The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 With I.A. No. 6107 of 2024 ------ 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education & Family Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 2. The Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education & Family Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 3. The Director, AYUSH, Health, Medical Education & Family Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. …. …. Appellants/Respondents 1. Md. Shahnawaz, aged about 41 years, son of Md. Jahiruddin, resident of village Parwa, P.O. Parwa, P.S. Pathargama, District Godda. 2. Saput Kumar Mishra, aged about 46 years, son of Sanjay Mishra, resident of village Kasba, P.O. Kasba Dudhichak, P.S. Meharma, District Godda. 3. Mahgi Mohli, aged about 42 years, son of Mahendra Mohli, resident of Shivpur, Godda, P.O. Godda, P.S. Godda (T), District Godda. 4. Shyamsunder Sharma, aged about 41 years, son of Deepnarayan Sharma, resident of village Amlo, P.O. and P.S. Godda, District Godda. 5. Pradeep Kumar, aged about 39 years, son of Nageshwar Kapri, resident of village and P.O. Haripur Garbanna, P.S. Godda (M), District Godda. 6. Parmanand Sharma, aged about 46 years, sone of Anirudh Sharma, resident of village Dumariya, P.O. Dumariya, P.S. & District Godda. 7. Md. Nasimuddin Ansari, aged about 44 years, son of Md. Amin Ansari, resident of village Kharkachiya, P.O. Barabanjhi, P.S. Deodanar, District Godda. Page 1 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 8. Prafulla Kumar Mahto, aged about 51 years, son of Late Mahendra Prasad Mahto, resident of village Maheshliti, P.O. Kadma, P.S. Pathargama, District Godda. 9. Munil Choudhary, aged about 43 years, son of Bhuneshwar Choudhary, resident of village & P.O. Haripur Garbanna, P.S. Godda (M), District Godda. 10. Abinandan Kumar Pandit, aged about 43 years, son of Sahdeo Pandit, resident of village Simariya Pathriya, P.O. Pipra, P.S. Pathargama, District Godda. 11. Mithlesh Sharma, aged about 33 years, son of Jaldhar Prasad Sharma, resident of village Dumariya P.O. Dumariya, P.S. & District Godda. 12. Pratima Kumari, aged about 50 years, daughter of Ester Singh, resident of village Ghangri, P.O. Gangatakala, P.S. Pathargama, District Godda. 13. Ramlal Soren, aged about 53 years, son of Late Nupu Soren, resident of village & P.O. Paraspani, P.S. Godda (M), District Godda. Versus … … Respondent/Petitioner ----- CORAM : HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI For the Appellants : None For the Respondents : None ------ Order No.06/Dated 06thAugust, 2024 ------ Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.: None present on behalf of both the parties. 1. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 13.07.2023 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 3400 of Page 2 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024
Decision
2020 by which the writ petition has been allowed. I.A. No. 6107 of 2024: 2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since as per the office note dated 04.07.2024, there is delay of 272 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 6107 of 2024 has been filed for condoning such delay. 3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 272 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit. 5. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal as mentioned in the interlocutory application is that after the impugned order/judgment having been passed in the writ petition on 13.07.2020, the file was placed before the competent authority on 06.12.2023 and on 14.12.2023 opinion of the Ld. Advocate general was given and thereafter discussions were held at the officer‟s level, including the Joint Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary on 08.09.2023 and other dates. Thereafter, the file was sent to the retainer of Page 3 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 department for preparing the grounds of appeal which was prepared and submitted and thereafter, the file was transferred to the counsel. In terms of discussion and opinion, the counsel drafted the memo of appeal and filed oath no. 3618 dated 15.02.2024 and sent the same for approval. After the approval from the department, it was filed on 17.02.2024 and certified copy of the impugned order was applied, which was obtained and filed on 10.05.2024 resulting into the elapse of time and a delay of 272 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal. 6. This Court while considering the delay condonation application deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon‟ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay. 7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. 8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest Page 4 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” While considering the similar issue, this Court Page 5 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 9. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that “Law Page 6 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the appellant.” In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 27 to 29 as under: “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the acceptable absence explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. limitation when plausible and of 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. limitation undoubtedly binds The everybody, including the Government. law of 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that for several the file was kept pending that unless Page 7 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 in tape months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their commitment. duties with diligence and Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit law for the government departments. The shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” Likewise, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr. (supra,) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder: “1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020. M.P. v. Bherulal [State of 2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months’ time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed of the Legal incompetence would Department. or not. What greater there be certificate for 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no Page 8 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 in view of judgment more admissible (India) in Postmaster General v. Living Media Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] the 4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing. 5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up.” The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this for condoning delay has Page 9 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of In dealing with such the Limitation Act. applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant’s lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant’s application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of „sufficient cause‟. The consideration of Page 10 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 meaning of „sufficient cause‟ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:- inactive”. However, “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court to be exercised exercises discretion, judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 1953] 2 , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .) : AIR it has 1970 SCC 770 the SC this Court explained 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be that interpretation given a to ensure liberal Page 11 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : Nath 100] AIR Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .) and Ram formula 2002 SC is the period of 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to limitation on equitable extend grounds. “A result from a statutory flowing provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of therefore, insecurity and uncertainty, and limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448] inaction, negligence or Jalam 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Page 12 L.P.A. No. 100 of 2024 engrafting principles