Dr. Shukdeo Prasad v. Ranchi University, Ranchi

Judgment

: The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 8th July, 2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No.1709 of 2014 by which the prayer of the appellant has been dismissed without determination of justification and unexplained latches and delay on the part of the concerned authorities/respondents in payment of “Deferred Dearness Allowance” which was paid on 10th September, 2012 partly without statutory interest whereas the appellant superannuated on 28th February, 1999. 2 I.A. No. 5681 of 2020

2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since there is delay of 558 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 5681 of 2020 has been filed for condoning such delay.

3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 558

days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.

5. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned in the interlocutory application that the appellant came to know about the status of the writ petition on 5th October, 2020 that the same was already dismissed on 8th July, 2019. The writ-petitioner was not knowing about the status of his case as the same was not communicated to him due to which delay has been occurred in filing the present appeal.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal propositions as has 3 been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.

7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.

8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939- 40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” 4 In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

9. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and 5 laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court 6 is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant’s lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant’s application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition 7 Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:- “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 :