Urmila Kumari @ Urmila Devi, aged about 52 years wife of Sri Ram Sewak v. Hazaribagh, Jharkhand
Case Details
2025:JHHC:34550 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI ---- Cr.M.P. No. 525 of 2024 ---- Urmila Kumari @ Urmila Devi, aged about 52 years wife of Sri Ram Sewak Mehta, resident of Hawai Adda, Churchu, PO Hazaribag, PS Korra, District …… …. -- Versus -- Hazaribagh, Jharkhand .... Petitioner(s) 1.The State of Jharkhand, through ACB 2.Meena Bala, wife of Sri Awdesh Dangi, resident of Kubba, PO Nawadih Damol, PS Pathalghadda, District – Chatra ….. .... Opp. Parties ---- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI --- For the Petitioner(s) For the A.C.B :- :-
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Mahesh Tewari, Advocate Mr. Vineet Kr Vashisth, Advocate ---- 6/19.11.2025 Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent ACB. 3. This petition has been preferred for quashing the order dated 22.11.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, A.C.B. Hazaribagh in connection with ACB (Hazaribagh) Vigilance Case No.02 of 2023 whereby the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance under Section 7(a) of Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 against the petitioner, and the matter is pending in the court of learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge, ACB, Hazaribagh. 4. The A.C.B has lodged the case on the basis of an undated written complaint given by the complainant Mina Bala to the S.P. ACB, Hazaribag alleging therein that, she is an angabari sevika of Aanganbari Centre No. 160 where almost 30 children are there and payment for their meal expenditure 1 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 for last 5 months have been made. However, for accepting the voucher for the month of February & March 2023, she went to office of Child development project, Itkhori whereupon she was told by Urmila Kumari (Supervisor) to pay 15% amount of the payment received for the last 5 months and then only vouchers for the month of February and March shall be accepted. Complainant also met Babita Devi who also told the same thing to her. It has been stated that complainant does not want to pay the bribe. That accordingly the complaint was made and same was forwarded by S.P. Vigilance on 13.03.2023 to Sri Nunudev Rai, Inspector to verify the allegation and submit the report. That a verification was allegedly done by Sri Nunudev Rai, Inspector of police -Cum verifying officer, A.C.B. Hazaribag on 14.03.2023 itself by going to Itkhori, although, no time has been mentioned. However, it is being stated that verifying officer went along with complainant, her husband and Babita devi whereupon a sum of Rs.7500/- was asked and found the allegation to be true and then submitted a report on 15.03.2023 before S.P. Vigilance, Hazaribagh. That pursuant to the same, the F.I.R was instituted on 15.03.2023 at 17.00 hrs and thereafter trap team was formed on 15.03.2023 at 17.30 hrs with a direction to assemble on 16.03.2023 at 10.00 hrs and pre trap memorandum was prepared on 16.03.2023 between 10.00 AM to 10.30 AM and on the same day, at about 10.45 hrs., trap team proceeded for Child development project, Itkhori and at about 12.10 hrs, and directed the verifying officer and shadow witness to watch the proceedings of giving and taking of bribe money as closely was as possible and thereafter it is being said that at 12.20 hrs Complainant gave the bribe money to petitioner which petitioner took with her right hand and 2 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 kept in the purse after counting it and upon receiving the signal, team reached there and subsequently petitioner was apprehended and it is alleged that when she was asked about the money she told that it has been kept in the bag, which was counted in presence of executive magistrate and independent witnesses and found it to be Rs.7500/-consisting of 15 notes of Rs.500 each. Thereafter, fingers of both the hands of petitioner were washed in the solution of sodium carbonate then the solution of fingers of both hands turned pink. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and seizure list and post-trap memorandum was prepared. 5. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that Superintendent of Police, ACB, Hazaribagh has been pleased to appoint Nageshwar Rajak, Inspector of Police, A.C.B. to conduct the investigation under section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He further submits that however the said Nageshwar Rajak has not done the investigation and the investigation has been done by another person namely, Nunudev Rai. On this ground, he submits that once the procedure is made therein in light of the Prevention of Corruption Act on a particular person appointed by the competent authority to investigate, the investigation is required to be done by him, and in view of that the entire proceeding is vitiated. He further submits in view of that the criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. He also draws the attention of the Court to the charge sheet and submits that in the charge sheet it has come that Nunudev Rai has investigated the case and he submits that in Pre-Trap Memorandum also the said Nunudev Rai is at sl.no.4. On this ground, he submits that the entire criminal case is required to be quashed. He then submits that it is well 3 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 settled that once procedure is prescribed in the statute it is required to be followed and the entire proceeding is vitiated. He has relied in the case of The Coal Mines Provident Fund Organization, Dhanbad V/s Chandan Kumar and Others (LPA No.221 of 2020). Relying on the above judgement, he submits that the learned Division Bench has been pleased to rely on certain judgments in the said LPA and hold that once the procedure is disclosed in the statute, that is required to be followed and in view of that, the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Vineet Kumar Vashistha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-A.C.B submits that there is no miscarriage of justice and the investigation has already been done and the learned court has taken cognizance. He further submits that in view of that, unless any irregularity is made, the entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed and to buttress such argument, he has relied in the case of H.N. Rishbud v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1954) 2 SCC 934 and relied on paragraph no.13 of the said judgment, which is quoted as under: 13. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in Section 190 CrPC as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. Section 190 CrPC is one out of a group of sections under the heading “Conditions requisite for 4 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 initiation of proceedings”. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537 CrPC which is in the following terms is attracted: “537. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error or omission in charge or other proceedings.—Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered … on appeal or revision on account— (a) of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, *** unless such error, omission, irregularity or misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.” If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial is well-settled as appears from the cases in Parbhu v. King Emperor [Parbhu v. King Emperor, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1943-44) 71 IA 75 : AIR 1944 PC 73] and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. [Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 64 : (1949-50) 77 IA 62 : AIR 1950 PC 26] These no doubt relate to the illegality of arrest in the course of investigation while we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both the cases clearly show that invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the court. We are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. 7. On the same line, he has further relied in the case of State of 5 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 Madhya Pradesh. v. Bhooraji, (2001) 7 SCC 679 and has relied on paragraph nos. 14,15 and 16 of the said judgment, which are quoted below: 14. We have to examine Section 465(1) of the Code in the above the legislature disfavoured axing down context. It is extracted below: “465. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.” 15. A reading of the section makes it clear that the error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings held before or during the trial or in any enquiry were reckoned by the legislature as possible occurrences in the criminal courts. Yet proceedings or to direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh. Hence, the legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error, omission or irregularity has occasioned “a failure of justice” the superior court shall not quash the proceedings merely on the ground of such error, omission or irregularity. 16. What is meant by “a failure of justice” occasioned on account of such error, omission or irregularity? This Court has observed in Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka [(2001) 2 SCC 577 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 358] thus: (SCC p. 585, para 23) “23. We often hear about ‘failure of justice’ and quite often the submission in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable or facile an expression which could be fitted in any situation of a case. The expression ‘failure of justice’ would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon (the simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock in Town Investments Ltd. v. Deptt. of the Environment [(1977) 1 All ER 813 : 1978 AC 359 : (1977) 2 WLR 450 (HL)] ). The criminal court, particularly the superior court should make a close examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage.” 8. He further relied in the case of Fertico Mktg. & Investment (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2021) 2 SCC 525 and relied on paragraph nos.22 to 27 of the said judgment which are quoted as under: 22. As early as in 1955, the question arose for consideration before this Court, as to whether an investigation carried out by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, under Section 5(4) of 6 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, without the order of the Magistrate of First Class, was mandatory or directory? While holding that the provision is mandatory, this Court considered a question as to whether and to what extent, the trial which follows such investigation, is vitiated. The Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 : AIR 1955 SC 196 : 1955 Cri LJ 526] , observed as under : (AIR p. 204, para 9) “9. … If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Parbhu v. King Emperor [Parbhu v. King Emperor, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1943-44) 71 IA 75 : AIR 1944 PC 73] and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. [Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 64 : (1949-50) 77 IA 62 : AIR 1950 PC 26] These no doubt relate to the illegality of arrest in the course of investigation while we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both the cases clearly show that invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.” It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the cognizance and the trial cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice. It has been held that the illegality may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice but the invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the court. 23. It will also be apposite to note the following observations of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder, (1987) 2 SCC 74 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 280] , while considering the provisions of Section 465 CrPC : (SCC pp. 79-80, para 14) “14. The High Court, however, observed [Kuppaswamy Gounder v. State of Karnataka, 1981 SCC OnLine Kar 220 : (1981) 2 Kant LJ 509] that provisions of Section 465 CrPC cannot be made use of to regularise this trial. No reasons have been stated for this conclusion. Section 465 CrPC reads as under: ‘465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity.—(1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal, confirmation or revision Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder [State of 7 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.’ It is provided that a finding or sentence passed by a court of competent jurisdiction could not be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity if no prejudice is caused to the accused. It is not disputed that this question was neither raised by the accused at the trial nor any prejudice was pleaded either at the trial or at the appellate stage and therefore in the absence of any prejudice such a technical objection will not affect the order or sentence passed by the competent court. Apart from Section 465, Section 462 provides for remedy in cases of trial in wrong places. Section 462 reads as under: ‘462. Proceedings in wrong place.—No finding, sentence or order of any criminal court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong Sessions Division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.’ This provision even saves a decision if the trial has taken place in a wrong Sessions Division or sub-division or a district or other local area and such an error could only be of some consequence if it results in failure of justice, otherwise no finding or sentence could be set aside only on the basis of such an error.” 24. This Court in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja [Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1314] , while relying on the judgment of this Court in H.N. Rishbud [H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 : AIR 1955 SC 196 : 1955 Cri LJ 526] , has observed thus : (Prakash P. Hinduja case [Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1314] , SCC p. 210, para 21) “21. … to Parbhu v. King after Emperor [Parbhu v. King Emperor, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1943-44) 71 IA 75 : AIR 1944 PC 73] and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. [Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 64 : (1949-50) 77 IA 62 : AIR 1950 PC 26] held that if cognizance is in fact taken on a police report initiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial, which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice and that an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction referring Court The 8 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 of the court for trial. This being the legal position, even assuming for the sake of argument that CBI committed an error or irregularity in submitting the charge-sheet without the approval of CVC, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge on the basis of such a charge-sheet could not be set aside nor could further proceedings in pursuance thereof be quashed. The High Court [Prakash P. Hinduja v. Union of India, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 679 : (2002) 64 DRJ 34] has clearly erred in setting aside the order of the learned Special Judge taking cognizance of the offence and in quashing further proceedings of the case.” 25. It could thus be seen that this Court held that even for the sake of argument that CBI had committed an error or irregularity in submitting the charge-sheet without the approval of CVC, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge on the basis of such a charge-sheet, would not be set aside nor could further proceedings in pursuance thereof be quashed. 26. Recently, a Bench of this Court consisting one of us (Khanwilkar, J.) had an occasion to consider the aforesaid provisions of the DSPE Act, in Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar [Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar, (2020) 20 SCC 531 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 395] . In the said case, the question arose, as to whether when an offence was committed in the Union Territory and one of the accused was residing/employed in some other State outside the said Union Territory, the Members of DSPE had power to investigate the same, unless there was a specific consent given by the State concerned under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. The contention on behalf of the appellant before the High Court was that since the appellant was employed in connection with the affairs of the Government of Bihar, an investigation was not permissible, unless there was a specific consent of the State of Bihar under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. This Court rejected the said contention holding that if the offence is committed in Delhi, merely because the investigation of the said offence incidentally transcends to the territory of the State of Bihar, it cannot be held that the investigation against an officer employed in the territory of Bihar cannot be permitted, unless there was specific consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. While considering the argument on behalf of the State, that such a consent was necessary for CBI to proceed with the investigation, this Court held that the respondent State having granted general consent in terms of Section 6 of the DSPE Act vide Notification dated 19-2-1996, it was not open to the State to argue to the contrary. 27. In the present case, there are no pleadings by the public servants with regard to the prejudice caused to them on account of non-obtaining of prior consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act qua them specifically in addition to the general consent in force, nor with regard to miscarriage of justice. 9. He then submits that in the entire petition even what prejudice is caused to the petitioner is not disclosed and miscarriage of justice is not pleaded in the petition. He submits that in all the above judgments it has 9 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 been held that merely because the investigation of the said case was investigated by another officer, that cannot be a ground to quash the entire criminal proceeding. On these grounds, he submits that this petition may kindly be dismissed. 10. In view of above submission of the learned counsels appearing for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record as well as the contents of the FIR and the letters and the documents relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. It is an admitted position that allegation is made against the petitioner of demanding certain amount which has been also recovered in the Pre-Trap Memorandum. The investigation has already been done and the charge sheet has been submitted and pursuant to that, the learned court has taken cognizance. The only plea has been taken to quash the entire criminal proceeding to the effect that the competent authority appointed Nageshwar Rajak, Inspector of Police to investigate the case, however, the investigation was made by another person namely Nunudev Rai and on this ground only, the entire criminal proceeding has been sought to be quashed. This aspect of the matter has already been answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several judgments including the judgment which has been relied by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-A.C.B. in the cases of H.N. Rishbud v. State (Delhi Admn.), State of Madhya Pradesh. v. Bhooraji and Fertico Mktg. & Investment (P) Ltd. v. CBI (supra). This aspect of the matter has further been subject matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, (2011) 4 SCC 402, wherein the case relied by the learned counsel 10 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 for the respondent-A.C.B in the cases (supra), has been further considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph nos.20 of the said judgment which stipulates as under: 20. The issues raised hereinabove are no more res integra. The matter of investigation by an officer not authorised by law has been considered by this Court time and again and it has consistently been held that a defect or irregularity in investigation however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial and, therefore, where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. The defect or irregularity in investigation has no bearing on the competence of the court or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. (Vide H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196 : 1955 Cri LJ 526] , Munnalal v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 28 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 11] , Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 854 : AIR 1972 SC 958] , State of M.P. v. Bhooraji [(2001) 7 SCC 679 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1373] , State of M.P. v. Ramesh C. Sharma [(2005) 12 SCC 628 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] and State of M.P. v. Virender Kumar Tripathi [(2009) 15 SCC 533 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 667] .) 12. The case of State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri, [(2006) 7 SCC 172 was considered in the said judgment at paragraph no.22, which is quoted below: 22. In State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court had taken a contrary view without taking note of the earlier two-Judge Bench judgment in Kalpnath Rai [(1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134 : AIR 1998 SC 201] and held as under : (Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 178, para 16) “16. … When a statutory functionary passes an order, that too authorising a person to carry out a public function like investigation into an offence, an order in writing was required to be passed. A statutory functionary must act in a manner laid down in the statute. Issuance of an oral direction is not contemplated under the Act. Such a concept is unknown in administrative law. The statutory functionaries are enjoined with a duty to pass written orders.” However, the Court taking note of subsequent proceedings recorded its conclusions as under : (Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 179, para 21) “21. It is true that only on the basis of illegal investigation a proceeding 11 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 2025:JHHC:34550 may not be quashed unless miscarriage of justice is shown, but, in this case, as we have noticed hereinbefore, the respondent had suffered miscarriage of justice as the investigation made by PW 41 was not fair.” 13. In the aforesaid judgment also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that unless the miscarriage of justice is shown, the entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed, and in the case in hand, even pleadings have not been made to that effect. The cognizance has already been taken. It is also not pleaded that the investigation has been done illegally, without following the procedure. 15. In the attending facts and circumstances of the present case, I am not inclined to quash the order taking cognizance. As such, this petition being Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024 is, hereby, dismissed. 16. 17.
Decision
Pending petition, if any, also stands disposed of, accordingly. It is made clear that dismissal of this petition will not prejudice the case of the petitioner and the trial will proceed in accordance with law. ( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Dated : 19th Nov.,2025 SI/ A.F.R. Uploaded on 26.11.2025 12 Cr.M.P. No.525 of 2024