The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 1697 of 2022 Kiran Singh, wife of Late Manoj Prasad, Resident of Devi Darshan Road, Near Arjun Niwas, BITT, Polytechnic College, P.O. – Neori, P.S. – Sadar, District – Ranchi. V E R S U S … Petitioner 1. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, through its Managing Director, having its office at Engineering Bhawan, Dhurwa, Ranchi 2. General Manager (Personnel) - cum – General Administration, Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, having its office at Engineering Bhawan, Dhurwa, Ranchi 3. Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, through its Managing Director, having its office at Engineering Bhawan, Dhurwa, Ranchi 4. Managing Director, Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, having its office at Engineering Bhawan, Dhurwa, Ranchi 5. Deputy General Manager, Transmission, Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, office at Engineering Bhawan, Dhurwa, Ranchi CORAM: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S. N. PATHAK … … Respondents.
Legal Reasoning
For the Petitioner For the Respondents : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate Mr. Sameer Saurabh, Advocate : 12/17.12.2024 Heard the parties. PRAYER OF THE PETITIONER 2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer for quashing the Resolution No. 1461, dated 23.08.2017, issued vide Memo NO. 1462, dated 23.08.2017 (Annexure-9) by the respondent no. 5, by which husband of the petitioner (late Manoj Prasad) was dismissed from service. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order issued vide Memo No. 128, dated 01.02.2022 (Annexure-12) by which appeal of the petitioner against dismissal of service of her husband, has been rejected by the respondent no. 2. Petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to pay consequential benefits. RC 1 FACTS OF THE CASE 3. Petitioner is the wife of Late Manoj Prasad, who was working as Junior Electrical Engineer and died on 13.10.2017. According to petitioner, while her husband was posted as Junior Electrical Engineer, Lohardaga, a raid was conducted on 14.03.2013 in relation to theft of electricity for which her husband lodged an FIR vide Lohardaga P.S. Case No. 43/2013 against several persons including one Rajendra Sahu. It is alleged that said Rajendra Sahu was illegally using electricity by putting hook on the electrical transmission wire and said theft caused financial loss of Rs.36,000/- to the respondent no. 3. A seizure list was also prepared which was part of the said FIR. After institution of the FIR, said Rajendra Sahu deposited the amount of fine and thereafter, the case was dropped vide order dated 27.04.2013, after a compromise arrived at in Lok Adalat. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that Sonuj Kumar Sahu, son of Rajendra Sahu, applied for electric connection for his shop on 10.04.2013 and also deposited the requisite fee on 18.04.2013. The husband of the petitioner, being Junior Engineer, submitted his report on 10.04.2013 and pursuant to the same on 19.04.2013, the electric connection was established in the shop of Sonu Kumar Sahu, son of Rajendra Sahu, The calculation of the electrical bill commenced from 19.04.2013 and after 27.04.2013, no action was required in relation to electric connection given to said Sonu Kumar Sahu. Since earlier case was lodged against Rajendra Sahu, with an intention to take revenge from deceased husband of the petitioner and malign the reputation, said Sonu Kumar Sahu made a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi on 04.05.2013 with the allegation that petitioner’s husband was demanding a sum of Rs.2,000/- as a bribe for providing electric connection on his shop. On the basis of said complaint, FIR being Vigilance P.S. Case No. 13/13, corresponding to Special Case No. 14/13, for the offence under Section 7/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was lodged. After lodging of the FIR, a raid was conducted and petitioner’s husband was arrested on 07.05.2013. After investigation, the Vigilance Bureau submitted the charge-sheet against the petitioner for the 2 RC offence under Section 7/13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Petitioner’s husband preferred regular bail and vide order dated 24.07.2013, he was released on regular bail. After his release, he was suspended on 04.06.2013 with effect from 06.05.2013 and thereafter departmental proceeding was started. Memo of charge was served to the petitioner’s husband vide Memo NO. 7516, dated 19.12.2013 and the charge was that the Vigilance Bureau had arrested him while accepting Rs.2,000/- as bribe money. Enquiry officer was also appointed and petitioner’s husband was directed to submit his reply. The memo of charge was issued and thereafter proceeding was initiated for allegation of accepting bribe of Rs.2,000/-. After following the procedure, petitioner was dismissed from the service vide Resolution NO. 1461, dated 23.08.2017, issued under the signature of respondent no. 5 vide Memo NO. 1462, dated 23.08.2017. Against the order of dismissal, petitioner’s husband preferred an appeal but during pendency of the appeal, he died on 13.10.2017 and no decision was taken on appeal. 5. Being aggrieved, petitioner being wife of the deceased, preferred writ petition before this Court vide W.P.(S) No. 1486 of 2018. However, during pendency of the writ petition, the appeal preferred by the petitioner’s husband was rejected and information to that effect was given vide letter no. 1785, dated 09.08.2018. However, the same was challenged by the petitioner by filing an amendment application in the pending writ petition. This Court, vide order dated 24.11.2010, set aside the appellate order dated 09.08.2018, passed by the appellate authority and the case was remitted back to the appellate authority to pass reasoned order considering objection made in memo of appeal. However, the appellate authority again rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner vide memo no. 128, dated 01.02.2022. Assailing the said orders, petitioner has been constrained to knock door of this Court. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 6. Mr. Sameer Saurabh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, assailing the impugned orders on the ground that in a regular departmental proceeding, the enquiry officer has come to a conclusion holding the petitioner guilty of the charges, which is based on no 3 RC evidence. Further, it has been argued that the enquiry officer, without examining any of the witnesses and without taking any evidence on record and without proving the documents in a regular departmental proceeding, has come to a conclusion holding the petitioner guilty of charges and referring the same to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority also mechanically held the petitioner guilty of charges and thereafter inflicted the punishment of dismissal, the same was affirmed by the appellate authority. Learned counsel further argues that though this Court interfered with the order of the appellate authority and set aside with a direction to reconsider the same, but the same view has again been reiterated in the reasoned order passed by the authority. 7. Placing heavy reliance upon the Judgment rendered in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, learned counsel submits that the impugned orders based on no evidence, are fit to be quashed and set aside. Hence, after quashing the said order, a direction may be passed by this Court to pay the benefits in view of the fact that after death of the employee, his wife has approached this Court because of stigma attached with her husband and is in great hardship. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE JUVNL 8. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel representing JUVNL emphatically argues that there is no illegality or any infirmity in the impugned order. Since petitioner’s husband was caught red handed and was put behind the bar, there was no any other option for the department than to suspend him and initiate a regular departmental proceeding. Learned counsel submits that since petitioner’s husband was caught red handed, the statement of officers during investigation formed part of the regular departmental proceeding and there was no independent witnesses for proving those statements which were notified for considering the petitioner to be guilty of charges. The enquiry officer rightly based his conclusion on the investigation report as well as statement of witnesses and hence rightly petitioner’s husband has been held guilty of charges by the enquiry officer and thereafter punishment has been inflicted. Justifying RC 4 the impugned order, learned counsel submits that since petitioner’s husband was caught red handed, the punishment of dismissal is fully justified. FINDINGS OF THE COURT 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length across the bar, after giving thoughtful consideration, this Court is of the view that the order of dismissal inflicted upon the petitioner by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate authority by way of reasoned order is not tenable in the eyes of law for the following facts and reasons: (i) The enquiry officer has held the petitioner’s husband guilty of charges on the basis of statements of the police officers which have not been proved in the regular departmental proceeding. (ii) The enquiry report itself is perverse. The perversity on the point that no evidence has been laid down neither any witnesses have been examined nor the opportunity of cross examination has been given to the petitioner to cross examine the witnesses, who deposed against him. The entire conclusion of the enquiry report is based on the criminal investigation. There is no quarrel to the logical sequitur that the enquiry officer in the regular departmental proceeding cannot look into the investigation report for coming to the conclusion holding the petitioner’s husband guilty of charges. In the instant case, what to talk of the case diary, the entire findings of the enquiry report is based on criminal investigation. (iii) The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others (Supra) and the Hon’ble Court has held in para-14 to 16 as under: “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi- judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi- judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and RC 5 died not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by thye enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the Police Station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left. 16. In Union of India V. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] it was held: “22. … The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent. 23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that Charge 3 was proved against him? In RC 6 exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.” Further, in the said case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra) it has been held as under: