Vinay Kumar Singh, son of Sri Parmanand Singh, resident of Baridih Bidya Pati Nagar v. 1. State of Jharkhand 2. The Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(L) No. 1771 of 2009 Vinay Kumar Singh, son of Sri Parmanand Singh, resident of Baridih Bidya Pati Nagar, Patna Line, Holding No.7, P.O. – Baridih, P.S. Sidgora, Town – Jamshedpur, District – Singhbhum East … … Petitioner Versus 1. State of Jharkhand 2. The Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (now Tata Motors Limited) through its Plant Head Tata Motors, Ltd. Sri Satish B. Bunker Telco Town, P.S. Telco, Jamshedpur, District – East … Respondents Singhbhum … CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Petitioner --- : Mr. Anurag Kumar, Advocate : Ms. Nidhi Kumari, Advocate For the Respondent No.2 : Mr. A.K. Das, Advocate For the State : Mrs. Swati Shalini, Advocate : Mr. Kunal Chandra Suman, AC to GP II --- 16/21.11.2024 Heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties. 2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the award dated 08.02.2008 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No.12 of 2003 whereby the learned court has decided the case against the concerned workman namely Vinay Kumar Singh. The terms of reference are as follows:
Legal Reasoning
“Whether the dismissal of Shri Vinay Kuar Singh, Ticket the workman of M/s. Telco Ltd; No.9920/07712/5 Jamshedpur by the management is justified? If not what relief he is entitled to?” 3. The learned court framed three issues for consideration: “(i) Whether the Vinay Kumar Singh, on temporary post had completed 240 days in preceeding year i.e. in 12 month, when he was dismissed/retrenched by the management? (ii) Whether the dismissal of Sri Vinay Kumar Singh having tecket no.9920/07720/5, by the management M/s. Telco Ltd; Jamshedpur is justified? (iii) To what relief or relieves, he is entitled to?” 1 4. The learned court decided the issues in favour of the respondent -management by holding that the petitioner was working as temporary and substituted employee and did not complete 240 days in a year and is accordingly not entitled to any relief in terms of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and ultimately decided the reference against the petitioner. Arguments of the Petitioner. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the impugned award at the threshold has referred to the order dated 24.03.2021 by which this case was admitted and submits that the order has taken note of the argument of the petitioner, who submitted that the break in service which was shown was an artificial break but in fact the petitioner has continuously worked from the year 1994 and therefore the impact of artificial break is required to be considered. With respect to the period of working for 240 days, the learned counsel has referred to Section 25B of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and submitted that the period of work has to be counted with respect to one year preceding the date of termination and there is no such requirement that he should have worked continuously for 240 days. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the period of work as mentioned in the written statement filed by the workman and submitted that the chart indicates that from 25.07.2000 till 22.07.2001, the concerned workman had worked for 237 days. However, during the course of argument, he has also submitted that the period from 09.02.2001 to 10.03.2001 has been wrongly taken as one month or 30 days as the month of February would be for 28 days and the total days of work would be 235 days. 6. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment dated 23.01.1984 passed by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Kapurthala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. Labour Court, Jullundur being Civil Writ Petition No.3766 of 1983 and submitted that in the said case, 230 days was considered to be sufficient and it has been taken note of the fact that when the workman was on the verge of completion of 240 days, he was discontinued upon 2 attaining 230 days of work. The learned counsel submits that the aforesaid judgment was cited before the learned court but the same has been wrongly distinguished. It is submitted that the award is perverse and calls for interference in writ jurisdiction. Arguments of the Respondent-management. 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- management has opposed the prayer and referred to the various letters of engagement and discontinuation of the petitioner which has been annexed along with the writ petition and were exhibited before the learned court by the workman himself to submit that on each letter or office order of engagement, the period of engagement has also been mentioned. It has been clearly indicated that the appointment was on purely temporary basis. 8. The learned counsel submits that there has been not even one instance whereby the concerned workman was continued for a period beyond the period mentioned in the office order and in order to continue the workman’s engagement, separate office order was issued for each occasion again for the specified period mentioned therein. The learned counsel has also submitted that the employment being for fixed period and on the date of discontinuation of service, the period having expired, it is not a case of dismissal or termination, and therefore, the provisions of Section 25F is not at all invited. 9. He has also submitted that, otherwise also, during the period which has been referred to by the petitioner i.e. from 25.07.2000 till 25.07.2001, there has been numerous breaks which has been indicated by the workman in the chart itself and those breaks were ranging from 6 days to 30 days, and accordingly, it cannot be said that the breaks were of artificial nature only to deprive the concerned workman from completing 240 days of service, and therefore, the judgment passed by Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court has been rightly distinguished by the learned court. He submits that the impugned award is a reasoned award taking into consideration all the aspects of the matter, and therefore, the same does not call for any interference. 3 Findings of this Court. 10. It was the specific case of the workman before the learned court that he had joined the respondent company on 19.02.1994 on the post of Pharmacist Grade I in medical service division of Telco Hospital and had completed 7 ½ years of continuous service and thereafter he was terminated on and from 25.07.2001 by order dated 14.07.2001. It was his further case that throughout he was kept on the roll as temporary workman, but he was doing the work of permanent nature and worked till 25.07.2001. It was his further case that during the period of employment from 19.02.1994 to 25.07.2001, he was made idle for one or two days and thereafter he used to be reinstated on the same post by the management and in this way 7 ½ years were completed and in support of that the workman had exhibited W to Exhibit W/77, which were official orders of appointment, separation and reinstatement issued by the management. So, the case of the workman was that his termination amounts to retrenchment and such retrenchment on and from 25.07.2001 was in violation of Section 25F, 25N of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No notice was served on the workman before his retrenchment, and therefore, he was entitled for reinstatement with full back-wages. 11. On the other hand, it was the case of the management before the learned court that there was no cause of action for the government to refer the dispute for adjudication as the concerned workman was in temporary pool and he was not a permanent employee. It was not a case of dismissal of his service and his service was temporary and he had not completed 240 days of service in 12 months preceding the date of his discontinuation. The management had never dismissed the workman and he was discontinued after completion of the period for which he was employed and thereafter his engagement was not continued. 12. The point no.(i) and (ii) as framed by the learned court was decided vide paragraph no.7. The learned court scrutinized both the documentary and oral evidence on behalf of the parties. The learned court recorded a finding that the evidence of the workman namely Mr. 4 V.K. Singh and the documentary evidence available on record established that the workman was working as temporary employee and was never dismissed by the management although the reference was as to whether the dismissal of the concerned workman by the management was justified. The learned court also recorded that the concerned workman was working as temporary and as substituted employee and it was also established from the letter of demand Annexure – A i.e. the Memorandum of Settlement dated 11.02.2002 and the dispute was in regard to regularization of service of workers of temporary pool and as per the terms of settlement, it was agreed that the process of inducting one batch numbering 100 workers out of the temporary pool as probationer trainees for one year would commence immediately. However, the induction was to be completed before end of March 2002 and on successful completion of training of probation, they were to be absorbed in the regular appropriate scale of the company and during the probation period, the probationer will be paid a minimum basic & D.A as was done in case of previous batch. The process of induction of another 100 workers out of temporary pool would commence in the month of April 2002 and would be completed preferably by June 2002 and the next transaction of induction of probation from temporary pool would be reviewed after the AGM meeting of 2002 depending on the financial position and otherwise number of probationer trainees will be decided accordingly. 13. The learned court recorded that the main grievance of the workman was that the terms of settlement dated 11.02.2002 was not completed by the management and he was not regularized in service. The learned court recorded that as per the written statement of the concerned workman, he had completed only 115 days in 12 months preceding termination. The learned court ultimately recorded that the concerned workman was working as temporary and substituted employee since 19.02.1994 but never worked as continuous permanent employee and did not complete 240 days in every 12 months since the year 1994 to 25.07.2001 and also recorded that the workman never completed 240 days in 12 months preceding the date 5 of termination which was 25.07.2001 and decided the reference against the concerned workman. 14. This Court finds that in the impugned award, it has been recorded that the concerned workman worked for a period of 115 days before one year from 25.07.2001 and before this Court, the learned counsel has submitted during the course of argument that the concerned workman had worked for a period of 235 days as per his written statement. This Court finds that even as per the best case of the petitioner, he did not work for 240 days in one year preceding the date of termination and the argument of the petitioner that the break in service was only artificial in order to ensure that the petitioner did not complete 240 days is also devoid of any merits considering the fact that the break in service was ranging from 6 days to 30 days at a time. 15. The chart which has been furnished by the petitioner with regard to the period of service dates back to 1994, but the relevant period is from 19.07.2000 to 24.07.2001, which is as follows: “Period of employment date and months/days Idle period Date and day (s) 19.7.2k to 17.8.2k 1 month 18.8.2k to 17.9.2k 30 days 18.9.2k to 18.10.2k 31 days 19 to 24.10.2k 6 days 25.10.2k to 25.11.2k 32 days 26.11 to 20.12.2k 25 days 21.12.2k to 19.1.2001 1 month 20.1 to 8.2.2k 20 days 9.2.2001 to 10.3.2001 1 month 11 to 22.3.01 12 days 23.3.01 to 21.4.2001 1 month 22.4 to 15.5.01 24 days 16.5.01 to 14.6.2001 1 month 15 to 24.6.01 10 days 25.6.2001 to 24.7.2001 30 days 16. From perusal of the said chart and upon the argument of the 25.7.2001 retrenched” petitioner, it appears that during the period of one year preceding the date of discontinuation of the service of the petitioner, he had worked for about 235 days, and during this period, there has been break in service for 30 days from 18.08.2000 to 17.09.2000, 6 days from 19.10.2000 to 24.10.2000, 25 days from 26.11.2000 to 20.12.2000, 20 days from 21.01.2001 to 08.02.2001, 12 days from 11.03.2001 to 6 22.03.2001, 24 days from 22.04.2001 to 15.05.2001 and 10 days from 15.06.2001 to 24.06.2001 and he was discontinued on 25.07.2001. 17. This Court finds that the petitioner had admittedly not completed 240 days and further there are numerous breaks in service for long period and therefore, it cannot be said that those breaks in service were artificial in order to ensure that the petitioner may not complete 240 days of engagement in a year. Accordingly, the judgment, which has been relied upon by the petitioner in the case of Kapurthala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. Labour Court, Jullundur (supra) has no applicability to the fact and circumstances of this case. 18. This Court finds that the concerned workman not only failed to prove 240 days of work in the year preceding the discontinuation of his service, but his own case reflects numerous breaks, which cannot be considered artificial in nature. After having gone through the impugned award, this Court finds that the same is a well-reasoned award. No other illegality or perversity as such has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner calling for any interference under writ jurisdiction. Finding no merit in this petition and considering the limited scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the impugned award does not call for any interference and accordingly this writ petition is dismissed. 19. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed. Saurav/- (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) 7