Deo Narayan Prasad @ Deo Narayan Sahu v. The State of Jharkhand, through Labour Commissioner, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi

: Mr. Sachinandan Das, Advocate Mr. Om Prakash Singh, Advocate : Mr. Shubham Gaurav, AC to AAG V : In Person ------ P R E S E N T HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY By the Court:- Heard the parties.

2. This Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inter alia with a prayer to quash the entire proceeding of M.W. Case No.19 of 2008 including the order dated 24.02.2010 passed by the Labour Court, Ranchi, the copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-9 of this Writ Petition whereby and where under the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi 1 W.P.(L) No.2770 of 2010 allowed the application filed by the respondent No.3 on behalf of 47 workmen awarding difference of minimum wages and one time compensation.

3. The brief facts of the case that 47 applicants whose name appears in the final order dated 24.02.2010 passed in M.W. Case No.19 of 2008 worked in the construction of building of the opposite party from 15.02.007 to 23.09.2008. The mason was paid daily wage @ Rs.110/- and the female labourers (Reza) were paid Rs.40/- per day and the male labourers (Coolie) were paid Rs.50/- per day. 47 labourers were engaged for the period of 576 days from 15.02.2007 to

23.09.2008 and the difference between the amount and the minimum wage for the 47 workmen from 15.02.2007 to 23.09.2008 was Rs.2,41,200/-. The writ petitioner who was the opposite party in the labour court in their show-cause filed in the labour court challenged the maintainability of the claim application under Section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act. The writ petitioner/opposite party denied any concern with the huge construction work where the applicants claim to have been engaged as labourers. The opposite party claimed that he has been paying the minimum wages notified by the tribunal. In the labour court, the applicant examined five witnesses while four witnesses were examined by the opposite party. The opposite party also proved three documents which have been marked as Ext. A to Ext. C.

4. D.W.1 stated that he was the Rajmistri (Mason) in the house construction work of the opposite party and 47 labourers were working there and he worked there from 15.02.2007 to 23.09.2008. He further submitted that Rajmistri (Mason) were paid Rs.110/- per day, male labours Rs.50/- per day and female labours Rs.40/- per day and the difference between the minimum and the wages paid for all these 47 labours for the entire period of 576 days from 2 W.P.(L) No.2770 of 2010

15.02.2007 to 23.09.2008 is Rs.2,41,200/-. In his cross-examination, he has stated that building was constructed near Bus Stand and Sanjay Sahu has kept him there. There is absolutely no cross-examination of the D.W.1 regarding his testimony that the differential wage paid and the amount due to 47 workmen for the entire period of 576 days as per the minimum wages paid to them is Rs.2,41,200/-.

6. The D.W.2 to D.W.5 have also corroborated the testimony of the D.W.1. The O.P.W.1 stated that the workers never worked in his house construction work because the house construction work was completed in May, 2007. He has also filed the copy of the tenancy agreement which has been marked as Ext. A, Ext. B and Ext. C for the period 01.11.2005 to 31.06.2006. In his cross-examination, the O.P.W.1 stated that the area of the land is not mentioned in the agreement marked Ext. A, B and C.

7. The O.P.W.2- Chandan Kumar has stated that he was the tenant in the house of the O.P.W.1.

8. The O.P.W.3 is the opposite party No.2 himself. He has stated that after May, 2003 work was done and his wife let out some portion of the house to different person. In his cross-examination, the O.P.W.3 admitted that the non- judicial stamp paper for the agreement is dated 02.03.2006 even though the date of agreement is 01.11.2005.

9. The Labour Court considering the materials available in the record came to the conclusion that the claim of the petitioner is genuine. 47 labourers have worked in the work of construction of the house of opposite party Nos.1 and 2 at Balumath for the period from 15.02.2007 to 23.09.2008 but in order to avoid the claim of the petitioner, the opposite party has filed false agreement dated 3 W.P.(L) No.2770 of 2010

01.11.2005 because admittedly since the non-judicial stamp paper was purchased on 02.03.2006, so, the agreement on 01.11.2005 could not have been executed on such stamp paper before its purchase and considering the area of the land to be 99.5 decimal, it was observed that construction could not be completed thereon before 23.09.2008. So, it appeared to the labour court that the witnesses of the opposite parties are not reliable and it found that the minimum rate of wages have not been paid to Rajmistri(Mason), male and female labourers and allowed the petition under Section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act on contest. The opposite parties were directed to pay the difference of minimum rate of wages of Rs.2,41,200/- and further amount of Rs.2,41,200/- as one time compensation. Thus, to pay a total sum of Rs.4,82,400/- which is to be distributed as per the chart of dues attached with the claim application within thirty days of the order.

10. Mr. Sachinandan Das- learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the labour court failed to appreciate the evidence in the record in its right perspective and unnecessarily without any basis held that the witnesses examined by the opposite parties are not reliable. It is next submitted that the learned labour court ought to have held that the house was constructed by the mother of the writ petitioners in May, 2003 by engaging a contractor and only seven labourers. It is further submitted by Mr. Das that respondent No.3- Anjani Kumar Pandey who claims to be the General Secretary of Jharkhand General Kamgar Union, in order to fulfill his grudge and dissatisfaction of not satisfying his illegal demand by the petitioner No.1 and his wife and the fact that the said Anjani Kumar Pandey threatened the petitioner No.1 and his wife; that he will show how he can extort money from petitioner No.1 and his wife; 4 W.P.(L) No.2770 of 2010 has foisted this false case with ulterior motive. It is next submitted that it has not been mentioned as to what was the wages fixed by the State Government for the schedule work and the different enclosures to the applications reveal that the number of days of work is shown as 576 and 90 days’ wage is due which can be a case covered under the payment of Wages Act or under Section 33 (c) (2) of the I.D. Act but cannot be a case of payment of minimum wages and if the application is treated to be one under Section 33 (c) (2) of the I.D. Act then there is no provision for payment of compensation under Section 33 (c) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, it is submitted that the portion of the order dated 24.02.2010 by which the Labour Court, Ranchi has directed for payment of one time compensation be quashed and set aside. It is next submitted that the labour court ought not have believed the contention of the applicants that they worked for 90 days without payment of wages. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer made in this writ petition be allowed.

11. Respondent No.3 who appears in person draws the attention of this Court towards the counter-affidavit and submits that the application is fit to be dismissed on the ground that there is alternative remedy of the appeal under Section 20 (6) of the Minimum Wages Act. It is next submitted by the respondent No.3 that Section 20 (5) (a) of the Minimum Wages Act, as has been amended by the State of Bihar by Act No.09 of 1988 with effect from 12.02.1988 which is applicable in the State of Jharkhand envisages that at the time of hearing the authority direct the employers to deposit at least 50% of the claim amount with the authority excluding the amount of compensation and the same may be paid to claimant which shall be adjusted with the decreed amount and in order to avoid such payment instead of filing the statutory appeal under 5 W.P.(L) No.2770 of 2010 Section 20 (6) of the said Minimum Wages Act as has been amended by the State of Bihar by Act No.09 of 1988 with effect from 12.02.1988, this writ petition has been filed which is an abuse of process of the court and, thus, the petitioner avoided the deposit at least 50% of the claim amount. It is next submitted that this writ petition has been filed beyond the period of limitation for filing the Minimum Wages Act as this writ petition has been filed on

07.06.2010 i.e. beyond the period of 30 days; which is the limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under the sub-section 26 (A) of the Minimum Wages Act as amended by the State of Bihar by Act No.09 of 1988 with effect from 12.02.1988. Hence, it is submitted that this writ petition, being without any merit, be dismissed.

12. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, this Court is of the considered view that as the impugned order passed in purported exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948; there is a statutory remedy of filing the appeal under Section 20 (6) of the Minimum Wages Act as amended by the State of Bihar by Act No.09 of 1988 with effect from 12.02.1988 but with two riders that such appeal is to be filed within 30 days and under Section 6 (A) of the Minimum Wages Act, the appellate authority if satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for preparing appeal within the period specified under Section 20 (6) as amended by the State of Bihar by Act No.09 of 1988 with effect from 12.02.1988, may allow the appeal to be preferred within thirty more days beyond the prescribed period of limitation but not thereafter and as under Section 20 (5) (a) of the Minimum Wages Act as amended by the State of Bihar by Act No.09 of 6 W.P.(L) No.2770 of 2010 1988 with effect from 12.02.1988, the appellate authority has been vested with the power to direct the employer to deposit at least 50% of the claimed amount with the appellate authority excluding the amount of compensation but the writ petitioner without assigning any plausible reason as to why it has not availed the statutory remedy, has instead filed this writ petition; after the period of limitation prescribed and to avoid taking risk of being directed to pay 50% of the claimed amount to be deposited by it and this is not a case where any cogent reason has been assigned by the writ petitioner regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the labour court to entertain the application under Section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act. Further keeping in view of the settled principle of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 paragraph-7 of which reads as under:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be 7 W.P.(L) No.2770 of 2010 regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168]” of Hills Division It is pertinent to mention here that this is a case where no admissible evidence has not been considered by the labour court nor the labour court having admitted any inadmissible evidence and as this is not a case based on no evidence and the fact that the claim of the applicants made in their deposition, has remained unchallenged in the cross-examination of the P.W.1 and other witnesses examined on behalf of the applicant and thereby in the absence of any cross examination it has to be treated to have been admitted the opposite party-writ petitioner, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case where the prayer made by the petitioner is to be allowed.

13. Accordingly, this writ petition, being without any merit, is dismissed. (Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated the 27th of February, 2024 AFR/ Animesh 8