The Principal Secretary, Social Welfare, Woman and Child v. Development Department, Ranchi
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S). No. 343 of 2024 ---------- Ram Sakhi Kumari ………. Petitioner 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Principal Secretary, Social Welfare, Woman and Child Versus Development Department, Ranchi. 3. The Director, Social Welfare, Woman and Child Development Department, Ranchi. 4. The Deputy Director, Welfare, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka. 5. The Deputy Commissioner, Godda. 6. The District Social Welfare Officer, Godda ………. Respondents. ---------- CORAM: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N.PATHAK For the Petitioner For the Respondents
Legal Reasoning
subject matter of challenge before this Court in W.P.(S). No. 6721 of 2017 in which the Hon’ble Court was pleased to revoke the order of suspension. Thereafter, though petitioner made several representations before the respondent-authorities but neither any heed was paid nor the petitioner has received the salary of the period of suspension. Hence, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 1 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argues that since the suspension order has already been quashed and set aside by this Court and the same was revoked and further never any departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, she is entitled for full salary of the period of suspension. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that petitioner was given subsistence allowance and as such, she is not entitled for full salary of the period of suspension. However, no cogent reason has been assigned as to why the petitioner is not entitled for full salary of the period of suspension. Learned counsel submits that since counter-affidavit has not been filed, he is not in a position to controvert the stand of the respondents. 6. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and from a bare perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that petitioner is entitled for full salary for the period of suspension i.e. from 30.09.2008 to 28.12.2018 since order of suspension itself was quashed and set aside and never any departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. 7. The identical issued fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1984) 2 SCC 433 and the Hon’ble Court dealing with the issue has held that, “the appellant was a permanent UDC who has already retired on superannuation and must receive a measure of a socio-economic justice. Keeping in view the facts of the case that the appellant was never hauled up for departmental enquiry, that he was reinstated and was paid full salary for the period commencing from his acquittal, and further that even for the period in question the concerned authority had not held that the suspension was wholly justified because three-fourth of the salary was ordered to be paid, it must be held that in this case full amount of salary should have been paid to the appellant on his reinstatement for the entire period”. Further, in case of State of Punjab Vrs. Shambhu Nath Singla, reported in (1996) 1 SCC 296 the same view was reiterated, 2 “Reinstatement ordered by the High Court pending criminal trial. Subsequently, the appellant discharged by the criminal court. Held, appellant is entitled for full salary and allowance for the period during which he was kept under suspension”. Further, in case of Raj Narain Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 809, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23-10-1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21-10-1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21-3-1983. It is clear from the record that the appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental enquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23-10-1979 came to an end on 21-3- 1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21-10-1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the IA, we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the appellant is entitled for full wages from 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.” 8. While dealing with the identical issued, this Hon’ble Court in case of Prasenjit Ghosh Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2004 (2) JLJR 101 has held that, “in case of acquittal of an employee in the criminal case, he is entitled for full salary for the entire period during which he remained under suspension because of the criminal case”. 9. Recently, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court considering the aforesaid judgments reiterated the same view in case of Anil Kumar Singh 3 Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (Writ-A-No. 11555 of 2021), disposed of on 13.03.2024, wherein the Hon’ble Court has held as under: “7. ……………………………. The order of suspension though was passed by the disciplinary authority but the suspension was not in contemplation of any inquiry as the order does not disclose that competent authority intended to hold disciplinary inquiry. So it should be taken as a suspension simpliciter for detention of the petitioner in jail. The department also did not proceed further in the matter and upon acquittal of the petitioner in a criminal case, he came to be reinstated under the order of reinstatement revoking his suspension. The order of reinstatement only records that reinstatement would abide by the result of the criminal appeal, if any filed. The respondents have not come out with any case that criminal appeal has been preferred against the order of acquittal. 10. In the absence of any departmental proceeding being drawn, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that petitioner was restrained from discharging duties on account of his detention in jail in connection with a criminal case a circumstance to be taken as beyond his control and his innocence ultimately being proved by way of acquittal in the said criminal case, he should not be penalized.” 10. In my considered view the petitioner’s case is on much better footing as she was only suspended and the order of suspension was quashed and set aside by this Court in W.P.(S). No. 6721 of 2017 and the respondents have never initiated any departmental proceeding against the petitioner. As such, finding strength from the aforesaid judgments, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that petitioner is entitled for full salary of the period of suspension. 11. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and legal propositions, this Court is of the view that petitioner is entitled for full salary of the period of suspension and accordingly, directs the respondents to pay the same to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date
Arguments
Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, AC to GA-I ----------- : : ---------- 04/ 02.04.2024 The defects pointed-out by the Office is hereby ignored. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay salary to the petitioner for the period of suspension i.e. from 30.09.2008 to 28.12.2018 along with interest. 3. The case of the petitioner lies in a narrow compass. Initially petitioner was appointed to the post of Lady Supervisor on 18.07.1989 and she was discharging her duties with utmost satisfaction of the respondents. One fine morning, the petitioner came to know that she was put under suspension. It is the case of petitioner that though she was suspended in contemplation of a departmental proceeding but never any such proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. The said order of suspension was the
Decision
of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. 12. Resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed. kunal/- (Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.) 4