Sushil Kumar Jain v. State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, Project Building

SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ------ For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Suraj Singh, Advocate For the State For Accountant General: Ms. Richa Sanchita, Advocate : Mr. Varun Prabhakar, AC to GP-III Ms. Suman Roy, Advocate …...... 02 /04.09.2025: Heard the parties.

2. The petitioner was posted as Junior Engineer in Rural Development, Special Division, Dhanbad. On 23.08.2009 an inspection was carried out in an under construction bridge in village Barbandiya, Nirsa Block and some irregularities were found for which he was suspended vide Memo No. 6318 dated 29.08.2009 and a departmental proceeding was initiated vide order no. 2502 dated 14.05.2010. The inquiry report was submitted on 26.08.2009. Vide letter dated 18.06.2010 the petitioner was directed to appear before the inquiry officer thereafter on several occasions the 1 petitioner appeared before the inquiry officer. After due inquiry finding the charge to be proved against the petitioner he was inflicted punishment on 08.11.2012. He was punished with stoppage of six pay increments with cumulative effect with further punishment that he will not be entitled for any promotion during his service career. Further it was ordered that the petitioner will not be paid anything except his subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. The petitioner was also implicated in a criminal case being Vigilance PS Case No. 27 of 2010 registered under sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 109 IPC and under section 13(2) read with 13(1) (D) of Prevention of Corruption Act. After imposition of punishment in the departmental proceeding on 08.11.2012 the Anti- Corruption Bureau after investigation submitted Final Form being Final Form No. 56 of 2014 dated 31.12.2014 in the criminal case. Thereafter vide order dated 17.08.2017 the Special Judge, ACB, Ranchi accepted the Final Form.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that for the same set of allegation both the departmental proceeding and the criminal proceeding was initiated. In the departmental proceeding he was found guilty whereas in the criminal proceeding there is submission of Final Form stating therein mistake of fact. The petitioner has relied on paragraph nos. 12 and 30 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others” reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175, which held as under: “12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the in certain review can grant Court circumstances. The Court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. redress judicial 2 489] (See G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] , State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) of T.N. v. S. and S. Samuthiram [State Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] .) 30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] .”

4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner was punished by the department on 08.11.2012 and after much delay only on 2025 he has challenged the same, thus, no relief could be granted to the petitioner.

5. First Information Report and the departmental proceeding is absolutely on a different premises and standard of proof is also different. Both are different in terms of nature and the standard of proof. While criminal proceedings require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, departmental proceedings are governed by the preponderance of probabilities.

6. The petitioner has never challenged the continuation of the departmental proceeding nor the punishment at any point of time though criminal proceeding was pending against the petitioner, so exoneration of the petitioner in the criminal case will have no effect. The petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case has no bearing on the departmental proceedings or the punishment imposed therein. Further the departmental proceeding culminated in a punishment much prior to the criminal case.

7. The petitioner has challenged the Memo No. 8614 dated

08.11.2012 when the petitioner was in service thereafter the petitioner superannuated on 31.03.2022 and much thereafter only in 2025 he had challenged the order of punishment dated 3

08.11.2012 which is at a much belated stage i.e. after 13 years. More than thirteen years after the punishment order was passed, the petitioner has now chosen to file the present writ petition, challenging the very same order. Such an unexplained delay renders the petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of gross laches and delay.

8. Further, I find that it is the negligence of the petitioner which is being put in question in the departmental proceeding. Negligence was not and cannot be the subject matter of the criminal case. The petitioner did not supervise the work properly which may be a charge under the departmental proceeding but the same cannot be a criminal charge, so the judgment which the petitioner is relying upon does not fit in the facts of this case.

9. In view of the unexplained delay and latches of the petitioner and considering the difference in the criminal and departmental charge, this writ petition is dismissed. Tanuj/ (ANANDA SEN, J.) 4