1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department v. 1. Garib Nath Mishra, aged about 66 years, Son of Late Sumadhav Nath Mishra
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 333 of 2024 1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department, Ranchi, office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. – Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi. 2. The Director, Primary Education, Govt. of Jharkhand, Office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi. ……. Respondents/Appellants Versus 1. Garib Nath Mishra, aged about 66 years, Son of Late Sumadhav Nath Mishra, retired from Upgraded Middle School, Dighariya, Jasidih, Dist.-Deoghar, Resident of Meghlalpuri Land, Kali Bari, P.O. & P.S.- Deoghar, Dist.- Deoghar. 2. Kapildeo Agarwal, aged about 65 years, Son of Jugal Kishor Agrawal, retired from Primay School, Salgati, Block Mohanpur, Dist.- Deoghar, resident of Rikhiya, P.O.- Rikhiya, P.S.- Mohanpur, Dist.- Deoghar. 3. Jai Narayan Prasad Yadav, aged about 66 years, Son of Latte Kanthi Prasad Yadav, retired from Primary School, Nawadih-II, Block- Mohanpur, Dist.-Deoghar, resident of village- Jharkhandi Tola, Jamuniya, P.O. Tapovan, P.S.-Kunda, Dist.-Deoghar. 4. Anil Kumar Mishra, aged about 66 years, Son of Late Manmohan Mishra, Kushmil, retired from Middle School, Kushmil, Jasidih, Dist.- Deoghar, Village-Kairy, P.O. Kairy, P.S.-Bounsi, Dist.- Banka, Bihar. 5. Surendra Prasad Jha, aged about 70 years, Son of Late Baikuth Prasad Jha, retired from Middle School, Kushmil, Jasidih, Dist.- Deoghar, resident of Village &P.O.- Golhati, P.S. Bounsi, Dist.- Banka, Bihar. 6. Rajendra Shekhar Rajhans, aged about 66 years, son of Late Kapil Shekhar Rajhans, retired from Primary School, Baswaria, Block Sarwan, Dist.- Deoghar, resident of Village – Kushmaha, Tola- Danipur, P.O. & P.S.- Sarwan, Dist.- Deoghar, resident of Village – Hathgarh, Kunda More, P.O. & P.S.- Kunda, Dist.- Deoghar. 7. Janardhan Prasad Roy, aged 68 years, Son of Late Bhagwat Roy, retired from Upgraded Primary School, Tikorayadih, Block Sarwan, Dist- Deoghar, resident of Village – Mahtodih, P.O. & P.S.- Sarwan, Dist. – Deoghar. 8. Nawal Prasad Singh, aged about 66 years, Son of Sri Triveni Prasad Singh, retired from Primary School Sanskrit, Block- Sarwan, Dist.- -1 of 8- Deoghar, resident of village- Mahtodih, P.O. & P.S.-Sarwan, Dist.- Deoghar. 9. Damodar Prasad Singh, aged about 68 years, Son of Late Vishwanath Singh, from Upgraded Middle School, Banniyadih, Block Sarwan, Dist.-Deoghar, resident of Village Mahtodih, P.O. & P.S.-Sarwan, Dist.-Deoghar. retired 10. Dilip Kumar Mishra, aged about 63 years, Son of Narshing Prasad Mishra, retired from Upgraded Middle School, Bagicha, Block- Sarwan, Dist.-Deoghar, resident of village-Lohardih, P.O. & P.S.- Sarwan, Dist.-Deoghar. 11. Radhakant Mishra, aged about 69 years, Son of Late Shukh Deo Mishra, retired from Primary School, Shashi Bhushan Gram, Block- Mohanpur, Dist.-Deoghar, resident of village-Bahoriya, P.O.-Amlo, P.S.& Dist. Godda. 12. Adeen Prasad Yadav, aged about 71 years, Son of Late Ram Prasad Yadav, retired from Primary School, Kapsiya, Block- Jasidih, Dist.- Deoghar, resident of village-Gangta Fasia, P.O.-Fasia, P.S.- Godda (M), Dist. Godda. ….. Petitioners/Respondents 13. The Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar, P.S.-Deoghar, Dist.-Deoghar. P.O. & P.S.- Deoghar, Dist.-Deoghar. 14. The Superintendent of Education, Deoghar, P.O. & P.S.-Deoghar, Dist. Deoghar. 15. The Accountant General (A & E), Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S.- Doranda, Dist.- Ranchi. …… Respondents/Performa Respondents. --------- CORAM:
Legal Reasoning
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” 11) These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case. 12) The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India & Others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others6. 13) In Union of India Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir7, the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the merits of
Arguments
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN For the Appellants: For the Acct. General: Mr. Rohit Sinha, Advocate --------- Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I --------- Reserved on: 12.12.2024 Pronounced on: _18/12/2024 I.A. No. 5378 of 2024 (in L.P.A. No. 333 of 2024) Per M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J. 1) This application is filed by the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone delay of 237 days in filing this appeal. -2 of 8- 2) In the application filed seeking condonation of delay, it is contended that after the judgment was pronounced by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 2625 of 2021 on 19.09.2023, the file was put up before the competent authority on 22.11.2023; on 04.12.2023 the Assistant Director of the Department examined the record and the case file was then put up before the Legal Department; on 18.12.2023 it was again put up before the Joint Secretary who took a decision to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge; thereafter, Retainer Advocate of the Department was directed to prepare grounds of appeal; on 22.12.2023 the grounds of appeal were prepared and were put up before the Legal Department; subsequently, several rounds of discussions were held and the Department then took a decision to file an appeal. 3) On 05.01.2024 grounds of appeal were placed before the Director of the Department; on 08.01.2024 he directed the Retainer Advocate to prepare memo of appeal; on 05.02.2024 memo of appeal was drafted and placed before the Assistant Director. In the meantime, opinion of the Advocate General, State of Jharkhand was also sought who advised on 28.02.2024 to file appeal. 4) According to the appellants, the Department authorised the competent authority to file memo of appeal; the case file was allotted on 24.11.2023 to office of the Senior Standing Counsel-I and then the appeal was filed on 17.05.2024. 5) A reading of the above pleadings on behalf of the appellants indicates that though the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 2625 of 2021 was pronounced on 19.09.2023, till 22.11.2023, -3 of 8- i.e., two months, it was not even put up before the competent authority for examining whether the said judgment is to be challenged or not. 6) Moreover, when the Joint Secretary took a decision on 18.12.2023 to file appeal, the case file seems to have been again sent to the Retainer Advocate, then to the Director of the Department, again to the Retainer Advocate, then to the Assistant Director and, lastly, to the Advocate General. 7) Even after the Advocate General gave legal opinion on 28.02.2024 to file appeal, almost three months later the appeal was filed on 17.05.2024. 8) Thus, at every stage, no diligence was shown by the appellants to ensure challenge to the judgment of the learned Single Judge is made by filing the Letters Patent Appeal within the time permitted by law. 9) This attitude on the part of the appellants in taking steps to file the Letters Patent Appeal is nothing but negligence, since, it is not as if the appellants were not aware that the time limit for preferring the said appeal is only thirty days from the date of judgment of the Single Judge. 10) In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another1, the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in 1 (2012) 3 SCC 563 -4 of 8- Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9- 2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely -5 of 8- because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to