Babulal Marandi v. The State of Jharkhand

Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that an FIR that too by a person other than the person aggrieved is not maintainable in respect of the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. In this respect, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Others reported in (2016) 7 SCC 221 and submits that in para-207 of which the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in no uncertain manner held that Section 199 of CrPC envisages filing of a complaint in court and in case of criminal defamation neither can any FIR be filed nor can any direction be issued under Section 156(3) of CrPC. Hence, it is submitted that FIR in respect of offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is not maintainable.

9. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Manzar Sayeed Khan vs. State of Maharashtra & Another with allied cases reported in (2007) 5 SCC 1 and submits that in para-16 of which it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in respect of the offence punishable under Section 153-A of IPC, the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused and in para-17 of that judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has relied upon its own judgement in the case of Ramesh vs. Union of India 3 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 ) reported in (1988) 1 SCC 668 which in turn relied upon the judgment in the case of Bhagwati Charan Shukla vs. Provincial Govt. reported in AIR 1947 Nag 1, wherein the court observed that the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’.

10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India & Others reported in (2020) 14 SCC 12 and submits that therein it was held that for the occurrence against which, this is the first FIR, subsequently several FIRs have also been lodged and in para-31 of the said judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has reiterated that “there can be no second FIR” where the information concerns the same cognizable offence alleged in the first FIR or the same occurrence or incident which gives rise to one or more cognizable offences.

11. It is next submitted that in para-33 of that judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that barring situations in which a counter-case is filed, a fresh investigation or a second FIR on the basis of the same or connected cognizable offence would constitute an “abuse of the statutory power of investigation” and in para-36 of that judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has relied upon its own judgment in the 4 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 ) case of Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010) 12 SCC 254 in para-21 of which it was held that if there are two FIRs, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction, if the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed.

12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Patricia Mukhim vs. State of Meghalaya & Others reported in (2021) 15 SCC 35 and submits that in that case in para-12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India relied upon its own judgement in the case of Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan vs. Union of India reported in (2014) 11 SCC 477, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India referred to a judgement of the Canadian Supreme Court the case of Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) vs. William Whatcott reported in 2013 1 SCR 467, wherein in order to find out whether there is any hate speech, three main prescriptions have been laid down; firstly, the courts must to apply the hate speech prohibition objectively and in so doing, ask whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred and the second test was to restrict interpretation of the legislative term “hatred” to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words “detestation” and “vilification”. This would filter out and protect speech 5 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 ) which might be repugnant and offensive, but does not incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization rejection causing discrimination or injury.

13. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that altogether six FIRs have been registered against the petitioner, the details of which has been mentioned in para-5 of this Cr.M.P. It is then submitted that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still neither the offence punishable under Section 153-A of the IPC nor the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is made out.

14. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that the petitioner’s statement has been blown out of proportion by the informant for political motives. It is next submitted that the petitioner has never used the word “family” (Parivaar) in his entire speech. It is next submitted that the present criminal proceeding has been instituted for the purpose of wreaking vengeance, therefore, it is lastly submitted that the prayer as prayed for in this Cr.M.P., be allowed.

15. Learned Spl.P.P. appearing for the State on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer of the petitioner made in the instant Cr.M.P and submits that if the allegations made in the FIR are considered to be true in their entirety, then each of the offences in respect of which the FIR has been registered is made out and since the investigation of the case is going on, at this nascent stage the entire criminal proceeding ought 6 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 ) not to be nipped in the bud. Therefore, it is submitted that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, be dismissed.

16. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, so far as the offences punishable under Sections 500 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure debars any court from taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Chapter-XXI of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence except for the persons aggrieved, some other can also filed, but the fact remains that the complaint is to be filed.

17. Now it is needless to mention that Section 500 of the IPC falls under Chapter-XXI of the IPC, therefore, registration of the FIR in respect of the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is not permissible in law as has been categorically held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in para-207 of the Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Others (supra).

18. Therefore, this court has no hesitation in holding that the registration of the First Information Report in respect of the offence punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, being bad in law is not sustainable.

19. So far as the offence punishable under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredients to constitute the said offences are:- 7 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 ) (a) the accused must by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities mens rea if essential ingredients of the offences.

20. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner that the statement of the petitioner even if assumed to be true in their entirety still the words that “The entire Family of the Leader of the informant are looters” but itself, in the considered opinion of this Court is not sufficient to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. Hence, in the considered opinion of this Court even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety still, the offence punishable under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code is not made out.

21. So far as the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2019) 14 SCC 207, paragraph no.24 of which reads as under :- “24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the 8 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 ) appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] . that the intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.

22. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of perpetrating any intentional insult to any person of such a degree that should provoke that person to break public peace or to commit any other offence and in the absence of this essential ingredient, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out.

23. So far as the offence punishable under Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredients to constitute the said offence are as under:- (1) The accused made published or circulated any statement, rumour or report; (2) He did so- 9 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 ) i. With intent to cause or which he knew to be likely to cause any officer, soldier, sailor or airman to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty; ii. With intent to cause or which he knew to be likely to cause fear or alarm to the public thereby inducing any person to commit an offence against the State or public tranquility; iii. With intent to inciter or which he knew to be likely to incite any class or community to commit any offence against any other class or community.

24. Now coming to the facts of the case, in the considered opinion of this Court, the allegation is that “The entire Family of my Leader are looters” is insufficient to fulfill the essential ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code.

25. Besides the fact that this is the subsequent FIR in respect of the self- same occurrence, more so, because this is the subsequent FIR in respect of the offence for which the FIR of Ramgarh P.S. Case No.196 of 2023 has been registered earlier.

26. In view of the discussions made above, since none of the offences in respect of which the FIR has been registered, is made out against the petitioner even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, so this Court is of the considered view that the continuation of this criminal proceeding against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law and this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Madhupur P.S. Case No.176 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 153-A(1)(a), 500, 504 & 505 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner, be quashed and set aside. 10 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024 ( 2026:JHHC:4773 )

27. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Madhupur P.S. Case No.176 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 153-A(1)(a), 500, 504 & 505 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner, is quashed and set aside qua the petitioner.

28. In the result, this Cr.M.P., stands allowed. (Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated the 17th of February, 2026 AFR/ Abhiraj Uploaded on 28/02/2026 11 Cr. M.P. No.987 of 2024