The High Court
Case Details
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(Cr.) No.314 of 2011 ---- Ram Kumar Singh son of Sri Rajendra Prasad Singh, Resident of Flat No.401 Shyam Kunj Kali Mandir Road, PO PS Lalpur, Dist. Ranchi. … Petitioner -versus- The State of Jharkhand through CBI … Respondent ---- WITH W.P.(Cr.) No.217 of 2012 ---- Naresh Kumar Singh son of Shri Siya Lal Mandal, resident of Bandhu Nagar, PO Hinoo, PS Doranda, Town and District Ranchi. … Petitioner -versus- 1. The Central Bureau of Investigation through the Superintendent of Police (CBI), Ranchi having Office at Near Kuchery, PO GPO, PS Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi. 2. The Superintendent of Police (CBI), ACB, Ranchi, Office at Near Kuchery, PO GPO, PS Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi. … Respondents ---- WITH Cr. M.P. No.1415 of 2012 ---- Manauwar Alam son of Sri Gulam Murtza Ansari, resident of village Joda Talab, Bariatu, PO PS Bariatu, District Ranchi. … Petitioner -versus- Central Bureau of Investigation ---- WITH Cr. M.P. No.3219 of 2013 ---- … Opposite Party Ajay Shekhar S/o Sri Sita Ram Jaiswal, resident of Sahu Nagar, Madhukam, Ratu Road, PO PS Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi. … Petitioner -versus- The State of Jharkhand through Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) … Opposite Party ---- 2 WITH Cr. M.P. No.2857 of 2013 ---- Durganand Minz son of late Birsa Minz, resident of village Murgu, Chaily Toli, PO PS Sisai, District Gumla. … Petitioner -versus- State of Jharkhand through CBI ---- WITH Cr. M.P. No.1153 of 2012 ---- … Opposite Party Umesh Prasad Singh son of Late Jugeshwar Prasad Singh, resident of Devi Mandap Road, Ratu Road, PO Hehal, PS Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi. … Petitioner -versus- The State of Jharkhand through S.P., C.B.I. … Opposite Party ---- CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANDA SEN ---- For the Petitioners : Mr. Sidhartha Ranjan, Advocate Ms. Shipra Shalini, Advocate Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate Ms. Shilpi Sandil Gadodia, Advocate Mr. Ritesh Kumar Gupta, Advocate Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, Advocate Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha, Advocate Mr. Akshansh Kishore, Advocate For the Respondents/ Opp. Party : Mr. R.N. Singh, Sr. P.P. Mr. Priyanshu Singh, Sr. P.P. Mr. Aditya Raman, AC to GA III Mr. Shambhu Nath Singh, Advocate Mr. Jitendra Sharma, Advocate ---- O R D E R RESERVED ON 13.10.2022 [In W.P.(Cr.) No.314 of 2011, W.P.(Cr.) No.217 of 2012, Cr. M.P. No.1415 of 2012, Cr. M.P. No.3219 of 2013] RESERVED ON 20.10.2022 [In Cr. M.P. No. 2857 of 2013] RESERVED ON 25.11.2022 Cr. M.P. No.1153 of 2012] PRONOUNCED ON 05.05.2023 1. W.P.(Cr.) No.314 of 2011 has been filed by petitioner, Ram Kumar Singh, who was the Town Planner of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; W.P.(Cr.) No. 217 of 2012 has been filed by petitioner Naresh 3 Kumar Singh, who was the Junior Engineer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; Cr. M.P. No.1415 of 2012 has been filed by petitioner Manauwar Alam, who was the Vigilance Officer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; Cr. M.P. No.3219 of 2013 has been filed by petitioner Ajay Sekhar, who was the Estate Officer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; and Cr. M.P. 2857 of 2013 has been filed by petitioner Durga Nand Minz, who was the then Town Planner of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; and Cr. M.P. No.1153 of 2012 has been filed by petitioner, Umesh Prasad Singh, who was the then Head Assistant, Ranchi Regional Development Authority. W.P.(Cr.) No.314 of 2011, W.P.(Cr.) No.217 of 2012, Cr. M.P. No.1415 of 2012, Cr. M.P. No.3219 of 2013, Cr. M.P. No.2857 of 2013 AND Cr. M.P. No.1153 of 2012 2. In all these applications, which have been filed either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a common prayer has been made to quash the order dated 25.10.2011 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in RC 03 (A)/2011-R, whereby the Court took cognizance of offence under Sections 120B read with Sections 420, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 52 of the Jharkhand Regional Development Authority Act, 2001 and Section 82 of the Registration Act, 1908 and thereafter summoned the petitioners. A prayer has also been made to quash the entire criminal proceeding pending against the petitioners in the aforementioned criminal case. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of each of the petitioners submitted that the order taking cognizance and issuing summons is a composite order, passed without any application of judicial mind. It is their case that without undertaking an exercise as to whether any of the penal provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act or under the Indian Penal Code or the other alleged penal provisions can at all be attracted qua the petitioners, the said order has been passed. It is submitted that the petitioners being the officials of the Ranchi Regional Development Authority, at best, if at all any case is made out, the same can be of laches in performing their official duty, which, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be an act with a criminal intent. An act to come within the purview of a criminal act, must fulfill the provisions of the Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act or any Penal Law, which in this instant case is missing. He further submits that the main co-accused namely, M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and its director, 4 Binay Prakash approached this Court by filing W.P.(Cr.) No.319 of 2011, challenging the same composite order taking cognizance and issuing summons. The said writ petition was heard by a Bench of this Court and ultimately the order dated 25.10.2011, which is the subject matter of these applications, was quashed. It is submitted that the case of the petitioners stand on a much better footing to that of Binay Prakash & M/s Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. as there is an allegation that Binay Prakash and M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd., in connivance with these petitioners, got the building plan and map sanctioned by furnishing wrong information. Be it noted that the building plan and the map was to be sanctioned in favour of M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash. When the case of M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash has been quashed, criminal proceeding against these petitioners on the allegations made therein is bound to be
Legal Reasoning
quashed. Further, their case is that the aforesaid order passed by this Court in the writ petition being W.P.(Cr.) No.319 of 2011 was tested by the Central Bureau of Investigation before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Crl. M.P. No(s). 12927 of 2016, which was also dismissed. Since the order passed in W.P.(Cr.) No.319 of 2011 attained finality and these applications arise out of same order and on the same facts, the petitioners case being on better footing than that of M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash, also need to be allowed. 4. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation submitted that building plan was sanctioned by the officials of Ranchi Regional Development Authority (petitioners) with a fraudulent intention, in connivance with M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and its Director Binay Prakash. He submits that Binay Prakash connived with these officials and got the building plan of his building sanctioned giving wrong description of plot numbers and also without leaving proper setbacks. Even the plot numbers were wrongly mentioned in the application, which was not properly scrutinized by these petitioners and with connivance and to give undue and illegal benefits to said Binay Prakash, building plan was sanctioned. Counsel for the Central Bureau of Investigation further argued that a public interest litigation being W.P.(PIL) No. 1531 of 2011 seeking for a direction to remove illegal and unauthorised constructions of one Chandralok Apartment was filed and this Court, taking notice of the fact that the authorities have turned blind to the deviations and are illegally sanctioning the maps, observed that without tacit consent of authorities and persons placed in high offices, these illegalities cannot be committed, thus, directed the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate into such cases. On such direction, First Information Report was 5 registered at the instance of the Registrar General of the High Court and investigation was taken up. The Central Bureau of Investigation, after completing the investigation submitted charge sheet on the accusation that the applicant Binay Prakash had submitted a plan vide B.C. No.706 of 2004 for getting it sanctioned for construction of commercial building over plot No.1735 and 1736 having specification of B+G+6. Upon the plan being sanctioned, Binay Prakash took up the construction work and proceeded with the construction considerably. Subsequently, a revised plan was submitted by him for construction of a building to be used as hotel and some shops having B+G+6 structure. Upon submission of the plan on both the occasions it had been pointed out that the applicant Binay Prakash does not hold clear title over plot No.1735 and hence, the plan be sanctioned over the land bearing plot No.1736 but the R.R.D.A. authority by overlooking the same, sanctioned the plan on both the occasions ignoring the issues raised regarding ownership of plot No.1735 which according to the Ranchi Municipal Corporation belonged to them over which a road and drainage were passing through. It was further found that there were several discrepancies in plot numbers and even several anomalies and irregularities were found in the sanctioned plan and the forwarding letters, which would suggest that in place of actual plot numbers, old plot numbers were mentioned. Thus, the case stands proved against these petitioners for which, after filing of the chargesheet, the Court took cognizance of the offence and issued summons to these petitioners. 5. In all these cases, the order taking cognizance and the summoning order is under challenge. I find that by order dated 25.10.2011, the Special Judge, CBI took cognizance of offence under Sections 120B read with Sections 420, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 52 of the Jharkhand Regional Development Authority Act, 2001 and Section 82 of the Registration Act, 1908 and thereafter summons have been issued to the petitioners to face trial. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Lalankumar Singh & Ors. versus State of Maharashtra [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383] has held that the order issuing process is not an empty formality. The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the case or not. The formation of such an opinion is required to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reasons are given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the accused. No doubt, that the order need not contain 6 detailed reasons. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also referred paragraphs 51, 52 and 53 of an earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal versus Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2015) 4 SCC 609. It is necessary to quote paragraph 38 of the said judgment in the case of Lalan Kumar Singh (supra), which reads as under: - 38. The order of issuance of process is not an empty formality. The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the case or not. The formation of such an opinion is required to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reasons are given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the accused. No doubt, that the order need not contain detailed reasons. A reference in this respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, which reads thus: 51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused. 52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into court merely because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be refused merely because he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction. 53. However, the words “sufficient ground for proceeding” appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation 7 of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect. 7. Further, while taking cognizance against an offence, the Court has to also see whether the offences, which are mentioned therein actually attract on the facts of the case or not. Merely reproducing the words of any penal Sections without any factual background to attract these Sections, cannot be a ground to take cognizance of the penal Sections mentioned in the Chargesheet. The penal provisions should have factual backing, which would constitute the said offence or any offence. This fact has to be scrutinized by the Magistrate. This exercise is not a mere formality, but is a sacrosanct duty of the Magistrate. 8. It is also a well settled principle that from bare perusal of a First Information Report or the complaint, if prima facie an offence is made out, then the order taking cognizance cannot be quashed. Court has to take cognizance of an offence after perusing the First Information Report, police papers and the Chargesheet and come to an independent conclusion whether any offence is made out or not. Only after taking cognizance of offence the Court can issue summons. It is not necessary that when cognizance of an offence is taken, summons against all the named accused have to be issued, rather only if there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, the Magistrate can issue such summons against such accused persons. To arrive at the said conclusion, a Magistrate has to form an opinion that there are sufficient materials against the accused to proceed. These sufficient materials should be derived from the police papers and the first information report. There may be a situation when from the record, it would be evident that there are no sufficient materials to proceed against one or some of the accused, though an offence, in general, is made out. In such situation, summons cannot be issued against all, rather should be issued against those accused against whom there are sufficient materials to proceed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. versus Neeta Bhalla and another reported in (2005) 8 SCC 89 at paragraph 5 thereof has held as under:- 5. Section 203 of the Code empowers a Magistrate to dismiss a complaint without even issuing a process. It uses the words “after considering” and “the 8 Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding”. These words suggest that the Magistrate has to apply his mind to a complaint at the initial stage itself and see whether a case is made out against the accused persons before issuing process to them on the basis of the complaint. For applying his mind and forming an opinion as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding, a complaint must make out a prima facie case to proceed. This, in other words, means that a complaint must contain material to enable the magistrate to make up his mind for issuing process. If this were not the requirement, consequences could be far-reaching. If a Magistrate had to issue process in every case, the burden of work before the Magistrate as well as the harassment caused to the respondents to whom process is issued would be tremendous. Even Section 204 of the Code starts with the words “if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground of proceeding”. The words “sufficient ground for proceeding” again suggest that ground should be made out in the complaint for proceeding against the respondent. It is settled law that at the time of issuing of the process the Magistrate is required to see only the allegations in the complaint and where allegations in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute an offence against a person, the complaint is liable to be dismissed. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust versus M/s India Infoline Limited, reported in 2013 (4) SCC 505 has held that before issuing summons, the Court has to record its satisfaction that prima facie case is made out against the accused. According to this Court, this is the satisfaction as envisaged under Section 204 Cr.P.C. and not under Section 190 Cr.P.C. This satisfaction has to be recorded only for the purpose of issuing process. The Magistrate has to see whether there are any materials to proceed against the accused person. Consideration for taking cognizance is different from that of issuing process. One is directed towards the offence and the other is towards the person. This cannot be mixed, even if a composite order is passed. 9 10. In the case of Pepsi Food Limited and Another versus Special Judicial Magistrate & Others reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749 at paragraph 28 thereof has observed as follows:- 28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 11. Further, this Court in the case of Amresh Kumar Dhiraj & Ors. versus State of Jharkhand & Anr., reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 2775, considering all the aforesaid judgments, has held that the order taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and order issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., can be a composite order but as observed, the degree of application of mind would be different in both cases. This application of mind must also be reflected in the order itself. The order should not be mechanical. Magistrate has to mention at least that there are sufficient materials to proceed against the persons and what are the prima-facie materials to proceed against them. He need not pass a detail judgment evaluating the materials, which are before him. The detail reasons as to why he is taking cognizance or issuing process are not to be mentioned but at least what are the bare minimum prima-facie materials against the accused-petitioners should be mentioned in the order issuing summon and prima facie what offence is alleged, in the order taking cognizance. 10 12. This Court, in the case of Amresh Kumar Dhiraj & Ors. versus State of Jharkhand & Anr., reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 2775, at paragraph 17 thereof, has also held as under:- 17. The question is, when can a process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. be issued? It does not mean that if cognizance of an offence is taken, the Magistrate has to issue summon against all the named accused persons in the complaint or FIR. This is not what Section 204 Cr.P.C. envisages. As per the provision of Section 204 Cr.P.C. only if there is sufficient ground to proceed, then only the Magistrate has to proceed. As the proceeding is against a person/accused, the Magistrate has to form an opinion that there are sufficient materials against the accused to proceed. There may be situation when from the records it would be evident that there are no sufficient materials to proceed against some of the accused persons, though in general an offence is made out. If this would be the situation, then summons cannot be issued against all the accused, rather it should be issued only against those accused persons against whom there are sufficient materials to proceed. 13. In the case of State of Haryana & Others versus Bhajan Lal & Others, reported in 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for exercising inherent powers to quash a First Information Report. After discussing the law and the several judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 102 of the said judgment has laid down the following principles when an FIR can be quashed: - (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in 11 support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 14. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court is entitled to exercise its inherent jurisdiction for quashing the criminal procedure or a First Information Report, when the allegations made in the First Information Report do not disclose commission of a cognizable offence. Whether a First Information Report has to be quashed or not depends on particular facts of each case. 15. Further, in the case of Prashant Bharti versus State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 22, while referring to the case of Rajiv Thapar & Others versus Madan Lal Kapoor reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330 has quoted paragraphs 30 to 30.5 wherein the Supreme Court has delineated the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing the criminal proceeding raised by an accused by invoking the power vested under Section 482 of the Code: - 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing 12 raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution / complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/ complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the Court and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. 16. In the case of Union of India versus Prakash P. Hinduja & Another reported in (2003) 6 SCC 195, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after considering the judgments, including the judgment of Bhajan Lal (supra) has held that Section 482 of the Code can be exercised to quash the criminal proceeding in following cases: - 1. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; 2. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission 13 of any offence and make out a case against the accused 3. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Act concerned to the institution and continuance of the proceedings. But this power has to be exercised in a rare case and with great circumspection. 17. In the case of Rupan Deol Bajaj (MRS) & Another versus K.P.S. Gill & Another, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 194, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 23, has observed and held that:- “…………….. – the settled principle of law that at the stage of quashing an FIR or complaint the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein…..” 18. Similarly, in the case of Rajesh Bajaj versus State (NCT of Delhi) & Others, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259, at paragraph 9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - 9. It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal the Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in the aforesaid decisions are a sound reminder (SCC p. 379, para 103) “103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal 14 proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not counter an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice” 19. In the case of Medchi Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. versus Biological E Ltd. & Others reported in (2000) 3 SCC 269, in paragraph 2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 2. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated 16 as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. With the lodgement of first information report the ball is set to roll and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. In the event, however, the court on a perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint or charge- sheet on the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise up to the expectation of the people and deal with the situation as is required under the law. Frustrated litigants ought not to be indulged to give vent to their vindictiveness through a legal process and such an investigation ought not to be allowed to be continued since the same is opposed to the concept of justice, which is paramount. 20. From the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which has been cited hereinabove, it is clear that an FIR can be quashed invoking inherent jurisdiction, if the allegations made in the First Information Report taken at their face value do not constitute the offence as alleged. Further, it is also clear that this power has to be exercised very sparingly. At the stage of quashing an FIR or complaint the High Court is not justified in embarking upon 15 an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein, nor can weigh the allegations, neither shift the burden. The statements made in the FIR have to be taken on their face value and accepting those statements to be true, the Court has to judge as to whether any offence, as alleged, is made out or not. If on the face value, an offence is made out, the FIR cannot be quashed. This means that if an offence, or an offence, as alleged, is not made out from bare perusal of the FIR, the FIR can be quashed to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. 21. Now, considering the aforesaid principles as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has to be seen as to whether composite order of cognizance and summoning can be sustained or not. 22. Impugned order dated 25.10.2011 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in RC 03 (A)/2011-R reads as follows:- R.C.03(A)/2011-R State V/s. Ajay Sekhar and others 25/10/11 Received final form vide memo no.5566/ 3/03(A)/2011(R) dated 24.10.2011 submitted by the Head of Branch, CBI, ACB, Ranchi against the accused persons namely 1. Ajay Sekhar 2. Manauwar Alam 3. Ram Kumar Singh 4. Shankar Prasad 5. Naresh Kumar Singh 6. Durga Nand Minz. 7. Umesh Prasad Singh 8. Binay Prakash and 9. M/s Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. u/s 120B r/w 420, 468 of IPC & section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and Sec. 52 of JRDA Act 2001 and accused persons namely 1. Surendra Nath Mandilwar 2. Ram Kumar Singh Bibhuti Bhushan Prasad Amar 4. Vijay Kumar Singh and M/s Aroma Construction (P) Ltd., Ranchi (A Pvt. Limited Company) u/s 120B r/w 420, 468, 471 of IPC & section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and Sec. 52 of JRDA Act 2001 and Sec. 82 of the Registration Act, 1908 along with the sanction order, list of witness, list of documents and case diary. Perused the case record as well as case diary and the documents on the record. Necessary sanction order for prosecution against the above named accused persons, who are Govt. employees granted by the competent authority is on record. On the basis of material available on record I find that a prima facie case is made out for taking cognizance for the offence u/s 120B r/w 420, 468 of IPC & section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 16 and Sec. 52 of JRDA Act 2001 and u/s 120B r/w 420, 468, 471 of IPC & Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and Sec. 52 of JRDA Act 2001 and Sec. 82 of the Registration Act, 1908. Accordingly cognizance for the offence u/s 120B r/w 420, 468 of IPC & section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and Sec. 52 of JRDA Act 2001 and u/s 120B r/w 420, 468, 471 of IPC & section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and Sec. 52 of JRDA Act 2001 and Sec. 82 of the Registration Act, 1908 is taken against the accused persons namely 1. Ajay Sekhar 2. Manauwar Alam 3. Ram Kumar Singh 4. Shankar Prasad 5. Naresh Kumar Singh 6 Durga Nand Minz 7. Umesh Prasad Singh 8. Binay Prakash and 9. M/s Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and accused persons namely 1. Surendra Nath Mandilwar 2. Ram Kumar Singh Bibhuti Bhshan Prasad Amar 4. Vijay Kumar Singh and M/s Aroma Construction (P) Ltd., Ranchi (A Pvt Limited Company) respectively. It has been further prayed that further investigation as per the provision of Sect. 173(8) of Cr.P.C. may kindly be allowed in this case. Prayer is allowed and issue summon to the accused persons. Put up on the date fixed as on 14/11/2011 for appearance. 23. Criminal case was set on motion on a written complaint of the Registrar General of this Court to the Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation, Ranchi, pursuant to the order passed by this Court in W.P.(PIL) No. 1531 of 2011. The said letter indicates that the Court had taken judicial notice of rampant unauthorized constructions being made in the city of Ranchi by making deviations from sanctioned plan. It has been further mentioned that ignoring the byelaws and planning standards of Ranchi Regional Development Authority, rampant constructions are being made. The authorities are duty bound to scrutinize the plans in terms of guidelines and byelaws and they are supposed to ensure strict compliance of the same. The letter further indicates that during last 10 (ten) years plan for 1574 multi-storied buildings were sanctioned, but only 64 completion certificates were received. There are numerous unauthorized construction cases initiated, which suggests that there is rampant violation of the byelaws and the authorities have deliberately and intentionally failed to prevent such rampant illegal constructions. The parking spaces have been converted to commercial spaces 17 for which there was no sanction, thus, there is encroachment at the instance of builders and others. There are instances of re-sanctioning of plans by the authorities, which perfectly sought to legalise wrong doings. By referring to two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Priyanka Estates International (P) Ltd. & Others versus The State of Assam & Others [(2010) 2 SCC 27] and in the case of Dr. G.N. Khajuria and others versus Delhi Development Authority & Others [(1995) 5 SCC 762], the Registrar General informed that the persons and officers, who have misused the powers, should be properly punished. On the aforesaid facts, the Registrar General wrote to the Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation that the erring builders and the influential persons and the officers should be punished for offences punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 420 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Sections 52 and / or 55 of the JRDA Act. Thus, a direction was given to institute a First Information Report. On the aforesaid complaint, the instant First Information Report was lodged. 24. From the statements made above in the First Information Report, I find that there is no specific allegation against any of these petitioners. These petitioners are Ram Kumar Singh [W.P.(Cr.) No.314 of 2011] who was the Town Planner of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; Naresh Kumar Singh [W.P.(Cr.) No. 217 of 2012], who was the Junior Engineer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; Manauwar Alam [Cr. M.P. No.1415 of 2012], who was the Vigilance Officer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; Ajay Sekhar [Cr. M.P. No.3219 of 2013], who was the Estate Officer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority; and Durga Nand Minz [Cr. M.P. 2857 of 2013], who was the Town Planner of Ranchi Regional Development Authority and Umesh Prasad Singh (Cr. M.P. No.1153 of 2012), who was the Head Assistant of Ranchi Regional Development Authority. Thus, they have been proceeded against. After the First Information Report was registered, the Central Bureau of Investigation investigated the case and filed chargesheet. 25. In this case, during investigation, it was found that on 02.06.2004, an application vide BC 706/04 for obtaining building construction permit for a commercial apartment on the plot Nos. MS(Municipal Survey) 1735 and 1736 under PS 199 Village Chadri was submitted in the name of Shri Binay Prakash & Others S/o Shri Ram Chandra Prasad, Booty Road, Bariatu. The two plots were shown to comprise 0.661 acres, i.e., 66.1 decimals. It was further found 18 that on 15.09.2008, Shri Binay Prakash submitted a revised building plan vide BC Case No.1103/08 for getting permission of construction of a Hotel and Commercial Apartment. In the application it was mentioned that earlier plan was sanctioned vide BC Case No.706/04. The application was again made for the plot No.1735 and 1736. At the time of acceptance of the application, it was reported by the Legal Section of the RRDA in a prescribed format that there was a UC Case vide No.351/06, which was instituted on receipt of complaint regarding unauthorized construction and subsequent verification by the RRDA officials, is pending in the RRDA. It was further found that on 18.10.2008 the file of BC 706/04 was attached with the file of BC 1103/08. It was further found that during process of the plan, the RRDA’s Advocate opined that the plan should be passed for plot No.1736 only, but, the plan was sanctioned giving benefit of the plot No.1735 also. As per the records and as per the verification reports submitted by the JE, RRDA on 28.06.2005 and 25.11.2006, it was disclosed that there was a road on the plot No.1735, which used to be maintained by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation. Hence, according to the Bye Laws, Front Set Back should have been calculated in place of Side Setback. But, Shri Naresh Kumar, Junior Engineer in the Calculation Sheet, did not consider the Plot No.1735 as road and hence, calculated side set back. In the plan, the side set back has been shown as 4 and 4.2 Meters. If front setback would have been calculated, it would have come to 7 meters and 4.5 meters. Thus, the public servants posted at relevant points of time extended undue benefit to the private persons Shri Binay Prakash and Others and M/s Ashlesha Corporation Ltd., Ranchi. 26. So far as the petitioners are concerned, allegations against each of them have been specifically summarized by the Investigating Officer in the chargesheet. For better appreciation, I am quoting the specific overt acts, which surfaced after investigation against each of these petitioners, which has been mentioned in the chargesheet, which is as under: - Ram Kumar Singh [W.P.(Cr.) No.314 of 2011], Town Planner of Ranchi Regional Development Authority : While working in the capacity of Town Planner Shri Ram Kumar Singh was supposed to properly check the building plans and forward the same to the Vice Chairman for his approval. In the matter of BC 1103/08, he overlooked the fact that there was a UC case pending vide UC 351/06. He also overlooked the fact that, RRDAs advocate has given clear opinion that the plan could have been passed on the plot number 1736, but he in pursuance to the criminal conspiracy ignored the fact that, there was a road on the plot number 1735 and as such front set back should have been calculated on that side, but side setback was calculated 19 giving the benefit of the plot number 1735 to the builder. Further, there was a clear cut opinion of the RRDAs advocate that the plan can be sanctioned on the plot number 1736 and not on 1735, but in criminal conspiracy with others and in strict abuse of his official position, he dishonestly and fraudulently gave benefit of the plot number 1735 to the builder. He also deliberately overlooked the verification report available in the file of BC 706/04, which revealed that the plot No.1735 was a road. Naresh Kumar Singh [W.P.(Cr.) No. 217 of 2012] Junior Engineer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority: While working in the capacity of Junior Engineer Shri Naresh Kumar Singh was supposed to properly check the building plans, prepare from C and Check list. In the matter of BC 706/04, there was a clear cut opinion of the RRDAs advocate that the plan can be sanctioned on the plot number 1736 and not on 1735, but he in criminal conspiracy with others and in strict abuse of his Official position, dishonestly and fraudulently gave benefit of the plot number 1735 to the builder. He deliberately overlooked the facts mentioned in the Sale Deed submitted by the builder, which showed that plot number 1735 was road. Again in the matter of BC 1103/08 also he prepared the Form C and Check List and even after the clear cut opinion of the RRDAs’ Advocate gave benefit of the plot No.1735 to the builder, which is evident from the setback provided in the north. Manauwar Alam [Cr. M.P. No.1415 of 2012], the Vigilance Officer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority: While working in the capacity of Vigilance Officer, Shri Manauwar Alam was supposed to give opinion on the ownership of land. It was on record that, there was a UC Case pending. The opinion of advocate of the RRDA was also on record that the plan could have been passed on plot Number 1736 only and not on 1735. Even though, there was a clear cut opinion of the RRDAs advocate that the plan can be sanctioned on the plot number 1736 and not on 1735, but, in criminal conspiracy with others and in strict abuse of his Official position, he dishonestly and fraudulently gave benefit of the plot number 1735 to the builder. On the plan only plot number 1736 was mentioned whereas on the forwarding letter plot number 1735 was also fraudulently included. Shri M. Alam who had opined about the ownership of land, had signed on the plan of BC 1103/08 as well as on the forwarding letter to extend undue benefit to the builder. Consequent upon the favour shown by the public servants, the area of the plot number 1735 was illegally covered by M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. Ajay Sekhar [Cr. M.P. No.3219 of 2013] the Estate Officer of Ranchi Regional Development Authority: While working in the capacity of Estate Officer, Shri Ajay Sekhar was supposed to give opinion on the ownership of land. The opinion of advocate of the RRDA was on record that the plan could have been passed on plot Number 1736 only and not on 1735. Even though, there was a clear cut opinion of the RRDAs advocate that the plan can be sanctioned on the plot number 1736 and not on 1735, but, in criminal conspiracy with others 20 and in strict abuse of his Official position, he dishonestly and fraudulently gave benefit of the plot number 1735 to the builder. On the plan only plot number 1736 was mentioned whereas on the forwarding letter plot number 1735 was also fraudulently included. Shri Ajay Shekhar had signed on the plan of BC 706/04 as well as on the forwarding letter in which plot number 1735 was dishonestly and fraudulently mentioned to extend undue benefit to the builder. Consequent upon the favour shown by the public servants, the area of the plot number 1735 was illegally covered by M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. Durga Nand Minz [Cr. M.P. 2857 of 2013], the then Town Planner of Ranchi Regional Development Authority: While working in the capacity of Town Planner Shri Durga Nand Minz was supposed to properly check the building plans and forward the same to the Vice Chairman for his approval. In the matter of BC 706/04, there was a clear cut opinion of the RRDAs advocate that the plan can be sanctioned on the plot number 1736 and not on 1735, but he in criminal conspiracy with others and in strict abuse of his Official position, dishonestly and fraudulently gave benefit of the plot number 1735 to the builder. He deliberately overlooked the facts mentioned in the Sale Deed submitted by the builder, which showed that plot number 1735 was road. Umesh Prasad Singh [Cr. M.P. 1153 of 2012], the then Head Assistant, RRDA, Ranchi: While working in the capacity of Head Assistant, Shri Umesh Prasad Singh put up the forwarding letters in BC 706/04 and 1103/08. It was clearly brought on record that the plan can be passed on plot no. MS 1736 and not on 1735, but Shri Umesh Kumar in criminal conspiracy with others and strict abuse of his Official position and in a dishonest and fraudulent manner included the plot number 1735 in both the forwarding letters issued with the plan of BC 706/04 and 1103/08 to extend undue favour to the private individuals. 27. From the aforesaid charges mentioned in the chargesheet, it is clear that there is an allegation that the petitioners connived with M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash for passing the building plan illegally and dishonestly, thus, they have fraudulently and dishonestly given benefit to the said company and Binay Prakash. 28. From the aforesaid charges, I find that though the terms “criminal conspiracy” and “dishonestly and fraudulently” have been mentioned, but, there is nothing to suggest the manner of criminal conspiracy or dishonest or fraudulent acts. 29. From the First Information Report, one can understand that the First Information Report is being instituted under Sections 120B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 52 and/or 55 of the Jharkhand Regional Development Authority Act, 2001. 21 30. A single Bench of this Court considered the similar issue arising from the same First Information Report so far as it related to M/s Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash has held that no criminal offence is made out and thereby quashed the proceeding. Be it noted that the allegation is that these petitioners extended undue illegal benefit fraudulently to M/s Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash. There is also an allegation that these petitioners hatched criminal conspiracy with M/s Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash. When this Court has held that on the same charge, criminal case against M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash has been quashed and when the said order has not been interfered with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, nothing much remains to proceed against these petitioners also. When a Single Bench of this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid allegation does not make out any offence so far as Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. and Binay Prakash are concerned, automatically then, for the same transaction, the allegation of criminal conspiracy and fraudulent acts by these petitioners, will also fail. Quashing of the case against Binay Prakash and his company means that there is no material to suggest conspiracy, dishonesty and fraud. If no criminal conspiracy, fraud and dishonesty has been committed by Binay Prakash and M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd., then, there cannot be a criminal proceeding against these petitioners for helping Binay Prakash and M/s. Ashlesha Corporation Ltd. in commission of such fraud or illegality. 31. The allegation for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act also fails, as because in W.P.(Cr.) No.319 of 2011, considering in detail all the aspects of this case, a Single Bench of this Court has quashed the proceedings. When the main accused, who allegedly had got the benefit and allegedly for whom some illegal acts were done, has got the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by this Court and the same having been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the allegations for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act against these petitioners, who are allegedly the conspirators along with the main accused, also cannot sustain. 32. So far as criminal misconduct is concerned, there is nothing in the chargesheet that what is the nature of misconduct these petitioners have committed. There may be negligence on their part in discharging their official duty, but every negligence cannot be said to be a criminal act. There has to be a particular criminality attached with a particular act, which has not been highlighted in the entire chargesheet against these petitioners. Merely, incorporating the words “dishonestly and fraudulently” and “criminal 22 conspiracy” will not make the entire act or transaction a criminal act. There has to be foundational factual allegations, which are definitely missing in this case. 33. Further, from the order taking cognizance and issuing summons, I find that same is absolutely cryptic and vague and in the teeth of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases as referred to hereinbefore. Bare minimum reasoning has not been given as to what are the materials to issue summons against these petitioners. Even if I take the pain to go through the chargesheet and find out what are the materials against these petitioners, I find that the overt act alleged can, at best, be said to be a negligence or may be an act which can call for a disciplinary proceeding for ignoring the laws, but, there is nothing to suggest that the same was done with criminal intent or was done in exchange of any illegal gratification or benefit. There is nothing in the chargesheet that there was any illegal gratification or there was any criminal intent save and except putting the words “criminal conspiracy” and “fraudulently and dishonestly”. 34. Considering the aforesaid facts, especially, the judgment of this Court in W.P.(Cr.) No.319 of 2011, arising from the same order and same First Information Report, wherein considering all the aspects in detail against the main accused, a Single Bench of this Court has quashed the proceedings qua the main accused, I am inclined to allow all these applications. Accordingly, the order dated 25.10.2011 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in RC 03 (A)/2011-R, so far as it relates to the petitioners herein, is hereby quashed. 35. 36. All these applications, accordingly, stand allowed. In view of the final order allowing all these applications, interlocutory applications, viz. I.A. No.536 of 2018, I.A. No.1987 of 2011, I.A. No.2090 of 2011, I.A. No.2520 of 2021 & I.A. No.6640 of 2018 in W.P.(Cr.) No.314 of 2011; I.A. No.1097 of 2018, I.A. No.2539 of 2021, I.A. No.5062 of 2018 & I.A. No.6867 of 2018 in W.P.(Cr.) No. 217 of 2012; I.A. No. 6967 of 2018 & I.A. No.9710 of 2017 in Cr. M.P. No.1415 of 2012; and I.A. No. 5119 of 2018 & I.A. No.7368 of 2017 in Cr. M.P. No.3219 of 2013 and I.A. No.10476 of
Decision
2022 in Cr. M.P. No.1153 of 2012 also stand disposed of. Kumar/Cp-03 (Ananda Sen, J.)