Dhanu Khan (Mistri) v. Awadesh Tiwari

Mr. Sheo Kumar Singh, Advocate Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahani, Advocate Mr. Anand Kumar Pandey, Advocate ----- 10/ 21.02.2024 Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

This civil revision is directed against the order dated 5.8.2021 passed by Rent Controller-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Palamau in Eviction Case No. 11 of 2021 by which the defendants-petitioners were directed to evict from the premises on the ground of bonafide necessity.

The plaintiff-respondent has filed Eviction Suit No. 11 of 2021 under section 19 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 for evicting the defendants-petitioners from the suit premises. It was stated that several shops in question were erected / constructed by the Khas Mahal Authority and the plaintiff being the leasehold owner of one of the shops has allowed the defendants-petitioners to keep their repairing equipment in the premises and the defendants are not the tenant of the plaintiffs.

On the other hand, the defendants-petitioners appeared and filed their written statement. They have stated that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties. The defendants are in possession of the premises and there is no valid cause of action for evicting them from suit premises. Hence, the present suit is not attracted under the provisions of Section 19 of the said Act.

On the pleadings of the parties, the Court below has passed the order impugned, which is under challenged in the present civil revision. 2

Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the impugned order has been passed without framing of issues and without recording any evidence and enquiry, which is bad and illegal. Learned counsel further submits that no provision enshrined in the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 is attracted in the present suit, so as to evict the defendants from the suit premises. Learned counsel further submits that there is no chit of paper on record to show that there was no any relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant. In absence of material ingredients, the Court below has committed error in law while passing the order for eviction of the defendants. Hence, it is a fit case in which the impugned order should be quashed and set aside.

On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff- respondent submits that after filing of application under Section 19 of the said Act, the Court below issued notice to the defendants and on their request, the matter was adjourned for several dates. Learned counsel submits that as per requirement of Section 21(4) of the said Act, 2011, the defendants have to file an application for leave, but the same was not filed, though they filed their written statement. Therefore, in absence of a petition seeking leave to contest the suit, which is mandatory as per provisions of Section 21(4), the Court below considering the statements of the plaintiff, passed the order for eviction of the defendants. Hence, the impugned order dated 5.8.2021 is legal, valid and proper and it does not warrant any interference by this Court.

Refuting the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant, learned counsel for the respondents submits that law is well settled in catena of decisions that “the landlord must not necessarily be land owner, but the person who receives rent as an agent, trustee, executor and administrator is also called landlord and he can maintain a suit for eviction.”. Learned counsel further submits that since the plaintiff has given the premises to the defendants, he comes within the meaning of ‘Landlord’ and he is entitled for the premises in bona fide requirement.

To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance upon the judgments in the cases of K.D. Dewan Vs. Harbhajan S. 3 Parihar, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 199 and Boorugu Mahadev And Sons & Anr. Vs. Sirigiri Narasing Rao & Ors., reported in (2016) 3 SCC 343.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the records, it appears that the main contention of learned counsel for the petitioner for assailing the impugned order is that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents and hence, the impugned order is fit to be quashed and set aside.

To rebut this submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court has gone through the legal proposition, as has been laid down in the case of K.D. Dewan Vs. Harbhajan S. Parihar, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 119, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that

to be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 a person need not be necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has defined the meaning of ‘landlord’ in paragraph-8 of the judgment which reads thus:- “8. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord: (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act; and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of “landlord”, Mr Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so, that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the act the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act.

Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Boorugu Mahadev and sons and Anr Vs. Sirigiri Narasing Rao & Ors., reported in 4 (2016) 3 SCC 343 has defined the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control laws, vis-à-vis in title suit. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that in rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and to retain control. The relevant paragraph-18 is as follows:-

18. It is also now a settled principle of law that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a suit. for ownership (Vide Sheela v. Firm Prem Prakash [Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375] .)

in a Rai Prahlad

Thus, from plain reading of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it can safely be said that the plaintiff-respondent comes with the meaning of ‘landlord’ because the defendants-petitioners themselves admitted that the plaintiff has allowed them to keep equipments in the shop in question and it has also come in the impugned order that the plaintiff has brought on record the rent receipt, which shows that the plaintiff is the landlord within the meaning of the Act. As such, the Court below has rightly passed the order for eviction of the defendants from the suit premises on the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff, which requires no interference. The bona fide need has also been explained in the impugned order.

Moreso, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd Vs. Dilbahar Singh, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 78 that the High Court has limited revisional power to interfere with the orders passed under the Rent Control Act, as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. The relevant paragraph-43 reads thus:-

43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different 5 law. A finding of from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.

As a sequitur to the aforesaid rules, regulations and judicial pronouncements, this Court is of the view that no case is made out by the petitioner worth interference by this Court. The learned Rent Controller- cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Palamau has rightly passed the impugned order dated 5.8.2021 for eviction of the defendants-petitioners from the suit premises.

There is no merit in this civil revision and the same is hereby dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. R.Kr. (Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)