Yadunandan Ram v. ………
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S). No. 6156 of 2014 Yadunandan Ram ---------- Versus ………. Petitioner 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Deputy Commissioner, Giridih. 3. The District Superintendent of Education, Giridih. ………. ---------- CORAM: THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N.PATHAK Respondents. For the Petitioner For the Respondents
Legal Reasoning
13/ 06.04.2023 Heard the parties. ----------- : : ----------
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Ram Lakhan Yadav, Advocate Mr. Rakesh Kr. Roy, AC to GA-III 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for direction upon the respondents to grant B.Sc. Trained Scale w.e.f. 03.02.1983 and further to grant senior pay-scale after an interval of 12 years, as has been done in cases of similarly situated teachers. 3. The facts of the case lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner was initially appointed on 06.04.1981 to the post of Science Teacher in the Middle School, Manjura, Bermo in Giridih district. Thereafter, as per condition stipulated in the appointment letter, the petitioner completed his B.Ed. from Teacher Training College, Deoghar on 03.02.1983. It is the case of the petitioner that all the B.Sc. Trained teachers had been given the pay- scale of Rs.850-1350 by the order of the District Superintendent of Education, Giridih but the petitioner has been denied the said benefits. Thereafter, the petitioner was extended the B.Sc. trained pay-scale (Grade- 4) w.e.f. 01.04.2010 vide memo No. 1564 dated 23.09.2011, ought to have been granted w.e.f. 03.02.1983, the date on which the petitioner completed B.Ed. degree and thereafter, upon completion of 12 years of service, the senior pay-scale ought to have been given to the petitioner. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the teachers who obtained B.Ed. Degree and appointed along with the petitioner as Science Teachers, were given the B.Sc. Trained pay-scale (Grade-4) w.e.f. 03.02.1983 (the date on which they 2 got B.Ed. degree) and thereafter, the senior pay-scale (Grade-5) was granted w.e.f. 03.02.1995. Not only that, the teachers, who were junior to the petitioner, were also granted the Grade-4 and Grade-4 much prior to the petitioner. The petitioner filed several representation for redressal of his grievances but all went in vain. Hence, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 4. Mr. Ram Lakhan Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that action of the respondents in granting promotion to the similarly situated and even juniors to the petitioner and discriminating the petitioner, is arbitrary, illegal and violative of principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further argues that similarly situated persons, namely, Kamal Kant Ram, Yugal Kishore Dubey, Jagdish Prasad Sharma, Surendra Kumar Singh, have been granted Grade-4 w.e.f. 03.02.1983 and thereafter, senior pay-scale was also granted but in case of petitioner, the same was granted in the year 2010 though he was also entitled for the same benefits w.e.f. 03.02.1983, the date when he completed Teachers Training course. Subsequently, on attaining the age of superannuation, the petitioner retired on 31.12.2013 from Middle School, Dumma, Giridih and after his retirement, he received the entire retiral benefits. Learned counsel further argues that the respondents have adopted pick and choose method, which is not tenable in the eyes of law. 5. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that matter of petitioner was placed before the District Establishment Committee, Giridih for redressal of his grievance in the meeting held on 16.09.2016 and after perusal of records, it was found that petitioner was appointed vide memo No. 2878- 3335 dated 06.04.1981 to the post of Inter Science Untrained Teacher on vritika of Rs.150/-. Thereafter, vide office order dated 09.07.1982, he was given the pay-scale of Rs.680-15-890-965 w.e.f. 01.04.1982 and subsequently, he obtained the I.Sc. Trained pay-scale of Rs.750-15-82-940- 3 1080 vide memo No. 4768-90 dated 09.08.1984 w.e.f. 03.02.1983. It was also found that the petitioner obtained 1st time bound promotion vide memo No. 932 dated 03.06.1997 and accordingly, senior inter trained pay-scale of Rs.1400-2600 was granted to the petitioner. Thereafter, as per decision of District Establishment Committee, Giridih dated 14.06.2011, the petitioner was given promotion in Grade-IV B.Sc. Trained. Learned counsel further argues that after perusal of the entire materials available on record, the District Establishment Committee, Giridih rejected the claim of petitioner. Learned counsel further argues that the promotion given earlier to the similarly situated teachers with whom the petitioner is claiming parity, their promotion have already been suspended vide memo No. 816 dated 13.04.2015. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, the writ petition being devoid of any merit, is fit to be dismissed. 6. Having heard the parties across the bar and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition for the following facts and reasons: I) The petitioner is claiming parity with the similarly situated person, who have been granted promotion w.e.f. 03.02.1983 and thereafter, senior pay-scale was granted to them in the year 1995 but in case of petitioner, the same was extended in the year 2010 only, which amounts to discrimination. The said contention of the petitioner is not tenable in the eyes of law since the promotion granted to the similarly situated persons have already been suspended by the respondents memo No. 816 dated 13.04.2015. II) Further, since the petitioner superannuated on 31.12.2013 and received all the retiral benefits without any protest and thereafter, filed the instant writ petition claiming benefits of promotion w.e.f. 03.02.1983, which is not tenable in the eyes of law. 4 III) The instant writ application was filed in the year 2014 claiming the benefits accrued in the year 1983, which is barred by limitation. 7. This issue has already been decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1979, in which while dismissing the writ petition, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that “for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated 21.12.1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, has held as under: it that in mind “Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains the respondent-employee being more significance as forgotten 5 absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 8. 9. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal proposition and judicial pronouncement, no other view can be taken as to what has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
Decision
Resultantly, the writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed. kunal/- (Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)