Baldev Singh v. State of H.P.

Station, where FIR (Ext.P27/PW11) was registered. ASI Jagir Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. He inspected the spot and found a white blanket with pink strips and a floral pattern. He also found a razor in shallow water. The razor was made of plastic, and the other part was made of steel, to which a blade was attached. ASI Jagir Singh (PW7) prepared the sketch (Ext.P3/PW4) of the razor. ASI Jagir Singh (PW7) also found blood drops in the grass at a distance of about 30-40 meters away. He lifted the grass containing blood from the spot and sealed it in a polythene bag. He also lifted a control sample from the spot and sealed it in another polythene bag. He put the bloodstained stone in a white carry bag and sealed it in a cloth parcel. He found some hair strands and a silver button. He put them in a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel. He found a multi coloured muffler at a distance of 30-40 meters, and he put it in a white cloth parcel. He found blood on the stones at a distance of 10-15 meters. He lifted the stones, put them in a polythene bag and put the bag in a white parcel. He sealed all the parcels with six impressions of seal ‘T’. He packed the razor 4 separately, because the opinion of the Medical Officer was to be taken about the same. All the parcels and razor were seized vide memo (Ext.P5/PW4). Sample seal (Ext.P4/PW4) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. ASI Jagir Singh prepared the spot map (Ext.P16/PW7) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He filed an application (Ext.P17/PW7) for the medical examination of the injured. Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16) examined Kamlender (PW2) and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. She collected the samples, sealed them in separate parcels and handed over the parcels to the police official accompanying the injured. In her opinion, the injuries were caused within 12 hours of examination by a sharp and a blunt weapon. She issued the MLC (Ext.P31/PW16). Injured was referred to PGI Chandigarh for treatment. Dy. SP Manvendra Thakur (PW11) investigated the matter. He arrested the accused on 11.12.2019 based on a statement made by the injured. The accused made a statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act that he could identify the shop from where he had purchased the blade for use in the razor, the place where he had assaulted the injured Kamlender (PW2) with the razor, the place where he had thrown the razor after using it and the place where he had concealed his motorcycle after the 5 commission of the crime. Memo (Ext.P7/PW5) was prepared. The accused led the police to the grocery shop of Sanjay Bansal (PW9) and identified the shop as the one from which two blades were purchased by him. Memo (Ext.P8/PW5) and Spot map (Ext.P21/PW11) were prepared. The accused led the police team to the shop of Ramjas (PW19) and disclosed that he had kept the key of his motorcycle, helmet and pair of gloves in the shop and had parked the motorcycle adjacent to the shop. Ramjas (PW19) produced the key of the motorcycle, helmet and pair of gloves. The motorcycle was also found in the backyard of the shop adjacent to the pharmaceutical company. These were seized vide memo (Ext.P9/PW5). One motorcycle delivery challan (Ext.P10/PW5) was also found in the motorcycle, which was seized vide memo (Ext.P9/PW5). A spot memo (Ext.P22/PW11) was prepared. The accused led the police to Jogiban Khad on 14.12.2019 and identified the places where he had assaulted the informant and thrown the razor in the Khad. Memo (Ext.P6/PW4) was prepared. The spot identified by the accused matched the spot map prepared by Jagir Singh (Ext.P16/PW7). The accused made a statement that he could identify the shop from where he had picked the razor. Memo (Ext.P12/PW5) was prepared. The accused led the police to the 6 saloon of Rijwan (PW3). Memo (Ext.PW2/PW3) and the site map (Ext.P20/PW11) were prepared. The Medical Officer opined that the injury sustained by the injured Kamlender (PW2) was dangerous to life. The accused produced one jacket and one lower which were worn by him at the time of the incident. These were seized vide memo (Ext.P14/PW6). The case property was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Junga, and a report (Ext.P38/PW15) was issued stating that human blood of group ‘A’ was detected on the bedsheet, bloodstained stone, muffler, blood sample of Kamlender, pants and jacket of Kamlender and blanket. Human blood was found on bloodstained stones, but the result was inconclusive regarding the blood group. The blood was detected on the bloodstained grass, leaves and soil, which was disintegrated for serological examination. Human blood was detected on the button, hair and the razor, but it was insufficient for blood group examination. Blood was detected on the shoe of Kamlender, but it was insufficient for the serological examination. Blood was not detected on the jacket or the lower of the accused. The hairs on the bloodstained stone, bloodstained grass, and button were identified as human head hair, which were similar to each other. Another report (Ext.P39/PW15) was issued, mentioning that the controlled 7 soil and the soil lifted from the spot matched each other. The buttons were found to be consistent in colour, construction, shape, size and design. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmaur at Nahan, who committed it to the Court of Sessions. Learned Sessions Judge assigned the case to learned Additional Sessions Judge Nahan (learned Trial Court) for disposal as per the law.

3. Learned Trial court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 325, and 307 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 21 witnesses to prove its case. The informant Nikhil Kolesh (PW1) and Shezaad (PW8) found the injured lying near Jogiban Bridge. Kamlender (PW2) is the injured/victim. Rijwan (PW3), Sanjay Bansal (PW9), and Ramjas (PW19) did not support the prosecution's case. Tika Ram (PW4), HC Kunwar Singh (PW6), and HHC Chaman Lal (PW21) witnessed the recoveries. HHC Ashok Kumar (PW5) is the witness to the disclosure statement and subsequent recoveries. ASI Jagir Singh 8 (PW7) and Manvendra Thakur (PW11) investigated the matter. Constable Nitish (PW10) transferred the CCTV footage to the DVD. Constable Nitesh (PW12) proved the entry in the daily diary. Sub Inspector Padam Singh (PW13) signed the FIR. Ram Pal (PW14) obtained the final opinion of the Medical Officer. HC Om Pal (PW15) entered the FIR in the Police Station. Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16) examined the injured. HASI Virender Kumar (PW17) carried the case property to SFSL Junga. HASI Rajeev Kumar (PW18) was posted as Malkhana in-charge, with whom the case property was deposited. Subhash Chand (PW20) was the Secretary of the Panchayat and issued the record.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimony of the injured was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the recoveries. The matter was reported to the police immediately, and there is no possibility of fabrication. The accused had made the disclosure statements leading to the recovery of various articles. 9 Minor contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. The case could not be doubted because some of the witnesses had not supported the prosecution’s case. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. Sanjay Bansal (PW9) specifically denied that the accused had purchased the blade from his shop. The CCTV footage only shows a person moving alone and does not show the crime scene or the accused moving with the victim. The prosecution had failed to prove the motive for the commission of the crime. The prosecution's version that the accused had stolen the razor from the shop of Rijwan (PW3) was not supported by him. The learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10

8. I have heard Mr T.K. Verma, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

9. Mr T.K. Verma, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution has failed to prove the motive for the commission of the crime, and it is highly unlikely that the accused would cause hurt to a stranger without any reason. Rijwan (PW19) and Sanjay Bansal (PW9) turned hostile, and the prosecution's version that the accused had stolen the razor from the shop of Rijwan and purchased the blades from the shop of Sanjay Bansal (PW9) was not proved. The CCTV footage does not show the accused moving with the victim. The ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC were not satisfied, and the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

10. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the testimony of the injured is duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the 11 recoveries made at the instance of the accused. The motive is not necessary in a case of direct evidence, and the accused cannot claim the acquittal because the motive was not proved by the prosecution. No reason was assigned as to why the injured would falsely implicate the accused. Learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the material on record, and there is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. Kamlender (PW2) stated that the accused came to his room and asked him to go out on a morning walk. He and the accused proceeded towards the jungle for a morning walk. He sat on the roadside, and the accused went towards the jungle. The accused returned after 15-20 minutes. The accused caught and stabbed him (the informant) on the neck with a sharp weapon. Thereafter, the accused hit him with the stone on the head. He became unconscious. He regained consciousness and found himself lying under the bridge. He was wearing a muffler and a blanket. He did not know the reason why the accused had stabbed him with a sharp weapon or hit him on the head. He stated in his 12 cross-examination that he used to go to Sarahan Kisan Bhawan to work as a Carpenter. Accused Baldev met him through Guru Suresh Sharma and started visiting his house. The accused had visited his house at 4:00 am on the date of the incident. The accused had proposed to go up to the temple in the jungle, but he declined, and the accused went ahead. He denied that people used to walk on the road. He denied that a quarrel had taken place between him and Baldev two days before the incident. He denied that he and the accused had consumed liquor on the date of the incident while going to the temple. He admitted that it used to remain dark up to 6:00 a.m. He denied that he had received injuries from falling on a sharp-edged weapon. He denied that he was making a false statement.

13. It was suggested to the injured in his cross-examination that he had quarrelled with the accused two days before the incident. This suggestion, even though denied by the victim, shows the motive for the commission of the crime. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while 13 determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 383: - “38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross- examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client.

39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner. ****

42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.”

14. Thus, the submission that the motive was not proved and the prosecution's case was doubtful cannot be accepted; even otherwise, the absence of motive is not important in a case of direct evidence but assumes significance in a case of circumstantial evidence. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 8 SCC 440: 2025 14 SCC OnLine SC 808 that failure to prove motive is not sufficient to record acquittal. It was observed at page 449: “29. The declaration in the cited decisions and the decisions relied on therein is to the effect that if the case is built solely upon circumstantial evidence, the absence of motive will be a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. Just as a strong motive does not by itself result in a conviction, the absence of motive on that sole ground cannot result in an acquittal. When the eyewitnesses are not convincing, a strong motive cannot by itself result in conviction. Likewise, when the circumstances are very convincing and provide an unbroken chain leading only to the conclusion of guilt of the accused and not to any other hypothesis, the total absence of a motive will be of no consequence.

30. We extract para 17 from a three-Judge Bench decision, Jan Mohammad v. State of Bihar [Jan Mohammad v. State of Bihar, (1953) 1 SCC 5], which also is of vintage flavour, succinctly putting forth the proposition: (SCC p. 12) “17. Motive is a relevant fact under the Evidence Act (Section 8). It is an important element in a chain of presumptive proof where the evidence is purely circumstantial, but it may lose importance in a case where there is direct evidence by witnesses implicating the accused. In a case such as the present, where the prosecution evidence itself shows that the relations between the deceased and the appellants were cordial, the absence of an apparent motive, though not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case, may reasonably be regarded as a fact in favour of the accused. We think, therefore, that the attempt to prove a motive against any of the appellants has failed. [sic]”

31. Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80: 1995 SCC (Cri) 60] held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, proof of motive would “supply a link in the chain of circumstances” but all the same, absence of motive cannot be a ground to 15 altogether reject the prosecution case. Para 21 reads as follows: (SCC p. 95) “21. At the very outset, we may mention that sometimes motive plays an important role and becomes a compelling force to commit a crime, and therefore, the motive behind the crime is a relevant factor for which evidence may be adduced. A motive is something that prompts a person to form an opinion or intention to do a certain illegal act or even a legal act, but with illegal means, with a view to achieving that intention. In a case where there is clear proof of motive for the commission of the crime, it affords added support to the finding of the court that the accused was guilty of the offence charged with. But it has to be remembered that the absence of proof of motive does not render the evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused nonetheless untrustworthy or unreliable because most often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who knows as to what circumstances prompted him to a certain course of action leading to the commission of the crime.” (emphasis supplied)

32. Sukhpal Singh v. State of Punjab [Sukhpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2019) 15 SCC 622 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 460] found that if prosecution establishes motive, it will undoubtedly strengthen the prosecution case, but to say that absence of motive will be fatal to the prosecution, irrespective of other material before the court in the form of circumstantial evidence is far-fetched. Para 15 reads as follows: (SCC p. 627) “15. The last submission that we are called upon to deal with is that there is no motive established against the appellant for committing murder. It is undoubtedly true that the question of motive may assume significance in a prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence. But the question is whether, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the inability on the part of the prosecution to establish a motive is fatal to the prosecution's case. We would think that while it is true that if the prosecution establishes a motive for the accused to commit a crime it will undoubtedly strengthen the prosecution version based on circumstantial evidence, but that is far cry from saying that the absence of a motive for the 16 commission of the crime by the accused will irrespective of other material available before the court by way of circumstantial evidence be fatal to the prosecution. In such circumstances, on account of the circumstances which stand established by evidence as discussed above, we find no merit in the appeal and the same shall stand dismissed.” (emphasis supplied)

33. Motive remains hidden in the inner recesses of the mind of the perpetrator, which cannot, oftener than ever, be ferreted out by the investigation agency. Though in a case of circumstantial evidence, the complete absence of motive would weigh in favour of the accused, it cannot be declared as a general proposition of universal application that, in the absence of motive, the entire inculpatory circumstances should be ignored and the accused acquitted.”

15. The testimony of the injured was corroborated by the medical evidence. Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16) examined the injured and found incised wounds on the neck, and behind the right Pinna, multiple abrasions on the left eye and lacerations on the right side of the parietal region, right side of the temporal parietal region, parieto-occipital region of the scalp, mouth and face. These injuries could have been caused by means of a razor and a stone. She denied in her cross-examination that injuries could be caused by a fall on a hard surface, but admitted that the injuries could be caused by a fall on a sharp object like an iron rod, glass, etc. The admission made by this witness in the cross-examination that the injury could be caused by a fall on a sharp object like an iron rod, glass, etc., is an alternative hypothesis and will not make the 17 prosecution's case suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”

16. Thus, the prosecution's case cannot be discarded because of the alternate hypothesis accepted by the Medical Officer.

17. The statement of the victim that the accused had caused injuries to him by means of a razor and a stone is corroborated by the medical evidence. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 18 Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt his testimony. It was observed: “22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial.

23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26) “26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be principles the under-noted legal appreciated, enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind:

26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition.

26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.

26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions.

26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishment in the evidence of an injured 19 witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence.

26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with the passage of time should be discarded.” (emphasis supplied)

18. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed: “33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: “(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” 20 In assessing the value of the evidence of the 34. eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365).

19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed: “The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It 21 may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them.”

20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed: - “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross- examination and what impression is created by his evidence, taken insofar as the context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the 22 accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied)

21. The injuries on the body of the victim established his presence on the spot, and his testimony is entitled to a great weight, which cannot be rejected without any cogent reason.

22. The police arrested the accused, and he made a disclosure statement that he could show the shops from where he had stolen the razor and purchased the blades. Rijwan (PW3) stated that the accused identified his shop and disclosed that he had taken the razor from his shop. He did not know whether the accused had visited his shop for a haircut. He was permitted to be cross- examined. He denied that the accused had visited his shop for a haircut and taken the razor from the shop. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Thus, this witness has not supported the prosecution's case that the accused had visited his shop and stolen the razor from the shop.

23. The accused claimed in his statement recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act that he had purchased the 23 blades from the shop of Sanjay Bansal (PW9). Sanjay Bansal (PW9) stated that the police had brought the accused to his shop and told him that the accused had purchased the blades from the shop. He did not remember the identity of the person who was with the police. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied, for want of knowledge, that the accused had identified his shop and told the police about the purchase of two blades from the shop. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in the cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that he did not remember the brand of the blades purchased from his shop. No proceedings were conducted in his presence. Nobody had visited the shop to purchase any kind of blades.

24. It was submitted that the statements of these witnesses make the prosecution's case doubtful. This submission is not acceptable. Rizwan is a hairdresser by profession, and Sanjay is a shopkeeper. Many people visit their shop, and they would have no reason to remember the identity of their customers. Hence, the fact that they could not identify the accused as their customer will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful.

25. The police had not discovered any article pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the accused. It was laid down by 24 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249: 1972 SCC (Cri) 88, that pointing out the place from where the accused had purchased the weapon of offence does not amount to the fact discovered within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed: “13. Thereafter, on the information furnished by the accused that he had purchased the weapon from Ganga Singh, PW 11 and that he would take them to him, they went to the thari of PW 11, where the accused pointed him out to them. It is contended that the information given by the accused that he purchased the dagger from PW 11, followed by his leading the police to his thari and pointing him out, is inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In our view, there is force in this contention. A fact discovered within the meaning of Section 27 must refer to a material fact to which the information directly relates. In order to render the information admissible, the fact discovered must be relevant and must have been such that it constitutes the information through which the discovery was made. What is the fact discovered in this case? Not the dagger, but the dagger hid under the stone, which is not known to the Police (See Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 67: 74 IA 65].) But thereafter, can it be said that the information furnished by the accused that he purchased the dagger from PW 11 led to a fact discovered when the accused took the police to the thari of PW 11 and pointed him out? A single Bench of the Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor v. India China Lingiah, [AIR 1954 Mad 433: 1953 MWN 918: 1954 Cri LJ 583] and in Re Vallingiri, [AIR 1950 Mad 613 : (1950) 1 MLJ 467: 1950 MWN 297] seems to have taken the view that the information by an accused leading to the discovery of a witness to whom he had given stolen articles is a discovery of a fact within the meaning of Section 27. In Emperor v. Ramanuja Ayyangar, [AIR 1935 Mad 528: 1934 MWN 1479: 36 Cr LJ 1442: 42 MLW 124] a Full Bench of three Judges by a majority held that the 25 statement of the accused “I purchased the mattress from this shop and it was this woman (another witness) that carried the mattress” as proved by the witness who visited him with the police was admissible because the word “fact” is not restricted to something which can be exhibited as a material object. This judgment was before the Pulukuri Kotayya case when, as far as the Presidency of Madras was concerned, the law laid down by the Full Bench of that Court, in Re Athappe Goundan, [ILR 1937 Mad 695: AIR 1937 Mad 618] prevailed. It held that where the accused's statement connects the fact discovered with the offence and makes it relevant, even though the statement amounts to a confession of the offence, it must be admitted because it is that which has led directly to the discovery. This view was overruled by the Privy Council in the Pulukuri Kotayya case, and this Court had approved the Privy Council case in Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay [AIR 1955 SC 104: (1955) 1 SCR 903].

14. In the Full Bench Judgment of Seven Judges in Sukhan v. Crown [ILR (1929) 10 Lah 283] which was approved by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya case, Shadi Lal, C.J., as he then was speaking for the majority pointed out that the expression “fact” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act includes not only the physical fact which can be perceived by the senses but also the psychological fact or mental condition of which any person is conscious and that it is in the former sense that the word used by the Legislature refers to a material and not to a mental fact. It is clear, therefore, that what should be discovered is the material fact, and the information that is admissible is that which has caused that discovery so as to connect the information and the fact with each other as the “cause and effect”. That information which does not distinctly connect with the fact discovered, or that portion of the information which merely explains the material thing discovered, is not admissible under Section 27 and cannot be proved. As explained by this Court as well as by the Privy Council, normally, Section 27 is brought into operation where a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is the accused. The concealment of the fact which is not known to the police is 26 what is discovered by the information, and lends assurance that the information was true. No witness with whom some material fact, such as the weapon of murder, stolen property or other incriminating article is not hidden, sold or kept and which is unknown to the Police, can be said to be discovered as a consequence of the information furnished by the accused. These examples, however, are only by way of illustration and are not exhaustive. What makes the information leading to the discovery of the witness admissible is the discovery from him of the thing sold to him, hidden or kept with him, which the police did not know until the information was furnished to them by the accused. A witness cannot be said to be discovered if nothing is to be found or recovered from him as a consequence of the information furnished by the accused, and the information that disclosed the identity of the witness will not be admissible. But even apart from the admissibility of the information under Section 27, the evidence of the Investigating Officer and the panchas that the accused had taken them to PW 11 and pointed him out and as corroborated by PW 11 himself, would be admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused.”

26. The prosecution also relied upon the disclosure statement leading to the recovery of the motorcycle and the keys. No person has deposed that the accused was riding a motorcycle at the time of the incident. Thus, the recovery of the motorcycle, keys and the documents will not connect the accused to the commission of the crime.

27. The prosecution relied upon the disclosure statements leading to the identification of the spot where he had assaulted Kamlender (PW2) and thrown a razor in the water. ASI Jagir Singh 27 had already visited the spot and prepared the spot map before the disclosure made by the accused. This is also evident from the testimony of Dy. SP Manvendra Thakur (PW11), who stated that the spots identified by the accused matched the spot map prepared by HC Jagir Singh (Ext.P16/PW7), which means that the accused had only shown the places that were known to the police. It was laid down by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh versus Sanjiv Kumar Alias Sanju 2019 (3) ShimLC 1710, that there cannot be any rediscovery of a fact. When the place was known to the police, the disclosure made by the accused regarding a place without any recovery would be inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed: - “(j) Disclosure statement of accused Sanjay Kumar alias Sanjjan regarding the place from where the dead body was thrown: The prosecution examined Constable Narpat Ram (PW-16 in ST No.3/95) to prove the disclosure statement (Ext. PM) of accused Sanjay Kumar alias Sanjjan in ST No. 3/1995. However, the accused Sanjay Kumar is dead; therefore, this evidence is also not going to arrive at any conclusion. Even otherwise, his testimony is also cryptic and leads to no conclusion because it points out to the place from where the accused had thrown the dead body. Whereas the police had already recovered the dead body from that place. Therefore, in the absence of recovery, such a confession does not fall within the exception of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (k) In Aher Raja Khima v State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217, a three-member bench of the Supreme Court holds, 28

20. Then we come to the recoveries. The false beard and mask were found buried in the grounds of Dewayat's house, and the appellant is said to have recovered them in the presence of panchas. But those discoveries are inadmissible in evidence because the police already knew where they were hidden... (l) In Thimma v. State of Mysore, 1970 2 SCC 105, a three- member bench of the Supreme Court holds,

10. Reliance on behalf of the prosecution was also placed on the information given by the appellant, which led to the discovery of the dead body and other articles found at the spot. It was contended that the information received from him related distinctly to the facts discovered and, therefore, the statement conveying the information was admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. This information, it was argued, also lends support to the appellant's guilt. It appears to us that when P. W. 4 was suspected of complicity in this offence, he would in all probability have disclosed to the police the existence of the dead body and the other articles at the place where they were actually found. Once a fact is discovered from other sources, there can be no fresh discovery, even if relevant information is extracted from the accused and Courts have to be watchful against the ingenuity of the investigating officer in this respect so that the protection afforded by the wholesome provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act is not whittled down by the mere manipulation of the record of the case diary. It would, in the circumstances, be somewhat unsafe to rely on this information for proving the appellant's guilt. We are accordingly disinclined to take into consideration this statement. (Emphasis supplied)

28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, (1970) 2 SCC 105: 1970 SCC (Cri) 320 that where the police had discovered some fact from 29 other sources, it cannot be re-discovered at the instance of the accused. It was observed on page 112: “10. Reliance on behalf of the prosecution was also placed on the information given by the appellant, which led to the discovery of the dead body and other articles found at the spot. It was contended that the information received from him related distinctly to the facts discovered and, therefore, the statement conveying the information was admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. This information, it was argued, also lends support to the appellant's guilt. It appears to us that when PW 4 was suspected of complicity in this offence, he would, in all probability, have disclosed to the police the existence of the dead body and the other articles at the place where they were actually found. Once a fact is discovered from other sources, there can be no fresh discovery even if relevant information is extracted from the accused, and courts have to be watchful against the ingenuity of the investigating officer in this respect so that the protection afforded by the wholesome provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act is not whittled down by mere manipulation of the record of the case diary. It would, in the circumstances, be somewhat unsafe to rely on this information to prove the appellant's guilt. We are accordingly disinclined to take into consideration this statement.” (Emphasis supplied)

29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijender v. State of Delhi, (1997) 6 SCC 171: 1997 SCC (Cri) 857 that where the fact was within the knowledge of the police, it cannot be discovered at the instance of the accused. It was observed at page 179: “17. Another elementary statutory breach which we notice in recording the evidence of the above witnesses is that of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Evidence was led through the 30 above three police witnesses that, in consequence of information received from the three appellants on 30-6- 1992, they discovered the place where the dead body of Khurshid was thrown. As already noticed, the dead body of Khurshid was recovered on 27-6-1992, and therefore, the question of the discovery of the place where it was thrown thereafter could not arise. Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, if information given by the accused leads to the discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such information, then only it would be evidence, but when the fact has already been discovered, as in the instant case, evidence could not be led in respect thereof.”

30. A similar view was taken in Allarakha Habib Memon Etc. v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1910, wherein it was observed: “41. We find that these so-called confessions are ex facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested in the present case. As such, the notings made by the Medical Officer, Dr Arvindbhai (PW-2), in the injury reports of Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and Amin @ Lalo would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter being referred to as ‘Evidence Act’). As a consequence, we are not inclined to accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. The circumstance regarding the identification of the place of incident at the instance of the accused is also inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police, and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure statements.” (Emphasis supplied)

31. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements made by the accused pointing out the places. 31

32. The police had also recovered the jacket and the lower of the accused and sent them to the SFSL. The report (Ext.P38/PW15) mentions that blood was not detected on the lower and jacket of the accused. Therefore, the report does not connect the articles belonging to the accused to the commission of the crime.

33. It was submitted that the CCTV footage shows the accused alone and does not corroborate the prosecution's case. The CCTV footage shows the time of 3:40 A.M. The victim stated that the accused had visited his house at about 4:00 A.M. Therefore, the accused would have been alone at 3:40 A.M., and the absence of the victim in the CCTV footage does not make the prosecution's case doubtful.

34. The testimony of the informant Kamlender (PW2) was duly corroborated by the medical evidence. It is natural and inspires confidence. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he has any motive to depose against the accused. The suggestion made to him in the cross-examination that he and the accused had consumed liquor on the way to the temple establishes the presence of the accused and the victim. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted the informant’s testimony. 32

35. It was submitted that no independent witness was examined, and the prosecution's case is highly doubtful. This submission will not help the accused. The incident had taken place in the morning, and the victim specifically stated that it remained dark till 6 a.m. Therefore, the movement of the people cannot be expected at that time, and the prosecution's case cannot be faulted for the non-examination of an independent person.

36. Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16) stated that the injuries were grievous and dangerous to life. The injury was caused by means of a razor on the neck, a vital part of the body. Had the death been caused, the accused would have been liable for murder because he had caused multiple injuries to the neck, showing his intent. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC.

37. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and pay a fine of ₹20,000/-, and in the default of payment of the fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. The accused had caused multiple incised wounds on the victim’s neck and had also caused lacerated wounds to him. He was known to the accused and had 33 taken advantage of his acquaintance to cause injuries. Therefore, he had breached the trust placed by the victim in him. Considering the nature of injuries and the relationship between the accused and the victim, the punishment of five years cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from the Court.

38. The injuries were caused to Kamlender (PW2). Section 307 of the IPC is a graver form of Section 325 of the IPC, and the accused could not have been punished for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC when he was punished of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC as per Section 71 of the IPC, and the learned Trial Court erred in sentencing the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC.

40. No other point was urged. Therefore, in view of the above, the present appeal is partly allowed, and the order of sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC is set aside. The fine amount, if deposited, be refunded to the accused after the expiry of the period of appeal in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the 34 Hon’ble Supreme Court. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgment and order are upheld.

41. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 22nd June, 2026 (Nikita) (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge