✦ Jharkhand High Court · 17 Jul 2023

Karuna Shankar Mishra v. Union of India, through Director General of C.I.S.F(Central Industrial

PATENT APPELLATE JURISDICTION) L.P.A No. 134 of 2021SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, RATNAKER BHENGRA7 min read

Case at a glance

Decided
17 Jul 2023
Bench
SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, RATNAKER BHENGRA

Key paragraphs

  • Para 99. L.P.A No.134 of 2021 is allowed to the above extent. (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) (Ratnaker Bhengra, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated :17th July 2023 sudhir/N.A.F.R.

Judgment

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RATNAKER BHENGRA For the Appellant For the UOI : Mr. Rahul Pandey, Advocate Mr. Ankit Apurva, Advocate : Mr. Vikash Kumar, CGC ---------------

O R D E R 17th July 2023 Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, J. W.P(S) No.4961 of 2019 has been dismissed on the ground that the order put to challenge before the writ Court was passed at Hyderabad and while so, the High Court of Jharkhand has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

2.

The writ Court has held as under: “8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has ventured to go through the materials on record. It is an admitted position that earlier the petitioner moved before this Court in W.P. (S) No.1737 of 2008 which was allowed on the ground that before differing with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority has not followed the procedure of law and has differed with the law laid down in the case of “ Punjab National Bank V. Kunj Bihari Misra” reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84. The learned Single Judge has further given liberty to the respondent to consider the case and to take afresh decision. The Division Bench of this Court affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge. Pursuant 2 L.P.A No.134 of 2021 thereto the impugned order has been passed. On perusal of disagreement note, it is crystal clear that after remand the authority concerned has held that so far Charge Nos.

1 & II are concerned that are to be proved wherein earlier disagreement note which was subject matter of the earlier round of litigation, he has held that charges have been proved. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that disagreement note of the present is same of earlier, is found to be untrue. On perusal of punishment order Annexure-4, it is clear that opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner. In para 10 of the impugned order, it has been clearly stated that after receiving disagreement note, the petitioner was directed to file written reply within 15 days. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner filed written reply on 27.06.2017 wherein he denied the charge nos. I and II. The Disciplinary Authority has looked into reply dated 27.06.2017 minutely and came to the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct in view of Rule 32(1) of the C.I.S.F Rules. Thus, on perusal of impugned order, it is crystal clear that the sufficient compliance has been made before passing the impugned order in view of order of this Court in earlier round of litigation.

In the light of direction of this Court and after afresh consideration lighter punishment has been inflicted and the petitioner has been reinstated in service. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submits that after reinstatement the petitioner is posted at Hyderabad. The impugned order has been passed at Hyderabad. The petitioner has not pressed the prayer no. 1(b) and it appears that only making territorial jurisdiction prayer has been made in prayer no. 1(b) which is with regard to earlier round of litigation and the same was already quashed by this Court which was affirmed by the Division Bench. The impugned order has been passed at Hyderabad and petitioner is posted at Hyderabad. On the ground of territorial jurisdiction the writ petition is not maintainable. 9. As a cumulative effect of the discussions made above, no relief can be extended to the petitioner. Accordingly, this writ petition is hereby dismissed.”

3.

No doubt a Court cannot entertain a petition alleging infraction of any right the cause of action for which has arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. However, the writ Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition which is founded on the ground that a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The law on this issue was first dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India” AIR 1961 SC 532 and the ratio of that case was followed and the Parliament introduced clause (1-A) which is the present clause(2) to Article 226 of the Constitution of India which reads as under:

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

3 L.P.A No.134 of 2021

4.

Now this is also beyond any pale of doubt what would constitute a cause of action. As understood in legal parlance, the expression “cause of action” indicates a bundle of material facts which a plaintiff is required to prove to claim relief from the Court.

5.

In “Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India” (2014) 9 SCC 329 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, clause (1-A) was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended clause (2) now reads as under:

226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3)-(4)***

On a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause (2), it is clear that now the High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court's territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. The term “cause of action” as appearing in clause (2) came up for consideration time and again before this Court.”

6.

This is not in dispute that the imputations of allegation made against the delinquent police constable pertain to the misconduct committed by him while he was posted at Jadugora within the the State of Jharkhand. It is therefore immaterial that the final order in compliance of the order passed by the writ Court in W.P(S) No.4961 of 2019 has now been passed by an authority who sits at Hyderabad.

7.

In view of the above, order dated 3rd March 2021 passed in 4 L.P.A No.134 of 2021 W.P(S) No.4961 of 2019 is set aside.

8.

W.P(S) No.4961 of 2019 is remitted back to the writ Court for a fresh consideration on the merits of the case.

9.

L.P.A No.134 of 2021 is allowed to the above extent. (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) (Ratnaker Bhengra, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated :17th July 2023 sudhir/N.A.F.R.

Questions this judgment answers

Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?

Constitution of India — arts. 226, 226(2); Fifteenth Amendment Act, 1963; Forty-second Amendment Act, 1976; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. 20(c).

Which court decided this case, and when?

Jharkhand High Court, on 17 Jul 2023. The bench was SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, RATNAKER BHENGRA.

Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case

No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.

This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.

Why is this linked?

This is the original judgment text, reproduced from the public court record. Always verify it against the official record before relying on it in a filing — check it on Jharkhand High Court or eCourts case status (search case no. PATENT APPELLATE JURISDICTION) L.P.A No. 134 of 2021). ← Search more judgments