Sambhu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand

Judgment

1. State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, 1st Floor, H.E.C. Campus, Dhurwa, Ranchi-834004.

2. Shri Rajiv Kumar I.P.S, Director General and Inspector of Police, Jharkhand Police Headquarters, PO-Dhurwa, Ranchi-834004.

3. Shri Laxman Prasad Singh I.P.S, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police, Raja Rani Kothi, P.O-Doranda, Ranchi-834002.

4. Shri The Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police, 4th Battalian, Lesliganj, PO +PS- Lesliganj, Distt-Palamu, Jharkhand State. ...... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD For the Petitioner For the Respondents : Mr. Munna Lal Yadav, SC (L&C)-III : Ms. Anjana Kumari, Advocate Mr. Deepak Kumar, AC to SC (L&C)-III ------------ C.A.V. on 13.05.2026 Pronounced on 24/06/2026 Per, Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred for the following reliefs: “For issuance of a writ of or in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the Impugned Force Order No. 530/12 of the Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police, 8th Battalion, Lesliganj, Palamu (Jharkhand) Respondent No. 4, issued vide his Memo No. 22/go dated- 28/03/2012 whereby the Respondent No. 4 on totally irrelevant and extraneous considerations has imposed the punishment of dismissal from service (Annexure-2/2A), and whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi, by his order-Memo No. 275/Sa Sha, dated 21 Feb, 2013 as communicated to the petitioner by Memo No. 440/Ra.Ka dated 05-03-13 of Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police, 8th Battalian, Lesliganj, Palamu (Annexure-3,3/A) and for directing the Respondent No. 4 to reinstate the petitioner from the date of dismissal and pay the petitioner full salary from the date of dismissal dated 28- 03-12 with all consequential benefits treating as if the petitioner was never punished/dismissed. AND/OR Any other relief(s) Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” Factual Matrix

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition reads as under: (i) The petitioner is a dismissed Sweeper of Jharkhand Armed Police, 8th Battalian, Lesliganj, Palamu. (ii) The petitioner was posted in J Company, Camp Dumri P.S., Gumla Distt on 10-12-2011. At the relevant time, the petitioner was filling masala in litties in the mess of the company. (iii) It is pleaded that few Constables asked the petitioner as to why he is not making proper safai in the campus. The petitioner replied that for the last 3 months, he has not been supplied the Jharoo, Phenyl, Cleaning Acid and Bleaching powder and in absence of these important items, he is unable to make proper safai in the campus. (iv) It has been stated that there are constables who wanted to create problems between the petitioner and J-Company Commander and they informed J- Company Commander that petitioner is abusing him. (v) Hearing this, J-Company Commander who was heavily drunk, came to the mess and lifted a chair to hit the petitioner. Since he was 2 heavily drunk, he could not control himself and due to unbalance, he fell on a bundle of woods and injured himself. He was lifted by the petitioner and other Jawans and was taken to his room. After sometime, he was sent to Community Health Centre, Dumri and then referred to Sadar Hospital, Gumla. (vi) The petitioner was also taken to Community Health Centre, Dumri and was examined by Medical Officers who found- Pt (patient) is semi unconscious, and confused state, not well oriented to T/P/P. It is also written Alcoholic smell not oriented to T/P/P. The petitioner was advised O.R.S. and Tablet Becasule. (vii) The charge that the petitioner was drunk, has not been proved by independent medical report. Further, the petitioner was in shock, after the J-Company Commander, who was heavily drunk and was unable to control himself, fell on a wooden log (Lakri ka bogha) due to unbalance and injured himself. (viii) Thereafter, the departmental proceeding was started wherein petitioner was held guilty for the charges and, accordingly, the Commandant, JAP-8 Bn, Lesliganj Palamu has awarded highest punishment of dismissal from service from 28-03-12 by his order - Force Order No. 530/12 as issued by Memo No. 22/Go dated- 28/03/2012 and communicated to the petitioner by Memo No. 542/Ra.Ka. dated 29-03-12. (ix) Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police, Ranchi who without considering the points raised by the Petitioner/Appellant, rejected the said appeal by issuing Memo No. 275/Sa. Sha. dated 21 3 Feb, 2013. (FO No. 293/13) dated 01-03-13. This order has been communicated by Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police, 8th Bn. Lesliganj Palamu by his Memo No. 440/Ra. Ka dated 05-03-13 to the petitioner.

3. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 28.03.2012 passed by the respondent no.4 and the order dated 21.02.2013 passed by the Appellate Authority, the present writ petition has been preferred by the writ petitioner.

4. It is evident from the factual aspect that the petitioner was working as Sweeper at Jharkhand Armed Polie, 8th Battalian, Lesliganj, Palamau. He was charge sheeted for the alleged commission of misconduct alleging therein the charge which is being referred hereunder as: Memo of Charge

“Suspended sweeper Shammu Manjhi, J.S.P-4, Lesliganj, Palamu, ‘J’ Company is accused of gross indiscipline, dereliction of duty, arbitrariness and acting in an insolent manner as follows: You, suspended sweeper Shammu Manjh, were posted to Dumri Police Station, Gumla, with the J. Company, Lesligenaj, Palamu. On December 10, 2011, at 8:00 pm, you returned from the local market drunk and entered the mess, hurling abuses, Upon hearing the abuse, the Company Commander arrived at the mess. Upon inquiring why, you verbally abused the Company Commander, Mr. Edward Minj, and, in a scuffle, assaulted him and pushed him forcefully. He fell, suffering serious injuries and a broken leg He was sent to Sadar Hospital, Gumla for treatment. The medical officer, describing his condition as dire, referred him to RIMS, Ranchi where he is currently undergoing treatment. You have committed a serious offense while serving in a disciplined force, which is highly condemnable. This situation makes you liable for dismissal from service. Your character is questionable and deplorable in light of the allegations. Thus, your conduct is indicative of gross indiscipline, dereliction of duty. Arbitrariness. Insolence and acting in an arbitrary manner.”

5. The authority has asked the writ petitioner to participate in the inquiry upon which he has participated in the inquiry proceeding and put 4 his defence. The inquiry officer has found the charge proved. The inquiry report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority while accepting the inquiry report has given the final opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself and being not satisfied with the response so made, the order of punishment from dismissal from service w.e.f. 28.03.2012 was passed vide Memo No.22/Go dated

28.03.2012 by which the writ petitioner was discharged from his service.

6. The order passed by the disciplinary authority has been carried to the appellate authority, but the appellate authority has declined to interfere with the view taken by the disciplinary authority against which the present writ petition has been filed. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

7. Ms. Anjana Kumari, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of her contention has taken the following grounds: (i) The disciplinary authority has not appreciated the fact that the petitioner is innocent and to save the drunkard J. Company Commander, namely, Edward Minz, a concocted story was planted against him alleging that the petitioner pushed the said officer due to which he suffered injuries, rather the fact is that the said officer in a drunken state had tried to beat the petitioner but he could not control over himself and as such he fell down on a wooden log and suffered injuries but the same has not been taken into consideration by the authority concerned. (ii) It has been submitted that during cross examination Cook Deepak Kumar Singh, Police 860 Praween Kumar Sinha and 5 Police 153 Manoj Kumar have not supported the charges which has not been taken into consideration by the authority concerned. (iii) It has been submitted that the quantum of punishment is so high which is not commensurate with the offence said to be committed by the writ petitioner. (iv) It has been submitted that the Commandant, JAP-8 Bn, Lesliganj, Palamu has not called for explanation against dismissal, enclosing copy of findings of Conducting Officer which is gross violation of principle of natural justice. (v) It has also been submitted that the aforesaid aspect of the matter has also not been appreciated in right perspective by the appellate authority who has upheld the order of the disciplinary authority. (vi) It has been submitted that the petitioner has been discriminated in awarding harsh punishment which is against the Rules 826 of Jharkhand Police Manual.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law and, as such, the same are liable to be quashed and set aside. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-State:

9. On the other hand, Mr. Munna Lal Yadav, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has taken the following grounds in support of the orders impugned: (i) The writ petitioner has been given full opportunity to defend himself in each and every stage, i.e., at the stage of inquiry as well as the disciplinary proceeding as also up to the stage of appellate 6 authority. The inquiry officer after considering the entire defence put forth by the writ petitioner has found the charge proved against him. (ii) The finding of the proved charge was forwarded by the inquiry officer to the disciplinary authority who on its acceptance has decided to inflict punishment of discharged from his service. (iii) The same has also been declined to be interfered with by the appellate authority vide its order contained in Memo No.275/Sa. Sha. Dated 21.02.2013 (F.O No.293/13, dated 01.03.2013).

10. The argument basically has been advanced that in the matter of decision taken in the administrative side by the disciplinary authority the jurisdiction which is to be exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited and only in the cases where the violation of principle of natural justice or the perversity in the finding is there, then only such interference is to be shown.

11. The learned counsel for the respondent-authority, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is not a fit case where interference is required. Analysis:

12. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents and the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as has been taken note by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority.

13. The charge has been framed against the writ petitioner as has been referred hereinabove. 7

14. This Court has gone through the nature of charge and has found that the element of misconduct has been alleged against the writ petitioner alleging that the petitioner in a drunken state has scuffled with his senior officers and pushed him due to which he fell down and suffered serious injury.

15. It is evident from record that thereafter the writ petitioner was sent for medical examination to Community Health Centre, Dumri wherein it was found by the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Dumri that the writ petitioner, i.e., Pt. (patient) is semi unconscious, and confused state, not well oriented to T/P/P/. It has also been mentioned therein that Alcoholic smell not oriented to T/P/P. The petitioner was advised O.R.S and Tablet Becosules.

16. The inquiry officer has found the alleged charge to be proved and accordingly, the disciplinary authority has awarded punishment of dismissal from service against the writ petitioner.

17. The order passed by the disciplinary authority has been challenged before the appellate authority which also affirmed the decision of the disciplinary authority and declined to interfere with the matter against which the present writ petition has been filed.

18. Before entering into merit of the case, it would be appropriate to refer herein the circumstances wherein the Court may interfere in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority/appellate authority.

19. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SSC 610 has held at paragraphs-12 and 13 thereof that the following guidelines have been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the 8 disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads as under: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. 9 (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

20. Further, in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali, [(2017) 4 SCC 507], guidelines have been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the Courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental inquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding. The extract of relevant passages, i.e., para 13 and 14, are referred hereinbelow: “13. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, [(2011) 4 SCC 584], this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations." 10

21. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power which is to be exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited one. However, the parameter has been fixed, as to in which case, the interference is to be made by the High Court in exercise of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in which case, such power is not to be exercised.

22. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of “Union of India & Others vs. P. Gunasekaran” (supra) and “Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali” (supra) that the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so far as it relates to interfering with the decision taken by the disciplinary authority, to be exercised only in the following situations: (i) if there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (ii) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (iii) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; and the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (iv) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; and if the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 11

23. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the fact of the present case is coming under the fold of the law as laid down and as per the guidelines formulated in the judgment as referred hereinabove.

24. On the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect and contention of the learned counsel for the parties this Court has to decide the following issues: (i) Whether the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner suffered from violation of principles of natural justice? (ii) Whether the findings of the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority were perverse or unsupported by evidence? (iii) Whether the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner from service is justified? (iv) Whether the present case is fit to be remanded? (v) Whether the petitioner is entitled for back wages, i.e., the salary for the period of dismissal and other consequential benefits? Re. Issue Nos.(i), (ii) & (iii)

25. Since the issue nos.(i) (ii) and (ii) are inextricably linked, as such, these issues are being taken together.

26. The record reveals that the Conducting Officer has not given independent findings by his report dated 19-03-2012. Further it has come on record that the Commandant, JAP-8th Bn, Lesliganj, Palamu who is the disciplinary authority has not called for explanation against dismissal, enclosing copy of findings of Conducting Officer and has inflicted upon the petitioner, the highest punishment of dismissal from service. This omission deprived the petitioner of an effective opportunity to rebut the conclusions. Such failure constitutes a clear breach of natural justice. 12

27. It needs to refer herein that in a case of disciplinary proceeding, the bearing of the observance of natural justice is must and without providing an opportunity the service of an employee cannot be taken away. Further it is settled position of law that whether it has been provided in the bylaws or not is immaterial, rather, the observance of principle of natural justice since has been held to be inbuilt and, hence, it is mandatorily to be followed. At this juncture, reference of the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., (1978) 1 SCC 248 is required to be made. The relevant paragraph is being reproduced hereinbelow: - "221. It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. This principle was laid down by this Court in the State of Orissa v. Dr (Miss) Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269, 1271] in the following words: "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." 13

28. Further, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, it has been laid down that it is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal /removal from service. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under: "28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.

29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee.

30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which 14 may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service.

31. In Shaughnessy v. United States [97 L Ed 956 : 345 US 206 (1952)] (Jackson, J.), a Judge of the United States Supreme Court has said: (L Ed p. 969) "... Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied."

29. In the case of State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal, (1998) 6 SCC 651 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that one of the principles of natural justice is that a person against whom an action is proposed to be taken has to be given an opportunity of hearing. This opportunity has to be an effective opportunity and not a mere pretence.

30. In the instant case, it has come on record that the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Conducting Officer has not given independent findings by his report dated 19-03-2012. Further, the medical report from Community Health Centre, Dumri, noted that the petitioner was semi-conscious and in a confused state, but did not establish intoxication beyond doubt.

31. Further, from the testimonies of the witnesses namely, Police 860, Praween Kumar Sinha, and Police 153 Manoj Kumar, the charge imputed against the writ petitioner has not been substantiated, for ready reference, the testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses are reproduced hereunder as: “8. साक्षी पुलिस 153 मनोज कु मार, झा०स०पु०-8, िेस्लीगंज, पिामू 'जे' कम्पनी डु मरी थाना गुमिा ने अपने ब्यान में बताया है लक घटना के लिन लिनांक

10.12.11 का रालि में मेस में लिट्टी भर रहा था। फलटक ड्यूटी पर था। करीब 20:00 बजे रालि में झाडू कश शम्भू मांझी मेस में आया और सािा झाडू नहीं है। इसी बीच सूबेिार साहब अपना ऑलफस से मेस में आयें और शम्भू मांझी से पूछे लक लकसको गािी िे रहा है और वहााँ पर रखी कु सी को उठाये। इसी बीच बचाव में रखी जिसवन की िकडी पर उनका (सूबेिार साहब का) पैर फं सा और वे लगर गये। उसके बाि सूबेिार साहब को हमिोग उठा कर थाना से जीप िेकर 15 डु मरी अस्पताि िे गये जहााँ से गुमिा सिर अस्पताि रे फर कर लिया गया। वहााँ से क्या हुआ नही जानते हैं। सूबेिार साहब अभी कहााँ पर हैं। नही पता।

9. साक्षी पुलिस 860 प्रवीण कु मार लसन्हा, झा०स०पु०-8, िेस्लीगंज, पिामू 'जे' कम्पनी डु मरी थाना गुमिा ने अपने ब्यान में बताया है लक घटना के लिन लिनांक

10.12.11 का रालि में मेस में लिट्टी भर रहा था। फलटक ड्यूटी बटा था। करीब 08:00 बजे रालि में झाडू कश शम्भू मांझी मेस में आकर लिट्टी भरने िगा। लिट्टी भरते-भरते शम्भू मांझी ने xxxxxxxxxx सािा बोि कर गािी-ग्लौज करने िगा। तब ऑलफस से सूबेिार साहब मेस में आयें और शम्भू मांझी को डाटते हुए कु सी उठा लिये। उसके बाि शंम्भू मांझी उठ कर कु सी पकडे उसी बीच में सूबेिार साहब लगर गये। उसके बाि शंम्भू मांझी को ठे ि कर वहााँ से हटाये और सूबेिार साहब को उठा कर उनके बेड पर िे गये। चार-पााँच आिमी लमिकर उठाकर िे गये। सूबेिार साहब चिने नहीं सक रहे थे। जमािार लमन्ज साहब के पास खबर भेजा गया और जमािार साहब आये तथा थाना से जीप िेकर सूबेिार साहब को डू मरी अस्पताि लिया गया था। मै अस्पताि नही गया था। क्योंलक 09:00 बजे रालि से थाना पर मेरी ड्यूटी थी। सुबह दू सरे लिन पता चिा था लक शम्भू मांझी को मेलडकि जााँच कराने हेतु रालि में ही डु मरी अस्पताि िे जाया गया था।“

32. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that witnesses examined during cross-examination, namely, Police 860, Praween Kumar Sinha, and Police 153 Manoj Kumar, did not support the charge of assault. These crucial aspects were ignored by the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority.

33. It is the bounden duty of the inquiry officer that while proving the charge he is to consider the evidence of the witnesses in right perspective being the quasi-judicial functionary. It appears from the consideration of the evidence of these witnesses, referred hereinabove, that even though that nothing has been said to substantiate the charge of assault but even then, the charge has been found to be proved. Further, the said finding that the petitioner assaulted the Company Commander is unsupported by independent cogent evidence, therefore the aforesaid finding of the inquiry officer, according to considered view of this Court, is perverse. 16

34. It needs to refer herein that the interpretation of the word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence.

35. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under: "24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression "perverse" means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding" means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from 17 the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. "Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. "Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence."

36. The law is well-settled that an Inquiry Officer, though appointed by the disciplinary or appointing authority, discharges a quasi-judicial function and is, therefore, required to act with complete impartiality. His duty is to apply an independent mind to the material placed before him, with due regard to the proper appreciation of evidence. In the present case, however, it is manifest that the testimonies of the witnesses have not been duly considered, and this patent error is conspicuous on the face of the record.

37. This Court, upon consideration of the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove, is of the view that it is a fit case wherein the guideline laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India & Others v. P. Gunasekaran (supra) is squarely applicable. 18

38. This Court, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 28.03.2012 and order dated 05.03.2013 passed by the appellate authority upholding the order of disciplinary authority require interference.

39. Accordingly, Issues Nos.(i), (ii) and (iii) are answered accordingly. Re: Issue No.(iv)

40. The specific issue of remand, i.e. issue no. (iv) has been formulated for the purpose of consideration of the issue no.(v) which pertains to disbursement of the arrears of salary for the period of dismissal. The reason being that if this Court will come to the conclusion while considering the present issue that it is a case fit to be remanded, then it will not be just and proper of this Court to pass an order, in affirmative, so far, the issue no.(v) is concerned. Therefore, the issue no.(v) will depend upon the outcome of the issue no.(iv).

41. On the issue of remand, the argument has been advanced that the memorandum of charge was served way back in December, 2011 and since then more than 14 years have already lapsed and, as such, after lapse of 14 years, if the matter would be remitted before the authority concerned, that will not be said to be just and proper that too when the said error has been committed by the disciplinary authority.

42. So far as this ground is concerned, this Court is conscious that if on violation of principle of natural justice or on technicality, a decision taken by the competent authority is being quashed and set aside, then generally it is to be remanded before the authority from the stage to meet out the aforesaid technicality or to adhere the principle of natural justice on the principle that on technicality no one can be allowed to take advantage. But 19 there cannot be any universal application of the aforesaid principle rather remitting the matter back is depend upon on the fact of each and every case.

43. The law is well settled that a wrong doer cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong but even accepting that on technicalities no advantage is to be given to the delinquent but whether after lapse of 14 years will it be proper for this Court to remit the matter before the authority concerned, that is the question.

44. This Court is of the view that at this juncture the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 wherein while dealing with the issue of remand as under paragraph 21 in a backdrop of the case that enquiry was not conducted as per the statutory rule and in such circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that after lapse of substantial period it will not be proper to remit the matter for fresh enquiry or for taking fresh decision, for ready reference, paragraph 21 of the aforesaid judgment is being referred herein :- "21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31-12- 1983. During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of another innings. We, therefore, do not issue any such directions and while dismissing these appeals, we affirm the decisions of the High Court which had set aside the orders imposing penalty and had directed the appellants to release the retirement benefits to the respondents. There will, however, be no order as to costs." 20

45. Adverting to the facts of the present case also that after lapse of 14 years it will not be proper for this Court to remit the matter for passing fresh order too in a case where consciously the irregularity has been committed in the enquiry and further Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Conducting Officer has not given independent findings. Even in the medical report from Community Health Centre, Dumri, it has been noted that the petitioner was semi-conscious and in a confused state, but did not establish intoxication beyond doubt. Further, from the testimonies of the witnesses, namely, Police 860, Praween Kumar Sinha, and Police 153 Manoj Kumar, the charge imputed against the writ petitioner has not been substantiated. The aforesaid factual aspect is indicative of the fact that the irregularity has been committed in holding the enquiry and the same has been done with pre-decided mind to terminate the services of the delinquent.

46. It is also evident that this case is of the year 2013 and if the matter is remanded to the authority concerned to consider the matter afresh, it will not be just and proper as the writ petitioner was terminated from the service in the year 2013 and prior to that he was facing inquiry proceeding in which he was under the mental agony and trauma of being not getting any engagement along with remuneration/wages. If the matter would again be remitted back to the authority concerned for its consideration afresh after a lapse of about 14 years, it will again take much time which affected the writ petitioner to remain under trauma which will not be just and proper in the eyes of law.

47. This Court, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that it is not a fit case for remand. 21

48. Accordingly, issue no. (iv) answered herein. Re: Issue No.(v)

49. So far, the issue of back wages is concerned, upon which very emphatically argument has been advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner that the petitioner is entitled for the back wages.

50. While on the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that the petitioner is not entitled for the back wages.

51. This Court has thought it proper to consider the issue of back wages during the period of dismissal separately.

52. The law is well-settled and the normal rule, i.e., “No Work No Pay” is to apply, but in each and every case the said principle cannot be made applicable, rather the principle is that if a concerned employee or the public servant after engagement was deprived from discharging the duty without any fault of his own and subsequently, it has been found by the Court of law that such disengagement was improper by holding it illegal, then the principle of “No Work No Pay” is not applicable.

53. This Court deems fit and proper to refer legal position pertaining to entitlement of back wages by the workman, which has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court (three judges) in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. K.V. Jankiraman reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109 wherein it has been held that although no work no pay is the normal rule, but it has got exception and it will not be applicable in a case where the employee was willing to work but had not been allowed to discharge the duty and if such a condition would be there, the principle of no work no pay will not be applicable. Relevant paragraph, i.e., para-25 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: 22 “25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of "no work no pay" is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.”

54. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board Vs. C. Muddaiah” reported in (2007) 7 SCC 689 has considered the issue of “No Work No Pay” and observed at paragraph 34 thereof which reads hereunder as :- “34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant- Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected.”

55. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also taken into consideration the issue of “No Work No Pay” in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (2013) 10 SCC 324 wherein paragraph no.38, parameters have been laid down for the purpose of consideration of the back wages. The aforesaid principle has been carved out by considering the fact that due to disengagement or termination keeping out the concerned employee from discharging duty the suffering is to be taken care of and the concerned employee is 23 required to be compensated by passing an order of the back wages. For ready reference, paragraph no.38 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted hereunder: “38. The propositions which can be culled out from the aforementioned judgments are:

38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule.

38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors.

38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments.

38.4. The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample 24 justification for award of full back wages.

38.5. The cases in which the competent court or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer’s obligation to pay the same. The courts must always keep in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.

38.6. In a number of cases, the superior courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees.

38.7. The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal that on reinstatement the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three- Judge Benches, referred to hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law.—"

56. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment, more particularly para-38.3 which starts as “Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are 25 terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments.” It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid paragraph that the ordinarily a pleading is to be made before the adjudicating authority of the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed.

57. Further, from paragraph-38.4, it would be evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down that the case in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. 26 However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages.

58. Further, from paragraph-38.5, it would be evident that the cases in which the competent court or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer’s obligation to pay the same. The courts must always keep in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.

59. Further, from paragraph-38.6, it would be evident that in a number of cases, the superior courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an 27 employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees.

60. It is, thus, evident that the guidelines as under para-38 of aforesaid judgment, according to the considered view of this Court, is in two parts, first part deals with the part of pleading to be made by the concerned workman of having not gainfully employed, however, if the learned labour court or the industrial tribunal is exercising the power conferred under Section 11-A of the Act, 1947 and if the punishment has been found to be disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then the discretion is upon the adjudicator not to award full back wages.

61. But, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages.

62. Likewise, para-38.5 also stipulates three eventualities of issuing a direction passing an award on back wages if the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then the court 28 or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages.

63. This Court, after having referred the aforesaid judgments and coupled with the other Judgment which has been passed by a Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in Intra Court Appeal being L.P.A. No. 80 of 2020 wherein the issue of “no work no pay” has been extensively dealt with, as also after applying the principle as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.V Jankiraman (supra), is of the opinion that the principle of “No Work No Pay” will not be applicable in each and every case, rather it will be tested on the basis of the fact of each and every case.

64. It also needs to refer herein that the State of Jharkhand has preferred a SLP being S.L.P (C) No 16868 of 2022 against the order passed in Intra Court Appeal being L.P.A. No. 80 of 2020 but that SLP was dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide order dated 10.01.2022.

65. In the instant case, the memo of charge was issued in December 2011 which culminated into final order of termination vide order dated

28.03.2012 and the said order of termination has been challenged by filing the instant writ petition in the year 2013 and since from year 2012 the writ petitioner has faced the trauma of being not getting any engagement along with remuneration/wages.

66. In the present case since the order of termination has been held to be unjust and improper in the preceding paragraph mentioned hereinabove, which itself suggests that the delinquent was willing to discharge the duty but it is the authority who has forcibly not allowed to discharge the duty and in that context the principle of 'no work no pay' will not be applicable. 29

67. This Court is of the view that for the fault committed by the authority itself the question is why the writ petitioner has been deprived from the benefit of back wages without any fault on his part.

68. Further, if the said situation will be allowed to be carried then the employer even though being a wrong doer will be allowed to take advantage of his action, which is not permissible in the eyes of law. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Kusheshwar Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar and Ors.”, (2007) 11 SCC 447, wherein at paragraphs-14, 15 and 16, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: “14. In this connection, our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellant to a decision of this Court in Mrutunjay Pani v. Narmada Bala Sasmal [AIR 1961 SC 1353] wherein it was held by this Court that where an obligation is cast on a party and he commits a breach of such obligation, he cannot be permitted to take advantage of such situation. This is based on the Latin maxim commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet (no party can take undue advantage of his own wrong).

15. … This Court (at SCC p. 142, para 28) referred to Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 191 wherein it was stated: “It is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure.”

16. It is settled principle of law that a man cannot be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain favourable interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. To put it differently, “a wrongdoer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong”.”

69. Further, in Advanta India Limited vs. B. N. Shivanna and Anr., (2018) 14 SCC 666, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe at para-20 which reads as under: 30

20. After going through the record, we find that the BCI has shown undue indulgence to the respondent by allowing him to take advantage of his own wrong, in the guise of exercising its review power. It is a case of nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria meaning thereby that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong. This maxim is explained in Eureka Forbes Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank in the following manner: (SCC p. 217, para 66) “66. The maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria has a clear mandate of law that, a person who by manipulation of a process frustrates the legal rights of others, should not be permitted to take advantage of his wrong or manipulations.”

70. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position, it is evident from the record that immediately upon his termination, the writ petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition, which demonstrates that he was not negligent in pursuing his remedy. However, the fact remains that the petitioner has been made to suffer for the last fourteen years. In such circumstances, and in view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.V. Jankiraman as well as Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (supra), this Court holds that the doctrine of “No Work No Pay” is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

71. Issue no (v) are answered, accordingly, in favour of the writ petitioner.

72. It is pertinent to record herein that in the prayer portion of the instant writ petition, the petitioner has specifically sought reinstatement in service with effect from the date of dismissal, i.e., 28.03.2012.

73. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court holds that the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service with continuity and full back wages from the date of dismissal, i.e., 28.03.2012. 31

74. Accordingly, the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated

28.03.2012 and appellate order dated 21.02.2013 are hereby quashed and aside.

75. In the result, the instant writ petition stands allowed and disposed of as such.

76. Pending I. As, if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Sudhir Dated: 24/06/2026 Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR Uploaded on 30/06/2026. 32