1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Secretary, Water Resource Department, Government of Jharkhand v. Sudheashwar Singh, son of late Ram Pati Singh, resident of
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 189 of 2021 ---- 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Secretary, Water Resource Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi 3. The Chief Engineer, Advance Planning, Water Resource Department, Jagannathpur School, Dhurwa, Ranchi P.O. Sector III, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi 4. The Executive Engineer, Advance Planning, Water Resource Department, Jagannathpur School, P.O. and P.S. - Dhurwa, District - Ranchi ………. Respondents/ Appellants Versus Sudheashwar Singh, son of late Ram Pati Singh, resident of Anant Pur, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Chutia, District Ranchi, Jharkhand ……. Writ Petitioner/ Respondent With L.P.A. No. 176 of 2021 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Secretary, Water Resource Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi 3. The Chief Engineer, Advance Planning, Water Resource Department, Jagannathpur School, Dhurwa, Ranchi P.O. Sector III, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi 4. The Executive Engineer, Advance Planning Division, Water Resource Department, A.G. More, P.O. and P.S. – Doranda, District - Ranchi ………. Respondents/ Appellants Versus Sudheashwar Singh, son of late Ram Pati Singh, resident of Anant Pur, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Chutia, District Ranchi, Jharkhand ……. Writ Petitioner/ Respondent With L.P.A. No. 180 of 2021 1. The State of Jharkhand Page 1 2. The Secretary, Water Resource Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi 3. The Chief Engineer, Advance Planning, Water Resource Department, Jagannathpur School, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi 4. The Executive Engineer, Advance Planning, Water Resource Department, A.G. More, P.O. and P.S. - Doranda, District - Ranchi ………. Respondents/ Appellants Versus Sudheashwar Singh, son of late Ram Pati Singh, resident of Anantpur, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Chutia, District Ranchi, Jharkhand ……. Writ Petitioner/ Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD --------- HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI --------- Mr. Sharad Kaushal, A.C. to AAG - III For the Appellants: For the Respondent: 06/Dated: 11th June, 2024 --------- Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1) The instant intra-court appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent are directed against the order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 4916 of 2016, W.P.(S) No. 2706 of 2009 and W.P.(S) No. 5760 of 2009 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ application along with other connected cases and the order of recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,53,041/- from the petitioner/respondent has been set aside and further directed the appellants to refund the entire recovered amount to the petitioner. 2) This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant intra-court appeals have been filed after inordinate delay of Page 2 171 days, deems it fit and proper to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit. I.A. No. 8217 of 2023 in L.P.A. No. 189 of 2021, I.A. No. 8213 of 2023 in L.P.A. No. 176 of 2021 & I.A. No. 8216 of 2023 in L.P.A. No. 180 of 2021. 3) The instant appeals are barred by inordinate delay of 171 days (L.P.A. No. 189 of 2021 & L.P.A. No. 176 of 2021) and delay of 170 days (L.P.A. No. 176 of 2021), therefore, the aforesaid applications for condoning delay have been filed. 4) The ground for condonation of delay has been taken, as per the pleadings made in the instant interlocutory applications, that the judgment dated 26.08.2019 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4916 of 2016 was brought to notice of the appellants by the undated representation received in the office of the appellants dated 12.06.2020. Thereafter, it was marked to the Secretariat cell of the Water Resources Department vide endorsement dated 15.06.2020. Thereafter, the same was marked to the Section Officer for immediate attention vide endorsement dated 25.06.2020. It has further submitted that the period was the covid pandemic period and in spite of all due diligence and efforts since various persons and decision makers was affected/were under the zone of being affected and the offices was also closed intermittently, as such the steps for taking opinion, movement of file was grossly affected and on account of Covid situation the file was arranged in all aspects and was again put up before the authority concerned. Page 3 5) It has been submitted that somehow when the office started functioning immediately after that the same was put up before the Under Secretary vide endorsement dated 10.07.2020 and thereafter the same was put up before the Joint Secretary with an observation that an opinion may be taken in this regard vide endorsement dated 21.07.2020. 6) It has been submitted that thereafter proper steps were taken to obtain an opinion and thereafter grounds of appeal was also sought to be prepared and the same was sent to the Department retainer vide endorsement dated 09.12.2020 and after finalization of grounds of appeal the matter was sent to Law Department vide endorsement dated 20.01.2021 and the file was sent to the office of the learned Advocate General for necessary direction and on approval of learned Advocate General the file was sent to the office of the concerned law officer to prepare the memo of appeal and after the memo of appeal was prepared the file was sent back to the Department for further proceeding. It has further been submitted that the memo of appeal and other documents were perused and the same was forwarded to the department for necessary approval. It has been submitted that the entire file was again handed over to the Law Officer for filing of LPA and thereafter the appeal was drafted. 7) It has been further submitted that the department is/was not aware of the factum of passing of judgment dated 26.08.2019 till representation received in the office of the appellant dated 12.06.2020 but in the process thereof, a delay of 171/170 days has occurred in preferring the instant appeals. Page 4 8) The delay, according to the appellants, is not intentional rather on account of procedural delay and in taking final decision, some extra time has been consumed by the appellants. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has prayed to condone the delay and has submitted that the reason assigned in the instant interlocutory applications is sufficient to condone the delay. 9) We have heard the learned counsel on delay condonation applications and before considering the same, this Court deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon‟ble Apex Court with respect to approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.
Legal Reasoning
10) There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then it is the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. 11) It requires to refer herein that the law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351. 12) The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) Page 5 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” 13) In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 14) While considering the similar issue, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors Page 6 to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 15) It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide motive and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at paragraph-17, it has been held that “Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the appellant.” 16) In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 27 to 29 as under: Page 7 “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to Page 8 considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 17) Likewise, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr., (supra) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder: “1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020. 2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the Page 9 SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department. 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] 4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing. 5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be Page 10 recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up.” 18) The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all Page 11 the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.” 19) Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation applications, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide Page 12 motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 20) It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of „sufficient cause‟. The consideration of meaning of „sufficient cause‟ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:- “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court Page 13 should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.