Suresh Kumar Bansal, son of Sri Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, R/o Phusro Bazar, Shanti Nagar v. 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for
Case Details
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI ---- W.P.(Cr.) No. 358 of 2015 Suresh Kumar Bansal, son of Sri Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, R/o Phusro Bazar, Shanti Nagar, P.O. and P.S.Phusro, District-Bokaro (Jharkhand) .... Petitioner ---- -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With .... Respondents W.P.(Cr.) No. 384 of 2015 ---- Ramji Prasad, son of Late Kanhai Lal, resident of Jaridih, Bermo Bazar, Bermo, P.O. and P.S. Bermo, District Bokaro (Jharkhand) .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With W.P.(Cr.) No. 391 of 2015 ---- .... Respondents Lochan Singh, son of late Sardar Iqbal Singh, resident of Jaridih, Bermo Bazar, Bermo, P.O. and P.S. Bermo, District Bokaro (Jharkhand) .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With W.P.(Cr.) No. 397 of 2015 ---- .... Respondents RajKumar Agarwal, son of Sri Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, resident of Phusro Bazar, Shastri Nagar, P.O. and P.S. Phusro, District Bokaro .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With W.P.(Cr.) No. 400 of 2015 ---- .... Respondents Nand Kishore Prasad, son of late Ramchander Prasad Gupta, resident of Jhanda Chowk, Ramgarh Cantt., P.O. and P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh 2 (Jharkhand) .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With W.P.(Cr.) No. 455 of 2015 ---- .... Respondents Krishna Prasad Gupta, son of late Ram Chandra Prasad Gupta, resident of Jhanda Chowk, Ramgarh Cantt., P.O. and P.S. Ramgarh, District –Ramgarh (Jharkhand) .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With W.P.(Cr.) No. 2 of 2016 ---- .... Respondents Prakash Kumar, son of Shri Damodar Lal resident of Jaina More, Bokaro, P.O Jaina More and P.S. Jaridih, District Bokaro (Jharkhand) .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With W.P.(Cr.) No. 4 of 2016 ---- .... Respondents Anil Kumar, son of late Bajrang Lal, resident of Jaina More, Bokaro, P.O. Jaina More and P.S. Jaridih, District Bokaro (Jharkhand) .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late S. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) With Cr.M.P. No. 2734 of 2018 ---- .... Respondents
Legal Reasoning
Ajay Goyal, son of Sri Madan Lal Goyal, aged about 46 years, resident of Phusro Bazar, P.O. and P.S. Phusro, District Bokaro, Jharkhand .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.Uday Kumar Nand, son of late A. Nand working for gain as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Ranchi, having its office at Beside Civil Court Campus, Commercial Taxes Office Building, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, Kutchery Road, P.O.-G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, 3 Town and District Ranchi (Jharkhand) .... Respondents ---- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI For the Petitioners For the State :- :- --- Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, Advocate Mr. Sachin Kumar, Advocate Ms. Shivani Kapoor, Advocate Mr. Kunal Chandra Suman, Advocate Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Advocate Ms. Priyanka Bobby, Advocate Mr. Ravi Kerketta, Advocate Mr. Sanat Kumar Jha, Advocate ---- 10/09.05.2023 A common question of facts and law are involved in all these writ petitions and in Cr.M.P.No.2734 of 2018 and that is why these petitions have been heard together with consent of the parties. 2. In all these petitions, the prayer is made for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Kotwali P.S.Case No.432 of 2013 dated 24.05.2013, G.R.No.2745 of 2013, pending before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi. 3. The case has been registered on the written report of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, and the complaint case has been lodged alleging therein that on the basis of requisition received from the learned Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bharatpur, Rajasthan for verification of „C‟ form purported to have been issued by the Government of Jharkhand, Commercial Tax Department. On verification of the „C‟ form it transpired that „C‟ form was not genuine, not issued by the concerned Division of Commercial Taxes within the State of Jharkhand and out of 231 „C‟ forms purported to have been issued by the dealers only 27 are genuine and 204 „C‟ forms were forged/ingenuine/ duplicate. In terms whereof it was sought to be alleged that due to such ingenuine /forged „C‟ forms the State of Rajasthan has sustained loss of Rs.2.20 crores approximately towards sales tax and as such on the that basis a chart was prepared enumerating the number of dealers within the State of Jharkhand who have purportedly issued the „C‟ forms. While lodging the FIR, the name of the petitioner(s) before this Hon‟ble Court was also included under Tenughat/ 4 Bokaro Division purported to have issued 2 number of forged „C‟ forms for an amount of Rs.12 lacs approximately in terms whereof the State of Rajasthan as purportedly sustained loss of Rs.60,000/-. 4. Mr. Pasari, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the FIR was registered on the basis of the report of manufacturer established at Bharatpur, Rajasthan inasmuch as a perusal of the FIR would suggest that so far as petitioners are concerned their name have been mentioned as a purchasing dealer under Tenughat/Bokaro Division purchasing goods from one Shree Hiralal Tel Udyog, Bharatpur, Rajasthan. He submits that other petitioners have been alleged to be purchased the said oil from other manufacturers. He submits that a purchasing dealer in order to purchase goods at concessional rate of tax has to furnish „C‟ form to the selling dealer and in lieu thereof reduced rate of tax is permissable. He submits that on production of said Form „C‟ 2% CST is charged and in absence of the same 5% CST is charged. He submits that in the entire case the allegations are made that by way of misusing the Form-„C‟, the benefit of the tax has been taken and that is why, the case has been registered under section 467, 468, 471, 420, 120B of the I.P.C and further sections 84 and 85 of the Value Added Tax (hereinafter to be referred to as „VAT‟) Act. He submits that the F.I.R has been registered in absence of any authorization in terms of section 84 without following section 87 of the VAT Act, 2005 read with Rule 57 of the Jharkhand VAT Rules, 2006. He further submits that Jharkhand VAT Act, 2005 is a complete code in itself and the nature of allegation is made of forging the document which comes within the purview of section 84 of the said Act. On these grounds, he submits that the entire criminal case is bad in law. He further submits that in view of section 87 of the said Act only complaint petition can be maintained wherein in the present case the FIR has been registered. He submits that the ingredients of sections of the I.P.C are not made out. He submits that once the special Act is there and which is a complete code in itself, the I.P.C sections are not attracted and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of “Sharat Babu Digumarti Versus 5 Government (NCT of Delhi)”, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 18, wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in paras-28 to 32 held as under:- “28. We have referred to all these provisions of the IT Act only to lay stress that the legislature has deliberately used the words “electronic form”. Dr. Singhvi has brought to our notice Section in Chapter XII dealing with 79 of the IT Act that occurs intermediaries not to be liable in certain cases. Learned counsel has also relied on Shreya Singhal (supra) as to how the Court has dealt with the challenge to Section 79 of the IT Act. The Court has associated the said provision with exemption and Section 69A and in that context, expressed that:- “121. It must first be appreciated that Section 79 is an exemption provision. Being an exemption provision, it is closely related to provisions which provide for offences including Section 69-A. We have seen how under Section 69-A blocking can take place only by a reasoned order after complying with several procedural safeguards including a hearing to the originator and intermediary. We have also seen how there are only two ways in which a blocking order can be passed—one by the Designated Officer after complying with the 2009 Rules and the other by the Designated Officer when he has to follow an order passed by a competent court. The intermediary applying its own mind to whether information should or should not be blocked is noticeably absent in Section 69-A read with the 2009 Rules. 122. Section 79(3)(b) has to be read down to mean that the intermediary upon receiving actual knowledge that a court order has been passed asking it to expeditiously remove or disable access to certain material must then fail to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material. This is for the reason that otherwise it would be very difficult for intermediaries like Google, Facebook, etc. to act when millions of requests are made and the intermediary is then to judge as to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not. We have been informed that in other countries worldwide this view has gained acceptance, Argentina being in the forefront. Also, the Court order and/or the notification by the appropriate Government or its agency must strictly conform to the subject-matters laid down in Article 19(2). Unlawful acts beyond what is laid down in Article 19(2) obviously cannot form any part of Section 79. With these two caveats, we refrain from striking down Section 79(3)(b). 123. The learned Additional Solicitor General informed us that it is a common practice worldwide for intermediaries to have user agreements containing what is stated in Rule 3(2). However, Rule 3(4) needs to be read down in the same manner as Section 6 79(3)(b). The knowledge spoken of in the said sub-rule must only be through the medium of a court order. Subject to this, the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid.” 29. We have referred to the aforesaid aspect as it has been argued by Dr. Singhvi that the appellant is protected under the said provision, even if the entire allegations are accepted. According to him, once the factum of electronic record is admitted, Section 79 of the IT Act must apply ipso facto and ipso jure. Learned senior counsel has urged Section 79, as the language would suggest and keeping in view the paradigm of internet world where service providers of platforms do not control and indeed cannot control the acts/omissions of primary, secondary and tertiary users of such internet platforms, protects the intermediary till he has the actual knowledge. He would contend that Act has created a separate and terms of Section distinct 2(1)(z)(a) under the IT Act to which the protection under Section ‘originator’ category called in 79 of the IT Act has been consciously not extended. Relying on the decision in Shreya Singhal (supra), he has urged that the horizon has been expanded and the effect of Section 79 of the IT Act provides protection to the individual since the provision has been read down emphasizing on the conception of actual knowledge. Relying on the said provision, it is further canvassed by him that Section 79 of the IT Act gets automatically attracted to electronic forms of publication and transmission by intermediaries, since it explicitly uses the non-obstante clauses and has an overriding effect on any other law in force. Thus, the emphasis is on the three provisions, namely, Sections 67, 79 and 81, and the three provisions, according to Dr. Singhvi, constitute a holistic trinity. 30. In this regard, we may reproduce Section 81 of the IT Act, which is as follows:- “81. Act to have overriding effect.- The provisions of this Act shall inconsistent therewith have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Provided that nothing contained in this Act shall restrict any person from exercising any right conferred under the Copyright Act 1957 or the Patents Act 1970.” The proviso has been inserted by Act 10 of 2009 w.e.f. 27.10.2009. 31. Having noted the provisions, it has to be recapitulated that Section 67 clearly stipulates punishment for publishing, transmitting obscene materials in electronic form. The said provision read with Section 67A and 67B is a complete code 7 relating to the offences that are covered under the IT Act. Section 79, as has been interpreted, is an exemption provision conferring protection to the individuals. However, the said protection has been expanded in the dictum of Shreya Singhal (supra) and we concur with the same. 32. Section 81 also specifically provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. All provisions will have their play and significance, if the alleged offence pertains to offence of electronic record. It has to be borne in mind that IT Act is a special enactment. It has special provisions. Section 292 of the IPC makes offence sale of obscene books, etc. but once the offence has a nexus or connection with the electronic record the protection and effect of Section 79 cannot be ignored and negated. We are inclined to think so as it is a special provision for a specific purpose and the Act has to be given effect to so as to make the protection effective and true to the legislative intent. This is the mandate behind Section 81 of the IT Act. The additional protection granted by the IT Act would apply. 5. He on the same line, further relied in the case of “Jeewan Kumar Raut and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation” reported in (2009 7 SCC 526). Paragraph nos. 19 to 28 of the said judgment are quoted below: “19. TOHO is a special Act. It deals with the subjects mentioned therein, viz. offences relating to removal of human organs, etc. Having regard to the importance of the subject only, enactment of the said regulatory statute was imperative. 20. TOHO provides for appointment of an appropriate authority to deal with the matters specified in sub-section (3) of Section 13 thereof. By reason of the aforementioned provision, an appropriate authority has specifically been authorised inter alia to investigate any complaint of the breach of any of the provisions of TOHO or any of the rules made thereunder and take appropriate action. The appropriate authority, subject to exceptions provided for in TOHO, thus, is only authorised to investigate cases of breach of any of the provisions thereof, whether penal or otherwise. 21. Ordinarily, any person can set the criminal law in motion. Parliament and the State Legislatures, however, keeping in view the sensitivity and/or importance of the subject, have carved out specific areas where violations of any of the provisions of a special statute like TOHO can be dealt with only by the authorities specified therein. The FIR lodged before the officer in charge of Gurgaon Police Station was by way of information. It disclosed not only commission of an offence under TOHO but also under various 8 provisions of the Penal Code. The officer in charge of the police station, however, was not authorised by the appropriate Government to deal with the matter in relation to TOHO; but, the respondent was. In that view of the matter, the investigation of the said complaint was handed over to it. 22. TOHO being a special statute, Section 4 of the Code, which ordinarily would be applicable for investigation into a cognizable offence or the other provisions, may not be applicable. Section 4 provides for investigation, inquiry, trial, etc. according to the provisions of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 4, however, specifically provides that offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, tried or otherwise dealing with such offences. 23. TOHO being a special Act and the matter relating to dealing with offences thereunder having been regulated by reason of the provisions thereof, there cannot be any manner of doubt whatsoever that the same shall prevail over the provisions of the Code. The investigation in terms of Section 13(3)(iv) of TOHO, thus, must be conducted by an authorised officer. Nobody else could do it. For the aforementioned reasons, the officer in charge of Gurgaon Police Station had no other option but to hand over the investigation to the appropriate authority. 24. The respondent has been constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. In terms of the provisions of the said Act, the authorities specified therein could make investigation in connection with a complaint. The mode and manner in which the investigation could be carried out have been laid down in the Act and/or the Manual framed thereunder. It is for the aforementioned reason, upon receipt of the complaint from the officer in charge of Gurgaon Police Station, it presumably having made a preliminary inquiry, lodged the FIR. Only because it lodged the FIR and proceeded in terms of the said Act and the Manual, the same by itself would not mean that all the provisions of Chapter XII of TOHO vis-(cid:224)-vis Chapter XV thereof could not be invoked. 25. Section 22 of TOHO prohibits taking of cognizance except on a complaint made by an appropriate authority or the person who had made a complaint earlier to it as laid down therein. The respondent, although, has all the powers of an investigating agency, it expressly has been statutorily prohibited from filing a police report. It could file a complaint petition only as an appropriate authority so as to comply with the requirements contained in Section 22 of TOHO. If by reason of the provisions of TOHO, filing of a police report by necessary implication is 9 necessarily forbidden, the question of its submitting a report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code did not and could not arise. In other words, if no police report could be filed, sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code was not attracted. 26. It is a well-settled principle of law that if a special statute lays down procedures, the ones laid down under the general statutes shall not be followed. In a situation of this nature, the respondent could carry out investigations in exercise of its authorisation under Section 13(3)(iv) of TOHO. While doing so, it could exercise such powers which are otherwise vested in it. But, as it could not file a police report but a complaint petition only; sub- section (2) of Section 167 of the Code may not be applicable. 27. The provisions of the Code, thus, for all intent and purport, would apply only to an extent till conflict arises between the provisions of the Code and TOHO and as soon as the area of conflict reaches, TOHO shall prevail over the Code. Ordinarily, thus, although in terms of the Code, the respondent upon completion of investigation and upon obtaining remand of the accused from time to time, was required to file a police report, it was precluded from doing so by reason of the provisions contained in Section 22 of TOHO. 28. To put it differently, upon completion of the investigation, an authorised officer could only file a complaint and not a police report, as a specific bar has been created by Parliament. In that view of the matter, the police report being not a complaint and vice versa, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to choose the said method invoking the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned for taking cognizance of the offence only in the manner laid down therein and not by any other mode. The procedure laid down in TOHO, thus, would permit the respondent to file a complaint and not a report which course of action could have been taken recourse to but for the special provisions contained in Section 22 of TOHO.” 6.
Decision
Relying on these judgments, he submits that in view of the above facts, the said ratio is applicable in the case of the petitioners and the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate General-II appearing on behalf of the respondent State submits that if the case under the I.P.C sections are made out that is not bar and the prosecution can proceed on both the Acts; I.P.C as well as special Act. He draws attention of the Court to the contents made in the F.I.R and submits that the 10 ingredients of I.P.C sections are made out and in that view of the matter, if the ingredients are there, the sections under both the Acts are applicable and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of “State of Maharashtra and Another v. Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan and Others” reported in (2019) 18 SCC 145. Paragraph nos. 5 to 7 of the said judgment are quoted below: “5. The High Court examined Section 55 of the FSS Act which provides for penalty for non-compliance of the directions of the Food Safety Officers. As per the said provision the failure to comply with the requirements of the Act or the Rules or Regulations would result in a penalty which may extend to Rs 2 lakhs. The High Court observed that non-compliance of the Notification dated 18-7-2013 can be penalised only by imposing of fine mentioned in Section 55 and not otherwise. No complaint for offences under IPC could have been preferred by the Food Safety Officer for violation of the prohibitory order issued by the Commissioner of Food Safety. The allegations against the respondents do not have the tendency to cause breach of law and order, according to the High Court. The High Court found that the Notification issued by the Commissioner dated 18-7-2013 is not an order contemplated under Chapter X IPC. The High Court was of the opinion that Section 55 of the FSS Act being a specific provision made in a special enactment, Section 188 IPC is not applicable. The High Court concluded on the first point that any violation of the prohibitory order can be dealt with only under Section 55 of the FSS Act and no other action can be initiated against the respondents. 6. There is no dispute that Section 55 of the FSS Act provides for penalty to be imposed for non-compliance of the requirements of the Act, Rules or Regulations or orders issued thereunder by the Food Safety Officer. But, we are afraid that we cannot agree with the conclusion of the High Court that non-compliance of the provisions of the Act, Rules or Regulations or orders cannot be subject-matter of a prosecution under IPC unless expressly or impliedly barred. The High Court is clearly wrong in holding that action can be initiated against defaulters only under Section 55 of the FSS Act or proceedings under Section 68 for adjudication have to be taken. A further error was committed by the High Court in interpreting the scope of Section 188 IPC. Section 188 IPC does not only cover breach of law and order, the disobedience of which is punishable. Section 188 is attracted even in cases where the act complained of causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety as well. We do not agree with the High Court that the prohibitory order of the Commissioner, Food and Safety is not an order contemplated under Chapter X IPC. We are also not in a 11 position to accept the findings of the High Court that Section 55 of the FSS Act is the only provision which can be resorted to for non- compliance of orders passed under the Act as it is a special enactment.” 7. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an act or an omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. [T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701] The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law. [State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 27] The High Court ought to have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.—Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” 8. He further submits that identical issue was involved in the case of “State (N.C.T of Delhi) v. Sanjay with Analogous cases” reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772. He further submits that the case reported in the year 2014 was also discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Maharashtra and Another v. Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan and Others”(supra). He further submits that in view of these judgments, the case is made out and merely on the ground that special Acts are there, the proceeding cannot be quashed. He further submits that identical was the situation in the case of “Jayant and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh with one Analogous case” reported in (2021) 2 SCC 670. He submits that in view of these judgments, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has directed that the case will proceed against the M.M.D.R. Act as well as the I.P.C. and relying on these judgments, he further submits that investigation is still going on and this Court may not exercise its powers under section 226 of the Constitution of India 12 as well as section 482 of the Cr.P.C. On these grounds he submits that the entire criminal proceeding may not be quashed. He also refers to sections 40 and 41 of the I.P.C. and submits that offence is defined in section 40 and special law is defined in section 41 which is applicable to a particular subject. 9. In view of the above submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the contents of the F.I.R and finds that admittedly the case has been registered under sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120B of the I.P.C and sections 84 and 85 of Jharkhand VAT Act. Surprisingly the case has been registered in 2013 and till date final form has not been submitted. Further the VAT Act is a complete code in itself and section 87 of the said Act speaks of any person authorized by the competent authority can register the complaint case. For ready reference section 87 of the VAT Act is quoted hereinbelow: “87. Investigation of Offences.-(1) Subject to conditions, if any, as may be prescribed, the Prescribed authority may authorize either generally or in respect of a particular case or class of cases any officer or person subordinate to him to investigate all or any of the offences punishable under this Act. (2) Every officer so authorized shall, in the conduct of such investigation, exercise the power conferred by the code of criminal procedure, 1973 upon an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of a cognizable offence.” 10. Rule 56 of the Jharkhand VAT Rules, 2006 speaks of prescribed authority which is Commissioner. The said Rule 56 is quoted below: “56. Investigation of offences- For the purposes of Section 87 the Commissioner may authorize any authority or officer appointed under Section 4 to investigate, either generally or in respect of a particular case or class of cases, all or any of the offences punishable under the Act. The officer so authorized shall conduct such investigation in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 87 of the Act.” 11. Looking to Rule 56 of Jharkhand VAT Rules, 2006, it appears that the Commissioner is prescribed authority for the purpose of section 87 of VAT Act. Section 84 is a penalty section for violation of provisions made therein of VAT Act and the penalty has been prescribed therein for various offences under 13 the said VAT Act. Thus, there is no doubt that in the VAT Act there are provisions of penalty and how to proceed and lodge the case under the said VAT Act. The judgment relied by Mr. Pasari, the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to special Acts are not in dispute. Thus, the dispute made in these petitions, it appears that it has been set at rest by the reasoned judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of “Jayant and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh with one Analogous case”(supra) which has been relied by learned counsel for the respondent State wherein at paragraph no.21 the following directions have been issued by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. Paragraph no.21 is quoted below: “21. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder vis-(cid:224)-vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, and the law laid down by this Court in the cases referred to hereinabove and for the reasons stated hereinabove, our conclusions are as under: 21.1. That the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the In-charge/SHO of the police station concerned to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted. 21.2. The bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder. 21.3. For commission of the offence under IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder. 21.4. That in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the In- charge/SHO of the police station concerned to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the In-charge of the police station/investigating officer concerned submits a report, the same can be sent to the Magistrate 14 concerned as well as to the authorised officer concerned as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the authorised officer concerned may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the investigating officer concerned and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.” 21.5. In a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per sub-section (1) of Section 23- A, considering sub-section (2) of Section 23-A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any Rules made thereunder so compounded. However, the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 23-A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under IPC, such as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further.” 12. In view of the above directions issued by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and considering that identical was the situation there, the Court finds that directions under para-21.4 and at conclusion of para-22 of the said judgment are sufficient to dispose of these petitions. 13. Accordingly, the respondent State shall act in terms of paragraph nos.21.4 and 21.5 of the said directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and in view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the prayer made in these petitions are allowed in part to the extent of quashing of the proceedings for the offence under sections 84 and 85 of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Act only in connection with Kotwali P.S.Case No.432 of 2013 dated 24.05.2013, G.R.No.2745 of 2013, pending before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi. These petitions are allowed in part and disposed of in the above terms. 14. Pending petition if any also stands disposed of. ( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) SI/;,