Sanjay Kumar son of Sri Bhagwat Prasad, resident of C/1 Edern Nand Apartment, Nand v. …
Case Details
2025:JHHC:35207-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 3331 of 2016 ----- Sanjay Kumar son of Sri Bhagwat Prasad, resident of C/1 Edern Nand Apartment, Nand Nagar, P.O. - Harmu, P.S. -Argora, District -Ranchi. Versus …… Petitioner Union of India through the Director of General APS Directorate, 1. West Block, P.O. and P.S. - R. K. Puram, New Delhi-110066. 2. The Chief Post Master General, Jharkhand Circle, Meghdoot Bhawan, Doranda, P.O. and P.S. – Doranda, Ranchi 834 002 (Jharkhand). 3. P.S - Kotwali, District-Ranchi, PIN-834001, Jharkhand. Sr. Superintendent of Post, Ranchi Division, Ranchi, Post -G.P.O, CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- …. Respondents For the Petitioner: --------- Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate Mr. Avishek Prasad, Advocate Mr. Rajendra Prasad Gupta, Advocate Mrs. Sanjana Kumari, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Prashant Pallav, ASGI Reserved on: 24.11.2025 Pronounced on: 26 .11.2025 Ms. Shivani Jaluka, A.C. to ASGI --------- Per Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J. 1. 2. Heard both sides. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the Original Application being O.A.051/00122/2015(R) by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, vide order dated 5th February, 2016, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 3. The petitioner had filed the Original Application praying therein, inter alia, for grant of following reliefs: “[8.a] For Issuance of a direction upon the concerned respondent authorities to issue an order of transfer and posting of the applicant in the Cadre of Inspector of Posts. [8.b] For issuance of an order of direction which seems just and equitable in the facts and circumstances of the case. -1 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB [8.c] For issuance to quash the letter No.B.227 dated 05.08.2015." 4. The petitioner was an employee of the Department of Posts and had qualified in the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE), 2014 held from 22-23.11.2014 for promotion to the cadre of Inspector of Posts. (i) The petitioner secured 3rd rank among the 07 candidates who were declared successful against the 07 vacancies that were available. (ii) However, notwithstanding the above, the respondents issued orders for posting of only 06 candidates to the cadre of Inspector of Posts, leaving aside the petitioner. (iii) Aggrieved by his omission, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 02.06.2015. However, the same did not evoke any response. (iv) The petitioner learnt that he had been excluded on grounds that he has not passed the examination in four attempts as is prescribed in applicable rules/guidelines and urged before the learned Tribunal that although he had filled up the form five times, however, he had actually appeared only on four occasions i.e. in the years 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2014. (v) In 2008, the petitioner filled up the form but did not appear on account of medical reasons. While in the remaining years, he though had appeared but was not successful and had succeeded only in the last examination held in 2014. (vi) It was further contended that it was the respondents who had duly accepted the application form for the year 2014 and -2 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB allowed the petitioner to appear in the examination which he had successfully passed and in such circumstances, the respondents had no authority whatsoever to deny the promotion to the petitioner. 5. The sole question before the learned Tribunal was whether the petitioner had qualified the examination in the 4th or the 5th attempt. The learned Tribunal after relying upon the rules and after considering the documents on record came to a categorical conclusion that the petitioner in fact had already participated in the four earlier LDCEs in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2013 and had not been granted any exemption on medical grounds from appearing in LDCE in 2008 and further claim of the petitioner to grant an exemption from appearing in the LDCE in 2008 could not be substantiated and instead, the documents on record indicated that no formal exemption was granted and therefore, he had qualified the examination in the 5th attempt. 6.
Legal Reasoning
It is vehemently argued by Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal are absolutely perverse and therefore, deserve to be set aside. 7. It is urged that the petitioner in terms of the instructions could have only submitted a form seeking exemption and thereafter it was for the authorities to have taken a decision thereupon. The petitioner could not have compelled the authorities to take a decision on such application, therefore, this is a fit case where the respondents have been trying to take advantage of their own wrong by firstly not deciding the representation made by the petitioner and secondly by asking the petitioner to perform the impossible. After all the law does not compel one to do that which cannot possibly be performed. In support of such -3 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB contention he has relied upon the judgment rendered by Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Re Presidential Poll, (1974) 2 SCC 33 more particularly para-15 thereof which reads as under: “15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration of the term of office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62(1) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. "Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him." Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God.” 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the same proposition has further relied upon another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and another Vs. Shamsher Singh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 416. Para-10 of the said judgment reads as under: “10. Mr. Jethmalani placed before us a passage from Broom's Legal Maxims (p. 162), 10th Edn., where the doctrine of impossibility of performance (lex non cogit ad impossibilia) has been discussed. It has been indicated therein that however mandatory the provision may be, where it is impossible of compliance that would be a sufficient excuse for non-compliance, particularly when it is a question of the time factor. Keeping the -4 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB attendant circumstances of this case in view, we find it difficult to hold that the time taken by the State Government can amount to withholding of the representation which resulted in non-compliance of Section 10 of the Act so as to vitiate the detention. It is useful to refer to a paragraph from a judgment of this Court in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra, while we are on this point. A Division Bench was dealing with a COFEPOSA detention. Section 8 of the COFEPOSA requires the appropriate Government to make a reference to the Board within five weeks from the date of detention. While dealing with an argument referring to this aspect of the matter, the Court observed: The four principles enunciated by the Court in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal as well as other principles enun-ciated in other cases, an analysis will show, are aimed at shielding personal freedom against indifference, insensibility, routine and red tape and thus to secure to the detenu the right to make an effective representation. We agree: (1) the detaining authority must provide the detenu a very early opportunity to make a representation, (2) the detaining authority must consider the representation as soon as possible, and this, preferably, must be before the representation is forwarded to the Advisory Board, (3) the representation must be forwarded to the Advisory Board before the Board makes its report, and (4) the consideration by the detaining authority of the representation must be entirely independent of the hearing by the Board or its report, expedition being essential at every stage. We, however, hasten to add that the time-imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The Court's observations are not to be so understood. There has to be lee-way, depending on the necessities (we refrain from using the word 'circumstances') of the case. One may well imagine a case where a detenu does not make a representation before the Board makes its report making it impossible for the detaining authority either to consider it or to forward it to the Board in time or a case where a detenu makes a representation to the detaining authority so shortly before the Advisory Board takes up the reference that the detaining -5 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB authority cannot consider the representation before then but may merely forward it to the Board without himself considering it. Several such situations may arise compelling departure from the time-imperative. But no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference. No allowance can be made for needless procastination. But, allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved.” 9. Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the proposition as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision but the question is whether the ratio laid down therein applies to the fact situation obtaining in the present case. The reason being that the petitioner was permitted to appear in the LDCE 2008 but he did not appear for the same. As per rule, a candidate who is permitted to appear at the examination would either withdraws his name before commencement of the examination or if he fails to appear at the examination should be treated as having appeared and failed. The Head of the Circle, may, however, exercise his discretion for relaxation of this provision if he is satisfied that the failure to appear is due to illness, in proof of which there should be a proper medical certificate, or to other reasons beyond the control of the candidate. It is further stipulated that no candidate will be allowed to withdraw his candidature after the examination, except where he has been on medical leave during the days of the examination and the request for withdrawal has been submitted within the ten days from the date of his return to duty. This Circular had been annexed with the reply as Annexure-R/1. It shall be apt to reproduce the necessary contents of the Circular which reads as under:- -6 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB “5. A candidate who is permitted to appear at the examination but who either withdraws his name before the commencement of the examination or fails to appear at the examination should be treated as having appeared and failed. The Head of the Circle, may, however, exercise his discretion for relaxation of this provision if he is satisfied that the failure to appear is due to illness, in proof of which there should be a proper medical certificate, or to other reasons beyond the control of the candidate. No candidate will be allowed to withdraw his candidature after the examination except where he has been on medical leave during the days of the examination and the request for withdrawal is submitted within ten days from the date of his return to duty. The decision of the Head of the Circle is final in this respect and no appeal will lie against his decision. When these conditions for relaxation are not fulfilled but the Head of the Circle feels that a relaxation of the conditions is justified, having regard to the special circumstances of the case, he may forward the case to the Director-General with the recommendations.” 10. The LDCE 2008, which was initially scheduled to be held from 8th to 10th August, 2008, was actually re-scheduled and held from 5th to 7th November, 2008. 11. As per the petitioner, he had submitted an application dated 30.10.2008 along with the medical prescription (Out Patient Slip) dated 29.10.2008 issued by the Sadar Hospital, Gumla, to the Postmaster, Gumla Head Post Office, however, the categorical stand of the respondents is that they did not receive any such application in the office of the Sr. Superintendent of Post Office, Ranchi Division. 12. Be that as it may, the learned Tribunal on perusal of the medical prescription (Out Patient Slip) dated 29.10.2008 issued by the Sadar Hospital, Gumla observed that the petitioner had been advised bed rest for one week only i.e. from 19.10.2008 to 04.11.2008. As such, the petitioner should have been medically fit to appear in the examination -7 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB which was scheduled to be held from 05.11.2008. The conditions of withdrawal of candidature from the LDCE 2008 held from 5th to 7th November, 2008 were thus not fulfilled by the petitioner as per the provisions contained in Rule 6(a), (b) and (c) of Appendix No. 37 of Post and Telegraphs Manual Volume-IV (Appendices) which reads as under: “6. Withdrawal of candidature - (a) Permission to a candidate to withdraw his candidature from an examination may be granted by the same authority who had granted him the permission to appear at that examination, or by such other authority as may have been specially authorized in this behalf. The decision of such authority will be final. (b) Withdrawal of candidature should not ordinarily be allowed unless the circumstances of the case fully justify the concession. After the assignment of roll numbers, a candidate should be allowed to withdraw his candidature only if he could not avail of the chance owing to circumstances beyond his control, and if the Head of the Circle (or any other competent authority, as the case may be) is fully satisfied about the genuineness of the case. (c) No candidate should be allowed to withdraw his candidature after the examination except under very rare circumstances. Even when a candidate has been on medical leave during the days of the examination, the request for withdrawal must be submitted within 10 days from the date of his return to duty. No such request submitted later should ordinarily be entertained.” 13. The petitioner has not been able to assail the aforesaid findings of the learned Tribunal which findings are based on the material on record. 14. In such circumstances, taking otherwise the case of the petitioner at its best that he had preferred a representation along with a medical prescription would only support/justify the medical incapacitation of the petitioner for one week i.e. from 29.10.2008 to 04.11.2008 and as such, the petitioner was medically fit for appearing in the examination conducted from 5th to 7th November, 2008. -8 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB 15. Apart from above, it has been noticed by the learned Tribunal that in the application form filled up by the petitioner himself for LDCE 2009 it has been clearly shown in column 11 that the petitioner’s appearance in LDCE 2009 was to be his 3rd attempt and thus, the petitioner is bound by what he has written. If that was not enough, the petitioner is again caught up in his own web when one refers to column 10 of the application for LDCE 2009, which requires:- “10(a) State the years of the examination in respect of withdrawal of candidature, (i) For which you were allotted Roll Numbers-JHR- 11/2008: (ii) (iii) For which you had applied for withdrawal: For which permission to withdrawal so as granted, write circle office letter no. and date:” 16. Evidently, the petitioner has omitted to provide any information in respect of queries at 10(a)(ii) and 10(a)(iii) above. In regard to 10(a)(ii) he has only indicated his roll number for LDCE, 2008 i.e. JHR/11/2008. 17. Thus, it stands established on record that the petitioner had applied for participation in LDCE, 2008 but had not secured any approval exempting him from appearance on medical grounds. Since, he has not even filled up column 10(a)(ii), therefore the learned Tribunal was absolutely right in observing that in such circumstances it is a moot question whether the petitioner had ever applied and even if a benefit of doubt is extended in the matter, it cannot be refuted that no formal exemption was granted or obtained. It was for the petitioner to have duly established on record that he had actually filed an application and only then the question of exemption for so-called performing him possible would arise. -9 of 10- 2025:JHHC:35207-DB 18. No exception in the given facts and circumstances can be taken with the decision taken by the authorities in treating the petitioner ineligible for 5th attempt for LDCE 2014, as, such decision cannot be held to be either illegal or irrational or arbitrary, rather, the same is in accordance with law. Likewise, the order passed by the learned Tribunal does not suffer from any error or illegality so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Decision
19. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of. (Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 26.11.2025 N.A.F.R. VK Uploaded on 26.11.2025 -10 of 10-