The High Court
Case Details
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Revision No. 988 of 2017 Md. Kalim Sah Afsana Khatoon …. Versus ----- …… Petitioner …… Opp. Party CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ----- For the Petitioner For the O.P. : Mr. Sahay Gaurav Piyush, Advocate : Mr. Yogesh Modi, Advocate ORAL JUDGMENT IN COURT 16/28.02.2024 This Criminal Revision No. 988 of 2017 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner challenging the ‘order’ dated 07.06.2017 passed by Sri Ram Sharma, learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad in Original Maintenance No. 304 of 2015 by which the petition filed by the opposite party under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. has been allowed and direction has been given to the petitioner to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the opposite party - wife namely Afsana Khatoon as maintenance from the date of filing of the application. 2. The case of the opposite party (i.e. wife), in brief, is that she was married with the petitioner on 02.03.2014 as per Muslim Customs and at the time of her marriage, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in cash and Passion Pro Motorcycle and Other household articles were given by her father and then, she went to her matrimonial home and both of them, i.e. the petitioner and opposite party lived together as husband and wife for about a month. However, they lived in her matrimonial home till 15.10.2014 and they have taken her signature on some blank paper. She further stated that she has no source of income, whereas the respondent is earning Rs. 30,000/- per month from the garage and Rs. 1,00,000/- per year by cultivation and as such, she may be allowed maintenance of 2 Rs. 10,000/- per month. 3. The case of the husband-petitioner, in brief is that the husband-petitioner has divorced his wife i.e. the opposite party on 15.10.2014 at a meeting held at Govindpur in the presence of Mukhia and both the parties and their family members and as a result of understanding and compromise and settlement arrived between the parties. He also stated that the divorce was pronounced to the applicant-opposite party on 15.10.2014 and a
Facts
Talaqnama was prepared and signed by both the parties and by the witnesses and by the Mukhia and she was given Rs. 65,000/- as one time settlement and she has acknowledged the receipt of the same and goods and articles as well as cash. It is stated that both the sides signed the documents and everything had happened in the presence of Mukhia and relatives of both the sides. It is further stated that the case of the applicant-opposite party is governed by Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Act, 1986 and the applicant-opposite party has received the amount as one time settlement amount, Dain Mohar, Iddat etc. including goods and articles given at the time of marriage and hence, this Criminal Revision Application is not maintainable and accordingly, this Application may be dismissed. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Legal Reasoning
scientific research”. We are of the opinion that there is a non-rebuttable presumption that the legislature while making a provision like Section 125 Cr.P.C., to fulfil its constitutional duty in good faith, had always intended to give relief to the woman becoming “wife” under such circumstances. This approach is particularly needed while deciding the issues relating to gender justice. We already have examples of exemplary efforts in this regard. Journey from Shah Bano to Shabana Bano guaranteeing maintenance rights to Muslim women is a classical example. Para-26:- The above Legislative Scheme indicates that Magistrate does not become functus officio after passing an order under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as and when occasion arises the Magistrate exercises the jurisdiction from time to time. By Section 125(5) Cr.P.C., Magistrate is expressly empowered to cancel an order passed under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. on fulfilment of certain conditions. Para-27:- Section 127 Cr.P.C. also discloses the legislative intendment where the Magistrate is empowered to alter an order passed 17 under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Sub-Section (2) of Section 127 Cr.P.C. also empower the Magistrate to cancel or vary an order under Section 125. The Legislative Scheme as delineated by Sections 125 and 127 Cr.P.C. as noted above clearly enumerated the circumstances and incidents provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure where Court passing a judgment or final order disposing the case can alter or review the same. The embargo as contained in Section 362 is, thus, clearly relaxed in proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as indicated above. 35. This Court finds that claim of maintenance has rightly been allowed by the learned Court below. 36. This Court is not looking to the factum of Talaque between the parties as it is a different issue and it cannot be decided here as it is a disputed question of fact. 37. It appears that there is no documentary evidence of the income of the petitioner and hence the quantum of maintenance granted by the petitioner to his wife i.e. opposite party by the petitioner is reduced from Rs. 5,000/- per month to Rs. 4,000/- per month from the date of filing of the application. Arrears of the maintenance amount is directed to be paid within six months failing which the opposite party may take necessary steps in accordance with law for recovery of the arrears of the said amount and the amount paid by the petitioner, if any, may be adjusted. 38. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision No. 988 of 2017 is partly allowed. Kamlesh/ A. F. R. (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Arguments
counsel for the State and learned counsel for the O. P. No. 2. 5. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order passed by the learned Court below is illegal and arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that the learned Court below was swayed by the fact signature of the applicant-opposite party was obtained by the respondent on the blank paper and misused by him. It is further submitted that the learned Court below has failed to consider the Ext.-A, Ext. –B and Ext.-C respectively which were prepared at 3 the time of pronouncement of Talaque, which was accepted by the opposite party. It is submitted that RW-2, Abdul Hamid Ansari is the author of the Talaqnama and his evidence was not considered by the learned Court below. It is further submitted that the petitioner has paid Rs. 65,000/- to the opposite party-wife in presence of the witnesses. It is submitted that evidence of the opposite party and her witnesses are not reliable. It is further submitted that in view of the judgment reported in the case of Mst. Bilkis Begum @ Jahanara Vs Majid Ali Gazi and Another reported in 2002 (3) ACR 2169(SC), JT 2002 (Suppl1) SC115, the case under Section 125 C.P.C. filed by the opposite party is not maintainable and the impugned order dated 07.06.2017 may be set aside and hence, this Criminal Revision may be allowed. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Court below is fit and proper and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that this Criminal Revision Application is devoid of merit. It is submitted that the learned Court below has rightly held that Talaqnama was got prepared by the petitioner on the blank paper, which has been misused by him and his witnesses. It is submitted that since the Talaqnama is disputed and hence, it has rightly been rejected by the learned Court below. It is submitted that the petitioner is working as Motor Mechanic and earning Rs. 30,000/- per month and as such, no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below by giving maintenance of Rs. 5,000/- per month to the opposite party. It is submitted that evidence of RW-1, Md. Kalim Sah and RW.-2, Abdul Hamid Ansari are not reliable and the same cannot relied upon and as such, impugned order passed by the learned Court below is fit and proper and as such, this Criminal Revision may be dismissed. 7. Perused the Lower Court Records and considered the 4 submission of both the sides. 8. It transpires from the records that wife-opposite party had filed a case under Section 125 of the CrPC before the learned Court below on 16.07.2015 in prescribed format and which was admitted on 24.07.2015. 9. It transpires that the petitioner has filed his show cause on 21.12.2015 and had also denied the claim of the opposite party and has taken the defence of pronouncement of Talaque and for one time settlement by paying Rs. 65,000/-, Dain Mohar, Iddat etc. 10. The wife-opposite party got examined herself as witness, who is as follows:- (i) P.W.1- is Afsana Khatoon, i.e. the opposite party herself. 11. However, opposite party has not produced any documents as Exhibits in support of her case. 12. The husband –petitioner got examined two (2) witnesses in support of his case, who are as follows:- (i) R.W.-1 is Md. Kalim Shah i.e. the petitioner himself and (ii) R.W.-2 is Abdul Hamid Ansari. 13. The petitioner, in support of his claim, got marked the following documents on the Exhibits, which are as follows:- (i) Ext.- A is the certificate issued by Mukhia Karmatand, Govindpur, (ii) Ext.-B is the certificate issued by Mukhia Karmatand, Govindpur and (iii) Ext.-I and II are the copy of Talaknama and Xerox copy of affidavit. 14. Apart from this the petitioner got marked following documents for identification as follows:- (i) Document marked as I is Talaqnama prepared by the Mukhia, Gram Panchayt-Karmatand, Bagmara, Dhanbad (ii) Document marked as II is declaration showing signature of both the parties i.e. the petitioner and the opposite party. 15. Thereafter, the learned Court below, after considering the submission of both the sides, had directed the petitioner to pay 5 Rs. 5,000/- per month to the opposite party-wife namely Afsana Khatoon as maintenance amount. 16. So far as oral evidence is concerned, P.W.-1 is Afsana Khatoon, and she stated during her evidence that she was married with the petitioner on 02.03.2014 and lived in her matrimonial home for one month and thereafter her in-laws member started demanded dowry of Rs. 50,000/- and started torturing her for non- fulfillment of the same and they tried to burn her. Thereafter, she called her father and went to her parental home. She has further stated that she is living in her parental home since 15.10.2014 and her father is not able to maintain her, whereas her husband is Mechanic in motor garage and earning Rs. 30,000/- per month and also earning Rs. 1,00,000/- from agriculture and hence, she may be given Rs. 10,000/- as maintenance amount per month. During cross-examination, she denied her signature on the acknowledgement receipt. She further denied her signature on three papers and had denied for not taking divorce by signing the paper on 15.10.2014 and she had not signed on any paper of Talaque. She has denied the suggestion for having put signature on three papers shown before her. 17. Therefore, from the evidence of P.W.-1, it is clear that she was married with the petitioner 02.03.2014 and she left her matrimonial home on 15.10.2014. Although, she is claiming that her husband is earning Rs. 30,000/- per month for working as mechanic in garage and earning Rs. 1,00,000/- per year from the agriculture, but there is no such documentary evidence of his income. 18. R.W.-1 is Md. Kalim Shah i.e. the petitioner himself and who stated during his evidence that he has solemnized marriage with the opposite party- Afsana Khatoon on 02.03.2014, (however, due to typographical error, it has been typed as “02.03.2006”) and 6 at the time of Nikah Rs. 10,000/- was fixed as Mehar and he can file Nikahnama. He further stated that the opposite party had remained in his house for around 10-15 days, but refused to live with her without any reason and she went for her parental home after 15 days. Although, the petitioner tried to bring her several times, but she did not return. He further stated that a panchayati had taken place twice between both the sides and finally on 15.10.2014, both the sides i.e. bride and bridegroom in presence of their relative had assembled before Mukhia of Karmatand Panchayat and 100-150 people were also present and even the father and mother of the wife-opposite party and his brother and mother had also participated and Talaque was pronounced and Talaquenama was written by one Md. Hamid and upon which, both, Mukhia and girl Afsana and her father and other persons had also signed and they were given Mehar (i.e. Dain Mohar) and amount of Iddat to the extent of Rs. 65,000/- and all the articles were returned to the opposite party and list was prepared and all the witnesses including the petitioner and opposite party had signed. He further stated that he is working as Motor mechanic and earning Rs. 200/- per day. 19. During cross-examination, he admitted that in C. P. Case No. 2523 of 2014, the opposite party-Afsana had instituted a case for demand of dowry of Rs. 50,000/- against his father and mother etc. and allegation for taking signature on those papers also. He admitted that the opposite party- Afsana is living in her maike. He had denied the suggestion for having any agricultural land or any having any landed property. He further stated that Talaquenama was signed by the persons of both the sides and also by the Independent witnesses. He denied the suggestion that the opposite party –Afsana and Mukhia had not signed on the Talaquenama and 7 had denied the suggestion for earning Rs. 30,000/- per month and earning Rs. 1,00,000/- per year from the agriculture. 20. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of RW-1, Md. Kalim Shah, it is evident that he is the husband of the opposite party- Afsana and had admitted the marriage with the opposite party, though he has claimed that he had given Talaque to the opposite party on 15.10.2014 in the presence of Mukhia and both the sides and their family members and relatives of both the sides and independent persons. However, the Learned Court below has disbelieved the Talaquenama on the ground of misuse of the papers by the husband-petitioner and by also due to non-examination of author of one Md. Hamid i.e. the person who had allegedly prepared Talaquenama. 21. R.W.-2 is Abdul Hamid Ansari, who stated, during his evidence that Talquenama was prepared on 15.10.2014 and a panchayati was taken place at Fakirdih Basti and in which the petitioner had given divorce to the opposite party as per Muslim Customs and Talaquemana was prepared in the presence of both the sides, which was signed by Lalita Devi and one Kadir Shah and Shariff Shah and others and it was signed by Kalim i.e. the petitioner and also signed by him i.e. R. W.-2. The photocopy of Takaquenama was marked as Mark.-1. He also proved the receipt of Rs. 65,000/- on which Afsana and her father and other witnesses are said to have put their signatures. Thus, this receipt was marked as Ext.-A. He further proved the certificate of Mukhia dated 07.04.2015 and the list prepared, which were marked as Ext.-B and Ext.-C respectively. He has proved the declaration marked as II, which was signed by Kalim and Afsana. 22. During cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the opposite party-Afsana had instituted the case against the petitioner-Kalim and his family members for taking signature on 8 blank paper and doing wrongly. He further admitted that the Mukhia of Fakirdih Panchayat had not put the signature on Talaquenama. He admitted that Talaquenama and receipt can be prepared by anyone. He further admitted that Kalim is Mechanic of Motorcycle, but he is not aware about the garage where he had worked. However, he shown ignorance about the contents of declaration prepared by whom. 23. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of R.W.-2, it is evident that he had proved the documents marked as Ext.-A, Ext.- B and Ext.-C and documents marked as Mark-I and Mark-II. Thus, he has tried to support the case of the petitioner that the Talaquenama was prepared. 24. Learned Court below while passing he impugned order has observed that P.W.-1 had stated during his cross-examination that it does not bear her signature on the Talaqenama. Learned Court below has further correctly observed that even if respondent- petitioner has divorced the opposite party- wife, she cannot be denied the maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. 25. It is well settled from the several judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Muslim Women is entitled to maintenance, even if she has been divorced by her husband. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Bilkis Begum @ Jahanara Versus Majid Ali Gazi and Anr. Reported in JT 2002 (Suppll) SC 115. However, the same is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the law has been settled in the case of Shabana Bano Versus Imran Khan reported in (2010) 1 SCC 666 and in the case of Abhilasha Versus Parkash and Ors. reported in (2021) 13 SCC 99. 9 27. It has been held in the case of Abhilasha Versus Parkash and Ors. reported in (2021) 13 SCC 99, at para 27 to 31, which are as follows:- “Para-27:- Muslim Law also recognises the obligation of father to maintain his daughters until they are married. Referring to Mulla’s Principle of Mohammedan Law, this Court in State of Haryana and Others Vs. Santra (Smt.), (2000) 5 SCC 182 in paragraph 40 held: (SCC p. 196) “40. Similarly, under the Mohammedan Law, a father is bound to maintain his sons until they have attained the age of puberty. He is also bound to maintain his daughters until they are married. [See: Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law (19th Edn.) page 300]” Para-28:- Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is nothing but recognition of principles of Hindu Law regarding maintenance of children and aged parents. Section 20(3) now makes it statutory obligation of a Hindu to maintain his or her daughter, who is unmarried and is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. Para-29:- Section 20 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 cast a statutory obligation on a Hindu to maintain his daughter who is unmarried and unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. As noted above, Hindu Law prior to enactment of Act, 1956 always obliged a Hindu to maintain unmarried daughter, who is unable to maintain herself. The obligation, which is cast on the father to maintain his unmarried daughter, can be enforced by her against her father, if she is unable to maintain herself by enforcing her right under Section 20. Para-30:- We may also notice another judgment of this Court in Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd. Quasim, (1997) 6 SCC 233, which was a case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. A Muslim wife with her two daughters and a son filed an application claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The trial court allowed the maintenance to the wife and children from her husband. The husband after divorcing the wife filed application in the trial court seeking modification of the order in view of the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The trial court modified the order insofar as the grant of maintenance of wife was concerned but maintained the order of maintenance to each of the three minor children. The husband challenged the order by means of revision, which was dismissed by the Revisional Court. An application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed in the High Court. The High Court accepted the claim of husband and relying on provision of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, 1986 held that a Muslim wife is entitled to claim maintenance from her previous husband for her children only for a period of two years from the date of birth of the child concerned. The High Court held that minor children were not entitled for maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. A special leave to appeal was filed judgment. This Court dealing with Section questioning 125 Cr.P.C. as well as Act, 1986 held that effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. This Court held that there is no conflict between the two provisions. the 10 Para-31:- This Court noticed the provisions of Section 3 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and Section 125 Cr.P.C. It is relevant to refer to the following observations made by this Court in paragraph 7 of the above judgment: (Noor Saba Khatoon Case, SCC pp. 238-39) “7. ...Under Section 125, CrPC the maintenance of the children is obligatory on the father (irrespective of his religion) and as long as he is in a position to do so and the children have no independent means of their own, it remains his absolute obligation to provide for them. Insofar as children born of Muslim parents are concerned there is nothing in Section 125 CrPC which exempts a Muslim father from his obligation to maintain the children. These provisions are not affected by Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act and indeed it would be unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even preposterous to deny the benefit of Section 125 CrPC to the children only on the ground that they are born of Muslim parents. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125 CrPC, cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. We do not find manifestation of any such intention in the 1986 Act to take away the to claim maintenance the children independent under Section 125 CrPC where they are minor and are unable to maintain themselves. A Muslim father's obligation, like that of a Hindu father, to maintain his minor children as contained in Section 125 CrPC is absolute and is not at all affected by Section 3 (1)(b) of the 1986 Act.” rights of (emphasis in original) 28. It has been held in the case of Sunita Kachwaha and Others vs Anil Kachwaha reported in 2014 (16) SCC 715 at para 7, 8 and 10 as follows:- “Para-7:- Inability to maintain herself is the pre-condition for grant of maintenance to the wife. The wife must positively aver and prove that she is unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that her husband has sufficient means to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her. In her evidence, the appellant-wife has stated that only due to help of her retired parents and brothers, she is able to maintain herself and her daughters. Where the wife states that she has great hardships in maintaining herself and the daughters, while her husband’s economic condition is quite good, the wife would be entitled to maintenance. Para-8:- The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant-wife is well qualified, having post graduate degree in Geography and working as a teacher in Jabalpur and also working in Health Department. Therefore, she has income of her own and needs 11 no financial support from respondent. In our considered view, merely because the appellant-wife is a qualified post graduate, it would not be sufficient to hold that she is in a position to maintain herself. Insofar as her employment as a teacher in Jabalpur, nothing was placed on record before the Family Court or in the High Court to prove her employment and her earnings. In any event, merely because the wife was earning something, it would not be a ground to reject her claim for maintenance. Para-10:-The impugned order of the High Court dated 26.06.2008 passed in Criminal Revision No. 2303/2007 is set aside and this appeal is allowed. The respondent is directed to pay the maintenance of Rs.3,000/- per month to the appellant-wife as ordered by the Family Court and also pay the arrears of maintenance payable to the appellant-wife within the period of eight weeks.” 29. It has been held in Kalyan Dey Chowdhury Vs Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy reported in 2017 Vol (14) SCC 200 at paragraph 15, as follows:- “Para 15:- The review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC came to be filed by the respondent wife pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court when the earlier order dated 2-2-20152 awarding a maintenance of Rs 16,000 to the respondent wife as well as to her minor son was under challenge before this Court. As pointed out by the High Court, in February 2015, the appellant husband was getting a net salary of Rs 63,842 after deduction of Rs 24,000 on account of GPF and Rs 12,000 towards income tax. In February 2016, the net salary of the appellant is stated to be Rs 95.527. Following Kulbhushan Kumar v. Raj Kumari, in this case, it was held that 25% of the husband's net salary would be just and proper to be awarded as maintenance to the respondent wife. The amount of permanent alimony awarded to the wife must be befitting the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay maintenance. Maintenance is always dependent on the factual situation of the case and the court would be justified in moulding the claim for maintenance passed on various factors. Since in February 2016, the net salary of the husband was Rs 95,000 per month, the High Court was justified in enhancing the maintenance amount. However, since the appellant has also got married second time and has a child from the second marriage, in the interest of justice, we think it proper to reduce the amount of maintenance of Rs 23.000 to Rs 20.000 per month as maintenance to the respondent wife and son. 12 30. It has been held in the case of Dr. Swapan Kumar Banerjee Vs. State of West Bengal and Another reported in 2020 (19) SCC 342, that even a wife who has been divorced on ground of desertion is entitled to claimed maintenance and it has been held at para 5 and 7 which are as follows:- “Para 5. Thereafter, in Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri this Court took a similar view: (SCCP 184, para 11) 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that once a decree for divorce was passed against the respondent and marital relations between the petitioner and the respondent came to an end, the mutual rights. Duties and obligations should also come to an end. He pleaded that in this situation, the obligation of the petitioner to maintain a woman with whom all relations came to an end should also be treated to have come to an end. This plea, as we have already indicated above, cannot be accepted as a woman has two distinct rights for maintenance. As a wife, she is entitled to maintenance unless she suffers from any of the disabilities indicated in Section 125(4). In another capacity, namely, as a divorced woman, she is again entitled to claim maintenance from the person of whom she was once the wife. A woman after divorce becomes a destitute. If she cannot maintain herself or remains unmarried, the man who was once her husband continues to be under a statutory duty and obligation to provide maintenance to her." “Para 7. No doubt, as urged by Mr Debal Banerjee. Explanation II to Section 125 9 CrPC by deeming fiction includes a divorced woman to be a wife and, therefore, a woman who has been divorced by her husband can still claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The question is how we should read the provisions of sub-section (4) in this regard, especially when we deal with those women, against whom a decree for divorce has been obtained on the ground that they have deserted their husband. Once the relationship of marriage comes to an end, the woman obviously is not under any obligation to live with her former husband. The deeming fiction of the divorced wife being treated as a wife can only be read for the limited purpose for grant of maintenance and the deeming fiction cannot be stretched to the illogical extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with the ex- husband. The husband cannot urge that he can divorce his wife on the ground that she has deserted him and then deny maintenance which should otherwise be payable to her on the ground that event after divorce she is not willing to live with him. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of Mr Debal Banerjee.” 31. It has been held in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another reported in 2021 (2) SCC 324 at Para-77, 78, 79, 80, 112 13 and 113, which are as follows:- “Para-77:- The objective of granting interim/permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There is no straitjacket formula for fixing the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. Para-78:- The factors which would weigh with the court inter alia are the status of the parties; reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children; whether the applicant is educated and professionally qualified; whether the applicant has any independent source of income; whether the income is sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home; whether the applicant was employed prior to her marriage; whether she was working during the subsistence of the marriage; whether the wife was required to sacrifice her employment opportunities for nurturing the family, child rearing, and looking after adult members of the family; reasonable costs of litigation for a non-working wife. [ Refer to Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge, Dehradun, (1997) 7 SCC 7; Refer to Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar, (2011) 13 SCC 112 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 290] Para-79:- In Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain [Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain, (2017) 15 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712] this Court held that the financial position of the parents of the applicant wife, would not be material while determining the quantum of maintenance. An order of interim maintenance is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim has no independent income, sufficient for her or his support. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. The court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay for her or his support. Maintenance is dependent upon factual situations; the court should mould the claim for maintenance based on various factors brought before it. Para-80:- On the other hand, the financial capacity of the husband, his actual income, reasonable expenses for his own maintenance, and dependent family members whom he is obliged to maintain under the law, liabilities if any, would be required to be taken into consideration, to arrive at the appropriate quantum of maintenance to be paid. The court must have due regard to the standard of living of the husband, as well as the spiralling inflation rates and high costs of living. The plea of the husband that he does not possess any source of income ipso facto does not absolve him of his moral duty to maintain his wife if he is able- bodied and has educational qualifications. [Reema Salkan v. Sumer Singh Salkan, (2019) 12 SCC 303 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 596 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 339] Para-112:- In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse [Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 51] , the Supreme Court was considering the interpretation of Section 125 CrPC. The Court held : (SCC p. 196, para 13) “13.3. … purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the 14 Court is dealing with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.” Para-113:- It has therefore become necessary to issue directions to bring about uniformity and consistency in the orders passed by all courts, by directing that maintenance be awarded from the date on which the application was made before the court concerned. The right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing the application, since the period during which the maintenance proceedings remained pending is not within the control of the applicant.” 32. It has been held in the case of Shabana Bano Versus Imran Khan reported in (2010) 1 SCC 666 that the Muslim women is also entitled to maintenance under the provisions of Section 125 of CrPC. 33. It has been held in the case of Shabana Bano Versus Imran Khan reported in (2010) 1 SCC 666 at Para- 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are as follows:- “Para-19:- The judgment of this Court in Iqbal Bano v. State of U.P. [(2007) 6 SCC 785 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 258] whereby the provisions contained in Section 125 CrPC have been aptly considered and the relevant portion of the order passed in Iqbal Bano case [(2007) 6 SCC 785 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 258] reads as under: (SCC p. 791, para 10) “10. Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC are civil in nature. Even if the Court noticed that there was a divorced woman in the case in question, it was open to it to treat it as a petition under the Act considering the beneficial nature of the legislation. Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC and claims made under the Act are tried by the same court. In Vijay Kumar Prasad v. State of Bihar [(2004) 5 SCC 196 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1576] it was held that proceedings under Section 125 CrPC are civil in nature. It was noted as follows: (SCC p. 200, para 14) ‘14. The basic distinction between Section 488 of the old Code and Section 126 of the Code is that Section 126 has essentially enlarged the venue of proceedings for maintenance so as to 15 move the place where the wife may be residing on the date of application. The change was thought necessary because of certain observations by the Law Commission, taking note of the fact that often deserted wives are compelled to live with their relatives far away from the place where the husband and wife last resided together. As noted by this Court in several cases, proceedings under Section 125 of the Code are of civil nature. Unlike clauses (b) and (c) of Section 126(1) an application by the father or the mother claiming maintenance has to be filed where the person from whom maintenance is claimed lives.’ ” Para-20:- In the light of the findings already recorded in earlier paras, it is not necessary for us to go into the merits. The point stands well settled which we would like to reiterate. Para-21:- The appellant's petition under Section 125 CrPC would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as the appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 CrPC cannot be restricted for the iddat period only. Para-22:- The learned Single Judge appeared to be little confused with regard to different provisions of the Muslim Act, the Family Act and CrPC and thus was wholly unjustified in rejecting the appellant's revision. Para-23:- Cumulative reading of the relevant portions of the judgments of this Court in Danial Latifi [(2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] and Iqbal Bano [(2007) 6 SCC 785 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 258] would make it crystal clear that even a divorced Muslim woman would be entitled to claim maintenance from her divorced husband, as long as she does not remarry. This being a beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit thereof must accrue to the divorced Muslim women.” 34. It has been held in the case of Sanjeev Kapoor Versus Chandana Kapoor and Ors. reported in 2020 (13) SCC 172 at paragraphs Nos. 23, 26 and 27 as follows:- “Para-23:- Before we proceed to look into the Legislative Scheme of Section 125 Cr.P.C., we need to notice few rules of interpretation of statutes when court is concerned with interpretation of a social justice legislation. Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a social justice legislation which order for maintenance for wives, children and parents. Maintenance of wives, children and parents is a continuous obligation enforced. This Court had 16 occasion to consider the interpretation of Section 125 Cr.P.C. in Badshah versus Urmila Badshah Godse. In paragraphs 13.3 to 18, following has been laid down: (SCC pp. 196-98) “13.3. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society. ……………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………… “18. The court as the interpreter of law is supposed to supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonise results with justice through a method of free decision — libre recherché scientifique i.e. “free