The High Court · 2025
Case Details
2025:JHHC:38769 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No.2880 of 2016 Brajbhan Singh S/o Imirti Singh , R/o Bhaluan, P.O. Sarya- Tiwari, P.S.-Khajni, Dist:- Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh -Versus- ... Petitioner 1. Union of India though the Secretary , Ministry of Home Affair, Government of India, having its office at North Block, Central Secretariat, New Delhi, P.O.+ P.S. Dist: New Delhi 2. The Secretary, Ministry of Home Affair, Government of India, having its office at North Block, Central Secretariat, New Delhi, P.O. + P.S.+ Dist: New Delhi 3. The Inspector General of C.I.S.F., Eastern Sector Patna, Government of India, having its Office at Boring Road, P.O.+ P.S.- Patliputra, Dist:- Patna, Bihar. 4. The Deputy Inspector General of C.I.S.F., East Zone Head Quarter Patna, Government of India, having its office at Boring Road, P.O. + P.S. – Patliputra, Dist: Patna The Senior Commandant, C.I.S.F. unit 2nd reserve 5. Battalion, Government of India, having its office at P.O- Dhurwa, P.S. – Dhurwa, Dist:- Ranchi, Jharkhand 6. The Commandant/Deputy Commandant, C.I.S.F Unit C.C.L Kargali, Government of India, having its office at P.o.-Phusro, P.S.-Bermo, Dist:- Ranchi, Jharkhand --------- … Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD For the Petitioner For the Respondent --------- --------- : Mr. Arun Kumar Dubey, Advocate : Mrs. Nitu Sinha, C.G.C. Pronounced on 29/08/2025 The Petitioner has filed the instant Writ Petition for the following reliefs:- (a) For an issuance of an appropriate writ preferably in the nature of certiorari to set aside/quash the final Decisional order of approval of Removal from service, dated 19.01.2016 passed by Inspector General of CISF. Eastern Sector Patna, pertaining to Memo No. V-11015/Pakh/Vivni/ Rivi 22/2015-759 dated 19/01/2016 issued under the authority of office of Inspector General, CISF, Ministry of 1 2025:JHHC:38769 Home Affairs, under the signature of Inspector General CLS.P office Parisar, Eastern Sector Head Quarter Boring Road Patna, in respect of confirming the Removal from service of the petitioner, (b) For an issuance of an appropriate writ preferably in the nature of certiorari to set aside / quash the final appellate order of approval of Removal from service, dated 07.09.2015 passed by Deputy Inspector General of C.I.S.F. East Zone Head Quarter Patna, pertaining to Memo No. P.S.V-11014/Pukshe / Prasha II /Appeal -12/ B.V.S/2015- 9003 dated 07/09/2015 issued under the authority of office of Deputy Inspector General, C.I.S.F, Ministry of Home Affairs, under the signature of Deputy Inspector General C1SP office Parisar, East Zone Head Quarter Parna, in respect of confirming the Removal from service of the petitioner, (c) The Petitioner prays for an issuance of an appropriate writ preferably in the nature of certiorari to set aside / quash the final order of Removal from service, dated 13.06.2015 passed by senior commandant C.IS.F. 2ND Reserve Battalion Ranchi, pertaining to Memo No. P.V- 15014/CISF/2nd Reserve Battalion/Adm/Major-10/2014-3776 (P.V-15014/Ke.Auo.Su.Ba/Dwiava/Anu/Major-10/2014- 3776) dated 13/06/2015 issued under the authority of office of Senior Commandant, C.LS.F, Ministry of Home Affairs, under the signature of Senior Commandant, C.I.S.F, 2ND Reserve Battalion Ranchi, in respect of Removal from service of the petitioner, (d) For an issuance of an appropriate writ preferably in the nature of Mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. 2 2025:JHHC:38769 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the Respondents. 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Final Decisional Order of Approval of Removal dated 19.01.2016 (Annexure- 6) the Appellate Court order dated 07.09.2015 (Annexure- 4), Removal order dated 13.06.2015 (Annexure- 3) are illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in eye of law as same had been passed in mechanical manner without considering the case of the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner is a trained soldier of Armed Forces and during the training session they were given the education that in any case of danger they may get ready with their weapons. It is submitted that everything in respect of said incident that took place was based on presumption only. It is submitted that the petitioner had submitted the written statement on 26.12.2014 that his mental condition was not good after when such major incident took place and this is the sole statement of petitioner during departmental proceeding and which requires for proper consideration. It is further submitted that the reasonable opportunity has not been provided to the petitioner in the light of statement made by him on 26.12.2014. It is submitted that the petitioner cannot be punished twice for committing same offence arising out of same cause of action because on the one hand, Rs. 120 (One hundred twenty) was taken on 02.04.2015 (Annexure-1) from the petitioner as fine for misusing 4 cartridges and Fine is also a kind of punishment and thereafter no any kind of punishment was expected to be imposed upon the petitioner. Punishment 3 2025:JHHC:38769 of petitioner for removal from the service was ought to be imposed in the last and so it is not sustainable in law. However, without considering the case of the petitioner the petitioner was dismissed from the service vide order dated 13.06.2015 (Annexure-3) passed by the Senior Commandant, C.I.S.F. i.e. Respondent No. 5. It is submitted that even the Deputy Inspector General of C.I.S.F. i.e. the Respondent No. 4 has dismissed the Departmental Appeal filed by the petitioner vide order dated 07.09.2015 (Annexure-4). Thereafter the petitioner had preferred revision on 03.10.2015 which was also dismissed by the Inspector General, C.I.S.F (i.e. Respondent No. 3) on 19.01.2016 (Annexure-6) in a mechanical manner. It is submitted that the petitioner was in shock after
Legal Reasoning
accidental firing, and he went under treatment under Central Institute of Psychiatry Kanke, Ranchi from 28.10.2014 to 16.04.2015 and during these periods all the witnesses were examined except prosecution witness no. 10, who had never been examined and during these periods he had given sole written statement which indicates that no reasonable opportunity had been provided to petitioner considering his mental condition and Treatment Certificate dated 17/04/2015 of the petitioner is enclosed as Annexure-7 It is submitted that failure to examine material witness amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. It has been held by the Supreme Court that such violation of principles of natural justice would vitiate the enquiry as held in the case of Hardwari Lal vs. State of U. P. and others reported (1999) 8 SCC 582 and hence this Writ Petition may be allowed. 4 2025:JHHC:38769 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that the Final Decisional Order of Approval of Removal dated 19.01.2016 (Annexure -6), the Appellate Court order dated 07.09.2015 (Annexure-4), Removal Order dated 13.06.2015 (Annexure-3) are fit and proper and no interference is required. It is submitted this Writ Petition is devoid of merit. The Petitioner was appointed as Const/GD in C.LS.F. and after completion of his training while he was posted at certain places, he was lastly posted at C.C.L. Kargali where he was deployed for C.I.S.F. Unit for security and his duty was for arms and ammunition safety of Government Property. It is submitted that the petitioner, while on duty, cocked his Service Rifle SLR butt No. 336 on his Senior and fired 04 rounds repeatedly from his service rifle on 24/10/2014 at about 01.00 hrs. Then, he was charge-sheeted U/R 36 of C.I.S.F. Act & Rules 2001 vide charge memo No. (5020) dated 19.12.2014. A regular departmental enquiry was conducted where the petitioner was given ample opportunity to defend his case and after that the Enquiry Officer found the charges proved against him. Even Disciplinary Authority found that the Departmental Proceeding was conducted as per procedure and the evidence of prosecution witnesses has rightly been considered by Enquiry Officer in the light of materials available on record. Since the act committed by the petitioner was serious, indisciplinary in nature and gross carelessness and hence petitioner was awarded the penalty of "Removal from Service" by the Senior Commandant C.I.S.F. Reserve 2nd Reserve Battalion, Ranchi, vide order No. (3776) dated 13.06.2015 (Annexure-3). Thereafter, the petitioner preferred the appeal and revision petition against the order of removal to DIG/EZ HQrs. Patna & IG/ES HQrs. Patna and 5 2025:JHHC:38769 same were rejected on 07.09.2015 (Annexure-4) and on 19.01.2016 (Annexure-6) respectively. It is submitted that in view of serious misconduct
Decision
committed by the petitioner, the writ petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this High Cour and thus the impugned orders (Annexure-3), (Annexure-4) and (Annexure-6) have been passed in accordance with Law and according to the existing rule. It is submitted that the act committed by the petitioner is serious indiscipline in nature and gross carelessness and he is not fit to be retained in service in the Armed Force of the Union like C.I.S.F. where high standard of discipline is required to be maintained. The good service record cannot be taken into account after the misconduct committed by the petitioner. No illegal and arbitrary action has been taken against the petitioner and which is the reason that the removal order has also been confirmed by the superior authorities. It is submitted that non -examination of P.W. 10 does not vitiate the whole departmental proceedings. The petitioner did not raise this point during enquiry. The Constable Resham Das (P.W. 13) has clearly stated that the Post Commander called the petitioner and the petitioner talked with him and made complaint about the duty sentry of Morcha No. 5. The Post Commander requested him to cool down and to hand over the issued rifle and thereafter, the petitioner cocked his rifle. The Post Commander called the petitioner and talked with him but the petitioner did not respond properly and cocked the rifle that clearly shows the wrong intention of the petitioner. The body language created suspicion to his other fellow worker. Even the body language of the petitioner while coming from Unit Barrack for mounting duty at Gujadih Morcha No. 5, with 6 2025:JHHC:38769 arms and ammunition wearing helmet and bullet proof jacket and using another way which is not normally used by any personnel for mounting duty created suspicion to his other fellow workers. It is submitted that the P.W. 4, who was the Post Commander, was responsible for round the clock (24 x 7) security of the post and when he got information to come immediately then it was not possible for him to come in uniform at that moment. Further P.W.4 did not go to Morcha No. 5, but he was standing near Morcha No.6. It is submitted that the petitioner should have intimated to the competent authority about his unsound mental condition for performing duty with Arms with medical certification. The illness of the petitioner has not any supportive documents. It is submitted that the petitioner was charge- sheeted for firing 04 rounds from his rifle without any valid order and after considering all the documents, he was awarded the penalty of removal from the service by the disciplinary authority. With regard to recovery of Rs.120/- from the petitioner, it is submitted that the said amount, recovered from him, was against the loss of government property (cost of 04 rounds fired by him during the incident). The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the Judgment in the case of State of Bihar and Others Vs. Phulpari Kumari reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 . Learned counsel for the Respondents in support the case has relied upon the Judgment in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank and Another vs. Rajender Singh reported in (2013 ) 12 SCC 372. Learned counsel for the Respondents in support of the case has relied upon the 7 2025:JHHC:38769 Judgment Union of India and Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610. It is submitted that the written statement filed by the petitioner was considered by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter, departmental proceeding was initiated and finalized according to existing rules. The Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have also rejected his Appeal and Revision and hence this Writ Petition may be dismissed. 5. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the prosecution witness No.10 (actual narrator of the story of this case) who had given the information of suspicious and offensive activities of the petitioner Brajbhan Singh to Post Commander, was not examined and which vitiates the entire proceeding because the Post Commander acted upon the statement of prosecution witness no. 10 without judging anything and the petitioner was unaware about what was going on in the mind of prosecution witness no. 10. It is submitted that the petitioner just came to join his post and he never expected that the Post Commander will arrive and will try to snatch the rifle because everything has happened beyond his imagination. He thought someone else is demanding his rifle and therefore he cocked his rifle in order to defend himself. It is submitted that neither the petitioner nor the prosecution witness no. 10 is able to see each other even with the help of dragon light. Therefore, plea taken by the Respondents is completely disputed. It is submitted that the petitioner resided at the barrack from where he had came to join his post with arms and ammunition and he had wore his own bullet proof jacket and helmet allotted to him and there was no wrong in it. 8 2025:JHHC:38769 6. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that the body language of petitioner while coming from unit barrack for duty of Gujadih Morcha No.05 with arms and ammunition, wearing helmet and bullet proof jacket and using another way which is not normally used by personnel for mounting duty and which became suspicious to the petitioner's act to fellow duty mates. When the Post Commander called the petitioner, he came to him but was in a ready position placing point finger on cocking handle and even did not respond properly to the Post Commander's question and having observed some abnormalities when the Post Commander tried to cool down the petitioner and asked him to hand over Service Rifle, the petitioner cocked the rifle. Thereafter the Post Commander held the barrel of the rifle forcefully made the direction of the rifle towards ground and further the petitioner fired 04 round from that service rifle repeatedly. Since the rifle was in possession of the petitioner and trigger was in his control, it is clear that the petitioner himself fired 04 rounds. Due to the misconduct of the petitioner, he was charge-sheeted under Rule 36 of CISF Rules 2001. The petitioner was given ample opportunity to defend his case. After carefully going through all the statements and documents adduced during the enquiry, the enquiry officer concluded that the charges against the petitioner is proved. There is no ambiguity or mistake in the enquiry report, since the misconduct committed by the petitioner is serious in nature and shows gross carelessness. 7. It is submitted that while the petitioner projected the matter of festival of Diwali in his appeal, the appellate authority had considered and examined the same point and discussed the matter in Appellate order at para 4 (ii). 9 2025:JHHC:38769 It is submitted that the incident cannot be termed as accidental firing rather it was repeated firing by the petitioner. Further it was the duty of Post Commander to ensure that all sentries were deployed at their respective posts properly and security system was continued smoothly. The petitioner was discharging duty under direct command and control of the Post Commander and therefore the plea of the petitioner is not acceptable. It is submitted that even after incident the petitioner never produced any medical certificate about his unsound mental condition before the authority. The petitioner produced Medical Fitness Certificate as SHAPE-I on 24/02/2014 (Annexure –B). It was only after the incident the petitioner started to take treatment from Central Institute of Psychiatry, Kanke. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner is an attempt to mislead and divert the attention of this High Court from actual fact of the case. 8. It is submitted that the petitioner was removed and dismissed from the service for the reason that he had not maintained the discipline and he had disobeyed the order of the superior officer. It is submitted that C.I.S.F. is also an Armed Force of the Union of India. It is deployed in sensitive Sectors such as Airports, Ports, Unit of department of Atomic Energy, Department of space, Power and Steel. The Force is also deployed on Internal Security duties and Election duties. The C.I.S.F is required to a maintain discipline of the highest order. Hence, this writ petition may be dismissed. 9. Perused the records and considered the submission of both sides. 10 2025:JHHC:38769 10. It further reveals from the record that during pendency of writ petition, the respondents filed the supplementary affidavit on 11.04.2022 through Senior Commandant, C.I.S.F, Ranchi and has enclosed the inquiry report marked as Annexure-A to the said affidavit dated 29.06.2017 which contains the records of the case including the statement of witnesses examined and cross-examined during the Departmental Inquiry and which also include the medical certificate of the petitioner , issued by Central Institute of Psychiatry , Ranchi. 11. From perusal of the inquiry report, it reveals that the petitioner was not given opportunity of the hearing properly. Even the material witness P.W. 10 was not examined which was required and demanded by the petitioner. 12. From perusal of final punishment order dated 13.06.2015 (i.e. Annexture 3) passed by Senior Commandant i.e. Respondent No. 5, it reveals that the petitioner was dismissed for the following reasons:- (i) the Disciplinary Authorities in inquiry report held that the charges against the petitioner were found proved, the petitioner was said to be present on duty on between 23.10.2014 from 5:00 pm to 24.10.2014 at 5 am and at around one hour on 24.10.2014 the act of the petitioner Constable Bhajbhan Singh found suspicious and aggressive and when Post Commander tried to pacify him by calling him near and asked his arms then the petitioner instead of handing over arm , Cocked his SLR . In anticipation of firing the Post Commanders put the barrel SLR towards the land / surface and the petitioner had fired four (04) round from his SLR. 11 2025:JHHC:38769 (ii) The voluntary four (04) around of firing by the petitioner is as example of his negligence. As such negligence could led to serious action and also led to loss of live because C.I.S.F. which is national heritage and its personnels are posted in important institution, industries and for V.I.P. Security in the entire Country. However, due to firing of four round by the petitioner, the image of C.I.S.F. was in question and it could have led to loss of four (04) lives and such person can take life of other persons which may put a question mark in the name of security of the country. Hence the petitioner was removed from service under Rule 32 of C.I.S.F. Rules 2001 read with Schedule -1 Rule 34 (2) of C.I.S.F Rules. (iii) The suspension period of charge official is treated as “Suspension” for all purpose. (iv) It was also recorded that the petitioner was given opportunity to defend himself, (v) The Disciplinary Authority i.e. Senior Commandant has rejected the defence of the petitioner that he had demanded leave on the occasion of Dewali 2014 but same was not considered because earlier he was granted leave on July/August, 2014. The Disciplinary Authority also referred his plea that his son aged around 16 months was ill and he was admitted to AIIMS, New Delhi and his parents are old aged persons and hence grant of leave was essential but due to non- grant of leave he was under mental pressure. 13. Thereafter the petitioner had preferred departmental appeal before D.I.G. (Annexure-4) by filing appeal on 25.06.2015 and has raised mainly the following ground as follows:- 12 (i) The petitioner -appellant was on duty in the night of 2025:JHHC:38769 24.10.2014 at 01:00 am to 5:00 am (i.e. five hours) at Gujadih Magzine and they were two (02) ways for the petitioner to attend duty at Gujadih for arriving at his Gujadih Magzine Morcha No. 5 and there was no restriction for using both the ways. It was night of Diwali on 24.10.2014 and there were fire crackers being exploded and as such the petitioner had wore Helment and Bullet Proof Jacket and proceeded to join his duty at Morcha No. 5 which is natural act and hence the appellant has been punished wrongly, (ii) Although the Inspector B.D. Lahariya was appointed as an Enquiry Officer and notices were issued on 14.01.2015, 16.01.2015, 23.01.2015, 18.02.2015, 18.03.2015, 31.03.2015 and 10.04.2016 (copy is enclosed) and he was informed for examination of witnesses but he was not informed that he had to cross-examine those prosecution witnesses and due to which the petitioner could not cross-examine those prosecution witnesses during departmental inquiry, (iii) The petitioner was also not given opportunity to appoint his Defence Assistant and thus he was denied of reasonable opportunity to defend himself, (iv) The finding of the inquiry officer and inquiry report is wrong because the inquiry report was submitted against the petitioner without giving him opportunity to cross- examine the prosecution witnesses ( Departmental Witnesses). (v) The dismissal of the petitioner is wrong due to contradictory statement of the witnesses. 13 2025:JHHC:38769 14. However, the D.I.G i.e. the Respondent No. 4 vide order dated 07.09.2015 (Annexure-5) has dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. 15. The Appellate Order has merely discussed P.W. 4 the statement of P.W. Md. Imran and has came to the conclusion that the appellant was negligent and defence of the appellant was rejected by the Appellate Authority, although the appellant was himself found that he had not committed offence for wearing Helmet and Bullet Prove Jacket while proceeding for duty at Morcha No. 5 . 16. The Appellate Authority also observed that the petitioner had not given any statement regarding Naxalite during Departmental Proceeding but he was wearing Bullet Proof Jacket in the name of Naxalite on the date of Diwali . 17. The Appellate Authority also rejected the defence of the petitioner ( i.e. The appellant) on the ground that during initial stage of Inquiry, the Inquiry Officer had asked him to take assistance of any Assistant from the C.I.S.F. force but the petitioner had refused. 18. The Appellate Court also observed the petitioner has not cross-examined the P.W. 4 Md. Imran, Post Commander which shows that the appellant –petitioner had presumed himself guilty. The Appellate Authority also failed to consider the plea that the parents of the petitioner is ill and his two younger brothers Manoj Singh and Dharmander Singh were studying and the petitioner had got one son of two years and one (01) daughter of three (03 ) months. 19. Thereafter the petitioner had preferred Revision before the I.G., C.I.S.F Patna, However the Revision was also dismissed on 11.01.2016 (Annexure-6) by the Inspector General of C.I.S.F. 14 2025:JHHC:38769 20. From perusal of the Revisional order dated 19.01.2016 (Annexure-6), it transpires that the Revisional Authority has merely referred the charge-sheet stage, inquiry stage and submission of inquiry report by Inquiry Officer and has referred to order of punishment of removal of service in case of the petitioner. 21. Thereafter Revisional Authority had referred the plea taken by the petitioner in brief and the point raised by the petitioner in para 4 of the order which reads as follows: - (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) A conspiracy was made to penalize him; He was not given reasonable opportunity to defend the case, which is against the law and also not provided defence assistant; Punishment awarded to him is arbitrary and without application of mind; The day of incident was on the day of deepawali and crackers were fired. He felt that Naxals had attacked the post. Keeping the attack of Naxals in mind, he wore Helmet and bullet proof Jacket and reached to the morcha No. 5; (v) He was in mental agony due to continuous treatment of his 16 months old child at AIIMS , New Delhi’ (vi) The firing incident occurred due to circumstances and not intentionally and (vii) His parents are old aged and his mother remains usually ill and his 02 younger brothers, his wife and his 02 children depend upon him. Thereafter, the Revisional Authority had rejected the prayer of the petitioner in para 5 and para 6 of its order. 15 2025:JHHC:38769 22. So far as order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the Inspector General (i.e. Respondent No. 3), it is evident that same is non- speaking and cryptic order has been passed without discussing the order on record and the Respondent No. 3 has merely taken the brief note of the facts and which shows that it has also been passed in violation of principles of natural Justice by passing a non-speaking order. No reason has been signed for concurring with the finding of the Disciplinary Authority i.e Senior Commandant, C.I.S.F- Respondent No. 5 and also for concurring with the finding of Appellate Order dated 07.09.2015 (Annexure-5) passed by the DIG i.e. Respondent no. 4 and thus the order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the Revisional Authority is liable to be set-aside on this ground . 23. Although the Revisional Authority is not required to pass an elaborate order but at least, he was to require to look into human aspect also. The Authority has merely observed that the petitioner had wore Helmet and Bullet Proof Jacket while arriving at to Morcha by coming out from his Barrack and also created a panic among the other duty personnels which is not correct. The petitioner had been confronted only with the Post Commander Md. Imran and no one had seen any hot discussion or talks between the petitioner and said Post Commander Md. Imran . 24. The Revisional Authority also observed that the petitioner had not handed over his Service Rifle to the Post Commander. Although several witnesses P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W.4, P.W. 5 namely Manga, S.B. Bari, Md. Imran and R.H. Choudhari respectively had seen that the petitioner was sitting on a chair and the Post Commander was pacifying him . 16 2025:JHHC:38769 Thus, there is nothing to show that the petitioner had disobeyed the order of his superior. 25. So far as the order dated 13.06.2015 ( Annexure-3) passed by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. Senior Commandant –Respondent No. 5 is concerned, this Court finds that the principles of natural justice have not been followed in course of departmental inquiry by the Inquiry Officer. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was given any opportunity to take assistance of any of his colleague as his defence attendance nor he was warned that Ex-parte enquiry may go against him because he is a mere Constable who was under strong mental depression due to illness of his16 months aged son who was under treatment at AIIMS, New Delhi. 26. As per Para 3 of the impugned order dated 13.06.2015 ( Annexure -3) the Respondent No. 5 had tried to show that sufficient opportunity was given to the charged employee for cross–examining the witnesses and for examining his witnesses and brief note was prepared that the witnesses were examined in the presence of the petitioner but no such record had been brought on record to show that the petitioner was given opportunity to cross- examine those witnesses . 27. It further transpires that P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 8, P.W. 14 and P.W. 15 namely Manga, S.B. Bari, H.R. Chaudhari, Anzum Asgar, R.V. Kuril, Vishwajeet Mandal and B.K. Chaudhari respectively have stated that the petitioner was under mental depression and they have not stated any over act against him but by the Disciplinary Authority relied upon their statements . 17 2025:JHHC:38769 28. The Respondent No. 5 further failed to take notice and human consideration that the child of the petitioner was aged 16 months who was admitted to AIIMS at New Delhi and considering the age of the child and also the condition of the parents of the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority, Senior Commandant could have taken lenient view by giving punishment of Censor, stoppage of certain increments, warning etc. instead of punishment of removal from the service which appears to be too harsh to be adequate rather the punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. 29. The Disciplinary Authority failed to consider that the even the petitioner had not cross-examined the Material Witness P.W. 4 who was the Post Commander and who had also stated that the petitioner was under mental depression for not having been sanctioned leave on account of illness of his child . P.W. 15 stated that the petitioner had only been granted sick leave and he was under depression and he had nothing stated against the petitioner regarding firing rather they had taken soft approach towards his conduct but the Disciplinary Authority as Inquiry Officer had taken action against the petitioner. 30. It has been held in the case of Hardwari Lal vs. State of U. P. and others reported (1999) 8 SCC 582 at paragraph 3,4 and 5 as follows:- “Para 3:- Before us the sole ground urged is as to the non- observance of the principles of natural justice in not examining the complainant. Shri Virender Singh, and witness, Jagdish Ram. The Tribunal as well as the High Court have brashed aside the grievance made by the appellant that 18 2025:JHHC:38769 the non-examination of those two persons has prejudiced his case. Examination of these two witnesses would have revealed as to whether the complaint made by Virender Singh was correct or not and to establish that he was the best person to speak to its veracity. So also, Jagdish Ram, who had accompanied the appellant to the hospital for medical examination, would have been an important witness to prove the state or the condition of the appellant. We do not think the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in thinking that non-examination of these two persons could not be material. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court and the Tribunal erred in not attaching importance to this contention of the appellant.” “ Para 4 :- However, Shri Goel, the learned Addl. Advocate General, State of Uttar Pradesh, has submitted that there was other material which was sufficient to come to the conclusion one way or the other and he has taken us through the same. But while appreciating the evidence on record the impact of the testimony of the complainant cannot be visualised. Similarly, the evidence of Jagdish Ram would also bear upon the state of inebriation, if any, of the appellant.” “ Para 5:- In the circumstances, we are satisfied that there was no proper enquiry held by the authorities and on this short ground we quash the order of dismissal passed against the appellant by setting aside the order made by the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal and direct that the appellant be reinstated in service. Considering the fact of long lapse of time before the date of dismissal and reinstatement and no blame can be put only on the door of the respondents, we think it appropriate to award 50 per cent of the back salary being payable to the appellant. We thus 19 2025:JHHC:38769 allow the appeal filed by the appellant. However, there shall be no order as to costs.” 31. It has been held in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 at paragraph 12 as follows:- “Para 12:- Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 32. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the Judgment in the case of State of Bihar and Others Vs. Phulpari Kumari reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130, however the above judgment is not applicable on the facts and in circumstances of this case. In the above judgment Hon’ble Supreme Court had set-aside the order of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the Patna High Court by observing that the 20 2025:JHHC:38769 High Court can interfere with dismissal order, pursuant to a Departmental Inquiry only in case of “ No evidence”, however in the above case, the Supreme Court had set-aside the order of the High Court on the ground by observing that standard of proof as required in a criminal trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry. Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by the criminal Court where the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge. The above case, was a case of demand of gratification of Rs. 1,50,000/- and raid was conducted and Rs. 1,50,000/- was recovered from the accused-respondent. However, in the instant case, there was evidence that the writ petitioner had arrived for discharging his duty at the sentry point when Post Commander had arrived there and he tried to snatch the service rifle of writ petitioner. Thus, the judgment reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 is not applicable on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. 33. It has been held in the order dated 06.10.2023 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench (Justice S.N. Pathak as then his Lordship was) of this Court in W.P.(S.) No. 1432 of 2016 at paragraph 13 as follows: - “Para 13:- The High Court of Delhi in the case of Chaman Lal Vs. State Bank of India, reported in 2003 (71) DRJ 133, wherein, the Court taking into consideration the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC held that “normally the Court would not substitute a punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, but the Court while coming to the 21 2025:JHHC:38769 conclusion that no loss has been caused to the Bank, directed the disciplinary authority to modify the punishment order”. Relevant para-7 is under:- “In view of the law laid down in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [1988 (1) L.L.N. 42], normally this Court would not substitute a punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority. However, in this case from the perusal of the order of appellate authority while coming to a conclusion that no loss has been caused to the bank still appellate authority has not stated that why dismissal be not substituted. 30 years of services rendered by the petitioner from 1955 to 1985 when show-cause notice was issued has been washed away. Said order shows complete non application of mind whereby denying the terminal benefits to the petitioner. This writ petition is pending in this Court since last 14 years. Petitioner, I have been told is quite old. No useful purpose will be served if case is remanded back to disciplinary authority. Even otherwise during the course of hearing on the last date of hearing, I had directed the respondent to take instructions as to whether the respondent was prepared to take a fresh decision in view of what has been stated above. Sri Arora has informed that he has received instructions that the decision cannot be reviewed and in this regard has placed a letter, dated 21 August, 2003, on record. Therefore, no useful purpose will be served to remit the case again to the respondent. The penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner. The order, dated 17 September, 1986, passed by disciplinary authority order, dated 8 September, 1987, passed by appellate authority and order, dated 4 February, 1989, passed by reviewing authority are hereby quashed. The order of dismissal is hereby quashed.” Thus, it has been held by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court that the High Court can interfere in the penalty of dismissal from the service, if, penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner. 22 2025:JHHC:38769 34. Learned counsel for the Respondents has also relied upon the Judgment in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank and Another reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 at paragraph 16,17,18,19,20 which are as follows:- “Para -16:- In the present case, however, we find that the High Court has, on the one hand directed the appellate authority to take a decision and in the same breath, snatched the discretion by directing the appellate authority to pass a particular order of punishment. In normal course, such an order would clearly be unsustainable, having regard to the legal position outlined above. The peculiar feature, however, is that the High Court has done so proceeding on the presumption that these three respondents are equally and identically placed as the other three employees who had admitted the charges, though this parity is not spelled out in the impugned order. Whether this approach of the High Court is tenable, looking into the facts of this case, is the moot question.” “Para -17:- If there is a complete parity in the two sets of cases, imposing different penalties would not be appropriate as inflicting of any/higher penalty in one case would be discriminatory and would amount to infraction of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That is the ratio of Rajendra Yadav case [Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P., (2013) 3 SCC 73 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 476 : (2013) 2 Scale 416] , already taken note above. On the other hand, if there is some difference, different penalty can be meted out and what should be the quantum is to be left to the appellate authority. However, such a penalty should be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct and cannot be shockingly disproportionate. As per the ratio of Obettee (P) Ltd. case [Obettee (P) Ltd. v. Mohd. Shafiq Khan, (2005) 8 SCC 46 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1075] even if the nature of misconduct committed by the two sets of employees is same, the conduct of one set of employees accepting the guilt and pleading for lenient view would justify lesser punishment to them than the other employees who remained adopted the mode of denial, with the result that charges stood proved ultimately in a full-fledged enquiry conducted against them. In that event, higher penalty can be imposed upon such delinquent employees. It would follow that choosing to take a chance to contest the charges such employees thereafter cannot fall back and say that the penalty in their cases cannot be more than the penalty which is imposed upon those employees who accepted the charges at the outset by tendering unconditional apology. “Para-18:- This, according to us, would be the harmonious reading of Obettee (P) Ltd. [Obettee (P) Ltd. v. Mohd. Shafiq Khan, (2005) 8 SCC 46 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1075] and Rajendra Yadav [Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P., (2013) 3 SCC 73 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 476 : (2013) 2 Scale 416] cases.” “Para 19:- The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 23 2025:JHHC:38769 the courts cannot assume function 19.2. The of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” “Para 20:- It is made clear that such a comparison is permissible only when the other employee(s) who is given lighter punishment was a co-delinquent. Such a comparison is not permissible by citing the cases of other employees, as precedents, in altogether different departmental enquiries.” “Para 21:- Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we may observe that, no doubt the charges in respect of two sets of employees were identical. Though the other set of employees accepted the charges on the first day of enquiry, a factor which is to be kept in mind, is that even those employees had denied the charges in the first instance and accepted the charges only in the departmental enquiry, that too after realising that similar charges had been proved against the respondents herein in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, it was not a case where those employees had expressed unconditional apology in the first instance. This may be a mitigating circumstance for the appellants herein. At the same time, we are of the opinion that all these aspects are to be considered by the appellate authority. The High Court did not look into all these aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass orders imposing a specific penalty only. This direction of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to take a decision imposing appropriate penalty on the respondents herein. We are confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the respondents herein would be given due consideration by the appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav case [Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P., (2013) 3 SCC 73 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 476 : (2013) 2 Scale 416] as well. It would be open to the respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on the basis of which the respondents want to contend that they should be given same three employees. Such a to other treatment as meted out 24 2025:JHHC:38769 representation will be given within 15 days from today. The appellate authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the appeals afresh within 2 months from today.” However, the above judgment supports the case of the petitioner. 35. So far the inquiry report is concerned which has been enclosed as Annexure-“A” to the Supplementary Affidavit dated 11.04.2022 filed on behalf of the Respondents through one Sumant Singh who was posted as Senior Commandant, C.I.S.F., 2nd Reserve Battalion , Ranchi and which also contains the statements of P.W. 1 to P.W. 15 from page 181 to page 207 whereas page 155 to page 180 is an inquiry report submitted by B.D. Lahoriya Inspector / Inquiry Officer, C.I.S.F . 36. It appears that the Inquiry Officer had referred the statements of P.W. 1 to P.W.9 and P.W. 11 to P.W. 15 respectively in detail. It has also been recorded by the Inquiry Officer that no witness was produced by the charge employee in defence of his case and as such the evidence of no witness of the petitioner was recorded by the Inquiry Officer . 37. However, the Inquiry Officer, apart from referring the statement of P.W. 1 to P.W. 9 in detail and P.W. 11 to P.W. 15 respectively in detail, had also examined the petitioner which runs from page 163 to page 165. Although, the Inquiry Officer was not required to ask question from the petitioner regarding the occurrence in “ Question and Answer form” because he was appointed by the Disciplinary Authority for charges leveled against him and he had to evaluate and appreciate the statement and evidence of witness produced by the C.I.S.F. i.e. Employer and was required to give an opportunity to the petitioner to produce 25 2025:JHHC:38769 the defence witness in support his case but Inquiry Officer himself acted as a Judge by asking the delinquent charged employee i.e the petitioner in “ Question and Answer form” which can not be said to be permissible as he travelled beyond his jurisdiction. The Inquiry Officer has to mainly evaluate and consider the evidence of the witnesses produced by the Employer in support of its charges but he himself acted as a Prosecutor instead of keeping the role of an Inquiry Officer . This also make Inquiry vitiated as the Inquiry Officer had not remained an independent person in the capacity of an Inquiry Officer . 38. So far as, evidence of the witnesses by produced employee is concerned. P.W. 1 is Bhupendra Singh Assistant Commandant, C.I.S.F who stated the he learnt about the occurrence on 24.10.2014 at around 01.20 hours in night from telephone and he learnt from Md Imran that one Constable Brajbhan Singh i.e the petitioner had fired four (04) round of bullet but there is no harm and loss. Then P.W. 1 is Bhupendra Singh arrived at place of occurrence that Md. Imran had got sat the petitioner near his chair and was pacifying him and his face was red and disturbed as he informed that there is some conspiracy against him and constable Uttam (P.W 10) and Constable Mandal (P.W. 13) were calling him by making the miss calls. His duty hour was 01.00 at morcha No. 5 and as he thought from miss call that there is conspiracy against him and he had wore Bullet Proof Jacket and Helmet in the Barrack and he arrived at Morcha No. 5 from other way by leaving general way and when Sentry put torch light upon his face and they did not open the door and he asked them to open the door but they did 26 2025:JHHC:38769 not open the door and due to which he thought that there will be assault upon him. Hence, he sat in the bushes by taking position and then someone called him and when he went near morcha that someone tried to caught his Rifle but he could not identify that person. In the meantime, he cocked the rifle in support of his defence and fired. Later on he learnt that his Post Commander was calling him. He also informed that he had got 16 months child and having severe Neuro problem. Earlier he was posted in H.E.C., Ranchi and living with his wife and child but after being transferred to C.C. L Kargali posting, he had taken leave in August for the purpose of treatment of his children and his parents were living in New Delhi where his child was under treatment. He also stated about his pass history of “Insomnia” for taking medicine of sleeping but he had not disclosed the said fact. He had also sought permission and leave from the Assistant Commandant Sri Manga (P.W. 2). Thus, it is clear that P.W. 1 Bhupendra Singh has not supported the case of the employer rather the employee that the appellant was called by some unknown persons in his name which he could not identified and then said person tried to snatch his rifle then there was firing in order to save his rifle. Even the petitioner was found mentally disturbed due to illness of his 16 months aged son. Even P.W. 1 is not the eye witness of the occurrence. However, the Inquiry Officer has relied upon the statement of P.W.1 to held the petitioner guilty which is not correct. 27 2025:JHHC:38769 39. Similarly, P.W. 2 Sri Manga Assistant Commandant, C.I.S.F has also stated the same fact and stated that he learnt about the occurrence from one Hemant Kumar. He was asked to he had gone to duty for wearing Bullet Proof Jacket and helmet for joining duty at morcha No. 5 by leave main way and arrived from other way, however, Sentry posted in, did not open the door but Constable B. Srinivasan and constable S.V. Suryanarayan allegedly noticed his suspicious activity and informed Post Commander Md. Imran , then Md. Imran came from his barrack and called the petitioner by voice and when the petitioner arrived near Md. Imran and they he cocked his rifle. In the meantime the barrel of his gun was pointed the earth but Constable – petitioner made four (04) round of firing. Thereafter one A. Subhas and Resham Das took control of rifle. He also stated to be disturbed due to illness of his son. He also stated that the son of the petitioner was ill and he was suffering from illness from his birth. The petitioner also applied for leave for treatment of his son which was not granted. Thus, it is clear that even P.W. 2 had not alleged the over act against the petitioner and he was not an eye- witness of the occurrence. 40. P.W. 3 is Inspector who also stated the same facts as stated by P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and stated that P.W. 1 had not given any reason of firing but he learnt from the petitioner that his child was ill. Even P.W. 3 constable R.S. Choudhary had stated that the petitioner was suffering from mental disturbance. Thus P.W. 3 has also not supported the case of C.I.S.F. as he not seen the petitioner near Md. Imran . 41. P.W. 4 Md. Imran is Post-Commander and he had stated about the incident and had stated about impulsive and 28 2025:JHHC:38769 negligent acts of the petitioner as Inquiry Officer on the basis of his statement, has held in guilty. 42. P.W 5 also arrived much after the occurrence and hence P.W. 5 was also not an eye-witness of the occurrence. P.W. 6 is G.D.K. Purshudar whereas Even P.W. 7 is an Expert who had examined the Rifle and found carbon of the pistol which showed firing and his report was marked as Exhibit- 1 . P.W .8 is R. V. Kurrie who was Formal witness and had produced expense voucher as evidence. He was also not cross-examined by the petitioner. P.W. 9 is Constable A. Subhas, however he stated that on hearing the alarm of Post Commander Md. Imran, he arrived at the place of occurrence by wearing Bullet Proof Jacket and helmet and had seen the petitioner and Post Commander and later on the magazine was removed from the revolver . P.W .11 had also stated that he arrived at the place of occurrence after 10-15 minutes on alarm made by Sentry. He denied for calling from his mobile to the mobile phone to the petitioner. 43. P.W 12 is S.P. Suryanarayan who also stated the same fact P.W. 1 and the P.W. 12 arrived at place of occurrence and on hearing alarm of Post Commander and having arrived with A. Subhas and Constable Resham Das on hearing gun short fire. However, Post Commander and two others had controlled the petitioner and had snatched his rifle, explosive. However, this P.W. 12 was examined by the petitioner for asking him for not using “Duggle Light” for identification for unknown person, though there was night vision camera and to which the witness replied that he had thrown torch light but 29 2025:JHHC:38769 could not identified the person and hence he had not opened the door. He was also questioned that the other persons including checking officer used that way also. He admitted that the petitioner had wore Bullet Proof Jacket and halmet before coming to duty and going other way and hence witness P.W. 12 had not opened the door. However, P.W.12 also admitted that he also wore Bullet Proof Jacket and helmet at the time of occurrence. Thus, the evidence of P.W. 12 clearly shows that the petitioner had wore Bullet Proof Jacket on duty but he had informed the unnatural act of the petitioner as the suspected act and even P.W. 12 was also wearing Bullet Proof jacket and helmet and he had also not used night vision camera and “Duggle Light” for identification of the person arriving at duty place. Thus, the evidence of P.W. 12 creates doubt. 44. P.W .13 is Constable Resham Das who stated that while he was returning at .1.05 hours from morcha no. 1 then Post Commander came outside from barrack and asking and calling the petitioner in front of morcha no.6 and then constable Brajbhan Singh i.e. the petitioner arrived from morcha no. 5 and started talking with Post Commander and started complaining that despite requesting several times the Sentry had not opened the Morcha No. 5. The Post Commander asked him to cool down and hand over the rifle but the constable Brajbhan Singh cocked the Rifle and this constable Brajbhan Singh was wearing Bullet Proof Jacket and helmet and hence the Post Commander caught the barrel of Rifle and pushed it to the earth and asked the petitioner to remain cool but in the meantime Brajbhan Singh fired from his SLR three (03) round. The Constable Brajbhan Singh tried to 30 2025:JHHC:38769 release himself from his clutches and both Post Commander and the petitioner fell down and one round firing was again made however on alarm raised by Post Commander, he i.e P.W .13 and other Constable A. Subhas arrived there and snatched the rifle from him and tried to pacify the petitioner . Thus, even the evidence of P.W. 13 reveals that the barrel of SLR rifle was pointed out at earth then firing was made. He also said that he arrived after firing. Thus, he had not seen the actual occurrence, however his statement was relied by the Inquiry Officer . Thus, the evidence of P.W. 13 is contradictory from prosecution witness as P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 5 to P.W. 9 P.W. 11 and P.W. 12 except P.W. 10 who was not examined. 45. P.W. 14 is G.D. Vishwajeet Mandal, he heard noise of firing and switch on siron and then he arrived in the office of Deputy Commandant after 30 minutes. Thus, the evidence of P.W. 14 reveals that he only heard the firing and had not stated anything against the petitioner. P.W 15 is formal witness B.K. Choudhary who used to prepare confidential note and he also stated that the petitioner was suffering from mental ailment and insomnia and prior to occurrence his behabour was good with others and his ACR was very good but in this case he has shown impulsive and weak action . 46. Thus, it is evident except the evidence of P.W. 4 Md . Imran, there is none to say that as to how actual incident happened and except P.W.11 and P.W. 13 no one had arrived at the place of occurrence to see the constable Brajbhan Singh and Post Commander Md. Imran. . 31 2025:JHHC:38769 47. From conjoint reading of evidence P.W 4 Md Imran P.W. 11 and P.W. 13, it is evident that barrel of rifle was pointed towards the surface when firing was made and even the petitioner had not identified the Post-Commander Md. Imran, P.W. 4 had stated that the Sentry was not opening the door . However the Inquiry Officer cross-examined him in detail several question i.e. more than 20 question were asked as the prosecutor after having examined all the witnesses which he should have avoided and which shows that the Inquiry Officer was not fair to the petitioner. 48. From perusal of impugned order dated 13.06.2015 ( Annexure-3) issued by the Senior Commandant, it is evident that the Disciplinary Authority had simply endorsed the finding of the Inquiry Officer and had relied upon the statements of witnesses of those persons i.e P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W.5, P.W.9, P.W. 12, P.W.14 and P.W. 15 who had not supported the case of CISF all of most of them had stated that the petitioner was suffering from Insomnia and his child was ill and his father and mother were old aged persons and who were living at New Delhi . However, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed him from the charges merely on the basis of inquiry report . 49. It further reveals from the order dated 13 .06.2015 (Annexure-3) that the disproportionate punishment was imposed upon the petitioner and hence the same is liable to be set-aside . 50. It has been held in the case of S.R.Tewari Vs Union of India & Anr. reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 at paragraph para -24 to 29 as follows:- “Para 24:- The question of interference on the quantum of punishment has been considered by this Court in a catena of judgments and it was held that if the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would be arbitrary, and thus, would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 32 2025:JHHC:38769 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] , this Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 620-21, paras 25 & 27)” “Para 25:- . But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. *** “Para 27:- In the present case the punishment is so strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review.” (emphasis supplied) the issue of proportionality, the court can also consider (See also Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806 : AIR 1997 SC 3387] , State of U.P. v. J.P. Saraswat [(2011) 4 SCC 545 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 718] , Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India [(2012) 6 SCC 369 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 152] and High Court of Patna v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad [(2012) 6 SCC 357 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 140 : AIR 2012 SC 2319] .)” “Para 25:- In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44 : AIR 1996 SC 484] , this Court after examining its various earlier decisions observed that in exercise of the power of judicial review, the court cannot “normally” substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an authority “shocks the conscience” of the court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. While the examining circumstances under which the misconduct was committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced the accused to act in a certain manner though he had not intended to do so. The court may further examine the effect, if the order is set aside or substituted by some other penalty. However, it is only in very rare cases that the court might, to shorten the litigation, think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority.” “Para26:- In V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC [(2005) 7 SCC 338 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 69 : AIR 2005 SC 3417] , this Court considered the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the charges and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found to be “shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards.” In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. However, in order to shorten the litigation, in exceptional and rare cases, the court itself can impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof.” “Para 27:- In State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak [(2008) 7 SCC 580 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 431 : AIR 2008 SC 2862] this Court observed that : (SCC p. 584, paras 13-14) “13. … A court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. 14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. … The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review.” “Para 28:- The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference by the court is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the 33 2025:JHHC:38769 conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. (Vide Union of India v. BodupalliGopalaswami [(2011) 13 SCC 553 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 94] and Sanjay Kumar Singh v. Union of India [(2011) 14 SCC 692 : AIR 2012 SC 1783] .) “Para 29. In Union of India v. R.K. Sharma [(2001) 9 SCC 592 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 767 : AIR 2001 SC 3053] , this Court explained the observations made in Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] observing that if the charge was ridiculous, the punishment was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would warrant in Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit interference. However, Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] are not to be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising the power of judicial review, interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on compassionate grounds.” observations said the 51. It has been held in the case of C.L. Subramaniam Vs Collector of Customs, Cochin reported in (1972) 3 SCC 542 at paragraph para -14 as follows:- “Para 14:- The grievance of the appellant was that he was pitted against a trained prosecutor and not that Sivaraman was a legal practitioner. The Disciplinary Authority did not consider that grievance. It brushed aside the request of the appellant on the ground that Sivaraman was not a legal practitioner, a consideration which was not relied on by the appellant. The grounds urged by the appellant in support of his request for permission to engage a legal practitioner were by no means irrelevant. The fact that the case against the appellant was being handled by a trained prosecutor was a good ground for allowing the appellant to engage a legal practitioner to defend him lest the scales should be weighed against him. The Disciplinary Authority completely ignored that circumstance. Therefore, that authority clearly failed to exercise the power conferred on it under the rule. It is not unlikely that the Disciplinary Authority's refusal to permit the appellant to engage a legal practitioner in the circumstances mentioned earlier had caused serious prejudice to the appellant and had amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself.” 52. It has been held in the case of Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others reported in (1983) 2 SCC 442 at paragraph part 5, para 10 to 15 as follows:- “Para 5:- The first contention canvassed on behalf of the appellant was that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry inasmuch as while the Department was represented by a Presenting Officer, till the first three witnesses are examined he was not given an opportunity to seek assistance of an officer in his defence. In para 3(vii) of the special leave petition, the appellant has averred that he was not informed and was not told that there will be a Presenting Officer on behalf of the Department till three witnesses were examined on January 8, 1975. He proceeded to state that the petitioner being a government employee in 34 2025:JHHC:38769 Class IV service of the level of a Forest Guard, he could not and was not expected to cross-examine witnesses pitted against him……..” “Para 10:_- Let us make it abundantly clear that we are not sitting in appeal over the findings of the Enquiry Officer. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court does not function as a Court of appeal over the findings of Disciplinary Authority. But where the finding is utterly perverse, the court can always interfere with the same. We may refer in this connection to Union of India v.H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 4 SCR 718, 728 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38 : (1964) 9 FLR 161] . Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: “It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311(2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charge framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence.” After applying this test in that case, the Court proceeded to have a close look at the evidence that was led in the case and in the circumstances of the case rejected the evidence of Shri Rajagopalan, who claimed to have given the bribe and reached the conclusion that the finding of the Government holding the delinquent officer guilty of accepting bribe was perverse and unsupported by any evidence. More or less the facts before us almost lead to the same conclusion.” “Para 11:- Mr Talukdar, learned counsel for the State, however, contended that at any rate failure to supervise felling of the trees which were not shown to have hammer-mark would permit an inference that there was negligence in performance of duty. If no tree can be felled without the hammer-mark then the contention of Shri Talukdar merits consideration. No such rule was brought to our notice. However, we would proceed on the assumption that such is the rule. In that event it can be said that there was some negligence in performance of duty of the appellant and his negligence in performance of duty was likely to cause some loss to the Government. But the fact is that no loss is caused. The man who felled the trees after demarcation of boundary conceded illicit felling and made good the loss by paving compensation. The default of the appellant is in not checking the hammer- mark. The Enquiry Officer may in these circumstances feel that there was some negligence in performance of the duty.” “Para 12:- In the facts and circumstances of this case herein threadbare discussed, we are of the opinion that the appellant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and accordingly the enquiry and consequential order of removal from service are vitiated.” “Para 13:- That conclusion poses another question as to what relief we should give in this appeal. Ordinarily where the disciplinary enquiry is shown to have been held in violation of principle of natural justice, the enquiry would be vitiated and the order based on such enquiry would be quashed by issuance of a writ of certiorari. It is well settled that in such a situation, it would be open to the Disciplinary Authority to hold the enquiry afresh. That would be the normal consequence.” “Para 14:- We invited Mr Talukdar, learned counsel for the respondent State to address us on the question whether the game of holding the fresh enquiry is worth the battle. Moreso looking to the fact that there is a very minor infraction of duty leading to a trivial charge of negligence in performance of duty which has caused no loss to the Government, we are of the opinion that it would not be fair to this low-paid Class IV government servant to face the hazards of a fresh enquiry.” 35 2025:JHHC:38769 “Para 15:- The question is once we quash the order, is it open to us to give any direction which would not permit a fresh enquiry to be held? After all what is the purpose of holding a fresh enquiry? Obviously, it must be to impose some penalty. It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Having been influenced by all these relevant considerations, we are of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by a fresh enquiry. What option is open to us in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 to make an appropriate order. We believe that justice and fairplay demand that we make an order of minor penalty here and now without being unduly technical apart jurisdiction, we are fortified in this view by the decision of this Court in Hindustan Steels Ltd., Rourkela v.A.K. Roy [(1969) 3 SCC 513 : AIR 1970 SC 1401 : (1970) 3 SCR 343 : (1970) 1 LLJ 228] where this Court after quashing the order of reinstatement proceeded to examine whether the party should be left to pursue further remedy. Other alternative was to remand the matter that being a case of an industrial dispute to the Tribunal. It is possible that on such a remand, this Court further observed, that the Tribunal may pass an appropriate order but that would mean prolonging the dispute which would hardly be fair to or conducive to the interest of the parties. This Court in such circumstances proceeded to make an appropriate order by awarding compensation. We may adopt the same approach. Keeping in view the nature of misconduct, gravity of charge and no consequential loss, a penalty of withholding his increments with future effect will meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, two increments with future effect of the appellant be withheld and he must be paid 50 percent of the arrears from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement.” 53. It has been held in the case of Ayayubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 at paragraph 24 to 30 as follows: SC 1963 1719] “Para :- 24. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan [AIR 1961 SC 1623] held that the rules of natural justice require that a party must be given the opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence upon which he relies, and further that, the evidence of the opposite party should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross- examining the witnesses examined by that party. Not providing the said opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, would violate the principles of natural justice. (See , Meenglas Tea India v. T.R. Varma [AIR 1957 SC 882] also Union of Estate v. Workmen [AIR , Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar [AIR 1964 SC 708] , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [(2008) 3 SCC 279 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 850 : AIR 2008 SC 876] , Rachpal Singh v. Gurmit Kaur [(2009) 15 SCC 88 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 549 : AIR 2009 SC 2448] , Biecco Lawrie Ltd. v. State of W.B. [(2009) 10 SCC 32 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 729 : AIR 2010 SC 142] and State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha [(2010) 2 SCC 772 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 675 : AIR 2010 SC 3131] .)” “Para 25:- In Lakshman Exports Ltd. v. CCE [(2005) 10 SCC 634] , this Court, while dealing with a case under the Central Excise Act, 1944, considered a similar issue i.e. permission with respect to the cross-examination of a witness. In the said case, the assessee had specifically asked to be allowed to cross-examine the representatives of the firms concerned, to establish that the goods in question had been accounted for in their books of accounts, and that excise duty had been paid. The Court held that such a request could not be turned down, as the denial of the right to cross-examine, would amount to a denial of the right to be heard i.e. audi alteram partem.” 36 2025:JHHC:38769 “Para 26:- In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [(2008) 3 SCC 279 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 850 : AIR 2008 SC 876] , this Court considered a case under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and held as follows : (SCC p. 295, para 45) “45. If some facts are to be proved by the landlord, indisputably the occupant should get an opportunity to cross-examine. The witness who intends to prove the said fact has the right to cross-examine the witness. This may not be provided by under the statute, but it being a part of the principles of natural justice should be held to be indefeasible right.” (emphasis added) In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the right of cross- examination is an integral part of the principles of natural justice.” “Para 27:- In K.L. Tripathi v. SBI [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62 : AIR 1984 SC 273] , this Court held that, in order to sustain a complaint of the violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity of cross- examination, it must be established that some prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the procedure followed. A party, who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence on record, or of the testimony gathered behind his back, cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent grievance raised by him, stating that no opportunity of cross-examination was provided to him, specially when the same was not requested, and there was no dispute regarding the veracity of the statement. (See also Union of India v. P.K. Roy [AIR 1968 SC 850] and Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore [(1971) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1972 SC 32] .) In Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. Sri Rama Krishna Rice Mill [(2006) 3 SCC 74 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 467 : AIR 2006 SC 1445] , this Court held : (SCC p. 80, para 9) “9. In order to establish that the cross-examination is necessary, the consumer has to make out a case for the same. Merely stating that the statement of an officer is being utilised for the purpose of adjudication would not be sufficient in all cases. If an application is made requesting for grant of an opportunity to cross-examine any official, the same has to be considered by the adjudicating authority who shall have to either grant the request or pass a reasoned order if he chooses to reject the application. In that event an adjudication being concluded, it shall be certainly open to the consumer to establish before the appellate authority as to how he has been prejudiced by the refusal to grant an opportunity to cross-examine any official.” “Para 28:- The meaning of providing a reasonable opportunity to show cause against an action proposed to be taken by the Government, is that the government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges, on the basis of which an inquiry is held. The government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so only when he is told what the charges against him are. He can, therefore, do so by cross- examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that, the government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against him. Unless the said statements are provided to the government servant, he will not be able to conduct an effective and useful cross-examination.” “Para 29:- In Rajiv Arora v. Union of India [(2008) 15 SCC 306 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 977 : AIR 2009 SC 1100] this Court held : (SCC p. 310, paras 13-14) “13. … Effective cross-examination could have been done as regards the correctness or otherwise of the report, if the contents of them were proved. The principles analogous to the provisions of the Evidence Act as also the principles of natural justice demand that the maker of the report should be examined, save and except in cases where the facts are admitted or the witnesses are not available for cross-examination or similar situation. … 14. The High Court in its impugned judgment proceeded to consider the issue on a technical plea, namely, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant by such non- examination. If the basic principles of law have not been complied with or there has been a gross violation of the principles of natural justice, the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction of judicial review.” “Para 30:- The aforesaid discussion makes it evident that, not only should the opportunity of cross-examination be made available, but it should be one of effective cross-examination, so as to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice. In the absence of such an opportunity, it cannot be held that the 37 2025:JHHC:38769 matter has been decided in accordance with law, as cross-examination is an integral part and parcel of the principles of natural justice.” Thus, it has been held in the above judgment that right to cross-examination is an integral part and parcel of the principles of natural justice. 54. It has been held in the case of Mahesh Chand Vs Union of India & Ors. reported in (2007) SCC Online Del 870 at paragraph 7,8 and 9 as follows:- Para 7:- The present is, in our opinion, one such case where the dismissal was totally disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct committed by the petitioner. The first incident involving an overstay of 32 days was a mix of celebration in the family followed by the demise of his father. The second started with the demise of his mother and ended with his illness. The inquiry did not show that the story about the death of his parents during the two intervals was a false claim. The illness was also supported by the prescriptions which the petitioner produced but was disbelieved only because he had not claimed any reimbursement. In the totality of these circumstances, the order of dismissal passed by the respondents cannot, in our view, be sustained.” “Para 8:- The next question is whether we should ourselves decide about the punishment which would meet the ends of justice or leave it to the disciplinary authority to do so. The predominant legal opinion on the subject is that it is only in rare cases that the Court should take upon itself the function of the disciplinary Authority in determining the quantum of punishment. The present may not be one such case where we ought to do that. The proper course in our opinion is to leave the question of lesser punishment, which the petitioner may be given, to be determined by the disciplinary authority.: “Para 9:- In the result, we allow this petition; set aside the impugned order and direct the reinstatement of the petitioner in service. We leave it open to the disciplinary authority to decide about the lesser punishment, if any, that may be imposed upon the petitioner. The competent authority shall also determine the treatment to be given to the period between the date he was dismissed from service and the date he is reinstated in accordance with the rules, keeping in view the lesser punishment that may be imposed upon him. Parties are left to bear their own costs. The petitioner shall report back to his unit for further orders to be passed by the disciplinary authority on 30th July, 2007.” 55. It has been held in the case of General Manager Personnel , Syndicate Bank and Others reported in (2025) 3 SCC 601 at paragraph 30 and 31as follows: 38 2025:JHHC:38769 “Para 30:- The respondent was employed in the appellant Bank on 5-8-1985 and had an unblemished record for more than 21 years till 11-6-2007. We have perused the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for short “the Disciplinary Regulations”). Under Regulation 4, there is a provision for imposing minor penalties and major penalties. The respondent has already reached the age of superannuation. In our view, the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to the misconduct established against the respondent and his unblemished career for a long time.” “Para 31:- However, fact remains that the misconduct alleged and proved against the respondent was of a serious nature considering the fact that a very high standard of conduct is expected from a Branch Manager of a bank. Considering the facts of the case, we are of the view that a minor penalty, as provided in Regulation 4(e) of the Disciplinary Regulations, would be appropriate. The penalty will be of reducing the respondent to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a period of one year, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension.” 56. It transpires that even the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had held that the High Court can interfere in quantum of punishment if there is violation of principles of nature justice and had observed that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of principles of nature justice. 57. It further evident from the judgment reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 that the delinquent may be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party and by not providing the said opportunity to cross- examine witnesses, it would violate the principles of natural justice. 58. It is further evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had further observed that not only should the opportunity of cross-examination be made available, but it should be one of effective cross-examination, so as to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice. In the absence of such an opportunity, it cannot be held that the matter has been decided in accordance with law, as cross-examination is an integral part and parcel of the principles of natural justice.” 59 . It has been held in the case of S.R. Tewari Vs Union of India & Anr. Reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 that 39 2025:JHHC:38769 scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the charges and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found to be “shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards.” In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 60. Thus, in view of the judgement upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court mentioned above and on the facts and in the circumstances, the Final Decisional Order of Approval of Removal dated 19.01.2016 (Annexure- 6), the Appellate Court order dated 07.09.2015 (Annexure- 4), Removal order dated 13.06.2015 (Annexure- 3) are set-aside and the matter remitted to the Respondent No. 5 for passing a fresh order in accordance with law on the point of quantum of punishment, except the punishment of dismissal, removal and termination from the services of the petitioner by imposing him some punishment. 61. Thus, this W.P.(S) No. 2880 of 2016 is allowed with the observation mentioned above. Bibha/ (Sanjay Prasad, J.) 40