Basant Kumar Singh v. ………
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S). No. 7487 of 2012 Basant Kumar Singh ---------- Versus ………. Petitioner 1. State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, 1st Floor, H.E.C. Campus, Dhurwa, Ranchi-834004. 2. Shri G.S. Rath, I.P.S., Director General and Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Police Headquarters, P.O. Dhurwa, Ranchi- 834004. 3. Shri Laxman Prasad Singh, I.P.S., Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police, Raja Rani Kothi, P.O. Doranda, Ranchi-834002.
Legal Reasoning
4. Shri Navin Kumar Sinha, I.P.S., the Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police, 4th Battalion, Bokaro, P.O.+P.S. Section 12, Bokaro, District Bokaro, Jharkhand State, Pin-827012. ………. Respondents. CORAM: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N.PATHAK ---------- For the Petitioner For the Respondents ----------- : : ------------ Mr. Ram Kr. Kataria, Advocate Mr. Ashish Kumar, AC to SC(M)-III 05/ 15.01.2024 Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for issuance of writ in the nature certiorari for quashing the order dated 05.01.2012, whereby respondent No. 4 has imposed the punishment of forfeiture of two years increment with cumulative effect. Later on, the said order of punishment was affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Revisional Authority. 3. The brief facts of the case is that while the petitioner was undergoing training at Jharkhand Armed Police, 1st Battalion, Ranchi for the Senior Promotion Course (SPC), he had applied for grant of leave to the Office of Commandant, JAP-I and the same was forwarded to the Commandant. Subsequently, the petitioner had also given application for leave to the Incharge of Doranda Police Station but when the leave was not granted, the petitioner handed over the said leave application to the Media Person, which was published in Newspaper on 30.04.2011 making a story and tried 2 to tarnish the image of Police Department. Thereafter, the Chief Instructor had written a letter to the Commandant, JAP-I on 30.04.2011 and the Commandant set-up an enquiry by appointing Enquiry Officer and framed charges against the petitioner and issued charge-sheet to the petitioner, to which he replied. However, being not satisfied with the reply of the petitioner, the Departmental Proceeding No. 05/2011 was initiated against the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority. In the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was provided ample opportunity to present his case and to cross-examine the witness. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the enquiry report as well as the misconduct of petitioner, passed the order of punishment dated 05.01.2012 withholding one increment for two years with cumulative effect. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police, Ranchi and the Appellate Authority after considering all aspects of the matter, dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner vide his order dated 18.06.2012. Further, the revision application preferred by the petitioner also stood dismissed vide order dated 11.09.2012 by Director General and Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi. Aggrieved by the said orders, the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court. 4. Mr. Ram Kr. Kataria, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vociferously argues that the impugned order is not tenable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that merely on the basis of enquiry report, the punishment was inflicted by the Disciplinary Authority. Learned counsel further argues that the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority without considering the grounds of defence taken by the petitioner have mechanically affirmed the order of punishment inflicted by the Disciplinary Authority. As such, the impugned orders are not tenable in the eyes of law and fit to be quashed and set aside. 5. Learned counsel representing the respondent-State by vehemently opposing the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the reply of the petitioner was fully considered and thereafter, the enquiry 3 office come to a finding that the petitioner is guilty of the charges levelled against him. Learned counsel further argues that order of Disciplinary Authority was passed after taking into consideration the enquiry report, hence the same was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Revisional Authority. Learned counsel further argues that in a Police Force indiscipline cannot be tolerated. The petitioner who is the member of Police Force has dared to pass Departmental matter before the Media, which cannot be tolerated and therefore, the punishment order is fully justified, which was later on affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional Authority. Learned counsel further argues that law is well settled that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot reappraise the evidences. 6. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no case is made-out for the interference for the following facts and reasons: (I) The findings of the enquiry officer were taken into consideration and the punishment order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority assigning cogent and valid reasons. The same was affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Revisional Authority, which requires no interference. (II) Nothing has been brought on record to show that there was any procedural laches in the proceedings rather a full-fledged enquiry was conducted following the provisions of natural justice by extending the petitioner ample opportunity of being heard. (III) Admittedly, when the order of punishment was affirmed upto the Revisional Authority, this Court refrains itself from interfering with the same. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 has held thus: “ The High Court does not act as appellant authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural 4 justice. Judicial review is not akin to the decision of a case on merit as an appellate authority.” (ii) Insufficiency of materials cannot be a ground to annul the findings of the Enquiry Officer neither can a substituted view be in place of Enquiry taken officer/disciplinary authority in cases of departmental proceeding. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 has held as under: 16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of the High Court cannot, normally judicial review, speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities 5 which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the the decision-making process. Lord examination of Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans1 observed: “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” 22. In the established facts and circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation to hold, at the outset, that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court fell into patent error in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authorities and interfering with the quantum of punishment, as if the High Court was sitting in appellate jurisdiction. From the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is quite obvious that the findings with regard to an “unbecoming act” committed by the respondent, as found by the departmental authorities, were not found fault with even on reappreciation of evidence. The High Court did not find that the occurrence, as alleged by the complainant, had not taken place. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench found that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer or the departmental appellate authority were either arbitrary or even perverse. As a matter of fact, the High Court found no fault whatsoever with the conduct of enquiry. The direction of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the respondent was not entitled to back wages and was to be posted outside the city for at least two years, which was upheld by the Division Bench, itself demonstrates that the High Court believed the complainant’s case fully for otherwise, neither the withholding of back wages nor a direction to post the respondent outside the city for at least two years was necessary. The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. To hold that since the respondent had not “actually molested” Miss X and that he had only “tried to molest” her and had “not managed” to make physical contact with her, the punishment of removal from service was not justified, was erroneous. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. 6 What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone. But there is another aspect of the case which is fundamental and goes to the root of the case and concerns the approach of the Court while dealing with cases of sexual harassment at the place of work of female employees. 8. Further, in case of Union of India & Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly observed that, “High Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot venture into appreciation of evidence or interfere with conclusions in enquiry proceedings if the same are conducted in accordance with law, or go into reliability/ adequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on findings are based, or correct error of fact however grave it may be, or go into proportionality of punishment unless it shocks conscience of court”. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Phulpari Kumari, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 has held as under: “6. The criminal trial against the respondent is still pending consideration by a competent criminal court. The order of dismissal from service of the respondent was pursuant to a departmental inquiry held against her. The inquiry officer examined the evidence and concluded that the charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the respondent was proved. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in reappreciating the evidence and coming to a conclusion that the evidence on record was not sufficient to point to the guilt of the respondent: 6.1. It is settled law that interference with the orders passed pursuant to a departmental inquiry can be only in case of “no evidence”. Sufficiency of evidence is not within the realm of judicial review. The standard of proof as required in a criminal trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry. Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by the criminal court where the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond 7 reasonable doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge. 6.2. The High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal of the respondent by re- examining the evidence and taking a view different from that of the disciplinary authority which was based on the findings of the inquiry officer.” Since the charges relate to indiscipline and dereliction of duties, this Court is of the view that no illegality or any infirmity has been committed by the respondents in inflicting the punishment of withholding increment for two years with cumulative effect. The Police Force is a disciplined force and each and every Police Personnel is required to maintain utmost discipline. Even iota of indiscipline attracts punishment. 10. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, judicial pronouncements and legal propositions, the writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed. kunal/- (Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)