitra on contractual basis. The petitioners have been working on the said post for almost 6 to 8 years. 10. In the meanwhile, the Jharkhand Municipal Service Cadre Rules, 2014 was amended vide notification dated 15.12.2017 being the Jharkhand Municipal Service Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2017. 11. The educational qualification that has been stipulated for the post of Sanitary Supervisor in the Rules of 2017 is being reproduced herein below:- “Sanitary Supervisor: To be filled through direct recruitment. Graduation from a recognized University/Institute or Post Graduate Diploma in Sanitary.” 12. The Jharkhand Municipal Service Cadre Rules, 2014 was again amended and published through notification no. 508 dated 30.09.2021 5 being the Jharkhand Municipal Service Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2021 which prescribed a higher educational qualification for appointment to the various post to be filled in the Public Health Cadre of the Municipal Services of Jharkhand. 13. In the year 2023, the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission floated an Advertisement No. 07/2023 for conducting the Jharkhand Municipal Services Cadre Combined Competitive Examination, 2023 for direct recruitment on several posts including the post of Sanitary Supervisor. 14. The said advertisement has been issued with the higher & enhanced minimum qualifications for the appointment to the several posts including the post of Sanitary Supervisor on the requisitions of the Department of Urban Development, Government of Jharkhand which is the parent department. The said advertisement under Clause 5 prescribes for the minimum educational qualification required for appointment on the post of Sanitary Supervisor. The same is being reproduced herein below: “Sanitary Supervisor: Post Graduate Diploma in Sanitary Inspector or Post Graduate Diploma in Health and Sanitation or Post Graduate Diploma in Water Sanitation & Hygiene.” 15. Thereafter, the respondents stopped taking work from the Sanitary Supervisors. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid, the writ petitioners have filed this present petition. 16. It is evident from the factual aspect as referred above that the writ petitioners, are being aggrieved with the provision as contained under 6 the Jharkhand Municipal Services Cadre Rules, 2014, which has been amended vide notification dated 15.12.2017 being Jharkhand Municipal Service Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2017, wherein, the provision has been inserted to the effect that the post of Sanitary Supervisor is to be filled up through direct recruitment. Graduation from a recognized University/Institute or Post Graduate Diploma in Sanitary, has been made mandatorily to be required. 17. The further facts demonstrate that the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission floated an Advertisement No.07/2023 for conducting the Jharkhand Municipal Services Cadre Combined Competitive Examination, 2023 for direct recruitment on several posts including the post of Sanitary Supervisor. 18. The petitioners, who are working on contract basis, are being aggrieved due to insertion of condition as under Clause 5 as contained in the advertisement which prescribes for the minimum educational qualification required for appointment on the post of Sanitary Supervisor, i.e., the candidate has to possess Post Graduate Diploma in Sanitary Inspector or Post Graduate Diploma in Health and Sanitation or Post Graduate Diploma in Water Sanitation & Hygiene. 19. The grievance of the writ petitioners is that they are working on contract basis for about last six to eight years and as such, due to insertion of condition in the amended Rules, 2017, they have seriously been prejudiced, since, they will not be eligible to participate in the process of selection and hence, the aforesaid Rule, as contained under Rules, 2017 has been challenged in this writ petition. 7 Arguments of the writ petitioners 20. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel for the writ petitioners assisted by Mr. Chanchal Jain, Advocate has submitted by referring to Annexure-1 as also the subsequent amendment by virtue of Amended Rules, 2017 have been challenged so far as it relates to insertion of the said condition. 21. It has been contended by referring to Annexure-1 which is a notification issued on 28.07.2014 by the order of the Governor of the State in exercise of power conferred under Section 590 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act, 2011’). But, in addition to the aforesaid statutory provision, the Rule, 2014 has been issued under the power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 22. It has been contended that when the Act, 2011 has conferred power upon the State as under Section 590 of the Act, 2011 which has got the procedure for the purpose of bringing an statute and mandatory condition is that any rule if is to be formulated, then the same will have to be placed before the assembly and only thereafter, the Rule is said to be Rule in the eye of law and in consonance with the provision as contained under Section 590 of the Act, 2011. 23. But, the Act, which has been notified on 28.07.2014 and its amendment which has been notified on 04.10.2021, has not been placed before the assembly. As such, both the statutory provisions since are in the teeth of the provision as contained under Section 590 of the Act, 2011, hence, the same are not sustainable. 8 24. It has further been contended by referring to another part of the Rules, 2014, wherein, the conferment of power has been referred as under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 25. It has, therefore, been contended that the aforesaid Rule will either under the provision of Section 590 of the Act, 2011 or under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and hence, the State is to clarify the aforesaid position as to under which power the Rules, 2014 and the amended Rule, 2021 has been brought into effect. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to the aforesaid, has also taken the ground that since, the petitioners are working on contract basis and due to insertion of any rule while they are in service, their chance for consideration will be deprived and hence, serious prejudice to the interest of the writ petitioners are there, hence, on that account also, the present writ petition has been filed. Arguments of the State 27. Learned Advocate General appearing for the Resp.-State assisted by Mr. Mohan Kr. Dubey, learned A.C. to A.G. has submitted by responding to first submission that the power which has been referred by making reference of Section 590 of the Act, 2011 under which the Jharkhand Municipal Service Cadre Rules, 2014 has been notified, admittedly, the same has not been placed before the assembly but the same is not said to be material consideration for interfering with the statutory provision, reason being that the power has also been referred said to be exercised under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 9 28. It has been contended that the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised by the State by way of an stop gap arrangement, i.e., till the rule is not being framed under the statutory provision which governs the field. Therefore, even if it is being accepted that the provision as contained under Section 590 has not been followed by not placing the Rule in the assembly but since, the reference of power as under proviso to Article 309 has also been made, hence, the Rule will be construed to be in exercise of power conferred under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 29. It has further been contended that merely because the petitioners are working on contract basis, the Rule cannot be said to suffer from an error and the position of law is well settled that any rule cannot be made which suits to the candidates, rather, making of the rule is the exclusive domain of the State or the appointing authority. Analysis 30. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the pleading made in the writ petition. 31. The issue which has been raised in this writ petition is on two folds:- (i) That the provision as contained under Section 590 of the Act, 2011 is not being followed and hence, the Rule notified on 28.07.2014 and amended in the year 2021, is not sustainable. (ii) The issue which requires consideration, i.e., “whether if the provision as contained under Section 590 10 of the Act, 2011 has not been followed but the statutory provision, if has been brought into effect in exercise of power conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, then, can the Rule be said to suffer from the vice of the jurisdiction.” 32. The issue of validity of the Rule is well settled, as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, wherein, it has been held that the validity of Rule is on the principle of presumption that whatever Rule has been formulated is constitutionally valid until a declaration to that effect is being made by the Court of law depending upon the situation, as has been laid down in the said judgment, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.L. Kamra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (1992) 2 SCC 36, wherein at paragraph-4, it has been held as under:- “4. …. ….. ….. It is settled law that there is a presumption of constitutionality of the rule. The Court ought not to interpret the statutory provisions, unless compelled by their language, in such a manner as would involve its unconstitutionality, since the legislature or the rule making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not contravene or violate the constitutional provisions. Therefore, there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a legislation or statutory rule unless ex facie it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. If the provisions of a law or the rule is construed in such a way as would make it consistent with the Constitution and another interpretation would render the provision or the rule unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the 11 former construction. In view of this settled legal position, the question emerges whether the language in Rule 5 would be capable to be construed consistent with the fundamental rights in Part III. As stated earlier, the phrase “in the event of the Society not having any further need of any employee's service whether permanent or temporary which shall be decided by the Board” is susceptible of two interpretations. The one interpretation put up by Sri Ramamurthy is that the Board may unilaterally and arbitrarily decide that there is no need for the services of a particular employee, in given facts and circumstances, though the post which the employee is occupying may continue and would be put to an end by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. In that event the rule per se is arbitrary offending Article 14. The other view capable to be construed from the language employed would be that the Board of Management may form an objective opinion, on the basis of the material, that the post which the officer or the employee is occupying no longer is in need. Thereby, the post would be abolished. This would be a policy decision depending on the exigencies. In consequence the service of the employee also would become redundant or surplus. In that event his service would no longer be needed. The officer or employee may be permanent or temporary but the absence of the need for the continuance of the post would necessitate to terminate the service of an employee or officer. It must not be a pretext or a ruse to get rid of the service of an inconvenient officer or of an employee. If that be so, it would become colourable exercise of power and would be liable to be quashed as offending Article 14. Once the Board reaches a decision to abolish the post, in 12 consequence the service of the officer/employee occupying the post could be terminated. The language couched in Rule 5 also is capable of that interpretation. In that light we are of the opinion that Rule 5 does not become arbitrary, unreasonable or void offending Article 14. Accordingly, we hold that the rule is valid.” 33. The law is equally also settled that the Rule is to be formulated under the statutory provision which is in command. Such rule if formulated under the statutory command, the same will be said to take the field of subordinate legislation. 34. Here in the instant case, the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 is invoked which contains a provision as under Section 590 thereof, wherein, the State has been conferred with the power to make rules, but subject to certain condition as referred therein, for ready reference, Section 590 of the Act, 2011 is being referred as under:- “590. Power to make rules.- (1) The State Government may, by notification, and subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) Any rule made under this Act may provide that any contravention thereof shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. (3) Every rule made under this Act shall, as soon as may be after it is made, be laid before the State Legislature while it is in session for a total period of ten days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if before the expiry of the session in which it is so laid or the successive sessions aforesaid, the State Legislature agrees in making any modification in the rules or the State Legislature agrees that the rules should not be 13 made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so however that such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done or omitted to be done under that rule.” 35. It is, thus, evident that if any rule is to be framed by the State, then the mandatory requirement is there as has been referred under sub-section 3 thereof that if the State is proposed to enact, then, the same is to be placed before the assembly for its approval. 36. It is equally settled and as would be evident from the word as contained under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, wherein, the constitutional arrangement has been made in order to fill up the stock that in absence of any statutory provision for the purpose of making out service conditions, the power can be exercised by the State under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, for ready reference, Article 309 of the Constitution of India is being referred as under:- “309. Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.-Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State: Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in 14 connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act.” 37. The proviso gives power to the President or the Governor to make Service Rules but this is only a transitional provision as the power under the proviso can be exercised only so long as the legislature does not make an Act whereby recruitment to public posts as also other conditions of service relating to that post are laid down. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A.B. Krishna & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (1998) 3 SCC 495, wherein, at paragraph-6, it has been held as under:- “6. …. …. ….. The proviso, however, gives power to the President or the Governor to make Service Rules but this is only a transitional provision as the power under the proviso can be exercised only so long as the legislature does not make an Act whereby recruitment to public posts as also other conditions of service relating to that post are laid down.” 38. Thus, the Rule framed under proviso to Article 309 will be for the period up till which the rule is not being framed under the conferment of power in the parent Act and the moment the rule will be framed as per the conferment of power and the parent act, the rule framed under proviso to Article 309 will have no existence. 15 39. Before adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, it requires to refer herein that it is for the rule-making authority or the appointing authority to prescribe the mode of selection and minimum qualification for any recruitment. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration through the Director Public Instructions (Colleges), Chandigarh v. Usha Kheterpal Waie, reported in [(2011) 9 SCC 645], the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:— “22. It is now well settled that it is for the rule-making authority or the appointing authority to prescribe the mode of selection and minimum qualification for any recruitment. The courts and tribunals can neither prescribe the qualifications nor entrench upon the power of the authority concerned so long as the qualifications prescribed by the employer is reasonably relevant and has a rational nexus with the functions and duties attached to the post and are not violative of any provision of the Constitution, statute and rules. (See J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of A.P. [(1990) 1 SCC 288] and P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General [(2003) 2 SCC 632].)—" 40. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, so far as the legal issues are concerned, here, it is the admitted fact that the reference of Section 590 of the Act, 2011 has been made while enacting the Rule, 2014 but simultaneously, the reference of Article 309 of the Constitution of India has also been made in the Rule, 2014. 41. It needs to refer herein that amendment which has been incorporated in the Rule, 2014, as would appear from the said 16 amended Rule, appended as Annexure-9, wherein also, the reference of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India has been referred. 42. It is further evident that the said amendment is in the limited extent by way of substitution for the purpose of supersession of certain provisions clarifying it that the rest of the provision, as contained under Rule, 2014 will be same. 43. The admitted fact is that there is no concurrence/approval by the assembly, since, as has been submitted by going through the gazette notification that there is no reference of a word that the said statutory rule of the Rule, 2014 has been referred before the assembly. 44. But the question is that merely because the rule has not been referred before the assembly, can the said rule be said to be ultra-vires if the Rule has been framed under the proviso to Article 309. 45. As has been referred hereinabove based upon the judicial pronouncements, the matter would have been different if there was no reference of exercise of power as conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, would have been there, then what has been contended on behalf of the petitioners, the same will be said to be correct, meaning thereby, if in exercise of power conferred under Section 590 of the Act, 2011, the rule has been brought to that effect but without following the sub-section 3 thereof, then the entire rule will be said to be illegal and in the teeth of Section 590 of the Act, 2011. 46. But, that is not the case herein, rather, as would appear from the very rule of the Rule, 2014, wherein, the reference of Article 309 of the Constitution of India has also been made. 17 47. Therefore, considering the purport of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, whereby, the power is to be exercised by the State in absence of statutory provision as legislated under the conferment of power under the parent act, as such, the reference of Section 590 in absence of fulfillment of requirement as per the provision as contained under sub-section 3 of Section 590 of the Act, 2011 will be meaningless in the present facts and circumstances of the case considering the fact that the referenced of power which has been exercised by the State is also there under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 48. As such, this Court is of the considered view that merely because sub-section 3 of Section 590 of the Act, 2011 has not been followed, the entire rule cannot be held to be illegal in view of the fact that conferment power under proviso to Article 309 is also to be exercised, hence, the Rule, 2014 or the amended Rule, 2021 will be said to be issued in exercise of power conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 49. The second ground which has been taken by questioning the insertion of the eligibility criteria, so far as the educational qualification is concerned, on the basis of the fact that the petitioners are working on contract for the last eight years and hence, due to insertion of new condition, they will be deprived from their chance to participate in the process of selection. 50. This Court, so far as this argument is concerned, is of view that merely because the candidates are working on contract, it will be said that no right is accrued in their favour. 18 51. The accrual of right will only be said to be there if the appointment is on substantive basis and if in course of service, any terms and conditions thereof are being changed, then the question of prejudice depending upon the accrued right, is to be considered. 52. But, the appointment made on contract basis since does not create a right said to be vested right and as such, if the State has come out with the decision to take the candidate for the purpose of filling the post in question by enhancing the educational qualification, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error, reason being that, insertion of condition making the candidate eligible for consideration for selection of such candidate in a particular post, is the exclusive domain of the State and there cannot be any interference by the Constitutional Court. 53. The question of vested interest has been taken only by this Court hereinabove, therefore, this Court is of the view that the vested interest also needs to be referred herein as per the interpretation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the vested or accrued right of one or the other, as has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of MGB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh, [(2014) 13 SCC 583] at paragraphs-11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as:- “11. The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: “Vested.—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, founded on or contingent anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute ‘vested rights’.” in property interest 19 12. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interest. 13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed.” 54. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition in the case of Chairman, Railway Board and Others v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and Others, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623 at paragraph-24, which reads hereunder as :- “24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in 20 consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [AIR 1967 SC 1889], B.S. Vedera [AIR 1969 SC 118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [(1983) 2 SCC 33].” 55. This Court, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove, is of the view that this writ petition lacks merit and as such, the same is fit to be dismissed. 56. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed. 57. In consequent to dismissal of this writ petition, pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) Rohit/-A.F.R. 21