1.Narayan Yadav 2.Birendra Yadav 3.Surendra Yadav … v. The State of Jharkhand
Case Details
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Appeal (S.J) No. 675 of 2010 ------ 1.Narayan Yadav 2.Birendra Yadav 3.Surendra Yadav …… Appellants Versus The State of Jharkhand …… Respondent PRESENT CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD For the Appellant For the State For the Informant ----- : Mr. Hemant Kr. Shikarwar, Advocate : Mr. Manoj Kr. Mishra, A.P.P. : Ms. Shaurya, Advocate ------ JUDGMENT CAV on:22.12.2022 Pronounced on: 09/05/2023 This Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.675 of 2010 has been filed on behalf of the appellants challenging the judgment dated 21.07.2010 and sentence dated 23.07.2010 passed in S.T. No.293 of 2004 (arising out of Barhi (Padma) P.S. Case No.192 of 1999, G.R. No.2297 of 1999) passed by Sri Awadhesh Mall, learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C-III, Hazaribagh who has convicted the appellants for the offence under section 323/34, 341/34 and 307/34 of the I.P.C and sentenced them to undergo S.I for 15 (fifteen) days and R.I for six months for the offence under section 341 and 323 of the I.P.C respectively and also directed the appellants to undergo R.I for five years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under section 307 of the I.P.C and in default of payment of fine they have been sentenced to undergo 2 R.I for two months. All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that upon the fardbeyan of Reba Yadav alleging therein that on 17.11.1999 at about 6.30 p.m. when the informant along with his son Anil Yadav were returning from Training Center, Padma to their house after giving milk to their customers and on way to their village Padma, P.S. Barhi (Padma), District Hazaribag all above named accused and one Jitendra Yadav near their house wrongfully restrained the informant and his son and assaulted them by means of lathi and iron rod, and after sustaining injuries informant and his son fell down on earth. On noise of informant villagers came there and saved the informant and his son. The villagers brought the informant and his son Anil Yadav in Sadar Hospital, Hazaribagh for their treatment. The occurrence took place due to previous dispute between the informant and accused. 3. I.A. No.9311 of 2022 has been filed on behalf of the appellants and the informant by way of Joint Compromise Petition to allow both the parties to compromise the case in connection with Barhi (Padma) P.S. Case No.192 of 1999, G.R. No.2297 of 1999). 4.
Legal Reasoning
It is submitted that it is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that if the parties are ready to compromise then it can be effected with regard to the offence which are non-compoundable in nature particularly if the offence are compoundable under sections 323 and 324 of the I.P.C and hence the appeal may be allowed. 7. Learned A.P.P appearing for the State has opposed the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants and submitted that the impugned judgment and sentence dated 21.07.2010 and 23.07.2010 passed by the learned court below are fit and proper and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that informant and his son, who are the injured persons, have fully supported the case and who have been examined as P.W-7 and P.W-3 respectively. It is submitted that P.W-8 (doctor) has also found injuries on the person of the injured-Anil Yadav. It is 5 submitted that other witnesses have also supported the allegations against the appellants. It is submitted that the court below has already taken lenient view by sentencing the appellant to undergo R.I for a period of five (05) years and pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under section 307 of the I.P.C and lesser sentence have been awarded for committing the offence under section 323 and 341 of the I.P.C and thus compromise petition may be rejected and this criminal appeal may be dismissed. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the informant has also submitted that the case has been compromised between the parties and the Informant along with the appellants have filed Joint Compromise Petition and the Informant has no objection if the compromise petition is allowed and the appellants are acquitted. 9. Perused the L.C.R and considered the submissions of both the sides. 10. It transpires that the Informant namely Rewa Yadav has lodged F.I.R on 21.12.1999 against the appellants bearing Barhi (Padma) P.S. Case No.192 of 1999 for committing the offences under sections 323, 341/34 of the I.P.C although the occurrence had taken place on 17.11.1999 and this F.I.R was seen by the learned C.J.M on 24.12.1999 but no explanation of delay has been given by the prosecution. 6 11. It further transpires that the fardbeyan of the Informant- Rewa Yadav was recorded on 17.11.1999 at around 6.30 p.m. in which he has alleged that while he was returning along with the son Anil Yadav to his house after supplying milk at Training Centre, Padma then he was surrounded by his elder brother Narayan Yadav and his sons Birendra Yadav and Surendra Yadav and they starting assaulting him by lathi due to which he and his son fell down on the ground and on being alarm raised by him nearby persons assembled and saved their lives. He claimed that he and his son Anil sustained injury on their head and they were taken to Sadar Hospital by the villagers and the cause of occurrence is land dispute. 12. The police after making investigation submitted charge sheet under sections 323, 307, 341 and 34 I.P.C against the appellants on 01.07.2000/04.07.2000 and the learned C.J.M, Hazaribagh has taken cognizance against the appellants under sections 341, 323, 307 and 34 of the I.P.C on 04.07.2000. 13. After supply of police papers to the appellants the charges were framed against the appellants on 08.10.2004 for committing the offences under sections 323/34, 341/34 and 307/34 by Sri Vijay Kumar no.1, Ist learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh and to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7 14. The prosecution has got examined nine (09) witnesses in support of its case, who are as follows: (i) P.W-1 is Chhotan Yadav, (ii) P.W-2 is Barju Bhiyan, (iii) P.W-3 is Anil Yadav, (iv) P.W-4 is Sanjay Yadav, (v) P.W-5 is Shyam Sunder Yadav, (vi) P.W-6 is Dr. D.P. Mandal, (vii) P.W-7 is Rewa Yadav, (viii) P.W-8 is Dr. Chandra Bhushan Sahay and (ix) P.W-9 is Lal Chand Yadav. 15. The prosecution in support of its case got marked the following exhibits, which are as follows:- (i) Exhibit-1 is injury report dated 17.11.1999, (ii) Exhibit- 2 is the injury report of dated 28.12.1999, (iii) Exhibit-3 is the discharge slip of RMCH, Ranchi dated 22.12.1999, (iv) Exhibit-4 is the discharge slip of medicine by doctor for Anil Yadav dated 24.06.2000 and (v) Exhibit-5 is discharge slip dated 30.10.2000 of RMCH. 16. Thereafter the appellants were examined under section 313 Cr.P.C on 01.07.2010 by the learned court below and they have denied the circumstances put forth to them. 17. Neither any defence witness was examined on behalf of the appellants nor any document was exhibited on behalf of the appellants. 18. Thereafter the learned court below, after appreciating the evidence, has convicted the appellants for the offences under 8 sections 323/34, 341/34 and 307/34 of the I.P.C and sentenced them to undergo S.I for 15 (fifteen) days and R.I for six months for the offence under section 341 and 323 of the I.P.C respectively and also directed them to undergo R.I for five years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under section 307 of the I.P.C and in default of payment of fine they have been sentenced to undergo R.I for two months. All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. Hence, appreciation of evidence of the witness will be necessary. 19. P.W-1 namely Chhotan Yadav during his evidence has supported the prosecution case that the appellants have assaulted the informant and his son and has stated that appellant Surendra Yadav has assaulted Anil Yadav and he had not seen anyone assaulting another. He has also stated that he had not seen Birendra Yadav, Jitendra Yadav and Surendra Yadav assaulting anyone and Jitendra, Birendra and Narayan were trying to settle the quarrel. Thus, from the evidence of P.W-1, it is evident that all the three appellants had not assaulted anyone. Thus, P.W-1 is not an eye witness and hence the evidence of P.W-1 is not reliable. 20. P.W-2 is Barju Bhiyan and during his evidence he has stated that upon hearing the alarm he went to his house then he had seen that Rewa Yadav was unconscious and Anil Yadav had 9 sustained head injury and they were taken by Sanjay Yadav, Shyam Sunder Mehta, Suresh Baitha and Badan Chndra Yadav but he is not aware where they were taken. He has further stated that he does not identify any accused persons. During cross examination he has stated that Narayan Yadav i.e. appellant no.1 and Rewa Yadav are own brothers. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W-2, it is evident that he is a hearsay witness and has not seen the occurrence and has not supported the prosecution case. 21. P.W-3 is Anil Yadav i.e. the son of the Informant. During evidence he has stated that while he along with his father Rewa Yadav was returning on 17.11.1999 at 6.30 p.m. after supplying milk at Padma Camp then the appellants armed with lathi, danda, rod, farsa and tangi surrounded them and assaulted him on his head. He has further stated that the appellant no.2 i.e. Birendra Yadav assaulted him by rod whereas appellant no.3 i.e. Surendra Yadav assaulted him by stone on his head and appellant no.1 i.e. Narayan Yadav assaulted him by lathi. He has further stated that Jitendra Yadav was having lathi and appellant no.3 i.e. Surendra Yadav had fractured the hand of his father Rewa Yadav and he had also sustained head injury. On alarm raised by them nearby people came and they were taken firstly to Padma O.P and from there they were sent to Sadar Hospital, Hazaribagh where they 10 were treated. Thereafter on 19.11.199 he was sent to RMCH, Ranchi and he was treated and discharged on 22.11.1999. During cross-examination he has stated that Narayan Yadav is his own uncle and other appellants are his own cousin brothers and other brothers Lalchand and Hemant Yadav are witnesses of this occurrence. He has further stated that he is not aware of the name of the persons before whom he had given milk and the person who had taken milk had gone after training. He claimed to have sustained injury by rod and stone. He further stated that on alarm raised by him nearby people came and he named some persons. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W-3 it reveals that he has claimed to have sustained injury on his head by rod and stone on 17.11.1999 and he was discharged on 22.11.1999 from R.M.C.H, Ranchi but the F.I.R was lodged after around one month on 21.12.199 and which was seen by the learned C.J.M on 24.12.1999. Therefore, it is evident that he has failed to explain the delay in lodging the F.I.R on 21.12.1999 whereas the occurrence took place on 17.11.1999 and they were taken to hospital on 17.11.1999 itself and his father was free but still no F.I.R was lodged and F.I.R was lodged for the first time on 21.12.1999. On being confronted that he is bald headed during his evidence the 11 witness has stated that he had come with bald head to show his injury and earlier also he had come with Government Advocate before the Civil Court for giving evidence in his bald head. 22. P.W-4 is Sanjay Yadav who has stated in his evidence that while he along with Shyam Sunder Mahto returned with motorcycle and arrived near the house of Narayan Yadav i.e. appellant no.1 then he had seen the crowd there and learnt that the Informant-Rewa Yadav and his son Anil Yadav has sustained injury. During cross examination he has stated that he has not seen the occurrence and he is not aware as to who had assaulted whom. He has further stated that he is not aware of quarrel. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W-4 it is evidence that he is hearsay witness and he has not supported the prosecution case. 23. P.W-5 is Shyam Sunder Mahto. During his evidence he has stated that while he was returning with Sanjay Yadav with motorcycle and arrived near the house of Narayan Yadav then he had seen that son of the informant was lying on the ground having head injury. During cross examination, he has stated that he is not aware as to how the son of the informant has sustained injury but he has stated that Rewa and Narayan are own brothers. 12 Thus, it is evident that P.W-5 has also not alleged against the appellants and he had not seen the occurrence. 24. P.W-6 is Dr. D.P. Mandal who had examined the injured Anil Yadav on 17.11.1999 at 9.45 p.m. He has proved the injury report of the injured Anil Yadav marked as Exhibit-1 and has found the following injuries which are as follows: “(i) Bleeding lacerated wound on head left side with diffused swelling and advised X-Ray Skull, A/P and laterial, ¼” x ¼” thin deep. X-Ray shows diffused fracture left side of skull. The patient was admitted vide Indoor No.2458. Age of Injury: Within 24 hours. Nature of Injury: Grievous caused by hard and blunt substance.” During cross examination he has stated that patient had come himself and he had disclosed his name himself. He also stated that the X-Ray plate was not produced before him during evidence. He also stated that the opinion was given on the basis of X-Ray report but X-Ray Plate is not mentioned in his report. The name of the radiologist is Dr. A. Ganguli. However, neither the signature of Dr. A. Ganguli nor the report of Dr. A. Ganguli were produced before him. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W-6, it is evident that though he had stated that the injury sustained by the injured Anil Yadav is grievous in nature but neither X-Ray report nor the X-Ray plate were produced during his evidence and even though the P.W-3 i.e. Anil Yadav was conscious and disclosed his 13 name himself. Thus from the evidence of P.W-6 i.e. Dr. D.P. Mandal grievous injury upon the injured is not proved. 25. P.W-7 is the Informant namely Rewa Yadav. During his evidence he has stated that occurrence took place on 17.11.1999 at 6.30 p.m. and has supported the prosecution by stating that he was beaten by the appellants by lathi and rod and while he was returning from Padma Training Centre after supplying milk then he and his son namely Anil Yadav were assaulted by the appellants and they were taken to the hospital by the villagers. During cross-examination, he has stated that apart from his head he had also sustained injury in hand. During cross examination he has further stated that apart from sustaining injury by his son, Anil Yadav on his head, he also sustained injury over his body. He also stated that his son was sent for treatment to Dr. D.P. Mandal. Thus, from scrutinizing evidence of P.W-7, it is evident that though the occurrence took place on 17.11.1999 but the F.I.R was lodged on 21.12.1999 and no explanation for delay has been mentioned. Although this question of delay has not been asked during cross examination from the informant but the formal F.I.R shows that the F.I.R was lodged on 21.12.1999. The informant is also silent upon his injuries and upon his treatment. Though the 14 prosecution has come out with case that both the informant and his son had been taken to Sadar Hospital, Hazaribagh after injury. He has also stated that he has given fardbeyan before Daroga on 17.11.1999 at 10- 11.30 p.m. but he is not aware as to how delay has caused. Thus, the evidence of P.W-7 i.e. Informant-Rewa Yadav is also not consistent. 26. P.W-8 is Dr. Chandra Bhushan Sahay, the Assistant Professor of RMCH, Ranchi and he has found following injuries on the person Anil Yadav on 19.11.1999, which are as follows: “(i) ½” long stitched wound on left side posterior aspect of frontal region behind hair line. X-Ray scalp A.P. & lateral showed depressed fracture of left side frontal bone. C.T. Scan of Brain snowed depressed fracture and left side frontal bone and underlying haemorrhagic contusion of brain.” He has stated that the injury sustained by the injured has been caused by hard and blunt weapon and nature of injury is grievous and has proved his injury report as Exhibit-2 and further stated that patient Anil Yadav was discharged on 22.11.1999. However, neither the X-Ray plate nor the injury report nor the operation prescription has been brought on record by the prosecution. During cross examination he has stated that he had handed over Exhibit-3, Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 respectively with regard 15 to earlier treatment made on 09.10.2000 in RMCH and was discharged on 30.10.2000 and operation was done on 29.10.2000. During cross examination he has stated that I.O had not demanded Exhibits-3, Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 from him and he had not handed over Exhibit-3, Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 to the police. He further stated that he had seen one injured but the C.T. Scan and X-Ray report are not before him. Thus, from the evidence of P.W-8 i.e. Dr. Chandra Bhushan Sahay it is evident that he has merely proved his injury report marked as Exhibit-2 with regard to injury sustained by the son of the informant on 17.11.1999 but the concerned X-Ray Plates, C.T. Scan Plate were not available at the time of his evidence. Thus, the grievous injury on the person of injured Anil Yadav is not corroborated due to non-production of X-Ray Plates, X-Ray report and C.T. Scan report of the injured Anil Yadav. 27. P.W-9 is Lalchand Yadav who has stated during his evidence that the informant and his son were lying on the ground in the injured condition and they were taken to Jeep for Sadar Hospital where both of them were treated and injured Anil Yadav was referred to RMCH, Ranchi. During cross examination he has stated that he had not 16 seen assaulting any person. Thus, it is evident that during evidence of P.W-9 that he is hearsay witness and he has not supported the prosecution case. 28. So far the injury report are concerned Exhibit-1 is the injury report dated 17.11.1999 on a plain paper by Dr. D.P. Mandal i.e. P.W-6, on the requisition slip of I.O he had shown X- Ray report opinion in his finding but X-Ray report was not produced during his evidence in the court below. Even Exhibit-2 is the injury report on the plain paper with the slip of Dr. Chandra Bhushan Sahay but it was given on the requisition slip of A.S.I., Padma O.P, Hazaribagh. Thus, the actual injury report prepared by Dr. Chandra Bhushan Sahay at the time of operation was not given to the Investigating Officer. Exhibit-3 and Exhibit-5 are the discharge slips of RMCH, Ranchi. Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 have been marked by the I.O concerned. However, the order sheet reveals that injury report was marked as Exhibit-1 and Exhibit-2, discharge slip were marked as Exhibit-3, Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 during evidence of P.W-8 i.e. Dr. Chandra Bhushan Sahay. Hence, the prescription dated 26.04.2000 and one discharge slip dated 30.10.2000 have been marked as Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5. Although Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 show that certain treatments were performed upon the injured but there is no supporting document to prove this fact and thus discharge slips 17 i.e. Exhibit-3, Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 were not handed over to the I.O and hence these discharge slips are not part of investigation and not reliable. 29. In view of the discussion made above, this can be a case under section 325 of the I.P.C but not under section 307 of the I.P.C. 30. It further transpires that the I.O of this case has not been examined and thus it is not clear as to how the F.I.R was lodged after delay of more than one month by the police where the Fardbeyan was recorded on 17.11.1999 itself. Therefore, the recording of the F.I.R and delaying in lodging the F.I.R can be seen with suspicious circumstances. Although the F.I.R was lodged under section 323 and 341 of the I.P.C and if the I.O had found ingredient under section 307 I.P.C then it ought to have added section 307 I.P.C only with the permission of the court and not on its own while submitting the charge sheet without leave of the court. 31. Paragraph nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 to 14 and 15 of the I.A. No.9311 of 2022, by way of Joint Compromise, read as follows:- “Para 6 :- That the appellants and the informant have settled their dispute outside the court and does not wants to perusing the case and the informant has got no objection if the judgment of the conviction and sentence passed against the appellants is set aside on the basis of the joint compromise. Para 7:- That in case of Narendra Singh Vrs. The State of Punjab reported in JBCJ 2014 Vol.2 Supreme Court, Pg.254 and also in case of Gyan Singh Vrs. The State of Punjab 18 reported in JBCJ Journal 2013 (1) Pg.142 the Hon‟ble apex court has even allowed the compromise in case of offence u/s 307 IPC. Para 8:- That no fruitful purpose will be achieved by refusing to allow the bail application on the ground of joint compromise petition. That judicial the pronouncement B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma the Hon‟ble court has allowed compromise even in case of none compoundable offences. Para 9:- several basis on Para 10:- That during the pendency of the matter, both the parties have discussed, negotiated and with the intervention of the well wishers arrived at a mutual consent on amicable settlement. Para 11:- That the petitioner and the informant state that they have settled their dispute between themselves as a result no ill or bad blood exists between the parties. Para 12:- That the informant and petitioners state that even outside the court they have settled the matter which is not against public policy. Para-14:- That the joint compromise petition filed by the parties is with a condition to withdraw the cases by the parties from the prosecution as well as from the accused persons of the present case. Para 15:- That the parties during pendency of the case decided not to contest the case and filed joint compromise petition before the Hon‟ble court for the relief prayed in the bail application.” 32. It has been held in the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Anr. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466, at paragraph nos.29.6, 31 and 33 as follows: “Para 29.6:- Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go 19 by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. Para 31:- In the present case, FIR No.121 dated 14-07- 2010 was registered under Sections 307/324/323/34 IPC. The investigation was completed, whereafter challan was presented in the court against the petitioner herein. Charges have also been framed; the case is at the stage of recording of evidence. At this juncture, parties entered into compromise on the basis of which petition under Section 482 of the Coe was filed by the petitioners, namely, the accused persons for quashing of the criminal proceedings under the said FIR. As per the copy of the settlement which was annexed along with the petition, the compromise took place between the parties on 12-7-2013 when respectable members of the Gram Panchayat held a meeting under the chairmanship of Sarpanch. It is stated that on the intervention of the said persons/panchayat, both the parties were agreed for compromise and have also decided to live with peace in future with each other. It was argued that since the parties have decided to keep harmony between the parties so that in future they are able to live with peace and love and they are the residents of the same village, the High Court should have accepted the proceedings. Para 33:- We have gone through the FIR as well which was the the basis of complainant/victim. It gives an indication that he complainant was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because of some previous dispute between the parties, though nature of dispute, etc. is not stated in detail. However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz. “respectable persons have been trying for a compromise uptil now, which could not be finalized”. …………… We, taking all these factors into consideration cumulatively, are of the opinion that that the compromise between the parties be accepted and the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.121 dated 14-7-2010 registered with Police Station Lopoke, District Amritsar Rural be quashed. We the said compromise and quashed statement of recorded on 20
Arguments
Heard Mr. Hemant Kumar Shikarwar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, learned APP for the 3 State and Ms. Shaurya, learned counsel for the informant. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the impugned judgment and sentence dated 21.07.2010 and 23.07.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C-III, Hazaribagh is not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that in this case only one injury has been found on the person of the injured Anil Yadav, who is the son of the Informant and Informant had not sustained any injuries. It is submitted that appellant no.1 namely Narayan Yadav has remained in jail for around 02 months 25 days, appellant no.2 namely Birendra Yadav has remained in jail for around 28 days whereas appellant no.3 namely Birendra Yadav has remained in jail for around 01 month and 20 days which is reflected from the custody report filed by the State. It is submitted that there is land dispute between the parties and there is major contradiction in the statement of the witnesses. It is submitted that there is delay in lodging the F.I.R and assault has been made indiscriminately upon the injured but the injury report of the Informant has not been brought on record. It is submitted that aggravated version of assault upon the appellants have been shown and there is major contradiction in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and only interested witnesses have been examined. It is submitted that during pendency of the appeal, good senses for compromise prevailed 4 among the parties and as such they have filed Joint Compromise Petition vide I.A. No.9311 of 2022. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are as follows: (i) (2012) 10 SCC 303 (ii) (2014) 6 SCC 466 (iii) (2021) SCC online SC 834 6.
Decision
order accordingly.” 33. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Hamriuddin Mian & Ors. vs The State of Jharkhand reported in 2023 (1) JLJR 62 has also relied upon the judgment reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 (Narinder Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Anr.) and has permitted the parties to get the case compounded under sections 307 and 326 of the I.P.C by accepting the compromise petition. 34. It has been held in the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramgopal and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2021) SCC online SC 834, at paragraph nos.12, 15, 16, 17 and 18 as follows: “Para 12:- The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are noncompoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system. Para 15:- Given these settled parameters, the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, to the extent it holds that the High Court does not have power to compound a non-compoundable offence, is in ignorance of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and is, thus, unsustainable. However, the judgment 21 and order dated 9th January, 2009 of the High Court of Karnataka, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No. 1488 of 2012 cannot be faulted with on this count for the reason that the parties did not bring any compromise/settlement to the notice of the High Court. Para 16:- Let us now delve into the nature of powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, with an intent to do complete justice. It would be ad rem to outrightly cite the Constitution Carbide decision Corporation v. Union of India4, where this Court has ruled as follows: in Union Bench in any ordinary that a provision “83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. The proposition law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Garg [1963 Supp (1) SCR 885, 899-900 : AIR 1963 SC 996] as well as Antulay cases [(1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] the point was one of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142 insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 CrPC or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different limitations or provisions quality. Prohibitions or contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature and status of the authority or the court on which conferment of powers — limited in some appropriate way — is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy. Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg case [1963 Supp (1) SCR 885, 899-900 : AIR 1963 SC 996], said that limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from “inconsistency with express statutory provisions of 22 if that provisions law. He suggested substantive law” must really mean and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any substantive the expression statutory „prohibition‟ is read in place of „provision‟ that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that constitutional statutory provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of “complete justice” of a cause or matter, the apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to what is or is not „complete justice‟ of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise.” (Emphasis Applied) the exercise of override a Para 17:- The afore-quoted precept has been consistently followed by this Court in numerous subsequent decisions, including in Monica Kumar v. State of U.P., Manohar Lal Bar Court Sharma v. Union Association v. Union of India, inter-alia, reiterating that: India and Supreme of in inherent “47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Court and the Constitution are are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the 23 due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the Court to prevent “clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice”…” (Emphasis Applied) Para 18:- It is now a well crystalized axiom that the plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation. Para 19:- We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between in respect of offences the parties „compoundable‟ within the statutory framework, the extra- ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind : (i) Nature and effect of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.” the conscious of the offence on 35. It transpires from the discussion of the witnesses named above that the offence under section 307 of the I.P.C is not made out and as such the appellants namely Narayan Yadav, Birendra Yadav and Surendra Yadav are acquitted for the offence 24 under section 307/34 of the I.P.C but altered for the offence under sections 325/34 of the IPC. 36. It further transpires that offences under section 341, 323 and 325 of the IPC are compoundable in nature and they can be compounded under the provision of Section 320 Cr.P.C. However, so far the offence under section 325 IPC is concerned it is compoundable in nature. However, it is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court that the offence can be compounded even in non-compoundable cases, if the parties have settled their dispute in the interest of justice and secure peace in the society. However, in the present case, the offences committed under sections 341, 323, 325 of the I.P.C by the appellants are compounded in nature. 37. In view of the law laid down in the case of Narinder Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Anr. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 and Ramgopal and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2021) SCC online SC 834, the appellants namely Narayan Yadav, Birendra Yadav and Surendra Yadav are permitted to get the case compounded for the offences committed under sections 341 and 323/34 and 325/34 of the I.P.C and I.A. No.9311 of 2022 is allowed. 38. Therefore, in view of the above, the judgment of conviction dated 21.07.2010 and order of sentence dated 23.07.2010 passed in S.T. No.293 of 2004 (arising out of Barhi 25 (Padma) P.S. Case No.192 of 1999, G.R. No.2297 of 1999) by Sri Awadhesh Mall, learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C-III, Hazaribagh who has convicted the appellants for the offences under sections 341 and 323/34 and 325/34 of the I.P.C, are permitted to be compounded under the provisions of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C and the Appellants namely Narayan Yadav, Birendra Yadav and Surendra Yadav are acquitted for the offences under sections 341, 323/34 and 325/34 of the I.P.C in terms of compromise and the appellants namely Narayan Yadav, Birendra Yadav and Surendra Yadav are discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bonds. 39. Thus, the Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.675 of 2010 is allowed in terms of compromise and stand disposed of. I.A. No.9311 of 2022 is also allowed and stands disposed of. Let the L.C.R be sent back to the learned court below at once. Saket/ N.A.F.R. (Sanjay Prasad, J.)