Devendra Pradhan … v. The State of Jharkhand The Director General of Police, Ranchi. The Deputy Inspector General
Case Details
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 4099 of 2015 Devendra Pradhan …. Petitioner 1. 2. 3. 4. Versus The State of Jharkhand The Director General of Police, Ranchi. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, J.J. (S.T.F.), Jharkhand, Ranchi. The Superintendent of Police, J.J. (STF), Jharkhand, Ranchi. …. Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N. PATHAK ------ For the Petitioner For the Respondents
Legal Reasoning
------ : Mr. Mahesh Kumar Sinha, Advocate : Mr. Anil Kumar, AC to GP-I ----- 16/ 06.03.2024 Heard the parties. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing of the order contained in memo No. 141 dated 13.10.2011 by which he has been dismissed from service. The appellate order contained in memo no. 7261 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand and revisional order contained in memo no. 332 dated 3.8.2015 passed by the Director General of Police, Ranchi are also under challenge, whereby the appeal as well as revision preferred by the petitioner against the dismissal order was also rejected. 3. Briefly stated, the petitioner, who was a Constable, while deputed for training at J.A.P.T.C., Padma Camp, a complaint was lodged by the warden- cum-Teacher of Kastoorba Gandhi Girls Residential School, Padma that on 21.09.2011 at 10.50 pm, the petitioner entered in the campus of school and through the window of the hostel tried to tease the girls. Thereafter, the girls raised hulla and the petitoner was caught by the night guard and chowkidar of the school and was handed over to the Hawaldar of training centre. With the said allegation, memo of charge dated 13.10.2011 was issued by the Superintendent of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police Training Center, Hazaribag. Denying the allegation, the petitioner submitted his reply. In the enquiry proceeding, seven witnesses have been examined to prove the charge against the petitioner. The inquiry officer submitted his report proving the charge true against the petitioner. Second show cause notice was issued on 30.7.2012 and the petitioner replied it. The petitoner has stated that he is innocent and no 2 misconduct has been committed by him. Finally, the petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 18.9.2012. The petitoner preferred appeal on 27.11.2012, but the same was also rejected. The revision preferred on 14.3.2013 was also rejected by order dated 28.12.2012. Challenging the aforesaid orders, the petitioner moved this Court. 4. Assailing the impugned orders, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the same are neither sustainable in law nor on facts. Learned counsel submits that the petitoner was made the victim of circumstance and there is only circumstantial evidence against him to connect with the occurrence. Actually, some other person was involved in the alleged occurrence and not by the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that from perusal of the evidence of the witnesses, it could only gather that no witness has identified the petitioner to be the accused. The relevant witness i.e. the night guard and chowkidar of the school have only stated that after following the accused, he reached at the training centre where Hawaldar Sanjay Kumar Singh was there and thereafter, they saw a police personnel came towards Padma in full drunken state and there is every suspicion that the said police personnel is the accused. Learned counsel places reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Madan Prasad Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2012 (3) JCR 438 (Jhr) to contend that mere suspicion howsoever high may be, the same should not be made basis for a major punishment of dismissal from service. Further in support of his contention, learned counsel refers to the judgment passed in the case of Surya Nath Singh Vs. Chairman and MD, M/s BBU Nigam Ltd, reported in 1995 (2) PLJR 421 and submits that the final order i.e. the order of dismissal which seriously affects the livelihood of the employee is not supposed to be passed in casual or whimsical manner, as has been done in the present case. Referring to the judgement in the case of D.V. Kapoor Vs. Union of India & Ors, reported in 1990(4) SCC 314, learned counsel argues that the imposition of penalty disproportionate to the nature of misconduct amounts to violation of cardinal principle of natural justice and as such, the punishment order, which seems to be harsh, is liable to be quashed and set aside. 5. On the other hand, leaned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the petitioner being a member of disciplined force should maintain utmost discipline. On the basis of the complaint of misbehaving with the girls 3 of the residential school, he was proceeded departmentally. The witnesses have identified him and caught in presence of Hawaldar Sanjay Kumar Singh. The petitioner initially told his name as Constable Rakesh Kumar, but upon enquiry, it came to light that it was the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner tried to mislead the authorities by telling his false name and number. He further submits that the conduct of the petitioner was shameful and against the reputation of the police force. Learned counsel further submits that no folly was pointed out by the petitioner in the entire departmental proceeding and rightly the petitioner was dismissed from service, which was affirmed up-to to the revisional authority. Learned counsel further argues that law is well settled that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot reappraise the evidence and as such, on this score also, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the records, this court is of the view that no case is made-out by the petitioner for interference in the impugned orders for the following facts and reasons: (i) Admittedly, the charge levelled against the petitioner is shameful and against the reputation of the police force. The charge has been proved in the full dressed enquiry after taking into consideration the evidence on record. It was stated in the enquiry report that the petitioner was caught by the guards and chowkidar of the school in presence of Hawaldar of the training centre and he told his name to be Rakesh Kumar Singh. Upon enquiry, it came to the light that the petitioner has wrongly told his name and actually, he is the person who entered in the campus of girls’ hostel and misbehaved with the girls. It was also stated in the complaint lodged by the warden of the school that since last one moth, someone by entering his hand through window of the hostel is eve-teasing the girls. Therefore, night guard was deputed. The said night guard has stated in his evidence that he saw a person in the campus of girl hostel after raising hulla by the girls, he followed the same. He further stated that he caught the person at the gate of training centre in presence of Hawaldar and upon enquiry, it was found that the petitioner is involved in the said crime. (ii) The findings of the inquiry officer were taken into consideration and the 4 punishment order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority assigning cogent reasons. The same was affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Revisional Authority, which requires no interference. (iii) Nothing has been brought on record to show that there was any procedural laches in the proceedings rather a full-fledged enquiry was conducted following the provisions of natural justice by extending the petitioner ample opportunity of being heard. (iv) Admittedly, when the order of punishment was affirmed upto the Revisional Authority, this Court refrains itself from interfering with the same. (v) The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 has held thus: “ The High Court does not act as appellant authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to the decision of a case on merit as an appellate authority (ii) Insufficiency of materials cannot be a ground to annul the findings of the Enquiry Officer neither can a substituted view be taken in place of Enquiry officer/disciplinary authority in cases of departmental proceeding.” (vi) The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 has held as under:- “16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact- finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate 5 authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans1 observed: “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” 22. In the established facts and circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation to hold, at the outset, that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court fell into patent error in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authorities and interfering with the quantum of punishment, as if the High Court was sitting in appellate jurisdiction. From the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is quite obvious that the findings with regard to an “unbecoming act” committed by the respondent, as found by the departmental authorities, were not found fault with even on reappreciation of evidence. The High Court did not find that the occurrence, as alleged by the complainant, had not taken place. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench found that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer or the departmental appellate authority were either arbitrary or even perverse. As a matter of fact, the High Court found no fault whatsoever with the conduct of enquiry. The direction of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the respondent was not entitled to back wages and was to be posted outside the city for at least two years, which was upheld by the Division Bench, itself demonstrates that the High Court believed the complainant’s case fully for otherwise, neither the withholding of back wages nor a direction to post the respondent outside the city for at least two years was necessary. The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. To hold that since the respondent had not “actually molested” Miss X and that he had only “tried to molest” her and had “not managed” to make physical contact 6 with her, the punishment of removal from service was not justified, was erroneous. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone. But there is another aspect of the case which is fundamental and goes to the root of the case and concerns the approach of the Court while dealing with cases of sexual harassment at the place of work of female employees.” (vii) The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Phulpari Kumari, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 has held as under: illegal gratification by “6. The criminal trial against the respondent is still pending consideration by a competent criminal court. The order of dismissal from service of the respondent was pursuant to a departmental inquiry held against her. The inquiry officer examined the evidence and concluded that the charge of the demand and acceptance of respondent was proved. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in reappreciating the evidence and coming to a conclusion that the evidence on record was not sufficient to point to the guilt of the respondent: 6.1. It is settled law that interference with the orders passed pursuant to a departmental inquiry can be only in case of “no evidence”. Sufficiency of evidence is not within the realm of judicial review. The standard of proof as required in a criminal trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry. Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by the criminal court where the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge. 6.2. The High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal of the respondent by reexamining the evidence and taking a view different from that of the disciplinary authority which was based on the findings of the inquiry officer.” (viii) Further, in case of Union of India & Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly observed that, “High Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot venture into appreciation of evidence or interfere with conclusions in enquiry proceedings if the same are conducted in accordance with law, or go into reliability/ adequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on findings are based, or correct error of fact however 7 grave it may be, or go into proportionality of punishment unless it shocks conscience of court”. (ix) Since the heinous charges are there against the petitioner, this Court is of the view that no illegality or any infirmity has been committed by the respondents in inflicting the impugned punishment of dismissal from service. The Police Force is a disciplined force and each and every Police Personnel is required to maintain discipline. Even iota of indiscipline attracts punishment. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are no help to the petitioner in the present facts and circumstances of the case, discussed above. 7. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, judicial pronouncements and legal propositions, the writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed. R.Kr./RC (Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)