Vidya Niwas Singh v. ……
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S). No. 2587 of 2013 Vidya Niwas Singh ---------- Versus ……… Petitioner. 1. Central Coalfields Ltd., Ranchi through its Chairman-cum- Managing Director. 2. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coalfields Ltd., Ranchi. 3. Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Ltd., Ranchi. 4. Chief General Manager, Central Coalfields Ltd., Argada Area, Sirka Colliery, Hazaribagh. 5. Staff Officer (M)(A), Sirka Colliery, Hazaribagh ………. Respondents. ---------- CORAM: THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N.PATHAK For the Petitioner ----------- :
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, Advocate Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha, Advocate Mr. Akchansh Kishore, Advocate Mr. Saurav Sagar, Advocate Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, Advocate Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate For the CCL : 07/06.04.2023. Heard the parties. Prayers made ---------- 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the appellate
Decision
order as contained in letter No. PD/IR- L/Argada/VNS/2012/1170 dated 17.03.2012 and order dated 02.04.2003 dismissing the petitioner from services. Petitioner has further prayed that after quashment of the said orders, the respondents may be directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. Factual Matrix 3. Vide Circular No. PD/BR/8/2, dated 02.01.1978, the Voluntary Retirement Scheme for its workers was floated by the respondent-CCL. The object of the aforesaid scheme was to provide an opportunity to the workers who have crossed the age of 45 years but were not above 58 years of age to retire from the service and in lieu thereof, the employment was to be provided to one of their relatives of the category specified in the said 2 Scheme. In pursuance of the said Scheme, one of the then employees of CCL namely, Karuna who was holding the post of Trammer, Category-III in the Sirka Colliery applied for the voluntary retirement in the prescribed form proposing for the employment of the petitioner in his place. The application of said Karuna was accepted communicating about his retirement w.e.f. 24.08.1978 and the petitioner was appointed in his place vide appointment letter dated 10.08.1978. At the time of appointment, the petitioner submitted his matriculation certificate, which shows his full name and father’s name. In the meanwhile the petitioner persuaded his education and earned several promotions. Subsequently, one N.E. Horo, president of Jharkhand Mazdoor Sangh, vide his letter No. 155/92 dated 05.05.1992 complained against a number of persons including the petitioner for allegedly having secured jobs by impersonation. Subsequently, the said N.E. Horo vide letter No. 243/92 dated 18.11.1994, requested for dropping of cases as after personal verification, he was satisfied that no proceedings be carried-out. However, the respondents initiated enquiry into the matter and issued charge-sheet dated 10.12.1998 against the erring personnel and reply was sought for. Thereafter, the petitioner demanded for furnishing the copies of certain documents which were in possession of the respondents and were relevant for the purpose of giving effective explanation however, the respondents refused to supply a copy of those documents. Consequently, the petitioner submitted his reply assailing the charge-sheet on various counts including the grounds of non-furnishing of the information and documents asked for as above. Being not satisfied with reply submitted by the petitioner, the departmental proceeding was initiated by appointment of Enquiry Officer, who after enquiry, submitted his report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. Thereafter, 2nd show-cause notice along with copy of enquiry report was given to the petitioner. In response to the same petitioner submitted his reply. 4. However, being not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner, Director (Personnel), CCL Ranchi vide is order dated 02.04.2003, dismissed him from services. Thereafter, the petitioner 3 preferred departmental appeal against the order of dismissal, however, the said appeal also stood dismissed vide order dated 17.03.2012 Hence, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. Submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner 5. Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order being unconstitutional, illegal and arbitrary are fit to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel further argues that the order of dismissal and the appellate order are also vitiated on account of concealment and denial to supply the records relating to the departmental proceeding exonerating Sri Bhagwan Singh, the Senior P.O., Sirka who was the official responsible for petitioner’s appointment. Learned counsel further argues that infliction of such prejudices upon the petitioner and non-advertence by the appellate authority to such germane aspects tantamounts to subjecting the petitioner to serious arbitrariness and violation of principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further argues that the petitioner had submitted his matriculation certificate at the time of appointment in which his full name and his father’s name were mentioned. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had concealed his full name and other relevant details from his Employer. Learned counsel further argues that from the date of his appointment i.e. August, 1978 onwards, the petitioner continued to work as piece rated worker working efficiently and diligently and no adverse entry has been made in his entire service records. Thereafter, the services of petitioner was regularized and during the course of service, he earned several promotion and in all the said orders, the petitioner’s full name was mentioned. Learned counsel further argues that during the intervening period, the petitioner was not in gainful employment and had to depend upon the financial help extended by his relatives and friends. Submissions of learned counsel for the Respondents 6. Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent- CCL vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the petitioner concealed the fact at the time of 4 seeking employment under VR Scheme that he is not the son of real brother of late Karuna and by fraudulent means he obtained employment in CCL by declaring himself to be the nephew of late Karuna while he was actually not the nephew of ex-employee. Thus, his dismissal is commensurate with the misconduct committed by him as proved during the course of departmental enquiry and as such, the punishment awarded is appropriate considering the gravity of misconduct. The appellate order was passed upon due consideration of the materials on record which included the perusal of appeal, the service book of the petitioner, VR Scheme, the appointment letter and the enquiry proceedings. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, the writ petition being devoid of any merit is fit to be dismissed outrightly. 7. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent-CCL places heavy reliance on the following judgments: (I) R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, [(2004) 2 SCC 105]; & (II) Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India, [2023 SCC OnLine SC 27] Findings of the Court 8. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition for the following facts and reasons: (I) The petitioner has been held guilty by the Enquiry Officer and thereafter, he was saddled with punishment of dismissal from service, which has been later on affirmed by the Appellate Authority. No grounds have been made out for differing with the two orders i.e. the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority. (II) Admittedly, the petitioner was aware of the fact that he was not the son of real brother of Shri Karun and as such, he concealed the true facts before the respondent-authorities at the time of his appointment. As per the V.R. Scheme applicable at the time of appointment of petitioner i.e. in the year 1978, in lieu of voluntary retirement of an employee, the son, son-in-law or the son of real 5 brother may be considered for appointment. Admittedly, petitioner was not the son of real brother of Sri Karuna, an ex-employee of Sirka Colliery and as such, he was not eligible to be considered for employment. (III) From perusal of the documents brought on record and the impugned orders it is crystal clear that petitioner obtained employment by fraudulent means by concealing the material facts. Much has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that no fingers were raised at the time of appointment, the certificates were verified and thereafter, petitioner was also considered for promotion and he had a bright career and after perusal of his service records, his services were found to be satisfactory and thus, after long period of service, even if appointment was made concealing the facts, the same does not warrant any interference as petitioner was not responsible for it. These arguments of counsel for the petitioner is totally misconceived and not acceptable to this Court. Any appointment obtained fraudulently, even after long years can be interfered with and only because, the appointment has prolonged for years, the same cannot be said to be justified and cannot be regularized. Time and again, this issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court and it was held that a person who comes by the back door should go by the same door. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers' Assn., reported in (1994) 2 SCC 204 has held as under: 19. ………………. The method of appointment is indeed not calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will always be appointed or that the appointments made will not be on considerations other than merit. In the absence of guidelines, the appointments may be made purely on personal or political considerations, and be arbitrary. This being so those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain the termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who come by the back door have to go by the same door. ……………”. if Emphasis supplied 6 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 1300), after taking into consideration the inconsistent views taken in the cases of Union of India v. Methu Meda [(2022) 1 SCC 1]; Union of India v. Dilip Kumar Mallick [(2022) 6 Scale 108]; Pawan Kumar v. Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 532]; Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited v. Anil Kanwariya [(2021) 10 SCC 136]; Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra [(2019) 17 SCC 696]; had framed a guideline in cases of such appointment. Further, in case of Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 27, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that: “9. …………… that there was deliberate suppression of facts which was an aggravating circumstance. ……………... Such a the well-reasoned and well considered decision of respondent-authorities should not have been interfered by the Single Bench in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when there were no allegations of malafides or of non-observance of rules of natural justice or of breach of statutory rules were attributed against the respondent authorities.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, reported in AIR 1963 SC 776, had observed that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. In case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, “Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on the charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court or Tribunal would be concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with”. 7 10. In the instant case, nothing has been brought out that it was a case of malafide or impugned orders are in complete violation of cardinal principle of natural justice. Ample opportunity was given to the petitioner in course of enquiry and no foully has been pointed-out in the departmental proceeding. 11. Even on quantum of punishment, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Om Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386, considering the Wednesbury Principles and the doctrine of proportionality has clearly held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or the other of the well-known principles. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to satisfy this Court as to whether the order was contrary to law, or whether relevant factors were not considered, or whether irrelevant factors were considered or whether the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. Summing-up the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 has held that, “the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact”. It has further held that, “the constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of R.Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 105 has clearly observed that, “where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud 8 or deceit, such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all.” Since in the instant case, the very appointment is rested on forgery, no statutory right can flow from it and as such, the impugned orders are fully justified. 12. As the petitioner has been found guilty of the charges and has committed gross misconduct right at the time of his initial appointment, the order of dismissal has rightly been passed after following due process of law and without actuated with malafide. This Court is in total agreement with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority as well as of the Appellate Authority. 13. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, logical propositions and judicial pronouncements, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition. The same merits dismissal and is hereby dismissed. kunal/- (Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)