1. Dhananjay Bouri @ Dhananjay Bauri @ Dhanna Bauri, aged about 24 years, son v. 2. Rajesh Kumar Mahto @ Laltoo s/o Nav Kumar Mahto, r/o village Jayatara, Tola-Lakhiatand
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Criminal Revision No. 1053 of 2018 --------- 1. Dhananjay Bouri @ Dhananjay Bauri @ Dhanna Bauri, aged about 24 years, son of Bindu Bauri @ Bindu Bouri 2. Kabul Bouri @ Kabul Bauri, aged about 25 years, son of Arun Bauri @ Arun Bouri, Both resident of village Jaytara, P.O. & P.S. – Pindrajora, District-Bokaro ..… Accused/Appellants/Petitioners 1. The State of Jharkhand Versus 2. Rajesh Kumar Mahto @ Laltoo s/o Nav Kumar Mahto, r/o village Jayatara, Tola-Lakhiatand, P.O. & P.S.- Pindrajora, District-Bokaro ….. Opp. Parties/Respondents/Opp. Parties ---------- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD --------- For the Petitioners : Mr. Mukesh Kumar, Advocate For the A.P.P. For the O.P.No.2 : Mr. Baibhaw Gahlaut, Advocate : Mr. Bishambhar Shastri, Advocate Mr. Subhaneet Jha, Advocate --------- JUDGMENT Reserved on 07.05.2024 Delivered on 01.10.2024 This criminal revision has been filed on behalf of the petitioners challenging the judgment dated 03.07.2018, passed by Sri Ranjeet Kumar, learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st, Bokaro, in Criminal Appeal No. 09 of 2015, by which the learned court below has dismissed the Criminal Appeal and has affirmed the judgment of conviction dated 30.01.2015, passed by Sri 1 Sudhanshu Kumar Shashi, learned Assistant Sessions Judge 1st, Bokaro in S.T. Case No. 354 of 2012, whereby the petitioners were convicted for offences under sections 326/34 of Indian Penal Code and under Sections 341/34 of Indian Penal Code. However, the learned Appellate Court below has modified the Sentence dated 31.01.2005 passed in S.T. Case No. 354 of 2012 by Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court has reduced the sentence of the Appellants from Rigorous Imprisonment of 3 ½ years to Rigorous Imprisonment of Two (02) years and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees Three thousand) and further directed that the fine amount shall be given to the injured as compensation although the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Bokaro has sentenced the petitioners to Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 ½ years and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/- (Rupees Three thousand) for the offence u/s 326/34 of I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, the petitioners were directed to undergo Simple Imprisonment of three months. However, no separate sentence was passed for the offence under Section 341/34 by
Facts
the learned Trial Court. 2. I.A. No. 11090 of 2023 dated 11.12.2023 has been filed on behalf of the petitioners and the O.P. No.2. 3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 08.03.2012 at about 6.00 p.m. while the Informant Rajesh Kumar Mahto @ Laltu Mahto, along with villagers Manoj Mahto and Ranjeet Mahto, had gone to “Mishra garia Pond” for easing themselves, then at that time seven persons on two motorcycles came there and started quarrelling with each other. He tried to pacify them, but 2 they started quarrelling with him only. In the meanwhile, four persons went towards Jamtara side by Motor-Cycle but remaining three persons continued to quarrel with him. He further alleged that Dhananjay Bauri, Kabul Bauri and other accused persons started assaulting him with fists and slaps and Kabul Bauri caught hold of him and Dhananjay Bauri inflicted knife blow in his abdomen due to which his intestine came out. Upon Hulla they ran away from the place of occurrence and he was taken to K.M. Memorial Hospital, Chas by friend. 4.
Legal Reasoning
declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental 9 Cr. Appeal (SJ).1675 of 2003 principle of judicial decision-making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernible and predictable. Unless that is 13 achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances”. 23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of the offences under Section 307 IPC.” 24. xxx xxx xxx 25. xxx xxx xxx 26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at 14 the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many time whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/Charge- sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge- sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties. Para 14:- In the backdrop of well defined limit and boundary for compounding the offences which are non- compoundable in nature, it is manifest that responsive justice is the genesis of delivering justice. In a society governed by rule of law, just and fair expectations of law abiding citizen are the essence of justice delivery system. In 15 a criminal case where offences are of pure personal nature, not heinous or brutal and not adversely affecting the society at large being a private nature and the parties concerned have willingly and voluntarily settled their differences amicably, it would be in the fitness of things that non- compoundable offences can be allowed to be compounded, of course with righteousness and probity irrespective of the fact that the trial has already been concluded and the post conviction compromise has taken place at the appellate stage.” 17. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also by this Court, the Petitioner No. 1 and Petitioner No.2, namely Dhananjay Bouri @ Dhananjay Bauri @ Dhanna Bauri and Kabul Bouri @ Kabul Bauri respectively and the O.P. No. 2, namely Rajesh Kumar Mahto @ Laltoo, i.e. the Informant are permitted to get the offences compounded and also to get the case compromised. 18. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the impugned judgment dated 03.07.2018, passed by Sri Ranjeet Kumar, then learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st , Bokaro, in Criminal Appeal No. 09 of 2015 and the judgment of conviction dated 30.01.2015 and order of sentence dated 31.01.2015, passed by Sri Sudhanshu Kumar Shashi, Assistant Sessions Judge-1st, Bokaro in S.T. Case No. 354 of 2012 are set aside in terms of the compromise and the petitioners, namely Dhananjay Bouri @ Dhananjay Bauri @ Dhanna Bauri and Kabul Bouri @ Kabul Bauri are acquitted for the charges under Section 326/34 and 341/34 of the I.P.C. and they are discharged from the liability of their respective bail bonds 19. Thus, this Criminal Revision No. 1053 of 2018 is allowed in terms of the compromise. (Sanjay Prasad, J.) s.m./ Dated 1st October, 2024 A.F.R. 16
Arguments
Heard Mr. Mukesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Bishwambhar Shashtri, learned A.P.P. for the State and Mr. Baibhaw Gahlaut, learned counsel for O.P. No. 2, assisted by Mr. Subhaneet Jha, learned counsel. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Court below are illegal, perverse and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that there has been delay of Two (02) days in lodging the First Information Report (F.I.R.) and no cogent explanation has been given. It is submitted that from the testimony of the injured witness (P.W.3) as well as from that of the alleged eye witnesses (PWs 4 and 5) that the victim was trying to pacify the quarrel between the accused and some other persons and on the spur of the moment, he allegedly received single knife blow. 3 It is submitted that admittedly there was neither any intention nor motive on the part of the petitioners to inflict the knife blow on the informant. It is submitted that the incident occurred out of a quarrel and there was no previous enmity between the parties. So the hurt caused to the injured cannot be said as “voluntarily” within the meaning of Section 326 I.P.C. It is submitted that learned Courts below have failed to appreciate that the medical evidence does not fully corroborate the oral testimony of the witnesses, as there is no other injury of assault and the intestine has not come out of the abdomen. It is submitted that the P.W. 4 and P.W.5 never supported the informant on the point that they accompanied the Informant to the pond at the time of occurrence, rather, they were chance witnesses watching the occurrence. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his contention, has relied upon the judgment pronounced on 04.02.2022 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navneet Kumar) passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 1675 of 2003. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh and Others Versus State of Punjab and Another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 and the judgment in the case of Ramgopal and 4 Another Versus State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2021) 1 SCC OnLine SC 834. 7. It is submitted that the case has been compromised between the parties and therefore, no cause of action remains against the parties. It is submitted that in view of the judgments, upon which the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance, petitioners may be allowed to get the case compromised. 8. 9. Learned A.P.P. has raised no objection. Learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 has also admitted the factum of compromise and has submitted that the informant has got the case compromised voluntarily and he has no grievance against the petitioners anymore. 10. It appears that the petitioners and the Informant have got the case compromised. 11. Paragraphs No. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Interlocutory Application No. 11090 of 2023 read as follows: “Para 4:- That, it is stated and submitted that during the pendency of the instant revision application, the petitioners and injured informant (PW 3) have voluntarily and willingly resolved their dispute amicably. Para 5:- That, the alleged incident took place more than 11 years back on the festival of Holi, and both the parties being co-villagers are living in a harmonious atmosphere, and hence for the ends of justice, Your Lordships may be pleased 5 to allow the offence u/sec. 326 I.P.C. be compromised under the circumstances of the case. Para 6:- That, the injured-informant (PW 3), who are co-villagers, want to bear good relations and maintain peace, and as such with the intervention of well wishers and common friends, the dispute has been amicably compromised between the parties, and as such the instant revision application may be allowed in view of the compromise between the parties. Para 7:-That, it is stated and submitted that the petitioners have no criminal antecedent. Para 8:- That, the dispute between the parties is purely a personal nature of dispute inasmuch as neither public policy is involved nor any trace of brutality or ruthlessness in the purported offence nor affecting the peace, tranquility and conscious of the society and therefore, this Hon’ble Court may allow the instant revision.” 12. The above compromise petition has been filed by Mr. Mukesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and signed by Mr. Baibhav Gahlot, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 and also seen by the learned A.P.P. 13. From submission of learned counsel for both sides and the averments made in I.A. No. 11090 of 2023, it appears that the case has been compromised amongst the parties. 6 14. It has been held in the case of Narinder Singh and Others Versus State of Punjab and Another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 at Para No. 22, 23 and 26 as follows:- “Para 22:- Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under Section 307 IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical 7 treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances”. Para 23:- As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances, it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of the offences under Section 307 IPC. Para 26:- Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the 8 parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate part of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties.” 15. It has been held in the case of Ramgopal and Another Versus State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2021) 1 SCC OnLine SC 834 at Paragraphs No. 19 and 20 and 22 as follows:- 9 Para 19:- We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations. Para 20:- Having appraised the afore-stated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that: Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants 10 had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s). Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against each other. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age. Para 22:- Insofar as this appeal is concerned, we note that even though the learned counsel(s) for the appellants and the complainant victim have jointly stated before this Court that the parties have settled their dispute(s), but no formal settlement has either been brought on record nor has it been even clarified that such a deed of settlement has been recorded. Admittedly, the factum of compromise/settlement between the parties has been raised for the first time before this Court. In the absence 11 of any proof of settlement, we find ourselves hard- pressed to take cognizance of the asseverated compromise. We, therefore, direct both the appellants as well as the complainant victim to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga and submit their settlement, if any, in writing within a period of three months. The CJM shall send a report to this Court immediately, recording his satisfaction with regard to the genuineness of the compromise. In the event, the said report would reflect a bona fide settlement between the parties, the present appeal shall also be deemed to have been disposed [ Set out in paras 2 to 21, above.] of in same terms as Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, referred to above. Further, the incontrovertible corollary in such event would be that the appellants shall be treated to have been acquitted of all the charged offences for all intents and purposes. On the other hand, if no formal settlement is placed before CJM, Shimoga within the stipulated period or the report reflects to the contrary, the criminal appeal shall stand as dismissed as no other substantial question of law is raised or involved in this appeal. 16. It has been held in the judgment pronounced on 04.02.2022 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navneet Kumar) in Cr.Appeal (SJ) No. 1675 of 2003, at Para No. 13 and 14 as follows: “Para 13:- As a matter of fact from the aforesaid propositions of law as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Gian Singh's case (Supra), Laxmi Narayan's case (Supra), and Yogender Yadav's Case (Supra) it is now well settled that the offences which are non-compoundable 12 cannot be compounded by a criminal Court under the section 320 of the Cr.P.C. In spite of that there is an scope of compounding the offences by invoking inherent powers of the High Court vested in it under section 482 of Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice by taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the incident, the manner and mode under which the compromise has been arrived at between the parties , and further due consideration to the nature and seriousness of the offence, in addition to the conduct of the accused, before and after the incident. But such power is to be exercised very carefully, diligently and cautiously as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466, as follows: 22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under Section 307 IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law