Ravi @ Mirgi v. State of Himachal Pradesh

“9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail there being any change of applications without circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”

12. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: “30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”

13. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the 9 circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: “7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be Judges, there would be disposed of by different conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 10

14. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.

15. The Court had earlier held in the bail petition filed by the petitioner that there was sufficient material on record to show his involvement in the murder. This finding cannot be challenged in the present bail petition, because the Court deciding the subsequent bail petition does not sit in appeal over its earlier order and can only consider the change in the circumstances. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070 that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676:

8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa 11 [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.

16. Therefore, it is impermissible to hold that the material on record is not sufficient to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime in the present petition.

17. It was submitted that the witnesses cited by the prosecution have not supported the prosecution’s case, and the petitioner is entitled to bail. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath to entertain the bail application of the Accused.

15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim. 12

16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.”

18. It was submitted that the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated because the prosecution has failed to complete the evidence after the lapse of more than one and a half years from the date of the incident. This submission will not help the petitioner. The petitioner has not filed the copies of the order sheets to demonstrate that the delay is not attributable to him but is attributable to the prosecution or the Court. Further, the petitioner is involved in the heinous offence of murder. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail. It was observed at page 141: 13 “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”

19. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek bail on the ground of delay in the progress of the trial.

20. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

21. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits. 23rd January, 2026 (Gaurav Rawat) (Rakesh Kainthla) Vacation Judge