Manoj Rai …. … v. 1. State of Jharkhand 2. Director General-cum-I.G of Police, Ranchi 3. Deputy Inspector General
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P(S) No. 7280 of 2016 ------ Manoj Rai …. …. Petitioner(s). Versus 1. State of Jharkhand 2. Director General-cum-I.G of Police, Ranchi 3. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Doranda 4. Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police No.1, Doranda, Ranchi …. …. Respondent(s) CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANDA SEN. ------ ------ For the Petitioner(s) For the State
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Pradeep Kumar, Advocate : Mr. Varun Prabhakar, AC to GP-III 5/15.02.2023 Heard the parties. 2. In this writ application, petitioner has prayed to quash the order contained in Memo No. 133 dated 30.4.2015 whereby punishment has been imposed upon the petitioner, on completion of a departmental proceeding. Further the Appellate Order passed by DIG, Jharkhand Armed Police, Ranchi contained in Memo No. 2812 dated 13.11.2016 is also under challenge. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no material to punish the petitioner, on the basis of the allegation. It is his contention that in W.P(S) No. 4597 of 2008 ( (Manoj Rai Vrs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.) this Court had quashed the punishment order, thus the result would be that the respondents were estopped from proceeding against the petitioner and punishing him on the same charges. 4. Counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner earlier challenge the order of dismissal in W.P(S) No. 4597 of 2008 which was set aside on the technical ground and the matter was remitted to the Disciplinary Authority to take a fresh decision. It is his contention that the punishment which has been imposed upon the petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate. Each and every aspect has been considered and on reconsideration a very lenient view has been taken by the respondents thus, this writ application should be dismissed. 5. The petitioner was a Constable in Jharkhand Armed Police-I (JAP-I). He was appointed on 8.01.2002. He was assigned the duty to drive a police jeep bearing Registration No. BR IJ 5319 on 26.8.2005. It is the allegation against the petitioner that while driving the jeep negligently, he dashed a cyclist and a pedestrian. Both of them sustained injury. One of them was hospitalized due to serious injuries sustained by him, later on he died in course of treatment. -2- The entire accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of this petitioner for which Lalpur P.S. Case No. 102 of 2005 was instituted under Sections 279, 447, 338 & 304(A) of the IPC. A Departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner being Departmental Proceeding No. 3 of 2016. Charge-sheet was filed alleging that petitioner on 26.8.2005 was driving the jeep in a rash & negligent manner which dashed one cyclist and a pedestrian. The pedestrian was seriously injured who died during the course of treatment. After conclusion of the departmental proceeding, based on the report of the Enquiry Officer, petitioner was dismissed from service. The aforesaid dismissal order was challenged by the petitioner in W.P(S) No. 4597 of 2008. The said writ application was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the Enquiry Report and the second show cause notice, punished the petitioner vide Memo No. 133 dated 30.4.2015 and the quantum of punishment was modified to forfeiture of one increment which would be equivalent to two black mark. The appeal preferred by the appellant was also dismissed. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 954 at paragraph 37 thereof has held that it is well settled that High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and re-appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry officer. By referring to judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Others versus S. Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the function of the High Court to review the findings and arrive at a different decision. In a departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can interfere. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:- (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; -3- (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 7. Further, in the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others versus Ajay Kumar Srivastava reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 24 thereof has held as under:- “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.” 8. In paragraph 25 of the aforesaid judgment (Ajay Kumar Srivastava) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has narrated the scope, which reads as follows:- “25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public service, the court is to examine and determine: (i)whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii)whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.” 9. In paragraph 28 of the aforesaid judgment (Ajay Kumar Srivastava) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution, the Court will not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceeding except in a case of mala fides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. 10. In the instant case, I find that the petitioner on earlier occasion had approached this Court filing writ application being W.P(S) No. 4597 of 2008. The said writ application was heard and this Court came to a conclusion that the copy of the Enquiry Report was not supplied to the petitioner. -4- Since without serving the copy of the Enquiry Report, major punishment of dismissal from service was imposed, the punishment order was thus declared to be bad and was set aside. This Court held that prejudice has been caused to the petitioner and the punishment order needs reconsideration by the respondents. The writ application was allowed and the matter was remanded to the respondents to pass afresh order within a reasonable period. 11. After the matter was remanded, the impugned order was passed considering all aspects. The Disciplinary Authority considered the Enquiry Report which is based on evidence and opportunity to file reply to the second show-cause notice was also given to the petitioner. The defence of the petitioner was also taken note of. There is no illegality in the process followed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority passed a fresh order of punishment and the punishment is of forfeiture of one increment which would be equivalent to two black mark. The Disciplinary Authority considering the judgment of this Court inflicted much lenient punishment and the punishment of dismissal which was passed earlier, was converted to that of forfeiture of only one increment which would be equivalent to two black marks. 12. One of the ground on which the departmental proceeding can be interfered with is the quantum of punishment, if it is harsh and disproportionate to the proved charge. In this case the Disciplinary Authority found the charge against the petitioner to be proved. When the charge is proved, it is the prerogative of the employer to select the nature/quantum of punishment. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vrs. Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 has held as under:- When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an “19.1 enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. The courts cannot assume the function of 19.2 disciplinary/departmental authorities and the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.” to decide -5- 14. In this case the Disciplinary Authority inflicted the punishment of forfeiture of one increment which is equivalent to two black mark. The said punishment cannot be said to be disproportionate to the charge proved. When the punishment is not disproportionate to the proved charge, Court by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Singh Vrs. Union of India reported in (2003) 3 SCC 309 has held that the scope of interference with punishment awarded by a disciplinary authority is very limited and unless the punishment appear to be shockingly disproportionate. 15. So far as the contention of the petitioner that on earlier occasion the punishment was quashed, thus the respondent cannot punish the petitioner on the same charge is concerned, I find that on earlier round of litigation, after setting aside the order of punishment, the matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order after supplying the copy of the Enquiry Report. This procedure was followed and thereafter the impugned order was passed. The Hon’ble Court on earlier round of litigation did not quash the entire proceeding, rather remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to take a fresh decision. The Disciplinary Authority thereafter took a fresh decision after complying with the principle of natural justice. Thus, I find no fault in the said decision. 16. Since the punishment is appropriate and there is no procedural illegality and irregularity in the departmental proceeding and sufficient opportunity was granted to the petitioner, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order of punishment and the Appellate Order. 17. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands dismissed. anjali/cp2 (ANANDA SEN , J)