Jai Prakash Ekka v. The Bank of India through General Manager, Head Officer, Human Resource

------ : Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate Mr. Siddharth Ranjan, Advocate Ms. Shivani Bhardwaj, Advocate Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate : Mr. A. Allam, Sr. Advocate Ms. Sushmita Kumari, Advocate Ms. Asifa Sultana, Advocate Reserved on: 08.04.2025 Pronounced On:09/06/2025 By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 07.12.2016 passed by respondent No.3, whereby the petitioner was dismissed on being found guilty. Further, he prays to quash the Appellate Order dated 31.03.2017 passed by respondent No.2, whereby the order of penalty is confirmed.

2. Undisputed facts of this case are that petitioner joined Bank of India as Probationary Officer on 24.09.1987 as Junior Management Grade-I. He was promoted as Middle Management Grade-II on

01.05.1998. He was further promoted to Middle Management Grade-III on 01.12.2007. After he was transferred from Ghaghra Branch to Mumbai Service Branch some irregularities was detected for which, a memorandum was issued on 11.05.2015 and the petitioner was asked to explain. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 06.06.2015, thereafter on 31.12.2015 the disciplinary authority issued article of charges related to lack of due diligence in sanctioning loan and 1 allowing cash withdrawal from cash credit account and failure to maintain the norms of the Bank. The petitioner submitted a written statement on 07.01.2016 denying the charges. Thereafter a departmental proceeding was initiated. On 03.03.2016 a preliminary hearing was made where the petitioner pleaded innocence and the proceeding continued. After submission of the inquiry report on

14.10.2016, the disciplinary authority issued show cause, which was replied on 26.10.2016 by the petitioner and lastly, the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal against the order of punishment which was also dismissed.

3. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that as the successor Branch Managers failed in discharging their duties in the matter of follow-up in the event of loan becoming NPA and for the failure of the successor Branch Manager, the petitioner has been targeted and punished. The petitioner in the process of disbursement of loan has followed all the prescribed norms, practice and procedure. The allegation levelled against him are unfounded and baseless. He further submitted that most of the charges are nonest and none of the allegation against the petitioner was established in the enquiry. The decision of the Inquiry Authority, Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority is bad and improper.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Bank has suffered huge financial loss for the act of the petitioner. The petitioner has got no legs to stand and the petitioner has been rightly held guilty and awarded major penalty of dismissal. The order of dismissal was passed after giving adequate and appropriate opportunity to the petitioner to the represent himself. The principle of natural justice has been followed in this case. As the charges were serious the Disciplinary Authority has rightly imposed major penalty of dismissal.

5. From the materials available on record, I find that article of charges contains mainly three charges i.e. (i) Sanctioning loans in gross violation of Bank lending norms, systems and procedures, (ii) Using official position in recklessly, sanctioning and disbursing credit limits 2 and (iii) In gross violation of banks’ lending norms sanctioning credit facilities. From inquiry report, I find that a detailed inquiry has been conducted in respect of all the charges levelled against the petitioner. There are witnesses who have been examined and documents which have been exhibited by the witnesses. The Inquiry Officer has addressed all the points of charges and came to a conclusion that the charges against the petitioner stands proved. I find no illegality and irregularity committed by the Inquiry Officer. Further, when I go through the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Authority, I find that the Disciplinary Authority has given adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The whole process of disciplinary proceeding was conducted in a fair manner. Thus, there is no lapses in the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Authority.

6. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot act as an appellate Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others vs Rajendra Kumar Dubey” reported in (2021) 14 SCC 735 has held as under: findings the decisions of the High Courts with this Court with respect “21.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of in a interference by departmental enquiry against a public servant. 21.2. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] , a three- Judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however, interfere where the departmental authority which has held delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the the proceedings against 3 conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If, however, the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition.”

7. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Bhupendra Singh” reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908, while referring to its earlier judgements has endorsed and reiterated the views and observations made in those judgements. Paragraphs 23, 24 and 26 of the judgement in the case of Bhupendra Singh (supra) read as under: scope of examination and “23. The interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’ 4 (emphasis supplied)