The High Court
Case Details
1 W.P. (Cr.) No. 54 of 2009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (Cr.) No. 54 of 2009 Birendra Singh … Petitioner -Versus- 1. 2. State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi The Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi The Director General of Police, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi 3. 4. Deputy Inspector General, S.P. Range, Bokaro 5. 6. Superintendent of Police, Bokaro Shri Anand Mohan Singh, Officer-in-Charge, Bermo Police Station, District- Bokaro … Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI ----- For the Petitioner For the State For Respondent No.6 ----- : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate : Mr. Deepak Kumar Dubey, A.C. to A.A.G.-II : Mr. Aashish Kumar, Advocate ----- 42/21.08.2023 Heard Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Deepak Kumar Dubey, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Aashish Kumar, learned counsel for respondent no.6. 2. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner confines his prayer to the extent of violation of reputation, right to life and privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and harassment by the police and for compensation to the petitioner. So far as other prayers
Decision
made in the writ petition is concerned, by way of passage of time they have become infructuous and that is why, he is not pressing other prayers made in the writ petition. 3. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was working as a Teacher in Bharat Singh Public School, Bermo since 1982 and he was residing at Qr. No.303, Block-25, Ambedkar Colony, Bermo, District- Bokaro. He further submits that the petitioner and his family members are not having any criminal antecedent. On 10.02.2009 at 2 W.P. (Cr.) No. 54 of 2009 about 07:00 p.m. in the evening, the Officer-in-Charge, Bermo Police Station namely Sri Anand Mohan Singh along with five policemen visited the said quarter of the petitioner and asking for his son namely Nachiketa and they took notes of his present address of Nachiketa and his mobile number and thereafter informed him that his son Nachiketa had indulged in eve teasing apart from using obscene language on mobile with the wife of higher official. He submits that the son of the petitioner, namely, Nachiketa has completed two years course in 2008 in National Trade Certificate awarded by the State Council of Vocational Training at Pundag, Ranchi, Jharkhand under the Department of Labour and Training, Government of Jharkhand. Thereafter, he had undergoing coaching at Kartar Coaching Centre, Ranchi for preparing Bank and Railway services. He was regularly attending his classes till 10.02.2009 where after he was summoned by the Bermo P.S. Officer-in-Charge and was being forced to miss his classes because of the threats of respondent no.6. He was supposed to appear for State Bank of India Clerical Grade Recruitment Exam scheduled for 01.03.2009 at Patiala, Punjab. He further submits that the petitioner on the request of the Officer-in-Charge, Bermo Police Station talked to his son Nachiketa and requested him to come to Bermo the next morning to meet the Officer-in-Charge, Bermo Police Station. On 11.02.2009, after the petitioner has left for his school, his son Nachiketa reached his residential quarter and after informing his mother, he sent to the Bermo Police Station. He thereafter informed his mother on phone that he had given his statement before the police and that the police officials were asking him to be taken to Bokaro. He further submits that on 12.02.2009 while the petitioner had gone for making some purchases at the Vegetable Market, 3 W.P. (Cr.) No. 54 of 2009 respondent no.6 visited his quarter and after threatening his wife took away his mobile set containing the number 9470120661 without giving any receipt of the same and started making a number of calls from the said mobile set. The petitioner informed the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro with copy to the Hon'ble Governor of State of Jharkhand about the aforesaid illegal act of respondent no.6. In the evening on 12.02.2009 itself at around 07:00 PM, the respondent no.6 along with police constables came to his quarter which comprises of only two rooms and invaded his house by occupying one of the rooms where the said police constables got themselves stationed. He also submits that on 14.02.2009, the behaviour of the local police was published in the newspaper on the number of dates. On 14.02.2009, a notice was posted under the signature of the Officer-in- Charge dated 14.02.2009 in which it has been alleged that in the name of the petitioner's son Nachiketa that he has committed acts of eve teasing on phone against the wife of a higher official. On 18.02.2009, the petitioner made representation before the Director General of Police, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Koyla Anchal), Bokaro, Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority and also before the Chairman, National Human Rights Commission in which he has made a request to undertake an independent enquiry into the matter, as contained in Annexure-5 to the petition. He further submits that in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-State, Nachiketa mobile number is said to be 9239879935 and the allegation was made that by that mobile the call was made on mobile number 9204980385. He submits that in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit, the mobile number disclosed as 9239879935 is not of Nachiketa. He further submits that when the news was published, 4 W.P. (Cr.) No. 54 of 2009 thereafter, the said constables were removed from the house of the petitioner. He also submits that in paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit, filed by respondent no.6 there was an error while noting down the mobile number on the direction of the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro. The correct numbers are 9234879935 and 9204780385. He submits that respondent no.6 in his counter affidavit, has disclosed totally different mobile number as 9234879935, whereas, earlier it was 9239879935. To substantiate this argument, he refers Annexures-A and G of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-State. He further submits that further documents brought on record by way of counter affidavit at Annexure-R/6-A are after thought. He further submits that vide order dated 14.08.2015, this Court has directed the State to produce Command Register/Guard Register to suggest whether the Guards were posted at the residence of the petitioner or not and in view of that order, the same was not brought on record and in the counter affidavit, it has been stated that it has been lost. He also submits that all these have happened in absence of any FIR and if such harassment has been put to the petitioner and his family members, appropriate order is the need of the hour at least to suggest that such thing may not happen in future with other persons. He submits that the reputation of the petitioner has been badly harmed due to the action, that too of an alleged act done by the son of the petitioner. He submits that if the Court comes to the conclusion that Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated, the Court can pass appropriate order under public law remedy. To buttress this argument, he relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman, Railway Board and others v. Chandrima Das (MRS) and others; [(2000) 2 SCC 465]. He relied upon paragraphs 9, 11, 12 and 13 of the said judgment, which are quoted 5 W.P. (Cr.) No. 54 of 2009 hereinbelow: “9. Various aspects of the public law field were considered. It was found that though initially a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution relating to contractual matters was held not to lie, the law underwent a change by subsequent decisions and it was noticed that even though the petition may relate essentially to a contractual matter, it would still be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The public law remedies have also been extended to the realm of tort. This Court, in its various decisions, has entertained petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution on a number of occasions and has awarded compensation to the petitioners who had suffered personal injuries at the hands of the officers of the Government. The causing of injuries, which amounted to tortious act, was compensated by this Court in many of its decisions beginning from Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : AIR 1983 SC 1086 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] . (See also Bhim Singh v. State of J&K [(1985) 4 SCC 677 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 47 : AIR 1986 SC 494], Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 265 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 58 : (1987) 1 SCR 631 : AIR 1987 SC 355], Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commr., Delhi Police Headquarters [(1989) 4 SCC 730 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 75 : (1989) 1 Scale 599], Saheli, A Women's Resources Centre v. Commr. of Police [(1990) 1 SCC 422 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 145 : 1989 Supp (2) SCR 488 : AIR 1990 SC 513], Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of U.P. [(1994) 6 SCC 565 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 29 : AIR 1995 SC 117], P. Rathinam v. Union of India [1989 Supp (2) SCC 716 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 228],Death of Sawinder Singh Grower In re [1995 Supp (4) SCC 450 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1464 : JT (1992) 6 SC 271 : (1992) 3 Scale 34] , Inder Singh v. State of Punjab [(1995) 3 SCC 702 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 857 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 586 : (1995) 30 ATC 122 : AIR 1995 SC 1949] and D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) 1 SCC 416 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 92 : AIR 1997 SC 610] ) 11. Having regard to what has been stated above, the contention that Smt Hanuffa Khatoon should have approached the civil court for damages and the matter should not have been considered in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. Where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of fundamental rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the public law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under private law. 12. In the instant case, it is not a mere matter of violation of an ordinary right of a person but the violation of fundamental rights which is involved. Smt Hanuffa Khatoon was a victim of rape. This Court in Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty [(1996) 1 SCC 490 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 133] has held “rape” as an offence which is violative of the fundamental right of a person guaranteed under Article 21 of the 6 W.P. (Cr.) No. 54 of 2009 Constitution. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 500, para 10) Rape is a crime not only against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. Rape is, therefore, the most hated crime. It is a crime against basic human rights and is violative of the victim's most cherished right, namely, right to life which includes right to live with human dignity contained in Article 21. 13. Rejecting, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the petition under public law was not maintainable, we now proceed to his next contention relating to the locus standi of the respondent, Mrs Chandrima Das, in filing the petition.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that Article 21 with regard to torture was again subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh and others; [(2012) 8 SCC 1]. He refers paragraph 30 of the said judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow: